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ABSTRACT
2
This thesis explores the manner in which British officials attempted to impose ideas 
of ‘good government’ upon the Indian states and the effect of such ideas upon the 
ruling princes of those states. The work studies the crucial period of transition from 
traditional to modem rule which occurred for the first generation of westernised 
princes during the latter decades of the nineteenth century. It is intended to test the 
hypothesis that, although virtually no aspect of palace life was left untouched by the 
paramount power, having instigated fundamental changes in princely practice during 
minority rule the British paid insufficient attention to the political development of 
their adult royal proteges. In many cases traditional royal practice and authority were 
deemed expendable in the urgency to instigate efficient and accountable methods of 
administration in states. The five sections following the introduction examine the life 
cycle of an Indian prince and the role of British officials at each stage of the cycle. 
The first section examines the position of the British in determining disputed 
successions to the Indian princely thrones. The second section deals with the first 
generation of Indian rulers to be exposed to a western education, either under an 
English tutor attached to a court or at one of the new princely colleges. The third 
section looks at marriages of Indian rulers and the extent to which royal women were 
empowered by British indirect rule. The fourth section tackles the administration of 
princely states and the relative success of political officers in turning Indian princes 
from traditional rulers into westernised administrators. The final section looks at 
British efforts to alter court hierarchy and ritual to conform to strict British 
bureaucratic guidelines and ideas of accountability. In analysing this critical phase of 
princely development the thesis makes a major contribution to the understanding of 
the progression of indirect rule under the Raj.
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PREFACE
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The years following the Indian Mutiny of 1857 to the beginning of the twentieth 
century are regarded by modem historians as a period in which the British cooperated 
with the Indian princes within a deliberate policy to build up the states as part of a 
network of alliances formed by Britain among influential Indians. Thomas Metcalf, 
for example, refers to the last decades of the nineteenth century as a ‘golden age’ for 
the princes1, and Francis Hutchins stresses the continuing support of native rulers 
during this period.2 In the light of the evidence provided in this thesis these views 
need to be re-evaluated. British support of its princely allies was by no means as 
effective as it might have been. Ian Copland has described the devotion to progress 
which lay behind the ‘mission civilisatrice’ of many young British political officers as 
they embarked on their career as trusted advisors to the rulers.3 However these 
officers were frequently accused of incompetent meddling in states’ administrations 
by their superiors and given little support in the impossible task of coordinating the 
different factions participating in state government, and in particular ensuring that 
Indian rulers played a significant role in their administrations. Such a negative 
approach by no means produced a ‘golden age’ for the princes. The continuing 
British efforts throughout the period to ‘support’ its adult princely allies in fact 
frequently consisted of little more than spasmodic efforts by residents and political 
agents to act as referees between various parties within a state.
1 Thomas R. Metcalf, The Aftermath o f Revolt: India 1857-1870 (Princeton, 1964), p. 323
2 Francis Hutchins, The Illusion o f  Permanence: British Imperialism in India (Princeton, 1967). p. 171
3 Ian Copland, The British Raj and the Indian Princes: Paramountcy in Western India, 1857-1930 
(Bombay, 1982), p. 130.
9In every area of Indian royal rule emphasis was placed by the paramount power above 
all else upon the virtues of accountability and efficiency. No stone was left unturned 
in the efforts to turn palace life into a model of openness, rules and regulations. The 
huge emphasis placed by the British upon exposure of young heirs to the throne to a 
western education was undoubtedly intended to further their espousal of such an 
exemplary life style. At the same time bureaucracies constructed on the British Indian 
model were introduced and fostered by the British in the interests of ‘good 
government’. However in the urgency to introduce visible and sound methods of 
administration into states there appeared to be too little emphasis on ensuring that an 
adult ruler in the first generation of westernised princes was given sufficient time and 
encouragement to abandon age-old ideas of largesse and autocracy to become a model 
frugal administrator operating above all in the interests of his subjects. There is 
evidence that, following significant British commitment to areas such as royal 
education and minority rule, political officers often neglected adult rulers in the 
maelstrom of state politics and the pursuit of well-regulated government, resulting in 
the loss of the traditional princely power base. British efforts at reform tended to be 
focused upon the minutiae of administrative procedure rather than the more 
challenging task of adapting an Indian prince to late nineteenth century requirements. 
At the same time royal status and influence were lost through deliberate attempts on 
the part of the British to sanitise palace practice and to adapt displays of ceremony 
and largesse to western standards.
Princes were often bound by treaty to rule according to British advice, making the 
post of resident one of considerable responsibility yet, since residents were often 
divided in the priorities of, on the one hand, the progress of their royal charge and 
raising the moral tone of the royal household, and, on the other, the demands of
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setting up an efficient system of government, it was not surprising that many princes 
resorted to ‘palace favorites and parallel administrations which they could control and 
which could often outflank the official bureaucracy’.4 As Robin Jeffrey has pointed 
out, much ‘misrule’ and princely ‘excess’ were the products of the impossible 
situation in which a prince was placed, and the dichotomy he faced in attempting to 
reconcile western and oriental cultures.5 For a political officer a similar tension was 
created by the clash of a western upbringing with an alien Indian culture, and the 
degree to which he was influenced by the widely held Victorian construction of India 
as ‘backward and uncivilized’, associating the subcontinent with such depravities as 
‘oriental corruption’, ‘female incarceration’ and ‘male effeminacy’.
During the period the Political Department patently lacked the backing of the 
Government of India to enable it to guide an Indian ruler from the cultural onslaught 
of an English education into his new role as head of a sophisticated bureaucratic 
machine. As will be considered in the introduction, the Department by repute 
consisted of men of a somewhat mediocre education and conservative instincts, 
despite their enthusiasm. However a lack of intellectual calibre cannot be held 
entirely responsible for the failure of political officers to intervene to ensure that the 
Indian princes played a significant role in their administrations. With the exception of 
Curzon’s viceroyalty such officers were given no official encouragement beyond a 
prince’s minority period to indulge in anything but the most minimal intervention in 
state government, such as maintaining the equilibrium between ruler, ministers and 
bureaucracy. As the century progressed, they were increasingly outmanoeuvred by 
intellectually superior dewans and powerful bureaucratic bodies, whose methods of
4 Robin Jeffrey, Introduction, People, Princes and Paramount Power: Society and Politics in the 
Indian Princely States (Delhi, 1978), p. 18.
5 Ibid.
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accountability the British inevitably admired as a welcome contrast to previous 
durbar practice.
This study sets out neither totally to condemn nor to condone British imperial practice 
in the Indian states. There were undoubtedly negative consequences for Indian rulers 
under British rule during the period, yet British motives for establishing sound 
administrative practice in the interests of states’ subjects undeniably had a certain 
merit. Moreover in their efforts to set up ‘good government’ the British by no means 
always held the upper hand. To some extent the work takes issue with the stance of 
Orientalism, in which Edward Said emphasises the unyielding nature of imperialist 
rule. Said states that ‘philosophies of British rule in the East stressed the rational 
importance of a strong executive aimed with various legal and penal codes, a system 
of doctrines on such matters as frontiers and land rents, and everywhere an irreducible 
supervisory imperial authority’,6 implying that there was little room for negotiation or 
resistance to imperial rule. However the inflexibility of such rigid control on the part 
of the paramount power was not an option in the princely states during the period, due 
to the post-Mutiny requirement to retain the loyalty of Indian rulers, and the paucity 
of British resources, both in terms of manpower and finances, allotted to princely 
India. States’ administrations would have ground to a halt without a significant 
amount of negotiation between British political officers and Indian rulers and 
politicians, during the course of which resistance to colonial rule inevitably occurred.
Said’s claim that Orientalism is a ‘discourse’ giving rise to a dialogue between 
coloniser and colonised in which the single political ideological intention of the 
coloniser is reinforced does not ring hue in the Indian states during the period. The
6 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York, 1994), p. 215.
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colonial message was to a certain degree open to arbitration to secure Indian 
cooperation under indirect rule. Moreover the interface between British political 
officers and Indian ministers and bureaucracies, transformed by their English 
education and administrative training into an elite, involved a certain amount of loss 
of control for the British coloniser. If it was on the one hand reassuring for the 
British that Indians became in certain respects ‘English’, on the other hand the 
adoption of English practices by Indian bureaucrats produced the ‘inevitable 
processes of counter-domination produced by the miming of the very operation of 
domination’,7 with the result that the identities of coloniser and colonised became less 
distinct.
Such a blurring of identities undoubtedly occurred in British India, however in the 
princely states where government was in an earlier stage of development the relative 
positions of the British and states’ administrators were even less cut and dried. In 
contrast to a view of Britain’s unswerving adherence to a position of dominance 
throughout the subcontinent this thesis provides a narrative in which the princes and 
their advisors appear as ‘people whose plans were often formulated on the run. or in 
the dark because of lack of knowledge ... struggling valiantly to “muddle through’” .8 
It is noticeable that correspondence at the highest level, for example between Viceroy 
and Secretary of State for India, tends to be of a significantly more pronounced 
‘Orientalist’ tone in its preconceptions of the East than the correspondence of the men 
on the ground in the states as they ‘muddled through’.
7 Robert Young, White Mythologies: Writing Histoj-y and the West (London, 1990), p. 148. See also 
‘Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse’ in Homi Bhabha, The Location o f  
Culture (New York, 1994), pp. 85-92.
8 Ian Copland, The Princes o f  India in the Endgame o f  Empire, 1917-1947 (Cambridge, 1997), p. 14.
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It has been necessary to make a choice in the method of presentation. Much of the 
material in this study is by its nature personal and could be used to present a series of 
short biographies of the more prominent individual rulers and their circles. However 
there is also a good deal of information of a more disconnected type, relating to rulers 
on whom a complete biography could not be attempted. Therefore it was felt that a 
better, perhaps more informative, result would be achieved by adopting the thematic 
construction of a princely life-cycle, using the situation of one ruler or another as an 
extended illustration of various stages of the life-cycle, not only because that 
particular case was better documented than the rest but also because it proved to be a 
more interesting and revealing example of the workings of indirect rule during the 
period. Inevitably the major states tend to feature most frequently in that they attracted 
the greatest British attention.
The analysis of a princely life cycle is a new approach to looking at material on the 
Indian states. There has been remarkably little work on areas of palace life such as 
successions, education and royal women during the period, and, apart from material 
by Cohn and Cannadine, little coverage of rank and hierarchy.9 Princely 
administration in the nineteenth century has been touched upon in Jeffrey’s collection 
of studies of individual states centred upon the twentieth century10 and Stephen 
Ashton’s general study of British policy towards the states from 1905 to 1939,11 
however with the exception of Travancore12 and the Bombay states13 the intricate
9 Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Representing Authority in Victorian India’ in E. Hobsbawm and T. Ranger eds., The 
Invention o f  Tradition (Cambridge, 1983), pp. 165-209. David Cannadine, Ornamentalism (London, 
2001).
10 Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes.
11 Stephen R. Ashton, British Policy towards the Indian States 1905-1939 (London, 1982).
12 Jeffrey, ‘The Politics of Indirect Rule: Types of Relationship among Rulers, Ministers and Residents 
in a Native State’, Journal o f Commonwealth and Comparative Politics XIII, 3 (November 1975), pp. 
261-81.
lj Copland, British Raj.
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relationships between political officer, ruler, minister and bureaucracy during the 
period have not been explored.
The primary sources for the thesis are mainly to be found in the Oriental and India 
Office Collections of the British Library. These include viceregal correspondence and 
other private collections dealing with the period, records of the Political and Secret 
Department, and Proceedings files. However for this study the most important 
sources of original material in India Office files are the Crown Representative 
Records, a particularly rich source of material on the workings of indirect rule in India 
into which there has been virtually no research to date to cover the period. File 
sequence R1 consists of secret files on Indian state matters selected from Political 
Department records in India concerning paramountcy, the affairs of particular’ states 
and rulers, honours and political service questions. These files contain 
correspondence with rulers, with residents and political agents in the states and with 
the India Office. File sequence R2 consists of records from the offices of residents 
and political agents, including correspondence with states5 authorities, with the 
Political Department and with provincial governments. Without the use of Crown 
Representative Records it would be impossible to create a sufficiently detailed picture 
of the critical stage of princely development in question to assess the area and degree 
of involvement of British officials with Indian rulers. Secondary material has also 
been used in the form of articles and general works.
The thesis is intended above all to demonstrate that in the latter part of the nineteenth 
century the role of a Indian prince was greatly diminished as a result of British 
indirect rule, and in particular as a result of imperial efforts to enforce regulation and 
accountability. The work will provide a unique picture of the interaction between
15
western and oriental cultural and political ideas in the states during the period, filling 
a significant gap in what has been a somewhat tired and limited portrait of princely 
India under the British empire at that time.
INTRODUCTION
16
THE STATES
Before 1947, two-fifths of the Indian subcontinent was not British territory and two 
ninths of its inhabitants were not British subjects. This territory was divided into over 
600 individual states which were governed by hereditary princes of varying rank, owing 
allegiance to the British Crown. The states displayed a great diversity in terms of size, 
population and revenue. Collectively they covered an area of nearly 600,000 square 
miles with a population of just over 80 million. Individually they ranged from 
Hyderabad, the principal state, with an area of 82,698 square miles and a population of 
over 14 million, to the tiny Kathiawar state of Veja-no-ness with an area of about three- 
tenths of a square mile and a population of 184.14 hi general, however, statistics indicate 
the ‘insignificance of the overwhelming majority of states’ and only twenty-eight had a 
population of over 500,000.15
There was a great diversity also in the irregular geographical distribution of the states. In 
Rajputana, for example, the states were few and of a comparatively large size, while in 
central and western India, they were small and very numerous. The explanation of these 
irregularities lies partly in the policies pursued by the British at various times and partly 
in a course of events over which they had exerted no control. In some areas of India a 
stronger power had destroyed newcomers and petty ancient dynasties before the arrival 
of the British. During the second half of the eighteenth century the ground had been
14 Descriptive note on the Indian States, 1931, quoted Ashton, British Policy>, p. 1.
15 Ashton, British Policy, p. 1.
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cleared in the south of India by the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Nawab of the Carnatic and 
Tipu Sultan, the Muslim usurper of Mysore. When the Carnatic fell under British 
control and Tipu Sultan was finally overthrown in 1799, large united territories had to be 
disposed of either by annexation or, as in the case of Mysore, by restitution to a former 
dynasty.16 The situation was different in central and western India. This was an area 
under Maratha control, a loose confederacy of five military units under the nominal 
leadership of the Peshwa who controlled western India from his capital at Poona. The 
other four units were led by the Gaekwar of Baroda, the Bhonsla Raja of Nagpur, the 
Maharajah of Gwalior and the Maharajah of Indore. In his study of the Indian states 
Stephen Ashton points out that by the close of the eighteenth century, the five chiefs of 
die confederacy ‘thought only in terms of personal aggrandizement5 and regarded each 
other as rivals in a struggle for supremacy.17 As a result territories in central and western 
India were constantly changing hands until 1818 when the Maratha chiefs were brought 
to heel by the British. The numerous petty states in that area stood in marked contrast to 
the situation in Rajputana where, despite Maratha intrusions, seventeen states preserved 
their separate political existence. The chief of these were Udaipur (Mewar), Jodhpur 
(Marwar), Jaipur and Bikaner.18
The physical characteristics of the states displayed the same diversity. Much of 
Rajputana was desert, while in the deep soudi Travancore possessed tropical vegetation. 
Hyderabad and Mysore were rich in mineral resources, contrasting in their wealth with 
the poverty of the hill states of the Punjab in northwestern India and the agriculturalists 
of Kathiawar in the west. Equally diverse were the varieties of population and religion. 
The primitive and mostly animistic tribes of the Assam states and Manipur on the
16 Ashton, British Policy, p. 1.
17 British Policy, p. 2.
18 Ibid. For an account of British relations with the Indian states at the beginning of the nineteenth 
century, see Edward Thompson, The Making o f the Indian Princes (London, 1943). Ian Copland 
discusses the diversity of the states in the twentieth century in Princes o f  India, pp. 8-11.
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Burmese frontier contrasted with the wealthy Muslim nobles of Hyderabad and the 
proud chieftains of Rajputana. In Kashmir in the far north the prince was Hindu and the 
population largely Muslim. In Hyderabad the reverse was the case.19 Many of the states 
exhibited feudal conditions. Land was divided into two categories: khalsa and non- 
khalsa. In the khalsa areas the land revenue and various administrative departments 
were centrally administered. The non-khalsa areas consisted of numerous estates or 
jagirs, the incumbents of which were known as jagirdars, who exercised considerable 
authority in judicial and police administration. In central India numerous minor Rajput 
chiefs, known as thakurs, existed as feudatories of the great Maratha princes, Scindia of 
Gwalior and Holkar of Indore. The thakurs were often descendants of nobles who ruled 
the territory before the arrival of the invading Marathas and their relations with their new 
overlords were frequently a bitter source of discontent.21 A different situation existed in 
Rajputana where the states were traditionally regarded as the property of a territorial 
nobility, not the individual prince who was only primus inter pares. In Udaipur twenty- 
eight principal nobles commanded the subsidiary allegiance of nearly one third of the 
population and their estates comprised just over half of the area of the entire state.22
At the beginning of the eighteenth century over much of the subcontinent’s huge 
landmass from Kashmir in the north to the upland plateau of the Deccan in the south, the 
Mogul dynasty at Delhi fought to maintain a hegemony which had been consolidated in 
the second half of the sixteenth century by Emperor Akbar. Thereafter the decline of 
imperial power quickened. Provincial governors in Awadh, Bengal and the Deccan 
consolidated their own regional bases of power in the aftermath of the Persian and, later, 
the Afghan invasions of 1759-61. In 1757 the British seized control of the rich province
19 Ashton, British Policy, p. 2.
20 Ibid.
21 See Sir Michael Q’Dwyer, India As I  Knew It: 1885-1925 (London, 1925), pp. 151-155.
22 Ashton, British Policy, pp. 2-3.
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of Bengal and after a brief rearguard action in defence of the core area of Delhi the 
Mogul emperor submitted in 1784 to the ‘protection’ of the Maratha war chief, Scindia. 
With the defeat of the Marathas in 1803 Delhi was occupied by the British, and the 
Mogul emperor was reduced in European eyes to the status of a ‘tinsel sovereign’.23
THE ASCENT OF THE RESIDENT
The successor states of the Mogul empire were often in conflict with each other, 
fighting for cash revenues and for the still limited pool of agricultural labour. The 
English East India Company was ‘the great beneficiary of this age of war, flux and 
opportunity’.24 The Company was able to play off one state against another and offer 
its formidable military services for sale. At the same time its own interests in the 
textile trade encouraged the Company to support Indian mercantile interests in then- 
periodic conflicts with military entrepreneurs and revenue farmers. The flexibility 
and sophistication of these networks for making money inexorably drew the Company 
and its servants into politics 25
The British first established their contact with India in 1600 when Elizabeth I gave the 
East India Company its charter. This commercial organisation controlled British 
affairs in India for just over 250 years, when it was superseded by the Government of 
India in the form of a colonial government responsible to a Minister in London. 
During its existence the East India Company in fact ruled, although its rule developed 
slowly and its commercial activities took preference for some considerable time. A
23 C. A. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making o f the British Empire (Cambridge, 1988), p. 8.
24 Bayly, Indian Society, p. 48.
25 Ibid.
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charter of Charles II of 1661 gave the Company power to make peace or war ‘with 
any Prince not Christian’ and from this charter the practice grew of making treaties of 
peace and defensive alliances, the first being anti-piracy treaties with the western 
Indian maritime states of Savantwadi (1730) and Janjira (173 3).26 This treaty making 
power was exercised by delegation through the Company’s representatives in India 
until 1773, when Parliament decreed that, unless an emergency existed, approval had 
to be obtained from London. Directed at first by a President, later known as 
Governor-General, the organisation in India (consisting of a small Council of traders 
who eventually became civil servants) was based in Calcutta and controlled by the 
Court of Directors in London.
The British adopted and perfected the mechanism of the subsidiary alliance. In return 
for a tribute or ‘subsidy’, or the lease of productive territories, the Company engaged to 
support a ruler against his enemies and to maintain their own troops in his lands as 
garrisons. For example by 1763 British naval and financial superiority had virtually 
banished French power from the coast and helped Mahomed Ali Wallajah to consolidate 
his position as Nawab of Arcot in the Carnatic. Powerful bonds of dependency were tied 
which were ultimately to strangle Arcot and draw the British into direct administrative 
control of the Tamil country. In the north the Nawab of Awadh agreed to a subsidiary 
treaty in 1765. These types of schemes were to be adopted many times over the whole 
subcontinent in the next half century as a mode of securing a stable frontier for British 
commercial interests and payment for Company troops. In practice, however, alliances 
put ‘intolerable shams’ on fragile Indian states whose rulers were never certain of the 
amount of then revenue from month to month. Shortfalls in subsidiary payments faced
26 Terence Creagh-Coen, The Indian Political Sendee: A Studyin Indirect Rule (London, 1971), p. 7. 
The Muslim state o f Janjira was an oddity, founded by Abyssinian pirates.
27 Creagh-Coen, Indian Political Service, pp. 7-8.
28 Bayly, Indian Society, p. 58.
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the British with mutinies among their own unpaid troops and led to piecemeal 
annexation in order to stabilise the financial situation. Christopher Bayly considers it 
‘ironic that the subsidiary alliance system, designed to set bounds to British territorial 
intervention, in fact pointed to its unlimited extension’.29
The Mogul empire had its own diplomatic conventions and regulations to which the 
Company had to conform, at least in part. A Mogul official was expected to send a 
personal agent, a vakil, to represent him before the Emperor in the official’s absence. 
Mogul officials also posted vakils to each other, particularly to other regional courts, in 
order to look after their interests.30 The title of ‘resident’ given to a Company 
representative in a state was particularly appropriate in the light of the Company’s 
peculiar role as far as the British and Mogul sovereigns were concerned. As a chartered 
company it could not appoint full ambassadors or deal with sovereigns on the basis of de
» 31 * *jure equality. Moreover the Company’s position within the Mogul empire could never 
be regularised within the practice of international law of the day. From 1772 the 
Company formally acknowledged Mogul sovereignty and at the same time 
acknowledged the sovereignty of the British crown, although the Council of the 
Governor-General agreed that to make the latter recognition public in India would create 
anti-Company feeling. Appointing a ‘resident’ instead of an ‘ambassador’ had 
advantages to the Company not only of lower cost, but also of raising fewer questions of 
ceremony and precedence.
29 Ibid.
30 Vakils were normally recruited from the Islamicised service elite of scholars and administrators who 
traditionally served in such positions across India.
31 Michael H. Fisher, Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System, 1764-1858 (New 
Delhi, 1991), p. 49.
32 Ibid.
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Michael Fisher makes it clear that the issue of sovereignty remained unsolved 
throughout the entire history of relations between Indian rulers, the Company and the 
British crown. On the one hand formal treaties with each major state specified the 
respective rights of the ruler and the British. On the other ‘rapidly shifting conditions 
prevalent on the ground, as the Resident and ruler jostled for power in individual states, 
often led to ad hoc procedures not always hi accord with formal treaties’.33 British 
officials often acted with little regard for precedents, responding rather to political 
expediency or some ‘overarching’ British principle. When the Company began political 
intercourse with rulers in the late eighteenth century it was presumed that not only the 
Mogul emperor but also other regional rulers held sovereignty. As the Company gained 
military ascendancy over successive regions, its views on the sovereignty of Indian 
rulers changed and treaties with rulers often transferred to the Company various rights 
normally held by the local sovereign. While no treaty explicitly revoked the sovereignty 
of a ruler, a growing number of treaties did specify that rulers were subordinate to die 
British.34
Although official policy called for intervention in external, not internal, affairs of states, 
in fact residents followed Company interests above all and on occasions engaged in deep 
intervention in domestic matters. After the ruling Gaekwar’s death in 1800 a long 
succession struggle in Baroda ensued. One faction enlisted the military support of the 
Company for which the new ruler was forced to guarantee valuable territories as security 
and on his failure to meet the arrears upon his debt was forced to give up the territories 
permanently to the Company. In Hyderabad an arrangement worked out in 1809 and 
sustained until 1843 gave the British the right to influence the choice of successor to the
33 Indirect Rule, p. 441.
34 Indirect Ride, pp. 442-4.
35 Indirect Ride, p. 209.
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Diwanship. Resident and Governor-General discussed the strengths and weaknesses of 
each possible candidate and the Resident then attempted to channel all business of state 
through the Diwan. Following die last Mysore war of 1799 the Company re­
established the Travancore residency and between 1811 and 1814 die Resident played a 
major role in the state administration, thereafter operating under an imposed Chief 
Minister who simply carried out British instructions in what Robin Jeffrey calls a 
‘Dominant Resident5 relationship between Resident and ruler.37 However when it 
suited Company policy internal intervention was minimal, hi the first half of the 
nineteenth century requests from the rulers of Awadh and Gwalior for Company 
assistance in the fonn of British troops and revenue officials to reform the administration 
were refused on the grounds that the Company could offer no more than the advice of 
the Resident.38
While, during this period, the Company and a number of rulers came to blows, the 
British remained committed to supporting rulers either within then states or as 
dependants of the Company. There remained the underlying assumption that there was 
a legitimacy attached to the princes as a whole, even if such legitimacy was 
overridden by the circumstances of the day. On most occasions the British attempted 
to preserve a local ruler under indirect rule. Where they deposed an incumbent they 
continued to accord him titles, dignity and what they considered to be an appropriate
■2Q
pension even in exile. Following the fourth and final war with Mysore and two wars 
with the Marathas, in addition to a number of minor armed conflicts, the Company 
frequently restored most of the defeated rulers to the throne. Where it deposed a 
particular ruler, he was usually replaced with a relative, as with the Nawab of Arcot in
36 Indirect Rule, p. 211.
37 Jeffrey, ‘Politics o f Indirect Rule’, pp. 263-68,
38 Indirect Rule, pp. 222-24.
39 Indirect Rule, pp. 191-3.
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1799. In Mysore in 1799 the British carefully drafted a treaty stipulating that the 
Company was giving the state to a scion of the ousted Hindu dynasty and reserved the 
right to interfere in the administration should the annual subsidy owed to the Company 
be threatened by misrule.40 Fisher points out that the case of Mysore illustrates the 
contradictions of the situation. On the one hand the British tended towards indirect rule 
with a respect for India’s hereditary rulers and the low investment of manpower and 
money implied therein. On the other hand the British felt an obligation to provide 
‘moral’ and efficient administration for the people of India. In Mysore, more 
conspicuously than in most other states, the conflict between the two resulted in ‘a 
condition between direct and indirect rule’ 41 The hereditary ruler remained nominally 
on the throne and absorbed significant amounts of state revenue. At the same time the 
British carried out the administration of the state directly.42
The Company attempted to isolate states from each other by inserting residents as an 
exclusive medium for political communication. Residents negotiated treaties binding 
most rulers to communicate officially with each other only through residencies, and 
British surveillance over rulers and courts established an enforced monopoly on 
interstate political communication. Starting in 1792 the Company induced some fifty- 
five states individually to agree by treaty to channel all foreign policy contacts through 
their residents 43 A typical treaty stipulated that the ruler in question abjured any 
‘negotiation or political correspondence with any European or native power without the 
consent of the said Company’ 44 While the Company did not literally forbid rulers from 
maintaining a foreign policy it did insist that all communications passed through its 
hands and met with its approval. By 1840 some thirty-one rulers had handed over their
40 Indirect Rule, p. 407.
41 Indirect Rule, p. 414.
42 Ibid.
43 Indirect Ride, p. 276.
44 William Lee- Warner, The Native States o f India (London, 1910), p. 220.
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official political interaction to their residents. Among the first were Awadh, Mysore, 
Hyderabad, Gwalior and Cochin, followed by others in Rajputana and central and 
western India.45
Fisher stresses that behind a resident’s advice to a ruler lay the ‘practically invincible 
military power of the Company’.46 In a crucial move to shift the financial burden of 
this power onto the princes the Company established subsidiary forces in several 
states. As well as reducing expenditure this action placed disciplined troops under the 
immediate control of the resident and, since the troops largely replaced the ruler’s 
own armies, the resident commanded the most potent military force in the state. In 
exchange for organising and disbursing funds for subsidiary forces the Company 
acquired substantial resources from states. In some cases a ruler paid subsidies in 
cash as a ‘tribute’, but in most cases land revenue from territory would be assigned in 
order to pay the subsidy. Hyderabad, for example, ceded the Northern Circars in 
1766 in exchange for the use of Company troops and in 1814 the Company 
established the ‘Russell Contingent’ in the same state (after the then Resident, Henry 
Russell) and took the rich territory of Berar to pay for i t 47 Many of the Company’s 
choicest territories came from such arrangements, as when Awadh ceded half of its 
lands in 1801. By controlling the military forces within a state and building a 
constituency of courtiers, administrators, landholders and members of the general 
populace, residents were able to accomplish many of the purposes of the Company 48
Rulers quickly recognised the danger to their authority that the establishment of a 
residency tended to entail. Into the early nineteenth century more powerful rulers
45 Indirect Rule, p. 277.
46 Indirect Rule, p. 230.
47 Indirect Rule, p. 195.
48 Indirect Rule, p. 196.
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retained the capacity to block or terminate a residency when it suited their policies. A 
few rulers entirely refused the residency system. In the eighteenth century Haydar Ali 
and Tipu Sultan were particularly anxious to avoid having a resident at the Mysore 
court and, after conflicts over the role of the British in their particular states, the 
Nawab of Awadh and the Raja of Travancore succeeded in obtaining the temporary 
abolition of their residencies.49 In some cases rulers or supporters resorted to extreme 
tactics to remove the resident, attacking the residency with force of arms. In the early 
nineteenth century political agents were attacked or killed in Banaras, Travancore, 
Nagpur, Poona, Jaipur and Sind, and several residencies, most prominently Delhi and 
Lucknow, were destroyed or besieged in 1857.50
Strategies and tactics employed by various rulers and officials did much to shape indirect 
rule. The variety among treaties suggests how each state was able to affect its individual 
relationship with the British. While many of the same phrases occur in a number of 
treaties concluded before the Mutiny, there are striking differences as well, as one or 
another ruler objected to or insisted upon a certain provision. Local practices varied 
also, reflecting the peculiar relationship between ruler and resident. The strategy of a 
ruler or official would be matched by Company strategy and different tactics resulted in 
a range of outcomes, leading to the acquisition of new powers or lands at the hand of 
Britain or to loss of territory, rights or even throne.51 hi his study of British policy 
towards the states, Stephen Ashton points out that from the outset the British maintained 
that it was impossible to achieve a precise definition of the paramountcy they exercised 
over the Indian states. The treaties which had been concluded could never be regarded 
as definitive simply because ‘no such agreement could survive indefinitely in its original
49 Indirect Rule, p. 282.
50 Indirect Rule, p. 283.
51 Indirect Rule, pp. 307-8.
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*>9 •form’. Sir William Lee-Warner, a leading authority on paramountcy at the end of the
nineteenth century, wrote that ‘Even if the whole body of Indian treaties, engagements 
and sanads were carefully compiled, with a view to extracting from them a catalogue of 
the obligations or duties that might be held to be common to all, the list would be 
incomplete5. In order to deal with changing needs and circumstances a body of 
political practice or usage was gradually built up. Ashton suggests that such usage was 
employed primarily to promote imperial interests and to supply imperial needs, as in the 
case of laws relating to the construction of roads and railways and the development of 
commercial policy, and that frequently new principles established in relations with one 
state were subsequently taken to apply to all states.54 In practice, therefore, the operation 
of paramountcy meant that ‘the full extent of British interference in the Home 
Departments of the states has never and never can be defined’ .55
THE BRITISH DEBATE
Unlike their Mogul predecessors, who through informal treaties and matrimonial 
relations established close links with rulers such as the princes of Rajputana, the 
religious and social mores of the British precluded diem from any form of partnership 
with the indigenous community. Suspicion and mistrust became normal as the British 
adopted a policy of keeping the princes at arm’s lengdi from die government and 
isolated from each other. Under the British system of tutelage the rulers had no hope of 
achieving either fame or distinction. Confined to their own territories and with no 
prospect of advancement, they began to lose the compulsion to maintain decent and
52 Ashton, British Policy, p. 6.
53 Lee-Warner, Native States, p. 201.
54 British Policy, p. 6.
55 Native States, p. 201.
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orderly standards of administration. Instead they became increasingly dependent upon 
British guarantees. Under British protection the princes were not only secure from 
foreign or domestic enemies, but also ‘free to govern in an arbitrary manner, defying the 
wishes of their subjects with impunity’.56 One of the most forthright critics of the 
subsidiary system was Sir Thomas Munro, Governor of Madras between 1820 and 1827, 
Munro respected indigenous customs and institutions and wished to preserve them in 
order to conciliate all sections of Indian society. Britain’s role in India, he believed, 
should be confined to the provision of sound and efficient government. In 1817 he 
expressed his view to the Governor-General, Lord Hastings:
There are many weighty objections to the employment of a subsidiary force. It has a 
natural tendency to render the government of every country in which it exists weak 
and oppressive; to extinguish all honourable spirit among the higher classes of society 
and to degrade and impoverish the whole people.57
The misgivings of Munro were shared by die liberal refonners of the early Victorian era. 
From the end of the eighteenth century until the Mutiny in 1857, the position of the 
Indian privileged classes was consistently criticised by supporters of Jeremy Bentham’s 
Utilitarianism. James Mill, the most fervent of Bentham’s lieutenants and a major figure 
in Indian policy making, demanded a revolution in Indian society carried through by the 
operation of ‘good government’, ‘just laws’ and a ‘scientific’ system of taxation. 
‘Clearness, certainty, promptitude, cheapness’ in British administration would, he 
believed, provide ‘a complete deliverance’ for the individual from the tyranny of priests 
and aristocrats, so that India would be placed on die path of ‘improvement’,58 The 
Utilitarian argument would have bome much less weight had it not been able to utilize 
Evangelical contempt for the personal conduct and character of the classes it opposed on
56 Ashton, British P o lic y p. 11.
57 Extract from Munro to Lord Hastings, 12 August 1817, quoted Ashton, British Policy, p. 11.
58 James Mill, British India, Vol. II, p. 47, Vol. V, pp. 474, 521, quoted E. Stokes, The English 
Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), pp. 56, 146.
29
political and economic grounds. Convinced that western civilisation was superior and 
inspired by the belief that Britain had a ‘moral obligation5 to change Indian society, the 
reformers were appalled to learn that British policy encouraged princely misgovemment. 
They found themselves converted, despite their pacifist and anti-imperial sentiments, 
into apostles of annexation.59 Mill, Examiner in die Company’s home government, was 
among the first to demand that Britain put an end to princely rule. Not to enhance 
Britain's imperial glory, he told a House of Commons Committee in 1832, but to secure 
the happiness of the people, the Indian states should be taken over:
Unless you take the collection of the revenue into your hands, and appoint your own 
collectors, with your own people to supervise those collectors, you may be perfectly 
sure the people will be plundered. In like manner, there will be no justice unless you 
administer it.60
The views of the annexationists, however, were by no means universally endorsed. 
Mountstuart Elphinstone and Sir John Malcolm were prominent among those who 
disagreed with the criticism of the subsidiary system and who strenuously opposed the 
idea of bringing princely rule to an end. Elphinstone, with experience as Resident at 
Poona and Governor of Bombay, believed that such decay and stagnation as existed in 
the states was due, not to the subsidiary system, but to what he described as the 
‘ephemeral character of Asiatic governments5.61 Elphinstone also warned any would-be 
annexationists that the stability of Britain's existing possessions in India was to a large 
extent dependent upon the maintenance of princely territories which afforded ‘a refuge 
to all those whose habits of war, intrigue, or depradation make them incapable of
59 Ashton, British Policy, p. 12.
60 Evidence to House of Commons Committee, 16 February 1832, quoted Metcalf, Aftermath o f  
Revolt, p. 31.
61 Elphinstone to T. H. Villiers, 5 August 1832, quoted Ashton, British Policy, p. 13
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• • fDkeeping quiet in ours’. In this respect he was supported by Malcolm, who succeeded 
him as Governor of Bombay and in 1832 declared that he was
decidedly of the opinion that the tranquillity, not to say the security of our vast 
Oriental possessions is involved in the preservation of the native principalities which 
are dependent upon us for protection ... their coexistence with our rule is of itself a 
source of political strength the value of which will never be known until it is lost.63
Malcolm recognised that territorial expansion and the introduction of western reforms 
were probably inevitable but warned of serious repercussions if they were not 
accompanied by restraint. He stressed that ‘We must try to march slow time if we 
cannot halt and to support, at least for a period, what is left of native rank and power. Its 
dissolution, to be safe, must be gradual, and we must make, before that crisis comes, a 
change in some sort of our principles of administration5.64
An examination of the twenty-five years preceding the Mutiny reveals that little heed 
was paid to the warnings of Elphinstone and Malcolm. However it has been argued that 
even during this period the British were not fully committed to a policy of annexing the 
states. The Board of Control and the Court of Directors in London were basically 
opposed to any further territorial expansion other than that dictated by political or 
military necessity. Successive Govemors-General at the start of then* administrations 
were also opposed to expansion, but ‘local circumstances, together with the urge to 
check abuses as and when they occurred, frequently led them to abandon their earlier 
views5.65 Lord Bentinck, Governor-General between 1828 and 1835 was at first a 
non-interventionist as far as the states were concerned. He believed that there was 
already too much ‘petty interference5, particularly in the private lives of the princes, and
62 Ibid.
63 Malcolm to T. H. Villiers, 26 March 1832, quoted Ashton, British Policy, p. 13.
64 John William Kaye, The Life and Correspondence o f Major General Sir John Malcolm (London, 
1854), Vol. 2, p. 324.
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even advocated the removal of political officers from all states except those in which 
subsidiary troops were stationed.66 However Bentinck soon found himself threatening 
the errant ruler of Awadh that he would have to forfeit his throne unless he mended his 
ways. Furthermore, he placed Mysore under British administration following a rebellion 
in 1831, and annexed the state of Coorg in 1834 on the grounds of misgovemment.67
It was not, however, until the time of Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General between 1848 
and 1856, that annexation became a salient feature of British policy. Convinced of the 
superiority of British rule and the degeneracy of the Indian states, Dalhousie stated his 
views at the start of his administration in August 1848:
I cannot conceive it possible for anyone to dispute die policy of taking advantage of 
every just opportunity which presents itself for consolidating the territories which 
already belong to us, by taking possession of States that may lapse in die midst of 
them; for thus getting rid of those petty intervening principalities, which may be 
made a means of annoyance, but which can never, I venture to think, be a source of 
strength, for adding to the resources of the public treasury, and for extending the 
uniform application of our system of government to those whose best interests, we 
sincerely believe, will be promoted thereby.68
The device which Dalhousie used to gain possession of seven states in seven years was 
the ‘doctrine of lapse5, giving the Government the right to take over a state if a prince 
died without heirs, a situation which is discussed in further depth in the chapter on 
succession. As Thomas Metcalf indicates, Dalhousie specifically limited the application 
of this right to dependent states created by the British Government or owing their 
existence to it. However the Governor-General wielded the doctrine of lapse so 
extensively as to arouse suspicion even among the most ancient Hindu princes. He was 
restrained by the Home Government from taking over the small semi-independent
66 Minute by Lord William Bentinck on Oude, 30 July 1831 quoted Ashton, British Policy, p. 14.
67 Ashton, British Policy, pp. 14-15.
68 Dalhousie's minute, 30 August 1848, PP 1849, Vol. XXXIX, p. 83.
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Rajput state of Kerauli, but, of the seven states he did annex, Satara, Jhansi and Nagpur 
were Maratha principalities of the first rank.69
In addition to the doctrine of lapse, Dalhousie's administration also abolished the 
pensions and titles of ex-ruling families. Even Bahadur Shah II, the last of the Mogul 
emperors, was informed that the imperial title would lapse upon his death.70 The climax 
of the ‘expansionist5 phase came in 1856 with the annexation of Awadh upon the 
grounds of misrule. Awadh was in drastic need of reform, yet the Resident, W. H. 
Sleeman, did not believe that it should be annexed outright and warned the 
Governor-General of the possible consequences of annexing states:
If we succeed in sweeping them all away or absorbing them, we shall be at the mercy 
of our native army, and they shall see it, and accidents may possibly occur to unite 
them, or a great proportion of them, in some desperate act ... the best provision 
against it seems to me to be the maintenance of native rulers, whose confidence and 
affection can be engaged, and administration improved under judicious 
management.71
However, the Govemor-General's Council and die government in London feared that 
civil war might ensue in Awadh. The subsequent annexation of the state in February 
1856 coincided with the end of Dalhousie's administration and, as an example of current 
British policy towards the rulers, contributed largely to the unrest from which the Indian 
Mutiny emerged the following year.
The loyalty of die reigning princes during the revolt clearly demonstrated die potential of 
the Indian states as a political force in support of British rule. Dalhousie's successor, 
Lord Canning, was urged by the Home Government to spare no effort in rewarding the 
princes who had given active assistance. In a despatch to Sir Charles Wood, who had
69 Metcalf, Aftermath o f Revolt, p. 36.
70 Ashton, British Policy, p. 15.
71 Sleeman to Dalhousie, 1848, quoted Creagh-Coen, Indian Political Service, pp. 17-18.
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become Secretary of State for India in June 1859, the Governor-General agreed that the 
‘safety of our rule is increased not diminished by the maintenance of Native Chiefs well 
affected to u s \72 During the Mutiny ‘patches of native government’ like Gwalior, 
Hyderabad, Patiala, Rampur and Rewa had, according to Canning, ‘served as 
breakwaters to the storm which would otherwise have swept over us’.73 He believed 
that ‘should the day come when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when 
the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more 
than ordinary risks, one of our best mainstays will be found in these Native States5.74 
The policy of annexation could no longer be continued. For the first time under British 
rule it appeared that the princes were to be given a permanent position as part of the 
British empire.
In his study of the representation of authority in Victorian India, Bernard Cohn suggests 
that the British, who had started their rule as ‘outsiders5, became ‘insiders5 by vesting in 
their monarch the sovereignty of India through an amnesty document, die Government 
of India Act.75 This new relationship between the British monarch, her Indian subjects 
and the native princes was published in all principal centres of British rule on the 1st of 
November 1858. In the proclamation Queen Victoria assured the Indian princes that 
‘their rights, dignity and honour5, as well as their control over their territorial 
possessions, would be respected and that the Queen ‘was bound to the natives of Our 
Indian territories by die same obligations of duty which binds us to all our other 
subjects5.76 All her Indian subjects were to be secure in die practice of their religions. 
They were to enjoy ‘the equal and impartial protection of the law5 and ‘due regard would
72 Gol FD to SoS, No. 43A, 30 April 1860, PCI, Vol. 85.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Cohn,‘Representing Authority’, p. 165.
76 Queen Victoria's Proclamation, 1 November 1858, in C. H. Philips (ed.) The Evolution o f India and 
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be paid to the ancient rights, usages and customs of India’. Works of ‘public utility and 
improvement’ were to be promoted and they ‘should enjoy that social advancement 
which can only be secured by internal peace and good government’.77
It is clear that the policy to cease annexation was to a great extent one of expediency 
under current*conditions. As Canning was aware, while India now seemed fairly secure, 
at least in a military sense, there was no room for complacency. Hatred of Europeans 
had if anything increased as a result of the Mutiny and another European war, as in 1854, 
might find India denuded of British troops.78 Economically a policy of detente with 
loyal princes and landlords made good sense. The campaigns of 1857-8, following hard 
on an expensive programme of public works under Dalhousie, had saddled the Raj with 
a legacy of debt, hi 1858-9 the budget deficit was 14 million lakhs, in 1859-60 nine
• • nomillion. At least in the foreseeable future the government was incapable of taking on 
new administrative burdens, ‘Our officers’, explained Canning, ‘are too few for the work 
which they have on their hands. Accession of territory will not make it easier to 
discharge our already existing duties in the administration of justice, the prosecution of 
public works, and in many other ways5.80 Most importantly, Canning regarded the 
princes as the natural leaders of Indian society, with ‘a hold over the feelings and hearts
Q 1
of the common herd which they cannot bequeath to us’.
To show British generosity to the rulers overall ‘an act of general and substantial grace5 
was needed. The specific measure that Canning proposed was to give ‘an assurance to 
every Chief above the rank of Jagheerdar, who now governs his own territory,... that on
77 Ibid.
78 Canning to Wood, 13 June 1860, quoted in S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1858-1905 (Cambridge, 
1965), p. 8.
79 The Annual Register, 100 (1858), p. 250, quoted Copland, British Raj, p. 95.
80 Gol to SoS, No. 43A, 30 April 1860, PCI, 1792-1864, Vol. 85 quoted R. J. Moore, Sir Charles Wood’s 
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failure of natural heirs his adoption of a successor ... will be recognised5.82 No other 
innovation, he assured Wood, would capture the confidence of the princes so 
successfully and 4give a character of immovability to the policy which it initiates5.83 
Both at home and from his Council Canning's proposal evoked a favourable response. 
Sir Henry Bartle Frere described the effects of the measure in glowing terms and told 
Canning that it would ‘do more for tranquillity and good government in India than years 
of legislation and successful campaigns5.84 No avid reformer, Frere felt few pangs of 
conscience at the thought of millions left under Indian rule, ‘Every real advantage to the 
people which can be expected from our rule can be secured through a Native ruler, with 
the aid of an English Political Agent of average ability, more surely, easily, and cheaply 
than by any form of direct administration with which I am acquainted5.85 Sir Charles 
Wood was less optimistic over the future of the states, but he recognised the value of 
attaching to Britain those ‘influential classes5 which would deprive ‘the active and 
stimng elements5 m India of any possible leaders. In a dispatch of July 1860 he 
authorised the issue of adoption sanads to all sovereign chiefs under British protection, 
‘It is not by the extension of our Empire that its permanence is to be secured, but by the 
character of British rule in the territories already committed to our care, and by 
practically demonstrating that we are as willing to respect the rights of others as we are 
capable of maintaining our own5.87
The measure was well received by some sections of the Indian people for different 
reasons. As Metcalf points out, ‘the states were islands of self-government in a sea of
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
84 Minute from Frere to Canning, 19 June I860, enclosure Canning to Wood, 26 June 1860, Wood 
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alien rule’. They provided an outlet for political ambition denied in British India and 
an example of the ability of Indians to rule themselves.89 As early as August 1858 the 
Hindoo Patriot had advocated recognition of the right of adoption and went on to 
recommend that the princes be freed from the surveillance of British residents. India, the 
newspaper suggested, should be organised on a federal basis, with the various states and 
provinces left free to manage their own internal affairs.90 With considerably more 
vehemence the vernacular Bengali press deplored British interference in the princely 
states and one newspaper asserted in 1863 that despite adoption ‘there is no 
independence allowed to Native Rajahs’.91
However Bhupen Qanungo states that not only in government correspondence but also 
in public addresses to rulers at durbars, Canning justified any such ‘interference’ by 
stressing that the British Government had a duty to the people of the native states, as 
much as to the rulers and their families. The Government would always consider it a 
right of the paramount power to intervene in the affairs of the native states to ensure 
elementary good government according to the principles of British rule in the country.92 
Indeed the recognition of adoption was by no means to prevent the British Government 
from interfering in princely affairs. Canning made it plain in April 1860 that, with 
annexation repudiated, intervention was a necessary deterrent to the opportunities now 
available for gross misrule. In explaining the adoption procedure to Wood, the Viceroy 
declared, ‘The proposed measure will not debar the Government of India from stepping 
in to set right such serious abuses in a native Government as may threaten any part of the
88 Metcalf, Aftermath o f Revolt, p. 225.
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country with anarchy or disturbance, nor from assuming temporary change of a Native 
State when there shall be sufficient reason to do so \93
The issue of sanads of adoption has often been represented as indicative of a 
determination to put an end to Britain's career of annexation in India, however during the 
1860s the tide of post-Mutiny reaction began to ebb. Lord Elgin, Viceroy from 1862 to 
1863, was to some extent in agreement with his departmental heads, such as Sir Henry 
Durand, that Canning's assessment of imperial priorities had been warped by the trauma 
of 1857. Writing to Wood in September 1862, he wondered whether the direction which 
British policy had taken under Canning was ‘altogether correct’ and whether ‘that 
portion of it which was a policy of circumstance should not have been distinguished 
from that which was a policy of principle’.94 Elgin was sure that his predecessor had 
‘never intended to let the chiefs get the bit into their mouths’ and that ‘his policy of 
deference to the authority of native chiefs was only a means to an end, that end being the 
establishment of the British Raj in India’.95 The Viceroy concluded, ‘It may perhaps 
turn out that a time of peace is better fitted to one of revolution for die discovery of the 
true theory according to which our relations with native states ought to be conducted’.96
THE MAN ON THE SPOT
Those men best equipped to discover the ‘true theory’ of governing states were 
undoubtedly the members of the Company branch, the political line. This line, having 
evolved over the years, consisted of residents, when there was only one state
93 Gol to SoS. No. 43A, 30 April I860, PCI, 1792-1864, Vol. 85.
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involved, and political agents, who usually each had a group of minor states in their 
charge, under the control of the Agent to the Governor-General at the local Political 
Agency. During periods of the greatest British expansion in the early nineteenth century 
the post of political officer had attracted the most ambitious of Company servants. 
Philip Mason says that of the ‘three main lines’, political, judicial and revenue ... there 
could be no question that the political was much the most attractive’.97 However 
following 1858 much of the appeal of the political line faded when routine replaced 
dynamism and glamour, as a result of the new British policy of stabilising relations 
with Indian states, and by the 1870s increased administrative importance had been 
placed upon political officers.98 Moreover, by the very nature of his duties, the 
political agent often found himself isolated for long periods from the company of 
Europeans in conditions which even by the standards of British India were primitive and 
uncomfortable.
After the Mutiny politicals were overwhelmingly military men recruited from the Staff 
Corps of the Indian Army.99 In stark contrast to the other main branches of government, 
revenue and justice, civilians comprised only a small part of the service. The main 
reason behind the post-Mutiny preference for military rather than civilian personnel in 
political posts was one of economy. Man for man, Staff Corps officers cost less than 
civilians, ‘perhaps as much as Rs. 1,000 a month less for men of equal standing’.100 
Moreover salary scales in the two services were calculated differently. In the Indian 
Civil Service a man’s pay was determined by his length of service; in the Political
97 Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India (London, 1953), Vol. I, pp. 204-5.
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Service101 by the importance of his appointment. A satisfactory time-scale system 
was not introduced until the second decade of the twentieth century and, owing to the 
shortage of command posts, promotional opportunities for most officers were 
extremely limited. In 1873 the Governor of Bombay noted that the ‘prizes of the 
Political Department are so few that the majority of Political officers can expect to 
rise to no higher pay than Rs. 1,200’ [monthly], roughly equivalent to £120.102 The 
financial prospects of the Political Service declined still further during the last 
decades of the century as a consequence of inflation. The cost of living in India, 
particularly for Europeans, increased sharply from the 1880s. Despite meagre 
increases in civil salaries, the real wages of Indian public servants were lower in 1900 
than they had been at any time since the Mutiny.103 Embittered by long standing 
grievances over pay and promotion, the rank and file of the Political Service retained 
little faith in the good intentions of the Secretariat. In a sense this was unfair, since 
‘the fault lay not with the Political Department as such, but with the Finance 
Department which controlled the purse strings and with the politicians at Whitehall 
who made the rules’.104
The most important part of the application form for the Political Service was the 
section devoted to comments from the candidate’s commanding officer. High on the 
list of information solicited were queries about the applicant’s popularity, 
horsemanship and sporting ability. Significantly, referees, whether commanding
101 The term Political Service, or Indian Political Service, is used throughout, following the examples 
of Creagh- Coen and Copland, however it was not coined until 1937, after the 1935 Government of 
India Act had removed all matters relating to the Indian states from the Foreign and Political 
Department o f the Gol to the Crown Representative, reporting directly to the British Government. In 
fact the Viceroy also held the office of Crown Representative and no major changes occurred.
102 Resolution o f the Govt, o f Bombay No. 5605 of 10 September 1873 quoted Ian Copland, ‘The 
Other Guardians: Ideology and Performance in the Indian Political Service’ in Jeffrey (ed.), People, 
Princes, p.288.
103 ‘Other Guardians’, p.292.
104 Ibid.
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officers or senior men in the government, almost never mentioned the mental ability 
of their proteges. Admittedly applicants had to have passed all their Army 
examinations plus a test in Hindustani, but in view of the departmental prejudice 
against civilians it seems likely that book learning and related skills were not highly 
thought of by the men who administered the selection process.105 Even William Lee- 
Warner, who was one of the most intellectual of nineteenth century Indian Civilians, 
when asked by the Adjutant-General to draw up a list of desirable qualifications for 
political employees, settled for the social factor, ‘A Pol. Officer has to deal with 
ruling chiefs and nobles in his capacity as representative of the British Govt.; it 
therefore follows that he should be a gentleman’.106
Copland considers that intellectually the Political Service fell far short of the standard of 
the Indian Civil Service, which was itself ‘no byword for brilliance’,107 On the other 
hand there was probably something to be said for the government’s argument that 
political work required more than just intellectual agility. Most of the durbars in the 
mid-nineteenth century were still run on basically paternal lines by high caste officials 
‘skilled in the byways of courtly intrigue’.108 In this relatively unbureaucratic world, a 
political officer who surrounded himself with files was unlikely to make headway. To 
win the confidence of the rulers personal contact was essential. The men who succeeded 
most at this task were invariably ‘those with the most magnetic personalities: extroverts 
and sporting types, sensitive to the cultural milieu of the courts but strong-willed enough 
to resist the temptations inherent in the environment’.109 Although few politicals 
qualified as intellectuals in the narrow sense of the term, they tended to be, especially the 
younger men, imbued with a strong sense of purpose and a vague but powerful vision of
105 British Raj, p. 78.
106 Memo by Lee-Wamer, 8 July 1892, quoted Copland, British Raj, p. 78.
107 British Raj, p. 85
108 Ibid.
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where they were headed. Most politicals came from middle-class English families and, 
as such, shared in the devotion to progress which was perhaps ‘the main article of the 
Victorian middle-class creed’.110
Except for civilians who worked for three years in the ‘revenue line’ before joining the
service, political officers received no special administrative or judicial training. Armed
only with manuals, grammars and legal texts, they were dispatched into the field to learn
their trade by experience. Copland makes it clear that ‘influence’, that ‘magical but
largely immeasurable quality’ which all political recruits desired, depended on the
individual coming to terms with his social environment.111 Months or even years might
be spent in building up the right contacts, mastering a new vernacular if a Political Agent
came from a different region, and becoming familiar with the customs and prejudices of
the people. Length of tenure could have an important bearing on a Political Agent’s 
1 1 0performance. It was surprising, therefore, that the transfer of political officers tended 
to become increasingly more frequent. In 1877 political appointments in Bombay 
averaged over four years’ duration; by 1901 the average had fallen by half to just over 
two years. The reason for this apparent paradox was the government’s fear, confirmed 
by costly experience, that ‘too long an exposure to the problems and personalities of one 
state or region might encourage an unhealthy spirit of partisanship’ among the officers 
concerned.113
A Political Agent posted to a large agency comprising many small states had on the 
whole a much tougher assignment that one appointed to a single state agency or 
residency. Not only were there more durbars to be won over but also there were the
110 British Raj, p. 130.
111 ‘Other Guardians’, p. 279.
112 ‘Other Guardians’, p. 280.
113 Ibid.
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sheer physical problems of getting around such a large area, especially in the type of 
terrain commonly encountered in central India and Orissa where many of the small states 
were located. The annual winter tour, which was supposed to put political officers in 
continuous touch with their agency, was ‘too brief to be good for anything but showing 
the flag’.114 Moreover by the late nineteenth century the durbars were often sufficiently 
cognisant of the workings of the political system to make sure that for the duration of his 
stay, the Political Agent failed to unearth information which might reflect unfavorably 
on the ruling regime. Some Political Agents may have been able to surmount these 
obstacles, but ‘judging from the paucity and naivety of much of the information 
contained in the periodic summaries which were filed with the Secretariat, they were 
probably in the minority5.115 By the twentieth century there was a groundswell of 
dissatisfaction with existing procedures of training and recruitment. Even by its own 
standards the Political Service had failed to attract enough men of a sufficiently high 
calibre from the Indian Civil Service and, more importantly, from the Staff Corps of the 
Indian Army, which was naturally reluctant to release its best young regimental 
officers for civil employment.116
Secretariat officials were frequently criticised for being out of touch with their 
political officers on the ground. In the nineteenth century the Government of India 
saw no incongruity in appointing men to the Political Secretariat without benefit of a 
practical apprenticeship in the states. Charles Gonne, Political Secretary in the 
Bombay Government for a record term of twenty years (1864-1884), never set foot in
117a ‘native5 state in an official capacity during his entire Indian career. His 
celebrated successor, William Lee-Warner, served only eighteen months in Kolhapur
114 ‘Other Guardians’, p. 281.
115 Ibid.
116 ‘Other Guardians’, pp. 286-7.
117 ‘Other Guardians’, p. 293.
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118prior to taking over as Political Secretary. The Secretariat was a closed shop to the 
vast majority of members of the Political Service, who were destined to spend their 
careers exclusively in subordinate stations. Feelings of hostility and frustration 
towards the Secretariat were exacerbated by what the subordinate men saw as ‘a 
gradual and deliberate erosion of their power and authority’.119
The late nineteenth century was a period of dramatic improvement in 
communications. Prior to 1870 not many states were linked to headquarters by the 
telegraph, and almost none by the railway. As a result, the man on the spot was 
frequently compelled to take the initiative in committing government to a particular 
course of action. During the 1870s, and still more in the 1880s and 1890s, a network 
of railways and telegraph lines was constructed across the country, some financed by 
the states themselves, with the result that the political officer became more and more a 
mere channel of communication between the British government and the ruler. 
Although still an important link in the chain of command, he could no longer maintain 
a regular influence on the course of imperial policy and was increasingly stifled by 
bureaucracy.120 Crown Representative records display a marked change in tone over 
the last thirty years of the century: the intimate, paternalistic approach of Resident to 
ruler alters to a less more fractious, less patient tone as the officer concerned is beset 
by an increasingly sophisticated administration on one hand and the scrutiny of his 
superiors on the other. This study will explore the manner in which, despite the low 
morale and apparent limitations of the Political Service, its officers set about the task 
of ‘civilising’ Indian rulers and modernising state administrations and their success or 
failure in accomplishing these tasks.
118 Ibid.
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The East India Company took an early step in asserting a degree of interference in the 
internal affairs of Indian states through its interest in the succession of rulers. To 
some extent the Company was assuming the mantle of the significant powers, the 
principal sana^-holders121, of the Mogul empire who entered a succession dispute to 
support the legitimacy of one candidate for a princely throne and, if the candidate 
were successful, to exact a tribute. This strategy was used dozens of times in the 
eighteenth century with a wide variety of groups as the outside power. Dost 
Mohammed Khan of Bhopal used it against the Rajput houses of Western Malwa and 
in the Bhopal succession of 1728 it was ultimately the sanad-grantor, the Nizam of 
Hyderabad, who decided which of Dost Mohammed’s two eligible sons was to 
succeed him. The subordinate treaties made by the French and English with Indian 
states towards the end of the century were ‘simply European terms for a very common 
indigenous phenomenon’.122
As was the case for the major sanad-holders under Mogul rule, the potential scope for 
intervention by a Resident in a succession remained broad partly because of political 
conditions within many states. The line of inheritance for most Indian dynasties 
followed no absolute or clear rule. Male rulers customarily engaged in sexual 
relations with a variety of types of wives and concubines, the offspring of whom
121 Under the Mogul empire, virtually every political authority from rajah down to village headman 
‘held from’ some larger authority. What most held was a written, dated document, known as a sanad 
in Mogul-influenced areas, which stated the holder’s name, rights and recompense, duties and length of 
tenure. Such a document was signed and sealed by the appropriate Mogul official. Stewart Gordon, 
‘Legitimacy and Loyalty in some Successor States’, in J. F. Richards (ed.) Kingship and Authority in 
South Asia (New Delhi, 1998) p. 330.
122 Gordon, ‘Legitimacy and Loyalty’, p. 335.
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made claims to their common father’s estate. Robbins Burling, having examined 
successions in several principal Maratha houses, concluded that:
Sons had a greater claim than brothers, elder brothers had precedence over younger 
brothers, and natural sons had a stronger claim than adopted sons. Except for the 
exclusive rights of the male line, however, none of these priorities were 
absolute.123
Residents, acting as an independent force, often proved to hold the balance of power 
among the ‘disparate pretenders’ to the throne, each of whom might hold the loyalty of 
only a small faction in the court or army as his basis of support within the state.124 Upon 
the death of a ruler, therefore, the Resident, and the Company’s political and military 
force which he represented could often prove ‘the arbiter of succession, to the political or 
financial advantage of the Company’.125 Even before its first appointment of Residents 
in 1764 the Company involved itself in the succession of Indian dynasties in both the 
Carnatic and Bengal.126 The sanction of successions within states provided an admirable 
opportunity for the tightening of British control. A ruler who owed his accession to the 
tacit or active approval of the Company incurred an obligation which affected his 
relationship with the Resident. Moreover, since die nomination of a successor depended 
on the blessing of the Company, potential heirs saw the Resident as an ‘assessor, whose 
good reports might prove vital to their future prospects’.127
The level of die Company’s interference in succession reached its peak with the 
‘doctrine of lapse’, already briefly discussed in the introduction. Although it did not 
originate with Lord Dalhouse, this measure was exercised by him most frequently and 
extensively. British recognition was given as a matter of course to heirs in the direct line
123 Robbins Burling, The Passage o f Power: Studies in Political Successions (New York, 1974), p. 
58, quoted Gordon, ‘Legitimacy and Loyalty’, p. 334..
124 Fisher, Indirect Rule, p. 140.
125 Ibid.
126 Indirect Ride, p. 141.
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of succession, but when a prince died without heirs the Government had the right to take 
over his state. Ordinarily a prince was able to avert this fate by adopting a son who 
succeeded to the throne as if he were the legal heir. Dalhousie's innovation lay in 
consistently refusing to sanction such adoptions, stating that on all occasions ‘where 
heirs natural shall fail, the territory should be made to lapse and adoption should not be 
permitted, excepting in those cases in which some strong political reason may render it 
necessary to depart from the general rule’.128
A heated debate in Britain and among the British in India was engendered over whether 
such action was justified on the basis of the interpretation of Hindu, Muslim, British or
• * 19Qinternational law. The details of the application of the doctrine varied considerably.
The Rajahs of Satara and Jhansi had both adopted sons prior to their deaths (in 1847 and 
1853 respectively). Despite these formal adoptions, the Company refused to 
acknowledge the adopted sons as heirs and, in the case of Satara, the Governor-General 
further justified annexation on the grounds that the Company had created the state and, 
when it served the Company’s convenience, it could be annexed as ‘a practical, 
administrative consolidation’. In the case of Nagpur, the ruler had no son, natural or 
adopted, and the Company annexed the state on the Rajah’s death in 1853. The 
Company also annexed a number of smaller states under the doctrine, awaiting the death 
of the incumbent ruler as a convenient point to take over his state, ‘when justified by its 
own administrative purposes’.131
The Company even asserted its right to determine the succession to the Mogul imperial 
dynasty. To the Company the reigning Emperor, Bahadur Shah II, represented a vestige
128 Dalhousie’s minute, 30 August 1848, PP 1849, Vol. XXXIX, p. 83.
129 Bisheshwar Prasad, Paramountcy under Dalhousie (New Delhi, 1964).
130 Indirect Rule, p. 258.
131 Indirect Rule, p. 259.
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of the old political order. While the Company wished to eliminate the Emperor’s 
remaining political authority, it was unwilling to do so abruptly. As a result, the 
Resident at Delhi reached an agreement in 1852 with the hen apparent that the Company 
would recognise his claim against those of his brothers in return for a ‘diminished 
political status’.132 In exchange for the support of the Company, he agreed ‘to accept a 
reduced title (horn Padshah, ‘Emperor’, to Shahzada, ‘King’s son’), meet the Governor- 
General in ceremonies symbolizing equality, and transfer the imperial palace (the Red 
Fort) to the Company, taking residence elsewhere’.133 In 1856, however, the Company 
obtained the opportunity to further ‘degrade’ die Mogul dynasty when the heir apparent 
predeceased his father. The Company refused to recognise the Emperor’s choice of 
another son as heir. Indeed, die Company determined to abolish the dynasty altogether 
on the death of Bahadur Shah. This proposed ‘blatant interference’ in the imperial 
succession did much to raise public hostility to the Company in 1857, when the Emperor 
proved a major focal point for the uprising against the British.134
After 1857 the British crown took over the government of India from die Company and 
to all intents and purposes returned to a policy of indirect rule. In order to safeguard the 
dynasties of the princes the Viceroy, Lord Canning, dispensed with the doctrine of lapse 
and, as stated in the introduction, in 1862 bestowed adoption sanads upon rulers above 
the rank of jagirdar who guaranteed to maintain the loyalty expressed in their treaties. 
Although less than two hundred sanads were issued, the four* or five hundred states 
which did not receive such a written guarantee from the British Government were all 
given to understand by the tone of official utterances on the subject that the paramount 
power wished ‘to perpetuate all loyal states’ and to acknowledge adopted successors to
132 Ibid.
133 Ibid.
134 Indirect Rule, p. 260.
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their gadis on the failure of natural heirs. Thereafter there was no dispute about the 
right to adopt. But often, when a prince died leaving an adopted son, ‘collaterals would 
weigh in with petitions drafted by the most eminent lawyers in India alleging a flaw here 
or there in the adoption and pressing their own claims’.136 If there had been no adoption, 
the case was further complicated. It required some legal ability and good knowledge of 
local conditions and personalities to advice on such cases which, if the state were of 
importance, were not finally decided by the Viceroy but went on to the Secretary of State 
for India.137
In larger and more powerful states, lost opportunities to regulate successions were 
much regretted by the British. In 1875 at the time of the selection of a successor to 
the late Maharajah of Alwar in Rajputana, dismay was expressed by the India Office 
that, by omitting to regrant the state on a formal basis by an adoption sanad or 
otherwise, a chance had been lost of ‘placing the relations between the British 
Government and Ulwur State on a footing less anomalous and unsuited to the present 
condition than is possible under existing treaties with that State’.138 Under similar 
circumstances, it was suggested, the British Government should not only recognise a 
succession on general grounds, but should attach conditions which would give the 
paramount power ‘a fair equivalent’ for the external protection and internal support 
which it provided.139 Although the confiscation of a state was ruled out following the 
Mutiny, the British could exercise much power in applying such conditions, and it
135 Ibid. The terms o f the adoption sanad granted to the Gaekwar of Baroda can be found in Philips 
(ed.), Evolution o f India and Pakistan, p. 416.
135 Creagh-Coen, Indian Political Sei'vice, p. 68.
137 Ibid.
138 SoS to Gol, No. 24, 9 September 1875, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 1.
139 Ibid.
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was stressed that the Indian rulers should be taught to look upon the restoration of 
native rule as ‘a favour, not a right’.140
In the latter part of the nineteenth century the Government of India never relinquished its 
right to sanction royal successions, and in the cause of instigating ‘good government’ 
took advantage of every available opportunity to install candidates of its choice. There 
was a concerted effort on the part of political officers during the period to settle the 
matter of succession prior to a ruler’s death and, of those successions which were 
disputed, the vast majority was resolved with none of the infighting and bloodletting 
which had occurred as a matter of course between various branches of royal families 
before British rule. Wars of succession such as those in Bhopal in 1742 and in Jaipur in 
1743 simply ceased to occur. No doubt the lack of conflict was largely due to the late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth century British guarantees to princes to fulfil both their 
internal and external defence requirements, thereby ensuring that the usurper of a 
legitimate heir to a gadi would feel the full force of British military power. The granting 
of adoption sanads to some princes was another significant factor. By making the 
succession process more cut and dried, the cases of disputed inheritance were much 
reduced. However the absence of bloodshed is also indicative of the fact that royal 
rulers and their families were remarkably quiescent in accepting without challenge the 
ruling of the paramount power when it came to successions. Through lack of opposition 
the British were enabled, principally through the enthronement of young, responsive 
candidates, to take a leading role as early as possible in the princely life cycle, a position 
which was maintained with great determination through the control of royal education 
and marriage, as subsequent chapters show.
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THE LEGAL POSITION
In 1886 in a paper on various principles applying to political relations with Indian states, 
Sir William Lee-Warner, whose views on paramountcy were discussed in the 
introduction, clarified the policy which had arisen during the decades following the 
granting of adoption sanads. Theoretically in the event of a ruler dying without natural 
heirs and without exercising the powers of adoption conferred upon him, the doctrine of 
lapse might legally operate. Under these circumstances the declared policy of the 
Queen’s Proclamation protected the integrity of tire state, however ‘the rights of the 
reigning dynasty’ were no longer secured by formal agreement. ‘The perpetuation of 
Native rule is wider than the perpetuation of the houses of Native rulers, and it is based 
on grounds of general policy, not on an exclusive regard for individual claims’.141 It is 
‘a policy and not a pledge’, to be ‘administered subject to conditions’ and ‘of course 
capable of exceptions under the pressure of adequate exigency’.142
hr Lee-Warner’s view there was a ‘wide and fundamental difference between escheat 
and confiscation’ and the attachment of conditions to tire restoration of native nrle in 
states such as Mysore or Baroda after the deposition of their respective rulers. In 
adoptions or successions guaranteed by sanad the minimum of interference was 
exercised, but in the ‘selection’ of a successor a wider play was allowed to the 
Government of India. The distinction between adoption and ‘selection’ was of great 
importance. The Government of India was bound by Canning’s sanads to recognise an 
adoption made by a ruler in accordance with Hindi law and the ‘customs of the house’. 
Where there was no valid adoption as, for example, in the case of the heir to a deposed
141 Lee-Wamer, Lee-Warner Collection, F92, quoted Philips (ed.) Evolution o f  India and Pakistan, pp. 
421-2.
142 Ibid.
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ruler, the Government could either recognise an invalid adoption, or exercise its own 
selection. In all cases the sanction of the British Government was necessary before any 
succession could be proclaimed, therefore ‘every endeavour should be made to induce a 
ruler to settle the succession in his lifetime by making an adoption, or choosing a 
successor in accordance with his Sanads\U3
Where there was the possibility of a British ‘selection5 of a successor, as in the case of 
Mysore, British policy was under great scrutiny. The transfer of Mysore back from 
British to princely rule had been under consideration since 1861 when Krishnaraja 
Wadiar, the former Maharajah deposed in 1831 upon grounds of misgovemment, 
petitioned Lord Canning for the restoration of his powers,144 Both Canning and his 
successor, Lord Lawrence, played for time in the hope that Mysore could be 
incorporated into British India upon the Maharajah's death. However in 1865 the 
Maharajah adopted an hen. The British were under no obligation to recognise the 
adoption, for Mysore had not been under princely rule when Canning bestowed adoption 
sanads upon the princes. Both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, Sir Charles 
Wood, were prepared to withhold recognition but Wood retired from office in 1866 and 
the Liberal government of which he had been a member was defeated in the same year. 
In 1867 Lord Cranboume, the Conservative Secretary of State whose respect for the 
Indian princes was ‘a frequent source of irritation to Lawrence5, pledged that the state
143 Ibid.
144 Following the defeat of the Muslim ruler of Mysore, Tipu Sultan, in 1799 the Governor-General, 
Lord Wellesley, rejected the restoration of a relative of the ruler on the grounds of Muslim ‘racial 
characteristics’ and family traditions of hostility to the British and Francophilia. Selected instead was a 
member of the ancient family of Hindu rulers of Mysore whom the Company had recently liberated 
from prison. However under his personal direction of the administration the state went into debt. In 
Mysore, with dire consequences for the prince, the Company encountered the conflict in cultural values 
that it met in many other states and which occurs with frequency throughout this study. Indian rulers, 
even when installed on the throne by the British, attempted to live up to their own notions of royal 
behaviour. The British, while they occasionally appreciated the pomp and ceremony of a court, 
derided what they considered to be ‘empty pageant’ and abhorred the vast cost. Rulers, while they 
accepted British military and political power, ‘bridled at any degradation of their dignity’. See Fisher, 
Indirect Rule, p. 410.
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would be restored to native rule.145
In 1879, when considering how best to effect the transfer to the Maharajah’s successor, 
Chamarajendra Wadiar, the Government of India prepared a draft Instrument of 
Transfer, including detailed restrictions upon the power of the adopted prince, and 
expressed the wish that they might serve as a precedent to be adopted in all cases of 
states emerging from minority periods.146 These restrictions came into force in Mysore 
in 1881 upon the young ruler’s investiture, but a more general application of them was 
disallowed by the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook, who considered that they would 
be interpreted as an unwarranted revision of the treaties with the states. Mysore was 
used as a showcase for British policy towards the states in the late nineteenth century, 
helped to a great extent by the existing strong British presence in the administration. 
British politicians both in England and India were well aware of the importance placed 
by Indians upon the future of the young adopted heir and the question mark hanging over 
the restoration, a subject which is tackled in greater depth in the chapter on princely 
administration.
Conscious of the highly sensitive nature of post-Mutiny princely successions, of which 
Mysore was an example, the Government of India made it patently clear that it wished to 
be thoroughly briefed in any case of disputed succession and that such matters were not 
to be concluded locally without further consultation. In 1885 the Bombay Government 
reported that a decision had been arrived at in the case of the death of the Nawab of 
Savanur and the succession of his cousin, Abdul Tabriz Khan. There were several 
claimants to the gadi and the local government had been guided by the opinion of their 
legal officer, submitting no information as to whether or not the succession was in
145 Ashton, British Policy, pp. 19-20.
146 Mysore Installment of Transfer, Philips (ed.) Evolution o f India and Pakistan, pp. 418-421.
53
accordance with the wishes of the late Nawab’s choice. William Lee-Warner stressed 
that ‘We have generally held that in recognising a distant succession the customs of the 
family, the wishes of die deceased or his widow, and the qualifications of the selected 
successor, are the main factors in a decision’, particularly where an adoption sanad had 
been given, as in the case of Savanur.147 Lee-Warner hoped that it would be possible for 
the Government of India to support the local government’s decision, but no action 
should have been taken which might ‘compromise the free selection of the Government 
of India’. In his opinion, ‘If there was time to refer to the legal advisers there was time 
to refer to the Government of India’.148 Whereas in Hindu law there were separate rules 
which regulated successions to ‘Principalities and Kingdoms’, works on Muslim law did 
not contain such rules. Therefore claims by contending parties needed to be decided 
upon after consultation with a ‘competent’ law officer.149 The Viceroy eventually 
accepted the succession of Abdul Tabriz Khan, but the point had been made.150
The Government of India, despite its ostensible adherence to the rule of law, fought hard 
to maintain its right to act as adjudicator in cases such as that of Savanur. A 
memorandum to the Marquis of Hartington, Secretary of State for India, from the 
Viceroy’s Council in 1880 frankly set out the objections of the Council to the referral to 
the High Courts of ‘disputed questions of laws or fact’ that might arise in Political 
cases.151 In the opinion of the Government of India points of native law and local and 
family custom arose in many cases and it was hard to see how it would be possible to 
‘define or circumscribe’ cases in winch reference was made to the High Courts. In 
central India and Rajputana constant questions were arising of succession, tribute and
147 Note by W. Lee-Warner, 11 February 1885 to Sec. Gol, FD R/l/1/703.
148 Ibid.
149 Ibid.
150 H. M. Durand to Chief Sec. Govt, o f Bombay, 19 June 1885, R/l/1/703.
151 Political memorandum to the Marquis o f Hartington, SoS for India, from the Viceroy’s Council, 28 
September 1880, L/PS/7/388. Ironically, in the light of the Council’s somewhat cavalier attitude towards 
the use of judicial procedure in this matter, the Viceroy at the time was the Liberal, Lord Ripon.
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boundary, and it was likely that as far as each question was concerned the defeated party 
would urge that justice was denied him until the claim was fairly argued out before a 
Court of Law. Discontented parties frequently sent agents to Calcutta to consult 
lawyers, English or native, in order to argue the client’s case before Agents to the 
Governor-General, If legislation were enacted allowing accessibility to the High Courts 
in disputed questions, professional advisers would concentrate their whole efforts upon 
obtaining submission of their case to the Presidency Courts and demand papers and 
correspondence (including records in state archives) to be produced in court, a request 
which could rarely be refused. Therefore the proposed enactment would materially 
affect not only the jurisdiction of rulers, but also the influence exercised by political 
officers and the Government of India in upholding the authority and responsibility of 
rulers and in dealing with disputes which might otherwise lead to disorder.152
The Council appreciated that it might be argued that the practice of referring all disputed 
questions of law to a Court of Justice would introduce stability and uniformity into the 
‘fluctuating and irregular mass of usages and traditional precedents’ involved in the 
regulation of succession disputes.153 However stereotyping laws that governed 
successions to states and the various jurisdictions that a ruler exercised in his territory 
could also radically change tire relations between a state and the Government of India. 
The effect of moulding constitutional laws would lead to a tendency of states to subside 
gradually into ‘proprietary sovereignties’.154 It would not only curtail the discretion of 
the Government of India in the free exercise of its influence to choose ‘fit and qualified’ 
rulers, but would also diminish the share now held by the leading men of tire principal 
states in the determination of such questions, of which they were normally the best
152 Ibid.153
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judges. Whereas the point of law was now usually a subordinate element in the 
determination of cases of high importance to the constitution of a state, this element 
would acquire predominance. A decision in a succession case which followed the 
‘wishes and votes’ of leading sirdars and others was often arbitrary and independent of 
fixed rules.155 This kind of consideration would be likely to fall into disrepute or neglect 
if matters were to be decided, as the High Court would decide them, by the same 
principle governing the devolution of property. Moreover when a case of this kind was 
referred to a Court of Law it was inevitably followed by litigation. Two hostile parties 
would face each other and frequently those parties would be the Government and ‘its 
own feudatories’, which would be extremely damaging to the influence of political 
officers and the existing good feeling between such officers and the rulers to whom they 
were attached.156
However, despite the heed which the above memorandum suggested should be paid to 
the ‘wishes and votes’ of leading sirdars, such wishes and votes were not intended to 
challenge the power of the of the Government of India. It was pointed out in 1885 when 
the Maharawut of Pratapgarh died without an heir that the custom prevailed in some
155 Ibid.
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status and access to domain privileges’. However die winner of a suit was not selected because the 
imperial government wanted a weaker or stronger ruler on the throne, or because he represented a 
powerful faction which needed to be appeased. Winners of litigation were picked, against local 
practice, on the basis o f ‘criteria which served the wider needs of government from a British imperial 
vision: the need for a standardised law to ensure, theoretically, that justice would be given fairly to all 
on an equal basis’. Pamela Price, Kingship and Political Practice in Colonial India (Cambridge, 1996), 
pp. 40, 52. J. Duncan M. Derrett also stresses that the concept of law and litigation did not agree with 
that existing before British rule. The native ruler as the ‘fountain of justice’ had been supplanted by 
law courts used as a means of obtaining an advantage over an opponent. Legal administration with its 
artificialities and technicalities, the limitation of actions, the rule that plaintiffs must pay court fees and, 
finally, the law o f evidence, affronted the traditional notions o f obtaining justice. J. Duncan M. 
Derrett, ‘Tradition and Law in India’ in R. J. Moore ed. Tradition and Politics in South Asia (New 
Delhi, 1979), p. 45.
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Rajput states of electing a successor before Government orders had been received. 
Sirdars and officials sometimes carried out a ceremony of investiture in order that the 
gadi was not left empty for a single day and there was no break in the ‘direction of 
general business or trade’.157 The Government of India considered that ceremonies of 
this kind ought to be discouraged, since they conferred no right and tended to ‘keep alive 
mistaken ideas as to the source from which Native States derive then authority’, 
producing ‘much practical embarrassment’ for the Government.158 Nevertheless, in 
view of the fact that there was a requirement in Rajputana to settle a succession as 
quickly as possible, if a highly competent political officer were present it was 
accepted that he could confer with the royal women and principal nobles rather than 
referring the matter to the Government of India. In the case of the somewhat unclear 
Mewar succession in 1884, the Resident, Colonel C. K. M. Walters, described how 
the maharanis summoned all the principal sirdars and officials to the door of the
1 SQzenana, where a unanimous decision was announced in favour of Fateh Singh to be
Maharana.160 The Government of India praised the ‘care and forethought’ of Colonel 
Walters in dealing with the question, recognising that ‘An officer of less experience 
might have been at a loss how to act or advise under such circumstances’.161
157 Col. Sir Edward Bradford to Col. C. K. M. Walter, Res. Mewar, 5 May 1885, R2/179/343.
158 Ibid.
159 The impressive power o f the women o f the zenana is discussed at greater length in the chapters of 
education and royal marriage.
160 Col. C. K. M. Walters, Res. Mewar, to Col. E. R. C. Bradford, AGG Rajputana, 26 December 1884, 
R/l/1/690.
161 Offg. Sec, Gol to AGG Rajputana, 27 January 1885, R/l/1/690.
MINORITIES
57
There were obvious advantages to the choice of an heir who was as young as possible. 
In Baroda, for example, the deposition of the Gaekwar, Malharrao,162 in 1875 provided 
an ideal opportunity for British sanction of the adoption of a minor to give more lengthy 
British control over a major state. Northbrook admitted that there would be
a distinct advantage to the Baroda state in a minority, for the sink of iniquity 
surrounding the old Court can be thoroughly purged, and we must be content to bear 
the further attack of having set up a doubtful claim for the purpose of being able 
virtually to direct the administration of Baroda during a long minority.163
Malharrao was replaced by a twelve-year-old boy, Sayajirao, son of a village headman 
from an obscure lineage of the Gaekwar* family living in Maharashtra. Despite his 
immediate inability to rule due to his age it was stressed in British official documents 
that extensive enquiries had been carried out into claims to the succession made by 
various members of the ruling family, and copper plates and family documents had 
indisputably proved Sayajirao to be the most desirable candidate.164 British reluctance 
to abdicate its newly found power in the state was illustrated by the fact that, even after 
the Gaekwar had been installed for nearly two year's, there was a strong recommendation 
from the Government of India that no alteration should be made in the constitution of the 
Baroda Agency for at least a further two years. This recommendation was in agreement 
with Northbrook’s minute of March 1876, stating that ‘Baroda State should remain 
under the control of the Governor-General in Council .... This conclusion is founded on 
considerations affecting the State and its administration; and also on grounds of general 
policy’.165
162 Malharrao’s deposition is discussed more folly in the chapter on administration.
163 Northbrook to Salisbury, 20 May 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
164 Memorandum by T. MadhavaRao, Minister Baroda, 13 May 1875, R/2/539/321.
165 Golto SoS, No. 110,31 August 1883, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box III.
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In the case of Hyderabad, a state of even greater importance in princely ranking than 
Baroda, British policy towards a succession was carefully worked out in advance. In an 
official despatch of 1877 the Secretary of State expressed his agreement with the 
Government of India that, because the Nizam was a minor, the paramount power acting 
on his behalf might ‘justly’ make the selection of a successor upon the failure of lineal 
heirs. It was considered that the Mohamedan civil law of inheritance furnished ‘scanty 
materials for a conclusion as to the succession to a regality’, moreover the terms used by 
Lord Canning in his sanad did not ‘possess that precision which would constitute a 
guide under all circumstances’.166 By these terms much was left to the decision of the 
paramount power upon each case as it occurred, and the Secretary of State was not of the 
opinion that it was desirable ‘to supply the blank which Lord Canning has left, by the 
establishment of a new rule, or the creation of a precedent binding the future action of 
the Government’.167
A political advantage might be derived by recognising in the reigning Nizam a right of 
selection, which the Government of India would practically exercise, but this 
convenience would be purchased at the cost of vesting in a future Nizam a new 
prerogative which might not be exercised with discretion. To retain as much British 
power as possible within Hyderabad it was considered wiser to recognise the most 
suitable candidate ‘as an act of favour -  but carefully avoiding the admission of any 
right’.168 It was emphatically not the intention of the Secretary of State to give a 
decision which would be taken as a precedent for other Moslem states under similar
166
167
168
SoS to Gol, No. 21, 8 March 1877, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 3.
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circumstances; each case which presented serious difficulty should be reported for 
separate consideration.169
The desirability of gaining increased control in a state, albeit one considerably smaller 
than Hyderabad, was apparent in the case of Pudukkottai in south India, where the 
British were prepared to challenge the local establishment by bending the rules of 
succession to suit their needs. In 1877 recognition was given to the adoption by the 
Rajah of Pudokottai of his daughter's son as heir, in supercession of the claims of the son 
of the Rajah's deceased brother. The contention had been made by officials of the state 
that there had been no failure of natural heirs to allow such an adoption, and this action 
was therefore ‘opposed to the customs of the Rajah's family’,170 However the result of 
the proposed adoption would be a prolonged minority, during which the State would be 
under British management, whereas on the Rajah's fairly imminent death, the nephew 
would still be ‘a young man with (probably) no training, save what he has got from 
priests, courtiers and dancing girls’.171 It was therefore agreed that the Government of 
India should comply with the Rajah's request and ‘Recognition should be based not on 
strict interpretation of the sunnud, but consideration of general policy’.172
The Pudukkottai succession was not an isolated example of Government enthusiasm to 
introduce ‘good government’ through the education of young princes in British hands. 
Following the death of Sidi Ibrahim Khan, the Nawab of Janjira, in 1879, the leading
169 Ibid. Minorities were not always seen as the most desirable route to increased British power in a state. 
When the Nizam appeared to be dying in 1876 the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, suggested that a puppet ruler in 
Hyderabad could solve British problems, ‘might it not be good policy for the British Government to step in 
boldly and insist on deciding the succession itself, as the Paramount Power? Select not a minor, nor an 
octogenarian, but a man of sufficient mental and physical vigour to assert his independence’. Lytton to 
Salisbury, 3 September 1876, Lytton Correspondence Vol. 18.
170 SoS to Gol, No. 117, 22 November 1877, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 3.
171 Ibid.
172 Ibid. The chapters on education and hierarchy make it clear that in the case of the adopted grandson, 
Martanda Tondaiman, an English ‘training’ did not invariably produce a model ruler.
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sirdars of the state elected the ruler's illegitimate son to the vacant gadi, ‘no doubt as a 
fresh assertion of right of control over the administration of the state’.173 However on 
the grounds that the education of Ahmed Khan, the only legitimate son of Sidi Ibrahim, 
had been expressly provided for in an agreement of 1870, the Government of India 
turned down the sirdars' request. The young prince would not be allowed to assume the 
administration until he was twenty-one and had finished his education at Rajkumar 
College.174 The choice as successor of a young, malleable prince who could be 
transformed into an effective ruler and an active prop to the British Government was 
seen to be ample justification for sanctioning a succession which ignored local feeling.
Minority rule was also the goal in the state of Idar in western India. In 1901, 
following the death of the Maharajah without male issue one of his widows, the 
Chavhan Rani, claimed to be two months’ pregnant. The Political Agent was aware 
of the fact that if the pregnancy were true and resulted in the birth of a male heir, the 
succession would be in direct line. If not, the next course of action would be the 
recognition of the nearest collateral, Jagatsinghji of Sawar, a distant relative of the 
late Maharajah, a man of between fifty five and sixty years old and ‘neither by 
training nor by education a desirable successor to the gadi of as important a state as 
Idar’ . '75
The Government of Bombay recognised the advantage of using the precedent of the 
Baroda succession, in which sanction was granted to the widow of the late ruler to 
adopt, ‘within certain limitations’, irrespective of any collateral’s claim. If this policy 
were adopted in Idar, the senior Maharani would probably be willing to adopt
173 SoS to Gol, No. 104, 25 September 1879, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 5.
174 Ibid. Rajkumar College is discussed in detail in the chapter on education.
175 Political Agent, Mahi Kantha to Sec. to Govt. Bombay, Political Dept., 24 February 1901, PSCI, 
1875-1911, Box XXXV.
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Jagatsinghi’s son in favour of his father. The financial position of the state was so 
dire that the longer the period of ‘nursing’ under British control the better. Under 
Jagatsinghi the administration would be likely to deteriorate and security for the 
heavy debts due to the Government would be ‘appreciably decreased’.176 In the 
circumstances it would be most desirable to have a long minority, either if the 
Maharani’s pregnancy resulted in a male heir or if there was an adopted son, in order 
that from the start a scheme could be drawn up for reforming the administration and 
setting the finances of the state upon a sound basis. However it was admitted that 
imperial levies on states would not help such measures. In the event of a collateral or 
an adopted son succeeding, the state would be liable for a further payment of about 
Rs. 400,000 for nazar which, on top of a loan contracted during the famine, would 
bring Idar’s debt to the Government of India to ten lakhs of rupees.177
Finally it was decided that the government of Idar would be better handed over to a 
proven administrator rather than a minority council. The Rathors of Jodhpur were 
closely related to the rulers of Idar and, while the other claimants were trying to make 
good their claims with the Viceroy, Sir Pratap Singh, the third son of the ruler of 
Jodhpur, appealed direct to Queen Victoria, sending her a cable saying simply ‘Idar is
* 17R *mine’. Despite the loss of an opportunity for minority rule, the Government of India 
conceded that Sir Pratap Singh was able to claim ‘a substantial share of credit for the 
prosperity, self development and good government in Marwar’ and fulfilled the 
requirements of the official maxim
that, where there are no direct or lineal heirs to a Chiefship, and when no real and 
valid adoption has been made, the succession must be determined by selection, the 
principal considerations being the personal fitness of the nominee and the general
176 Ibid
177 Ibid. See also R/2/157/178.
178 Charles Allen, Lives o f the Indian Princes (London, 1984), p. 95.
interests of the State.179
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The British desire for room to manoeuvre in die ‘general interests’ of princely subjects 
was in some cases helped by the particular conditions of inheritance existing in some 
states. Successions in Travancore (and Cochin) on the south west coast of India differed 
from other states in that they followed Marumakatayam law, by which descent was 
matrilineal and only female children of the family were able to carry on the succession. 
In 1899 the Travancore royal family consisted of four members, the Rani, aged fifty-one, 
the Maharajah, aged forty-two, the Elaya Rajah, aged thirty-two and his brother, aged 
twenty-eight. It was clear that the family would become extinct unless there was an 
adoption and the choice fell on two girls, aged diree and four, whose mothers were 
daughters of the sister of the Rani, therefore blood relations.180
The Elaya Rajah saw no need to adopt until the lifetime of the last remaining male and 
considered that the children were too young, however in the eyes of the Government of 
India this was not an ordinary case of succession to family property but an Act of State 
and a ‘political necessity5, needing official sanction before the proposed adoption could 
take place. It was also an opportunity to put an undisputed succession in place before 
the last surviving prince was on his deathbed. The youth of the girls was a consideration 
which would soon cease to be problematic and there was no reason why the girls should 
not live to be mothers of numerous offspring, moreover the princes were not in
179 H. S. Barnes, Sec. Gol, FD to J. L. Jenkins, Offg. Sec.Govt. Bombay, Political Dept., 18 July 1901, 
R/l/1/270. Sir Pratap Singh abdicated nine years later to take over as Regent of Jodhpur to support his 
nephew, the young Maharajah, as discussed in the chapter on education. The personification of the 
Rajput warrior, at the age o f seventy he accompanied his troops into the trenches of France and later 
into Palestine. Allen, Lives o f Indian Princes, p. 94. Sir Pratap was described by the Viceroy, Lord 
Hardinge, as ‘The best pig-sticker in India ... o f Spartan simplicity ... truly a white man among 
Indians’. Hardinge, My Indian Years, 1910-1916 (London, 1948), p. 48.
180 G. T. Mackenzie, Res. Travancore and Cochin, to Chief Sec. Govt. Madras, 18 December 1899, 
R/2/892/278.
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particularly good health.181 Following a legal opinion given by V. Bhashyam Iyengar, 
the Advocate-General, recommending that the adoption was valid according to Hindu 
law and custom, the Resident was informed to advise the Travancore durbar that the
1 S ')adoption would be recognised. Travancore was yet another case where, by 
sanctioning the succession of the son of one of two extraordinarily young girls, a 
substantial British presence to oversee minority arrangements would be deemed 
acceptable in the state for a significant time.
Successions such as those in Idar and Travancore were not always resolved with the 
same ease and relative harmony. The following section of this chapter studies cases of 
less amicable family inheritance and the manner in which British officials could on 
occasions take advantage of the situation to install the candidate most likely to further 
their goal of ‘good government5.
ROYAL FAMILY DISPUTES
The British took care to guard the interests of rightful heirs to Indian thrones whenever 
there was a whiff of intrigue in royal circles. Such a case occurred in Bhopal in 1891 
when there was speculation that the ruling Begam was attempting to break the chain of 
female rulers in 1891. From its establishment in 1709, the state had produced prominent 
female figures who were active in public and political life. Women’s political influence 
in Bhopal was carried a stage further in 1819 when the Nawab died suddenly, leaving his 
eighteen year old widow, Qudsia Begam, to be invested with the supreme authority of
181 Ibid.
182 Opinion by V. Bhashyam Iyengar, 12 February 1900, Gol FD to Res. Travancore and Cochin, 30 
April 1900, R/2/892/279. As one of the royal adoptees, later the Senior Maharani o f Travancore, 
revealed ‘The idea was that whoever between the two of us got the first child, he would be the next 
Maharajah’. Allen, Lives o f  Indian Princes, p. 14.
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the state. Appointed regent by the British Political Agent until her daughter, Sikander, 
came of age and mairied, Qudsia emerged from behind the veil, hired a tutor to teach her 
the ‘necessary skills of riding and the arts of war’, then proceeded to introduce wide 
ranging reforms.183 Sikander Begam followed in this tradition, forcibly claiming the 
throne from her husband and proving herself to be a highly competent ruler. She 
distinguished herself, in particular, for her loyalty to the British during the Mutiny and 
for large-scale administrative reforms. As a result the British withdrew their proviso that 
the husband of the Begam would become Nawab, naming her only daughter, Shahjehan 
Begam, as sovereign in her own right upon the death of Sikander in 1867. When 
Shahjehan Begam also failed to bear a son, the dynasty of female rule in Bhopal was 
confirmed. 184
However under the influence of her second husband, Sadiq Hassan, Shahjehan was 
estranged from her daughter, Sultan Jahan. The Political Agent in Bhopal reported in 
1891 that the Begam was determined to set aside the succession of Sultan Jahan in 
favour of her half-nephew, Miah Alamgir Muhammed Khan. Rumours circulated in the 
Hindu Patriot and die Lucknow Advocate of the ruler’s intention to disinherit her 
daughter. Alamgir was ‘in every sense base’, as his fadier was a child of a liaison 
between the Begam’s father and a common bazaar woman and the Minister of Bhopal 
was most emphatic that the question of a change in succession should not be
1 RScountenanced. Sultan Jahan was heir-apparent by right of her descent through her 
mother and Sikander Begam, her grandmother. The Agent to the Governor-General in 
Central India, R. J. Crosthwaite, agreed that action should be taken to deflect a 
communication from the Begam to die Viceroy, since she would inevitably receive ‘die
183 Siobhan Lambert Hurley, ‘Contesting Seclusion: The Political Emergence of Muslim Women in 
Bhopal, 1901-1930’, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, SOAS, University of London, 1998, p. 10.
184 Lambert Hurley, ‘Contesting Seclusion’, pp. 10-11.
185 M. J. Meade, Pol. Agent, Bhopal, to R. J. Crosthwaite, AGG Cl, 23 June 1893, R/l/1/158.
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ignominy of a refusal’. In any case he was of the opinion that the rumours contained 
little substance and a challenge to the succession was unlikely to develop.186
In situations where a succession was not as clear-cut as that in Bhopal, the British 
were not above using family disputes as an excuse to call into play the ‘right’ to 
overrule the personal wishes of the ruler and install their own choice of candidate. 
One such case was that of the Nawab of Bahawalpur in the Punjab, who banished his 
son and heir, Mobarak Khan, to a prison fort in the desert in the hope that the 
Government would recognise Haji Khan, the adopted son of a low caste woman 
whom he subsequently married.187 In 1897 the British felt bound to interfere in the 
interests of Mobarak Khan as, even if the life of the heir was not endangered, it was 
certain that several years in Kila Dherewar Fort would render him unfit for rule. The 
Punjab Government requested that the young prince be sent to Aitchison College in 
Lahore, despite the Nawab’s insistence that his son was being taught Urdu, Persian, 
and arithmetic, as well as instruction in the Koran, by a tutor. However, despite its 
apparent support of Mobarak Khan, the Government of India doubted his capabilities 
as ruler and insisted that it had no reason to depart from its usual custom of refusing 
to make, during the Nawab’s lifetime, a specific declaration as to whom it would 
recognise as heir on his death. The Foreign Secretary, W. J. Cuningham, repeated the 
Government line that the ‘principle of primogeniture determines the succession of
1 oo
Mohammedan states, but the successor must be fit to rule’.
186 Ibid. See also R /l/1/1179. Other than in Bhopal women were subject to rigid rules of succession. 
A woman could rule as a wife (or widow) or as a mother (and regent), but never as a daughter or sister 
of a former ruler. In practice this meant that a woman ruler had to operate in the milieu of her in-laws. 
Once she married into a royal house, she was cut off from her own kinsmen.
187 Nawab Sadik Mohammed Khan of Bhawalpur to L. W. Dane, Chief Sec. Govt. Punjab, 4 June 
1897.
188 W. J. Cuningham, Sec. Gol, FD to Chief Sec. Govt. Punjab, 25 October 1897, R/l/1/199. See also 
R/l/1/207.
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Such deliberate procrastination on the part of the Government of India in order to 
achieve the most advantageous position at the time of succession was also apparent in 
another Punjab state when the Mir of Khairpur requested permission in 1899 to set aside 
his eldest son, Imam Bukhsh, in favour of his brother, Ahmed Ali, who was of ‘inferior 
birth’. In the eyes of the British Imam Bukhsh was of a ‘weak and incapable character’, 
while Ahmed Ali’s succession was ‘out of the question’.189 However Imam Bukhsh had 
three sons, all ‘bright and promising boys’, tire eldest of whom was doing well at 
Aitchison College, and it was possible that the Mir might well survive until they were 
older.190 Following the death of the Mir ten years later it was agreed that Imam Bukhsh 
should succeed to the gadi, however as he had been regarded by the deceased ruler as 
‘unfitted mentally’ to take over the administration he was instructed to act in all matters 
under the advice of his vizier, referring matters to the Political Agent where there were 
irreconcilable differences.191
A family rift between the Maharajah of Kashmir, Sir Pratab Singh, and his brother, Sir 
Amar Singh, gave rise to a similar situation in 1906. The Maharajah asked the Viceroy 
for permission to adopt the son of his cousin, the Raja of Poonch, rather than his 
brother’s son, Hari Singh, ostensibly on religious grounds since Hari Singh was the only 
male child in the family and the Dharma Sastra declared that such a son was under an 
obligation to undertake the funeral rites for his own father to the exclusion of others. 
The Maharajah pleaded that ‘for a pious Hindu it is the most important religious 
obligation to leave a son behind for the peace and salvation of his soul, and in the Hindu 
Shasti'as it is considered a great sin to die childless’, however it emerged that the real 
reason behind the request was the ill feeling between the Maharajah and his brother, Sir
189 H. S. Barnes, Offg. Sec. Gol, FD, to Sec. Govt. Bombay, Political Dept, 13 May 1899, R/l/1/222.
190 Ibid.
191 A. Younghusband, Commissioner Sind, to Sir George Sydenham Clarke, Gov. Bombay, 6 March 
1909, R/l/1/372.
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Amar Singh, that had existed since their father considered supplanting the elder by the 
younger.192 Sir Louis Dane, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, was of the 
opinion that there was little doubt that, as demonstrated by Rajput practice, the adoption 
of a brother or even a brother’s son, even if the only son, was perfectly valid and 
recognised by the Shastras. If the Maharajah had already adopted the boy, as was 
suspected, it would be necessary to take further steps to ensure that neither of the 
‘unfortunate children’ was killed. The best action would be to call upon the Maharajah 
to formally adopt either Amar Singh or his son to put a stop to the uncertainty. If he 
refused he would be informed that no other adopted son would be recognised as heir and 
that it might also be necessary to place restrictions on his powers.193
Sir Francis Younghusband, Resident in Kashmir, made it clear to Pratab Singh that the 
Government of India would have great difficulty in sanctioning any adoption which 
would involve superceding Amar Singh and his son. The sanad of adoption granted to 
the Maharajah was in fact only a guarantee on the part of the Government that the state 
would not be resumed upon the failure of natural heirs. The ruler had two, his brother 
and his nephew, and in the interests of the state it was necessary that one of the two 
should succeed.194 However Younghusband was firmly reprimanded by Sir Louis for 
misleading the Maharajah by suggesting that his brother or nephew would succeed even 
if he produced a son, which at his advanced age was highly unlikely. Should a 
legitimate and fully recognised son be bom the question would have to be reconsidered. 
Indeed the actual succession would, in accordance with the general policy of the 
Government, be settled only when the vacancy to the gadi occurred. The Resident had 
advised the ruler that tire orders of the Government fixed die succession upon a
192 Maharajah o f Kashmir to Lord Minto, 4 July 1906, R/l/1/341.
193 Note by Sir Louis Dane, Sec. Gol, FD, 15 June 1906, R/2/1074/200.
194 Francis Younghusband, Res. Kashmir, to Sec. Gol, FD, 31 October 1906, R/l/1/341.
68
particular member of the family during the lifetime of a prince, rather than stressing the 
ultimate power of the Government to arrive at a decision after a ruler’s death.195
CONCLUSION
Following the Proclamation of 1858 by Queen Victoria guaranteeing the tenure of the 
Indian dynasties, the problem of the sovereignty of the Indian rulers was reduced but not 
resolved. The incongruity of Indian sovereigns as subordinate to a body such as the East 
India Company lessened somewhat as they were now directly subordinate to a sovereign 
power. However, despite much debate, no consensus ever emerged as to the precise 
legal status of the rulers. Since over the years each state negotiated its own series of 
treaties with the British, legal scholars could find no strict uniformity of principle with 
respect to the princely states as a whole. As this chapter has made clear, questions of 
succession were, like other issues traditionally settled by individual princely authority, 
open to a certain amount of liberal interpretation on the part of the British.
Bhupen Qanungo, in his study of Indian princely history during this period, states that, 
although the adoption sanads bound the states as never before in ‘ties of good faith and 
goodwill5 to the British Government, in no way did they diminish die position of power 
which the British had assumed in the days of the doctrine of lapse.196 The paramount 
power was still the ultimate arbiter in cases of a native ruler dying without a natural heir. 
No treaties between equal powers, only sanads or grants, ‘and these explicitly
195 Dane to Younghusband, 15 June 1907, R/2/1074/200. The Maharajah of Kashmir may have been 
wise in opposing the succession of either Amar Singh or his son. Younghusband managed to prevent 
Hari Singh from being poisoned, but in the 1920s the gullible prince became the victim of a blackmail 
plot ‘which contained all the ingredients of a good scandal5. Patrick French, Younghusband: The Last 
Great Imperial Adventurer (London, 1994), p. 270.
196 Qanungo, ‘Study o f British Relations’, p. 264
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conditional and revocable’, contained the assurance of the British Government regarding 
succession by adoptions. Qanungo contends that:
In accepting Canning's adoption sanads, the Native Rulers were accepting, by clear 
implication, the hitherto disputed claim of the Government that, as Paramount Power, 
it had the right to decide the validity of a succession to a gadi, to sanction a 
succession, and to intervene in a Native State to settle a disputed succession.197
Thus the total legal effect of such sanads was to emphasize the power of the 
Government of India ‘in matters relating to life and death’ of every state.198 Writing in 
Januaiy 1875 the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, summed up the situation in his 
advice to the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook:
It should be impressed on the minds of the feudatories that their privileges under the 
Proclamation and the Sunnud are contingent on then good behaviour and that 
misconduct releases the Paramount Power ft*om special obligation, and will not 
merely involve the supersession of the offender. If their misconduct took the form of 
rebellion, it would probably involve annexation; and in a lesser degree it involves the 
adjustment of the succession, not according to their customs, but according to the 
discretion of the Paramount Power.199
Nevertheless it was anticipated that in most cases an ‘adjustment of the succession’ to 
deal with princely misconduct could be avoided by routine Government sanction of 
successions to tighten British control, in the hope that the desired ‘good behaviour’ 
would result. Wherever possible a minor was selected, giving the young heir as much 
time as possible for the purposes of education and administrative training. As is the case 
in other sections of the princely life cycle, in the latter part of the nineteenth century the 
British goal in the Indian states was the instigation of salubrious and accountable 
practice both in royal private life and government. Even after accession, if a young ruler 
was not performing well, the British could lay down stringent conditions of rule.
197 Ibid.
198 Ibid.
199 Salisbury to Northbrook, January 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
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However if the Government of India wished to limit the personal power of a prince later 
in his reign, the terms of many treaties raised serious obstacles to major British 
intervention at that stage. It was therefore of the greatest importance that, in the case of 
an adult succeeding to a gadi, the candidate had to be deemed ‘fit to rule’ by the 
Government of India. This phrase could cover a wide spectrum of conditions and 
Government decisions were absolute.
It is true that the process of succession was not cut and dried in India before British rule. 
Succession was often in doubt in the successor states to the Mogul empire. Due to the 
fluidity of inheritance laws Muslim rulers tended to emerge from a large body of 
favourites connected with a dead ruler’s harem and concubines, and even in Hindu royal 
families an eldest son might not succeed if he proved to be incapable of fulfilling the 
strenuous demands of leadership. A prince had the prerogative of choosing among his 
sons for his heir and the rules of descent could be and were manipulated in the face of 
contingency. Moreover in the case of a disputed succession a successful candidate 
frequently required the support of an outside power with the inevitable strings attached. 
However under Mogul rule there was a great variety of such outside powers, large and 
small, with different agendas to fulfil. In contrast in the last decades of the nineteenth 
century the British were, given the opportunity, able to manipulate tire rules of descent 
with the single-minded, unconditional purpose of arriving at their desired form of 
westernised government in the Indian states. To this same goal the education of young 
rulers was placed under particularly close scrutiny, as demonstrated in the following 
chapter.
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EDUCATION
Stemming primarily from Evangelical and Utilitarian ideas, the pre-Mutiny British 
determination to reconcile Indians to European concepts by education or force gave way 
to a more balanced view in the second half of the nineteenth century. The British now 
discovered virtues in the traditional organisation of the society over which they ruled, as 
ideas emerged of ways in which that society could be turned to good use. In their new 
role as ‘loyal feudatories’ and a link between the paramount power and the Indian 
peasantry it would be necessary to transform the Indian princes into good natural leaders. 
On the one hand the young chiefs needed to be taught the guidelines of good 
government, based upon European liberal principles, and on the other there was a need 
to maintain the cultural differences which bound them to their subjects. Efforts were 
made from 1870 onwards both by formal education, either through tutors and special 
schools and colleges, or by the influence of political officers at courts, to produce a new 
multi-faceted breed of ruler, although few princes were given the opportunity to put such 
an education to good use after they reached their majority. This part of the princely life 
cycle is divided into two sections: the first looks at the individual education of young 
princes within their own states and the second deals with the princely colleges which 
were opened in the second half of the nineteenth century as boarding schools for royalty 
and the aristocracy.
PALACE EDUCATION
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TUTORIAL CREDENTIALS
In large and powerful principalities such as Baroda, Hyderadad and Mysore it was 
deemed desirable for training programmes for young princes to be carefully 
supervised by British tutors. Although some candidates from the Staff Corps were 
selected for the job, many tutors were selected from the Indian Civil Service. The 
Gaekwar of Baroda, for example, was educated by Frederick Elliott of the Bombay 
Civil Service and the Maharajahs of Kolhapur and Bhavnagar were put under the 
tuition of Stuart Fraser, also of the Bombay Civil Service, who then became tutor to 
the minor Maharajah of Mysore. Brian Egerton, District Superintendent of Police in 
Ajmer, was tutor to both the Maharajah of Bikaner and the Nizam of Hyderabad, and 
J, W. D. Johnstone of the Education Department of the Government of India was tutor 
to Scindia, Maharajah of Gwalior.
In the first half of the nineteenth century candidates for the Indian Civil Seivice were 
instructed at Haileybury College before assuming their duties in India. It has been 
suggested by Bernard Cohn that the educational background of members of the 
Service was in many cases not particularly rigorous, despite the presence of 
luminaries such as T, R. Malthus as lecturer in history and political economy at the 
Haileybury.200 The College faculty was said to be in a difficult position maintaining 
academic standards and discipline. By carrying out its duties it could come into conflict 
with the Court of Directors which, through its patronage, appointed students. If a
200 Bernard S. Cohn, ‘Recruitment and Training of British Civil Servants in India 1600-1860’ in Ralph
Braibanti (ed.) Asian Bureaucratic Systems Emergent from the British Imperial Tradition (Durham NC, 
1966), p. 136.
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student failed for academic inadequacies or was dismissed for misbehaviour the
appointing director lost out as well, as ‘each student represented a valuable
0 (\\appointment5. Moreover it was frequently the restricted possibilities of a career in 
England rather than the attractiveness of an Indian career which determined 
candidacy.202
Haileybury was closed in December 1857, owing to the introduction of a new scheme 
under which members of the Civil Service were appointed by competitive examination. 
Initially under the scheme there were difficulties in recruiting men from the desired 
background. A substantial number of candidates did not hold degrees from Oxbridge, as 
was originally desired, and a surprising proportion had not attended any university, a 
phenomenon that became increasingly evident in later competitions. Among the total 
number of competitors, the percentage of Oxbridge candidates declined from a high of 
62% in 1858 to a low of 8.2% in 1874.203 Bradford Spangenberg in his study of the 
Indian Civil Service in the late nineteenth century suggests that many thrifty, pragmatic 
middle class people questioned the merit of spending a great deal of money on their 
son’s university education when a shorter, less expensive, course at a cramming 
institution proved sufficient to succeed at the examination.204 Nevertheless it should be 
pointed out that, despite Spangenberg’s somewhat negative assessment of the Service 
candidacy, a number of high performing individuals continued to be turned out on a 
regular basis.
202 Ibid. The district officer John Beames recalled that his father had informed him o f his nomination 
to Haileybury with regret as he had anticipated a successful career at the Bar for his son. John Beames, 
Memoirs o f  a Bengal Civilian, p. 60.
203 B, Spangenberg, British Bureaucracy in India: Status, Policy and the ICS in the late Nineteenth 
Century (Columbia, 1976), p. 21.
204 British Bureaucracy, p. 25.
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For political officers from the Staff Corps with a purely military background the 
academic requirements were even less demanding than those at Haileybury. 
Addiscombe, the East India Company’s Military Seminary, was founded in 1809 to 
provide up to two years general and technical education for boys between fourteen and 
eighteen years who had been nominated for officer cadetship in Company forces. The 
Seminaiy was initially intended for students destined for engineering or artillery 
regiments, and later opened to guards and infantry cadets.205 Academic prowess 
appeared to be low in the scale of priorities of both teachers and taught. It would appear 
unlikely, therefore, that the educational grounding for both Indian Civil Service and Staff 
Corps recruits for the supervision of young Indian rulers was on the whole sufficiently 
demanding in quality or quantity to generate particularly high academic aspirations as far 
as their princely charges were concerned. However it is questionable whether the first 
wave of princely charges exposed to western ideas would have been able in any case to 
cope with a particularly demanding curriculum, especially as there was still considerable 
resistance in durbars to the dissemination of such ideas. Such resistance is apparent in 
the following section of this chapter.
EXTRACTION FROM THE CLUTCHES OF THE ZENANA
During Mayo’s viceroyalty, due to the sensitivity of the impending restoration of Mysore 
to native rule206 much official correspondence centred upon the young adopted prince, 
Chamarajendra Wadiar Bahadur, in whom it was hoped to instil the qualities of good 
leadership. A letter from the Maharajah’s tutor, Colonel G. Malleson, in September 
1869 emphasised the problems involved in extricating the prince from the claustrophobic
205 Martin Moir, A General Guide to the India Office Records (London, 1988), p. 38.
206 Discussed in the previous chapter.
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atmosphere of the zenana, a challenge which repeats itself throughout this chapter as in 
state after state there is relentless opposition by palace women to princely education in
• icnBritish hands. In Mysore it was hoped that with ‘prudence, firmness and kindness’ 
sufficient influence could be exerted over the ruler to ‘counteract the wretched 
atmosphere in which a young Native chief must live5.208 Criticism was made of the fact 
that for the Maharajah ‘Every whim is gratified, every wish forestalled5.209 It was felt 
essential for the boy to be taught outside the palace walls and by a tutor independent of 
the palace, a move vigorously opposed by the royal females who declared that to leave 
the palace would remove some of the young ruler's dignity. They pointed out that ‘the 
late Maharajah was not taught, why should this one be?5 and only agreed finally to the 
prince's tuition under the threat of being reported to the Viceroy for failing to stand by 
the conditions imposed by the British Government210
With his customary idealism Mayo saw the education of the young rulers and nobles as 
the cure for the secret ills of native India. The implanting of Western liberal ideas would 
transform the states. He firmly believed that Mysore had been saved from ‘much that 
would have given great trouble thereafter* and that British influence in guiding the 
young prince and his family ‘has worked a great cure and all intrigue and underhand 
work is I hope thoroughly choked5 211 To widen his horizons, die young Maharajah was 
to be made familiar with objects of interest in his own country and allowed ‘free 
personal intercourse5 with those from whom he might acquire information. Association
207 The considerable power wielded by royal women in matters other than education is discussed at 
length in the following chapter.
208 Letter from Col. G. Malleson to Mayo, 29 August 1869 enclosed Mayo to Argyll, 9 September 
1869, Argyll Collection, Vol. II.
209 Ibid.
210 Ibid.
211 Mayo to Argyll, 25 January 1871, Argyll Collection, IOR Neg. 4236.
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with other young noblemen ‘of good disposition and promising intelligence’ would give 
the young prince confidence and encouragement.
One of the main reasons for propping up what in many cases was an enfeebled ruling 
class was the contemporary widely held view that this class still held the loyalty and 
adulation of the people of India. Therefore care was to be taken that Western 
indoctrination was confined to the English language and the details of government. 
Instruction in Indian culture and religion, insofar as barbarous practices were not 
involved, was to continue as before. An official despatch from the Secretary of State in 
1871 stressed the fact that the Maharajah of Mysore would have to rule, when he came 
of age, over ‘a Hindoo people peculiarly jealous of, and attached to, the faith of their 
ancestors ... any measure which might alienate from him then sympathies should be 
carefully guarded against’ 213 It was recognised that there was great difficulty in training 
an Indian prince for the future government of his state, using principles recognised by 
European statesmen, without ‘offending the prejudices or affecting the interests of many 
who would fain see him reared in accordance with the old oriental model’ and only a 
moderate success rate was anticipated in introducing European ideas via the ruler.214 
While ‘truthfulness and sound morality’ should be inculcated, ‘no interference should be 
exercised with his religion in his forms of worship’. His views should be ‘constantly 
directed to the discharge of the regal and administrative functions which his high office 
will one day demand’.215
Despite the need to continue the association of the rulers with their cultural roots, it was 
deemed undesirable that a native should undertake the vital role of tutor to the
212 SoS to Gol, No. 133, 3 October 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16.
213 SoS to Gol, No. 104, 22 May 1871, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 14.
214 Ibid.
215 W. S. Seton-Karr, Sec. Gol, to L. B. Bowrmg, Commissioner Mysore, 12 December 1868, 
R/2/44/408.
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Maharajah of Mysore. Colonel Malleson was of the opinion that the ideal candidate 
should be
a gentleman fresh from one of the English universities ... of high character and 
attainments, totally unconnected with India. A greater mistake could not be 
committed than to appoint to that office any one directly connected with an Indian 
family, and still less any one now in India. No candid mind can deny that the 
tendency of Indian life is to bring the mind into a groove, from which, even under 
other climes, it rarely emerges. What is required for the Maharajah is the influence of 
an unfettered, unprejudiced English intellect, of a mind that has thought out problems 
for itself, and which takes nothing on trust.216
However the Secretary of State, Lord Salisbury, disagreed. Writing to the Viceroy, Lord 
Northbrook, in 1875 he declared that, if there were no object other than to bestow on the 
young ruler ‘Philosophical and Literary Knowledge’, Malleson’s suggestion would be 
feasible, but literary proficiency was not in this case the principal goal. The Maharajah 
was soon to be invested with powers and charged with duties which would leave little 
time for the ‘pursuits of a student life’ 217 It was vital that he should be instructed in the 
principles of government and ‘the warnings or encouragement furnished by the history 
of other Princes of his own race’ 218 To communicate this knowledge, an officer with 
some familiarity with Indian administration was required and such a person could be 
found more easily in India than Britain. Mysore would be much in the public eye when 
it was returned to native rule and the post of tutor was crucial since the ‘future form and 
permanency of Native rule in India will be largely influenced by the career of die Prince 
whose education you are preparing to complete’ 219
Since it was deemed by the British that diere was no ‘royal road to learning’, a school 
with three classes was formed in the Mysore palace, modelled on the system at
216 Col. G. Malleson to Sec. Gol, FD, 1 January 1875.
217 Salisbury to Northbrook, 17 June 1875, R/2/44/403.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
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Winchester.220 The Maharajah was joined by various sons of noblemen and officials of 
the court of about the same age. At first about forty, then later fifty, came to the school, 
including the Maharajah’s two brothers. At the beginning the Maharajah was seen as 
attending a class "without really belonging to it’, due to ‘prejudice’ and a ‘supposed loss 
of dignity’ perceived by the women of the palace 221 The occupants of the zenana 
ostensibly ‘threw many obstacles’ in the way of the prince’s education and had to be told 
forcibly that further interference would result in his being removed from the palace 
altogether at the age of seven, when separation horn his female relatives was generally 
considered to be highly undesirable.222 The headmaster of the royal school, Jayaram 
Rao, was a Brahmin who remained with the Maharajah until he was fifteen. The 
appointment of a native thoroughly acquainted with English was considered preferable 
to the selection of an Englishman in the post. Oootacamund was selected as the 
‘sanitarium’ for the summer season and the Maharajah, with a few of his classmates, was 
taken there by his tutor and guardian, J. D. Gordon (later Sir James Gordon, Chief 
Commissioner and Resident in Mysore), where ‘free from the turmoil of palace life’ his 
education was seen to progress considerably.223 The Government's assumption about the 
correct form of education was the same as the view held in England at the time. The 
public school emphasis on games as a training in character was confidently adapted to 
the training of Indian princes. It was agreed that the Maharajah should be taught to ride, 
swim, play cricket and handle firearms, and generally encouraged to participate in ‘those
220 Retrospective Note on the Education of the Maharajah o f Mysore, 8 September 1892, R/l/1/164.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid. A similar school modelled on English lines was opened in 1875 for the young Gaekwar of 
Baroda and the sons of sirdars o f the state. Baroda’s Minister, Sir Madhava Rao, was convinced o f the 
virtues of such an education, believing that ‘England repudiates ignorance as a basis o f strength or 
stability ... and bids Princes and people alike to be enlightened and happy’. Thomas Henry Thornton, 
General Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatory States o f Central and Southern India (London, 1898), p. 
240. T. Madhava Rao was the first Indian to be appointed Acting Principal o f the Madras High School, 
a Fellow o f Madras University and Dewan Regent of Baroda during the Gaekwar’s minority from 1875 
to 1881. Vikram Menon, ‘Popular Princes: Kingship and Social Change in Travancore and Cochin 
1870-1930’, Unpublished Ph. D. Thesis, University of Oxford, 1998, p. 263.
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physical and strengthening exercises which are suited to his country, position and
Later the Maharajah’s education was entrusted to W. A. Porter, a veteran educationalist 
who had made Kumbakonum College, ‘the Cambridge of Southern India’ 225 During the 
latter period of his studies he received instruction in the principles of British 
administration and for wider experience went on tour in the province and mixed in 
English society. It was the intention of the British Government to see the Maharajah 
married to ‘an educated and enlightened lady’ 226 With this object in mind Gordon set 
up a girls’ school within the palace for the education of the girls belonging to the royal 
family, together with several daughters of high Brahmin officials of the palace 227 A 
report made to the Government of India by Gordon in 1880 declared that
the progress made since Mr. Porter’s arrival, in developing His Highness’s general 
intelligence and giving him a proper mental training, has been marked and very 
satisfactory. He is now able to read and understand for himself ordinary books and 
newspapers and he composes fairly and writes his letters without assistance. His 
power of observation is keen and his judgment of persons and things remarkably 
sound.228
However the treatment of the Maharajh’s successor, Krishnaraja Wadiar, reveals the 
extent to which ideas about princely education changed over the second half of the 
nineteenth century, influenced by the emergence of the princely colleges designed for 
the purpose of training young rulers and aristocrats. As in his father’s youth, a school 
was formed at the palace at Mysore for the young Maharajah and boys of the same age
224 Seton-Karr to Bow ing, 12 December 1868, R/2/44/408.
225 Dewans Madhava Rao and A. Sashiah Sastri, who appears in the chapters on education and royal 
women, were both educated at Kumbakonum.
226 A. Vadivelu, Some Mysore Worthies (Madras, 1900), p. 15.
227 Ibid. This scheme never came to fruition. As will be seen in the chapter on marriage, the 
Maharajah eventually agreed to a marriage with the elder daughter of the Rana of Vana, a Rajput 
‘connected with other ruling Chiefs’ in Kathiawar.
228 Quoted Vadivelu, Mysore Worthies, p. 17.
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selected from the principal families of the state. A European tutor, J. J. Whiteley, was 
appointed instead of a native headmaster. The education followed the same lines as that 
at the major princely colleges, Mayo and Rajkumar (considered later in this chapter), but 
the students did not reside in the school premises. A special class was formed and 
several of the best Hindu and Muslim students from various institutions in Mysore were 
invited to participate ‘in order to infuse a spirit of wholesome rivalry in the mind of the 
Rajah’.229
On visiting the palace school in 1896 Mr. Cook, Principal of the Central College, 
Bangalore, and Educational Adviser to the Government of Mysore, remarked 
euphorically that the ‘general knowledge of the boys is superior to that of other schools’ 
and he ‘had no idea the system was so perfect’.230 Stuart Fraser of the Bombay Civil 
Service, appointed by the Government of India as personal tutor and guardian to the 
young prince,231 reported with equal enthusiasm, ‘The education that he has been 
receiving is not mere cramming nor the learning of a book-worm but is diversified, 
inasmuch as it embraces every art and science which will help to make him a wise, 
sagacious, and highly cultured ruler5.232 Certainly with historical studies of other rulers 
as diverse as Clive, Warren Hastings, the Marquis of Wellesley and, somewhat 
surprisingly, Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan,233 the Maharajah had a colourful range of 
political views from which to choose.234 Moreover, in addition to his class studies,
229 Vadivelu, Mysore Worthies, p. 63.
230 Report on education of Wadiar Bahadur for January 1896 by J. J. Whiteley, R/2/33/314. See also 
R/2/32/300.
231 Fraser, was appointed in 1896 at a salary of Rs. 1,600 rising to Rs. 2,500 a month, plus travelling 
expenses and a free house, under the strict conditions that he would stay until the Maharajah came of 
age, not applying for long leave unless sick during that period. W. Mackworth Young, Res. Mysore, to 
K. Sheshadri Iyer, Dewan, 9 April 1896, R/2/29/267. Later Sir Stuart Fraser, KCSI, CIE, he became an 
officer of great distinction who died a few weeks short of 100 years old after serving as Resident in 
Kashmir, Mysore and Hyderabad.
232 Quoted Vadivelu, Mysore Worthies, p. 63.
233 Hyder Ali and Tipu Sultan were the Muslim conquerors of Mysore, defeated by the British and 
replaced by the young Maharajah’s Hindu Wadiar family in 1799.
23 Fraser to J. A. Crawford, Res. Mysore, 16 November 1901, R/2/8/64.
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Wadiar Bahadur devoted two hours a day to special subjects such as international law 
and Indian political law, the principles of legislation, the history of the land revenue 
system, civil and criminal justice in Mysore, the Inam Settlement,235 forests, famine 
relief, excise and assessed taxes 236
However Whiteley expressed a certain unease as far as the young Maharajah’s moral 
environment was concerned and the difficulties involved in his exposure to the less 
desirable aspects of religious ritual and durbars. It was impossible to change religious 
ceremonies and the only available course of action would be to let his mother, the 
Maharani, know how necessary it was for such ceremonies to be conducted in a manner 
as ‘innocuous’ as possible 237 Nautches (court dances) could not be stopped, but could 
be made ‘more formal and less suggestive’, however this would be a particularly delicate 
matter for any Mysore official to tackle, hi addition Whiteley saw the need for 
Krishnaraja Wadiar to be given separate living and sleeping apartments in the palace to 
which the tutor would have access at all hours, since he was constantly met by ‘zenana 
difficulty’ when he ought to be able to go in and out of the young ruler’s rooms at will, 
except when prevented horn doing so by caste and religious ceremonies, such as eating 
and praying 238 No social visits should be paid, except to relations, and no guests should 
be able to associate with the Maharajah without the permission of the tutor as the 
representative of the Government of India. In Whiteley’s view, the Maharani should be 
made fully aware of the importance of the ‘innocence of youth’, and its significance in 
British eyes.239 Nevertheless the Maharajah’s existence was by no means dull and 
outside the palace he participated in a surprisingly eclectic mix of social appointments.
235 The Inam Settlement is discussed in detail in the chapter on hierarchy and ritual.
236 Fraser to J. A. Crawford, Res. Mysore, 16 November 1901, R/2/8/64. See also R/2/8/64.
237 J. J. Whiteley to W. Lee-Wamer, 26 May 1895, R/2/33/314. The Maharani, Vanivilas Sannidhana,
features strongly in hie chapter on marriage and royal women.
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While at Bangalore during 1895/6 his schedule included visits to the races and a polo 
tournament, the afternoon ‘At Home’ at the Residency, a vegetable show and a visit 
from the Papal Delegate.240
As in Mysore, official efforts were made in Hyderabad to distance the young ruler 
from the unwholesome atmosphere of palace quarters. Captain John Clerk, equerry to 
the Duke of Edinburgh, was employed as guardian and tutor to the young Nizam, 
Mahbub Ali Khan, in 1874, however the appointment was hardly productive. Sir 
Richard Meade, Resident in Hyderabad, reported in 1876 that the access of the tutor 
was so restricted that ‘it was impossible for him to educate in the narrowest sense, 
much less exert any moral influence over his charge’.241 Moreover Meade referred to 
medical reports declaring that the Nizam was ‘disgracefully fed and clothed, and the 
sanitary condition of his rooms dreadful*. He was exposed to ‘dissipated proceedings 
in the zenana5 and the procurement of liquor via certain ‘delinquents’.242 The 
Viceroy, Lord Lytton, was in no doubt that the object of the Diwan, Salar Jung I, was to 
reduce the Nizam to a ‘cipher’, in order that the power of the State might remain 
concentrated in his own hands,
for this purpose he keeps the boy secluded, almost a prisoner in the palace, where, I 
am told, he is waited upon by 25 young women trained to debauch him. Salar Jung 
visits him daily, but everyone else seems to be zealously excluded from his presence, 
and he is rarely allowed to leave the palace. Thus withdrawn from healthful external 
influences, it cannot be said that the development of his mind or body have fair play, 
nor that the objects on which the Government of India laid so much stress in 
constituting the Regency are being loyally carried out243
240 Whiteley, Reports on Education of Maharajah of Mysore, August 1895 and January 1896, 
R/2/32/300.
241 Thomas Henry Thornton, General Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatory States o f Central and 
Southern India (London, 1898), p. 286. See also V. K. Bawa, Hyderabad under Salar Jang I  (New 
Delhi, 1996), pp. 108-9.
242 Memo by Sir Richard Meade, Res. Hyderabad, 24 March 1881, attached to No. 461, Gol to Res., 
25 May 1881, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box I.
243 Lytton to Salisbuiy, 24 September 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19. Salar Jung’s somewhat 
autocratic stance appears with regularity throughout this thesis. However British efforts were not 
entirely in vain; the Reverend H. Fitzpatrick wrote in 1881 to Major F. A. Wilson, Superintendent of 
the Nizam’s education, that he was ‘particularly struck with the clear way in which the first Parliament
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In 1894 the Resident suggested to the Nizam that, like Clerk, an English gentleman 
should be appointed to superintend the education of his own son, the Sahibzada Mir 
Ali Khan, in his case from the age of eight or nine. The superintendent would not take 
a share in the teaching but would oversee the entire tutorial and household staff. The 
year would be divided into three or four terms with a suitable proportion of vacation 
and the pupil could live during the term time in the same house as his superintendent. 
All vacations would be spent at home but during the term it would be best to restrict 
the visits to the palace to special occasions.244 Such an arrangement, it was hoped, 
would break the ever-present ‘continuity of zenana influence’ and at the same time 
prevent the boy from becoming ‘over-Europeanised’ and alienated from his own 
people.245
Ideally five or six young native gentlemen of appropriate age and rank would be 
educated with the Nizam’s son and subject to the same rules and discipline. For the 
first few years the staff would be native Muslims, but at least one of the masters 
would be selected from the Education Department for his knowledge of English and 
Urdu, and for his special ability to teach. The aim was to to n  the Sahibzada into an 
‘educated Mohammedan of the highest type’, yet able also to read, write and speak 
English to a high standard. After two to three years the boy could be placed under an 
English tutor 246 The course of studies was to be approved by the Nizam and not 
altered without his sanction, however it was stressed that ‘Ample time should be left 
for recreation and for outdoor games and exercises’ 247
assembled in the reign o f Edward I was described by the young ruler, with ‘ingeniously phonetic’ 
spelling’. Letter dated 4 November 1881 attached to No. 16, 6 February 1882, Gol to SoS, PSCI, 
1875-1911, Box II.
244 Trevor Chichele Plowden, Res.Hyderabad, to Nizam, 6 September 1894, R/l/1/164.
245 Chichele Plowden to W. J. Cuningham, Sec. Gol, FD, 5 May 1894, R/2/67/19.
246 Ibid.
247 Chichele Plowden to Nizam, 6 September 1894, R/l/1/164. At the Foreign Office Sir Henry 
Durand recognized the problems inherent in attempting to control the education of the son of such a
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There was reluctance on the part of the Nizam to agree wholeheartedly to such rigid 
demands. The Resident reported six months later that the ruler had assigned a separate 
house to his son within the precincts of the palace in which he was supposed to pass the 
day. At night he returned to the zenana, as it was contended that its inhabitants would 
not agree to ‘more complete separation’.248 The Nizam had appointed four* elderly 
nobles, each of whom was to have charge of the boy in turn and be responsible for his 
conduct. In the opinion of the Resident ‘Nothing but harm can ... come of this 
arrangement. Elderly men are not suitable companions for boys of nine and I should 
imagine that this unfortunate lad will be perplexed by the varying counsels and 
prohibitions which these worthies are likely to impose on him’ .249 Nothing as yet had 
been done to find a teacher. The Minister, Nawab Vikar-al-Umra, generally agreed with 
the views of the Resident and felt that little would be achieved until the boy had an 
English governor to look after him, ‘No native will ever stand up against palace 
influences. The governor ought not only to be European, he ought also to be a 
government servant especially selected whose personal character, age and experience 
would carry weight’ 250
In 1898 the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, wrote that the Nizam was ‘entirely neglecting’ his son, 
a ‘poor boy who is growing up in the worst surroundings’, surrounded by ‘scoundrels 
who have the Nizam’s ear, to keep his son a poor ignorant creature that they may use 
him in his turn’. There might still be a hope of saving him if an English tutor or 
guardian were introduced into the palace, but it was clearly impossible to ask an
prominent ruler, suggesting ‘I would interfere as little as possible. Better a spoilt and uneducated heir- 
apparent than a discontented Nizam’. Extract from memorandum by Sir H. M. Durand, 20 April 1894, 
R/l/1/164.
248 Chichele Plowden to Cuningham, 19 March 1895, R/l/1/164.
249 Ibid.
250 Ibid. See also R/2/67/21.
251 Extract from private letter from Lord Elgin 3 February 1898, attached to No. 275, PSCI, 1875-
1911, Box XXV.
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Englishman to accept conditions such as those proposed by the Nizam, as he must have a 
position ‘which the Palace crew cannot pretend to control5.252 The Government of India 
was in a difficult position as it was not responsible for Sahibzada in the way that it had 
been responsible for his father, who was a minor orphan when he succeeded to his 
inheritance.
However in 1898 the Nizam agreed to give Brian Egerton, discussed below in his role as 
tutor to the Maharajah of Bikaner, ‘a fair trial5 by appointing him on probation for two 
years. The Nizam set out the following conditions,
He shall be considered strictly as a private servant of my household, and as such he 
shall be subject to the restrictions which custom and my own habit have necessarily 
imposed on that service. He shall in no way meddle with the political and 
administrative affairs of my State. Nor should he, without my permission, visit or 
receive any official or nobleman whoever he may be. Breach of such conditions will 
entail immediate dismissal at my discretion 253
As far as the Government of India was concerned, the requirements were that the 
candidate should be ‘a gentleman of the highest class. One who would keep entirely 
aloof from faction, be incapable of intrigue, able to assert control over teachers and the 
household, and at the same time keep in view imperial interests5 254
Under Egerton and living away from the palace die Sahibzada was seen by British 
officials to flourish with a ‘freedom hitherto unknown5.255 Egerton was said to be ‘most 
patient and long suffering5 and the boy, although ‘dull and very backward5 was of a
253 Nizam to Res. Hyderabad, 15 January 1898, R/l/1/201. Other candidates for the job of tutor to the 
Sahibzada were: Capt. J. R. C. Colvin of the Political Dept., tutor to the Nawab of Ranipur; J. W. D. 
Johnstone o f  the Education Dept., tutor to Scindia, Maharajah of Gwalior; and Theodore Morison of 
Aligarh College. R/2/67/27. It is perhaps surprising that the Nizam failed to choose a man with 
Muslim connections over and above Egerton, who had served exclusively in Rajputana.
254 Cuningham to Chichele Plowden, 10 August 1897, and Viceroy to SoS, 16 February 1897, 
R/l/1/201.
255 Sir David Barr, Res. Hyderabad, to Walter Lawrence, 8 July 1900, R/2/68/38.
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good disposition and anxious to learn. It was believed that the Nizam had been 
personally anxious to separate his son from palace life some years before, but had 
experienced great difficulty in ‘overcoming the prejudices of his inordinately extensive 
zenana’. However in 1903 it was apparent that the royal women and palace officials 
still wielded a considerable influence as far as the progress of the Sahibzada was 
concerned. After ‘consultation with the principal nobles’ the Nizam announced that his 
son was too old to go to Mayo College. Marriage had become ‘an imperative necessity 
in order to safeguard him from mental and moral temptations peculiar' to his present age’ 
and, rather than venturing further afield, he would benefit from visiting different parts of 
his own country and becoming acquainted with the administration.257
The zenana was not in all cases the main hindrance to the establishment of a salubrious 
atmosphere in which a princely education could be effectively accomplished. Sir Pratap 
Singh, discussed in the chapter on succession in his role as Maharajah of Idar, was for a 
long time in charge of his nephew, the young heir to the Jodhpur gadi, but in 1895 in the 
interests of both it was suggested that he should have a British officer to assist him as 
companion and tutor to the boy. Sir Pratap had failed in allowing the Maharajah to be in 
the constant and almost exclusive society of people who were not deemed suitable 
companions for the future ruler of a state. The late Maharajah had objected to this state 
of affairs and it had become both ‘irksome and distasteful to the young Maharajah’, 
while the rest of the community naturally resented the arrangement.258 Under such 
circumstances the presence of a qualified British tutor would enable the ruler to acquire 
more general knowledge and enlarge his ‘mental vision’, and if he were to live in 
separate accommodation with the officer he would be severed from his present social
257 Nizam to Bair, 6 November 1903, R/l/1/299.
258 Resident, Western Rajputana, to 1st Asst, to AGG Rajputana, 14 December 1895, R/2/182/360.
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259environment.
However the Government of India considered that, in view of the satisfactory way in 
which the administration of Jodhpur had been conducted during the minority, there 
should be as few changes as were ‘compatible with good government’.260 The Viceroy 
preferred that die Maharajah should remain under the care of Sir Pratap Singh, aided by 
the Resident, rather than under a young British officer appointed as guardian or tutor. Sir 
Pratap would no doubt find opportunities to instruct the ruler in state administration and 
he should be told that the Viceroy was especially anxious diat the Maharajah should 
avoid dubious company and have his attention directed towards more serious duties.261 
The Resident, A. Martindale, reported in 1898 that to give him an insight into the 
working of courts, the ruler was personally trying judicial cases and submitting his 
reports to the Residency. To train him in economy and accounts he had been allowed to 
supervise and control branches of the administration within budget limits and he was 
also used to attending meetings of the State Council.262
The removal of a young prince from the influence of unscrupulous court personnel was 
also a goal in the state of Jind in the Punjab. In 1897 a despatch declared that ‘His 
Highness’s personal character is so entirely unformed that it would be imprudent to 
entrust him with ruling powers in the near future’.263 Sir Louis Dane, later Lieutenant- 
Governor of the Punjab, observed that if the treatment of minor rulers was left entirely to 
state authorities, the princes concerned would at eighteen be ‘turned out on old native 
lines with some sense of dignity, some regard for tradition and, for the old State families,
259 Ibid. Sir Pratap Singh’s association with undesirable companions places him in a rather less rosy 
light than that suggested in the chapter on succession.
260 Cuningham to AGG Rajputana, 27 January 1896, R/2/182/360.
261 Ibid.
262 A. Martindale, Res. Western States Rajputana to 1st Asst, to AGG Rajputana, 24 December 1897, 
attached to No. 77, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXVI.
263 Gol to SoS, No. 165, 16 December 1897, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXIV.
some interest in their State, and some prospect of carrying on in the old grooves the 
processes of administration’,264 However the ‘march of ideas’ even in the states had 
been so rapid that it was almost impossible to equip tire rulers with the ‘necessary 
qualities for keeping straight’. Moreover self-interest was so strong and intrigue so 
prevalent among hereditary officials, that they were the worst people to educate tire 
princes. Dane appreciated that in Jind there was no family with a sufficiently 
‘wholesome atmosphere’ within which the young ruler could be disciplined and trained 
by tutors under the head of the family.265 Since a prince was unlikely to find a 
‘disinterested and capable guardian’, the Government should make him its ward. There 
was always a danger in separating a minor prince from his family and the influences of 
the court to such a degree that he was alienated from the state and disinclined to accept 
his responsibilities. Therefore the Government should be careful to impress upon a 
potential tutor that the ruler should be kept in touch with hereditary officials and the 
people of the state, and should remain receptive to their ideas.266
In response to a request from the other Phulkian states that the education of the Jind ruler 
be placed in the hands of three officials, one from each state, Dane was adamant that 
such interference was not warranted.267 Moreover the proposal was entirely opposed to 
one of the fundamental principles of the policy of the paramount power, namely that no 
native state be permitted to interfere in the internal affairs of another. A list of the tasks 
which the three officials intended to undertake in training tire prince hardly suggested 
that he would be reared according to western ideas:
264 Sir Louis Dane to Foreign Secretary Gol, attached to No. 165, 16 December 1897, PSCI, 1875-
1911, Box XXIV
267 Dane to Patiala and Nabha, and President o f Jind Council, No. 870, 23 September 1897, PSCI, 
1875-1911, Box XXIV.
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Their duties will be to look to his diet, the protection of his health, and his 
companions, to teach him the laws of religion and state matters, to arrange for the 
appointment of Aid de Camps [sic] and household servants jointly, to effect economy 
in his personal expenses, and to keep the two Chiefs informed of all important matters 
so that they may make proper arrangements in consultation with the State Council.268
As Dane pointed out to the English tutor, Captain F. E. Bradshaw, who was appointed to 
superintend the young ruler’s education, his job would not be easy. The prince of Jind 
was almost eighteen and ‘in dealing with a Native Chief of such an age the exercise of 
both tact and temper on your part is essential, and you will doubtless endeavour to 
influence him more by example and precept than by actual exercise of authority in the 
last resort’.269 It was felt unlikely that much could be accomplished by ‘mere book 
learning’, but the prince was to be encouraged to keep up his studies and the selection of 
reading matter would form an important part of the tutor’s duties. The instruction of the 
prince in the duties of state administration was in itself a somewhat delicate matter, as 
the tutor had to superintend such instruction without being able to intervene himself in 
the administration, channelling all orders through the Council.270 However the tutor was 
to have complete control over the person and the surroundings of the ruler and 
expenditure of his privy purse, as soon as the amount of this had been determined in 
consultation with the Council and sanctioned by Government271
The diligent efforts on the part of the British to ensure that a young male ruler achieved 
as much administrative wisdom as possible were not, to her regret, available to the only 
female ruler of India, the Begam of Bhopal, as the next section reveals.
268 Rajah of Nabha to Lt. Gov. of Punjab 13 August 1897 attached to No. 165, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box 
XXIV.
269 Dane to Capt. F. E, Bradshaw, 23 September 1897, attached to No. 165, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box 
XXIV.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid. As suspected, the young Rajah of Jind was by no means a compliant charge As discussed in 
the following chapter, in 1900 he entered into a suspicious secret marriage with a European woman. 
Proof, in Lord Curzon’s view, that the Government of the Punjab had failed miserably in disciplining 
the rulers under its aegis. See the first section of the chapter on administration
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THE EDUCATION OF A PRINCESS
In Bhopal Sultan Jahan Begam received her early education at the hands of court 
officials of the day. Mohammed Jamal-ud-din, the first Minister of the State, taught the 
princess Arabic and Persian and the Private Secretary, Munshi Husein Khan, taught her 
English.272 After she was five a regular course of study was prescribed, including the 
study of the Koran, handwriting, Arithmetic, Pashtu and fencing. Whenever the Political 
Agent, or any other English official, came to Bhopal, he would be asked to examine 
Sultan Jahan in English by her grandmother, Sikander Begam, a great believer in the 
merits of education 273
However Sikander Begam’s daughter, Shahjehan Begam, whose attempts to disinherit 
her own daughter are cited in the previous chapter, altered the arrangements for Sultan 
Jahan’s education after her grandmother’s death and the girl’s usual nine or so hour's of 
study dwindled to four a day. In her mother’s opinion it was more important that she 
should acquire experience in domestic and official duties than ‘progress in scholarly 
knowledge’. Having read the entire Koran before she was eleven, she was now made to 
study it a second time and English and Persian were her only actual lessons, however she 
was also made to read and write orders upon various official papers which were sent to 
her daily by her mother.274
Years later, at the start of her own rule, Sultan Jahan appreciated that these were papers 
on which orders had already been passed and comiected with matters of no interest or 
importance, giving her neither experience nor information. After her marriage she was
272 Sultan Jahan Begam, An Account o f My Life (London, 1912), Vol. I, pp. 17-18.
273 Ibid.
274 Account, Vol. I, pp. 23-9.
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to recognise the shortcomings of her own education and lack of administrative work, 
‘The training of a young chief can never be adequate if it is confined to the study of 
books and to such experience as he can gain from intercourse with his teachers’.275 
Nevertheless for a Muslim princess at the end of the nineteenth century, the breadth of 
Sultan Jahan’s education does appear to have been extraordinary. At the start of the 
twentieth century, having discussed the question of princely education with Lord 
Curzon, Sultan Jahan seriously considered sending her youngest son, Hamidullah Khan, 
to Mayo College in Ajmer, as opposed to Daly College in Indore which was in a 
precarious financial situation. However to use the education of her son as an example 
she decided instead to establish a special school for the jagirdar class which he would 
attend following a short period under the tutelage of an Oxford graduate, C. H. Payne. 
The Alexandra Nobles School, designed by Sir Swinton Jacob at an estimated cost of Rs. 
153,241, was opened in Bhopal in 1903 276
WESTERNISATION
Whereas in Bhopal Sultan Jahan espoused western ideas in a manner which proved 
highly satisfactory to the paramount power, the influence of particularly forceful British 
tutors upon their young charges did not always achieve as desirable a result. The leader 
of the ‘independence movement’ among Indian princes was Sayajirao, Gaekwar of 
Baroda, successor to Malharrao, whose deposition is discussed in the chapter on 
administration. The roots of Sayajirao’s antagonism can be traced to the ruler’s
275 Account, Vol I, p. 217.
276 Account, Vol. I, pp. 330-332.
0 7 7 For perceived examples of Sayajirao’s anti-British stance see Ian Copland, ‘The Dilemmas o f  a 
Ruling Prince: Maharaja Sayaji Rao Gaekwar and “Sedition”’ in P. Robb and D. Taylor (eds.), Rule, 
Protest, Identity: Aspects o f Modern South Asia (London, 1978), pp. 24-28; Charles W. Nuckolls, ‘The 
Durbar Incident’, Modern Asian Studies, 24, 3 (1990), pp. 529-59; and Manu Bhagavan, Sovereign
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desire, shaped by the unorthodox teaching of his tutor, Frederick Elliott, to run his state 
on ‘original lines’.278 The period of Elliott’s influence lasted from 1881 to 1895 and 
was a time of continuing reform in the state 279 To all intents and purposes Sayajirao 
developed into a humane, cultivated and conscientious prince. His day began at six in 
the morning with prayers, after which he spent a few horns reading authors such as 
Bentham, de Tocqueville, J. S. Mill and Shakespeare 280 However despite the 
dissemination of suitable liberal texts, Elliott was by no means popular in British 
government circles due to his championship of Baroda interests over those of Britain and 
in 1895 he was forced to revert to British service. British officials identified the fruits of 
Elliott’s influence in arguments put forward forcibly by the Gaekwar to combat 
supposed British infringements of his liberty, as displayed in a report of an inteiview in 
1898 in which the ruler declared, ‘I am only quoting the words of M ill... when I call the 
Government of India a despotic Government. It is without doubt a despotic 
Government, some may call it a despotic despotism, but it is nevertheless despotic’. 281
Having been versed by his tutor in the benefits of exposure to western ideas, the 
Gaekwar objected in particular to Curzon’s ruling that Indian princes wishing to travel to
Spheres: Princes, Education and Empire in Colonial India (New Delhi, 2003), pp. 47-69.
2 8 Sayajirao Rao to Lord Reay, 20 January 1897, quoted in J. P. Sergeant, The Rider o f Baroda 
(London, 1928), pp. 280-1.
279 In the Gaekwar’s reply to the Governor of Bombay’s address at the ruler’s investiture, he declared 
that Elliott’s contribution to his education had produced ‘an indelible impression’. Enclosure No. 21, P. 
S. Melvill, AGG Baroda, ‘Investiture of Gaekwar’, 2 January 1882, attached to Gol to SoS, No. 10, 
PSCI, 1875-1911 Box II. Elliott was given a wide brief in his subsequent duties in Baroda and in 1885 
was dispatched to England for three months to arrange for the care and education of young men whom 
the Gaekwar wished to be trained as ‘Engineers, Surveyors, Artists and Doctors’. Gol to SoS, No. 108, 
11 July 1885. PSCI, 1875-1911, Box V.
280 Lawrence James, Raj: The Making and Unmaking o f  British India (London, 1997), p. 337. At the 
time of their arranged marriage, his wife, Chimnabai, had been fourteen and illiterate. Her husband 
immediately arranged for her to receive an education and many years later wrote, ‘An educated lady in 
the house is more able to shed the light of happiness than one who is ignorant’. Sayajirao Rao, ‘My 
Ways and Days’, Nineteenth Century and After XLIX, p. 223 quoted James, Raj, p. 337. Her education 
bore fruit in a book launched in 1911 entitled The Position o f  Women in Indian Life, giving an 
international view o f the ‘women’s movement’. It examined the successes and failures of women in 
Europe, America and Japan, and contrasted the status of women elsewhere with that of women in India. 
The book contained a number of ‘radical ideas and assertions’. Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres, p. 58.
281 Report o f interview between the Baroda Res., Col. M. J. Meade and Gaekwar 14 February 1908, 
R/l/1/288.
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Europe must give notice to the Government of India, so that an official verdict could be 
given on the necessity or advisability of such a trip. He complained that the notice has 
now become ‘a communication in the nature of an application for permission’ to leave 
India and affected his ‘position and dignity’.282 To successive viceroys the Gaekwar 
showed great dereliction of duty in his absenteeism from Baroda. The ruler was away 
from his state for periods aggregating seven and a half years between 1886 and 1908 
and, in the view of the Baroda Resident, had failed to recognise the ‘injury’ such 
absences caused the administration and the ‘discontent and dissatisfaction ... engendered 
in the minds of the people’.283
At the Foreign Office, Sir Henry Durand in 1894 recognised the
danger in educating Native Chiefs too much according to our own views, they 
become too fond of English amusements, and lose all pride and interest in then 
States, They thus lose their raison d’etre and become useless as part of the Indian 
political system. We want ruling Chiefs, in touch with their people, not absentee 
landlords who race and drink. They are worse than useless.284
The difficulty in reconciling western and oriental ideas when it came to princely rule was 
well demonstrated in the state of Pudukkottai, Nicholas Dirks considers that the British 
success in weaning the minor Rajah Martanda Bhairava Tondaiman away from the 
‘seething intrigue of the zenana and state’ eventually resulted in the ruler’s premature 
retirement and total withdrawal from state affairs 285 When Martanda, adopted grandson 
of Rajah Ramachandra, succeeded to the gadi in 1886 there was a certain amount of 
British relief that the young hen had been spared the insalubrious aspects of palace life 
due to his youth and adoption from outside the main family. The British government
282 Ibid. File R/l/1/293 sets out the bitter objections of the Gaekwar to Curzon’s circular on foreign 
travel. The circular itself is discussed at greater length in the chapter on hierarchy and ritual.
283 Ibid.
284 Extract from memorandum by Sir H. M. Durand, 20 April 1894, R/l/1/164.
285 Nicholas B. Dirks, The Hollow Crown: Ethnohistory o f an Indian Kingdom (Cambridge, 1987), p. 
392.
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resolved to pay particular attention to the education of the Rajah, appointing Frank 
Crossley in 1887 as his English tutor with explicit instructions to ensure the inculcation 
of English ideas and values.
The western educated Dewan of Pudukkottai, A. Sashiah Sastri,286 expressed grave fears 
concerning the young ruler’s education when Martanda was removed from Pudukkottai 
to a bungalow near the British cantonment in Trichinopoly to be educated by Crossley 
and instructed in the appropriate social graces by the Political Agent, R. H. Farmer.287 
By 1890 the attention to body over mind was a daily fact of the Rajah’s routine, 
described by Sastri in a letter to the Maharajah of Travancore, ‘He nominally goes 
through a few lessons in English, Sanskrit, and drawing in the hot hours of the day and 
spends all the morning and all the evening in driving, tennis, golf, shooting in the 
jungles, playing chess, playing the banjo and the violin and billiards’ 288 In his yearly 
reports on the progress of his royal charge, Crossley mentions repeatedly the importance 
the political agent placed on scheduling the raja with ‘less time to the cultivation of the 
intellect and more to the body’, nevertheless noting that his ‘increasing obesity gives 
grounds for serious apprehension as regards his health’.289 Travel was an important 
component of his education and paramount importance was attached to exposing the 
young Rajah to wider vistas and perspectives so that he would not become engulfed in 
the ‘Byzantine preoccupations of court life’.290 He was taken on grand tours of northern 
India and Europe to accomplish this objective.
286 Sashiah Sastri was bom into a poor family, educated at Scottish mission schools in Madras and
received the 1st Prize of the Madras Council o f Education, He was later Head Sheristidar o f the Madras
Revenue Board, the highest position to which an Indian could rise, and a fellow of Madras University. 
Menon, ‘Popular Princes’ p. 263.
287 Joanne Punzo Wagthorne, The R aja’s Magic Clothes (Pennsylvania, 1994), p. 74.
288 Quoted R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 77.
289 Pudukkottai Durbar Files, Administration Report for 1888-9, quoted Wagthorne, R aja’s Magic 
Clothes, p. 75.
290 Dirks, Hollow Crown, p. 390.
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The progress of the eager and able student pleased Crossley to such an extent that the 
British viewed Martanda’s accession to die throne in 1894 with ‘a mixture of 
complacency and optimism’, although it was soon apparent that the qualities so 
assiduously instilled in the ruler were to make his rule ‘highly troublesome’.291 It was 
noted that the Rajah was ‘always knocking about amusing himself and but seldom 
troubles Pudokkottai with his presence ... Mr. Crossley has, I fear, done him no good of 
late, and instead of pressing him to buckle down to the task of governing has encouraged 
him to do quite the reverse’.292 In August 1897 a letter from the Madras Government 
declared that ‘the Raja is more like a coloured European gentleman, with entirely 
European tastes, than a Native Prince’, however as a ruler he had made no real effort to 
gain insight into the administration, the wants of his people or the expenditure of state 
funds. Between his installation in November 1894 and the writing of this letter the 
Raja spent a total of eight weeks in the state, returning principally for festivals and 
shooting expeditions, apparently encouraged in this somewhat untaxing lifestyle by 
Crossley 294
In the Rajput state of Bikaner the dissemination of western ideas had an equally 
significant effect upon the young ruler, if with a somewhat more productive outcome. 
The majority of royal Rajput families preferred to employ a Brahman as the predominant 
educative authority in the palace. Such a teacher would be imported from various parts 
of Rajasthan, Gujurat or Kashmir to teach their sons Sanskrit texts like the laws of Manu 
and epics like the Mahabharata and the Ramayana 295 Despite British pressure, there
291 Hollow Crown, p. 3 91,
292 Note by ‘JFP’, 11 February 1897, R/2/892/268.
293 Chief Sec. Govt. Madras to Sec. Gol, FD, 6 August 1897, R/2/892/271
294 Hollow Crown, p. 391. See R/2/892/268 for Government criticism o f Crossley.
295 Paolo Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule and Modem Conventions: The Maharajas of Bikaner and their
Relationship with the Raj, 1887-1947’, Unpublished Ph. D.Thesis, Royal Holloway College, 
University of London, 2001, p. 45.
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was great reluctance on the part of some royal Rajput families to employ an English 
tutor to impart administrative knowledge at the expense of a religious education.
Maharajah Ganga Singh’s first tutor at the Bikaner court was Pandit Ram Chandra Dube, 
a Kashmiri pandit who was with the Maharajah through childhood and adolescence. He 
was not quoted often in the Maharajah’s later correspondence and did not leave his mark 
in the records of the regency period, although he remained Ganga Singh’s tutor even 
after the Regency Council decided in 1889 to send the Maharajah to Mayo College to 
complete his education.296 The Vice-President of the Regency Council and Dewan, 
Sodhi Hukm Singh, a Sikh who was constantly conspiring in the zenana and the head of 
the most important faction at court, saw the return of Ganga Singh from Mayo College 
in 1894 as a threat to his influence. The Dewan concurred with the view of other 
members of the Council that the young ruler should go to Mount Abu297 to learn Persian 
and Urdu, before visiting other parts of India and England under the guardianship of a 
competent and trustworthy officer, ostensibly ‘to keep him away from bad 
temptations’ 298
However the Agent to the Governor General in Rajputana, Colonel Trevor, informed the 
Council that Brian Egerton, the ‘scion of an old English family of high standing in 
Cheshire’ who ‘combined sympathy and tact with firmness and a wholesome believe 
[sic] in discipline’,299 should be appointed as a guardian. Normally royal professional 
tutors were employed by durbars rather than by the Government of India, however
297 During the hot season Ganga Singh had previously spent holidays in Mount Abu in the 
companionship of Maharaj Kunwar, die heir to the Jodhpur gadi, in order that friendly relations would 
be established between the two Rahtore families. Col. C. K. M. Walter to Sec. Gol, FD 16 January 
1888, R/2/182/356. Mount Abu was and remains a popular Rajput pilgrimage destination, due to the 
significant number o f Jain and Hindu religious sites.
29 Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule5, p. 52.
299 .K. M. Panilckar, His Highness the Maharaja of Bikaner. A. Biography (London, 1937), p. 42
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Egerton’s record had impressed Curzon to such an extent that the Viceroy deliberately 
selected him to further British influence in the Bikaner minority administration. 
Egerton’s upper class background and his conservative outlook were common features 
of political officers in native states. His previous assignments in Rajputana as District 
Superintendent of Police in Ajmer, where he wrote the report on the 1891 census, 
followed by Boundary Settlement Officer in Udaipur from 1892-5, suggest that he had 
‘the disposition of an inflexible bureaucrat rather than of a humanist’.300 Ganga Singh 
remembered Egerton’s arrival in Bikaner in the hot season when the young Maharajah 
was living in part of the recently completed old palace ‘minus electric light, minus 
electric fans ... and minus water pipes’.301 Colonel Tom ffrench-Mullen, a senior 
British officer, was of the opinion that it was impossible for a European to stay there in 
temperatures of 110 degrees, but Egerton declared that ‘his place was with his ward and 
he insisted on residing in the Fort’.302
An ordinary day’s routine for the young Bikaner consisted of riding or shooting before 
breakfast, studying during the morning and afternoon, and playing polo and roller 
skating in the evening. On holidays the routine included visits to the royal residence at 
Gajner, a pleasure palace and a favourite shooting retreat of the Maharajahs of Bikaner. 
Visits to other parts of the state were frequent, including interviews with nobles and 
landowners, and religious and state ceremonies were strictly performed after some years 
of laxity under the Regency. The pupil received a grounding in Hindu law before he 
applied himself to state administration. His training then consisted of the explanation of 
various files and papers by senior officials of each department of state, after which he 
wrote up his own decisions on cases, making notes on the evidence on record. Land
300 Durisotto, ‘Traditional Rule’, p. 53.
301 Pannikar, Maharaja o f  Bikaner, p. 42.
302 Ibid.
303 Pannikar, Maharaja o f  Bikaner, p. 47
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settlement classification and an examination of correspondence between former 
Ministers, the Maharajah and the Residency also formed part of his administrative 
education. Biographies and letters of ‘great men’ were read to learn the history of 
Bikaner and of India.304 Christopher Bayly suggests that residents and tutors in states 
assumed ‘the position of close personal adviser which had been occupied by uncles or 
royal mothers in tire independent courts’.305 Ganga Singh often repeated that the ‘after 
life [sic]’ of a minor prince depended mostly on die right choice of guardian. He 
deemed himself very fortunate to have had a much more rigorous grounding than most 
other young rulers in finance, revenue, customs and excise, and other departments of 
administration.306
BROADENING PRINCELY HORIZONS
Not surprisingly, given the example of blatant neglect of state affairs displayed by rulers 
such as Martanda Tondaiman of Pudukkottai, young princes were not encouraged to 
leave India to complete their education. A proposal in 1876 by Lt. Col. Minchin, 
Political Agent in the Punjab state of Bahawalpur, that the young Nawab should come to 
England to study with three other boys was greeted by die Secretary of State with some 
misgivings, ‘the Nawab will have completed his fifteenth year, and it seems to me 
questionable whether, after attaining that age, a native of India is likely to derive
304 Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule5, p. 56.
305 Bayly, Indian Society, p. 111.
306 Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule’, p. 56. The Maharajah of Bikaner, no doubt partly due to the influence 
of an English tutor, also turned out to be inordinately fond of foreign travel. In 1902 Curzon feared 
that, although ‘very opinionated, and decidedly vain’, he was ‘much the most attractive in manner and 
style’ o f the Indian rulers and would be made ‘the darling of London Society’. Curzon to Hamilton, 21 
May 1902, Curzon Collection, F i l l ,  Vol. 161. As demonstrated in the chapter on royal marriage 
western ideas also had a dramatic effect on the Maharajah’s choice of bride.
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advantage from a two years' residence at a public school or with a Tutor in England’.307 
When aristocratic Indians did aspire to educational qualifications in England, problems 
tended to arise. Sahib-Zadah Wahid-ud-Din, a member of one of Mysore's leading 
families, accumulated large debts while studying for the Bar, but was treated 
sympathetically by the India Council as the case represented ‘the first genuine 
experiment’ and required ‘exceptional clemency’.308 There could also be ulterior 
motives in educating the scions of Indian ruling families abroad. It was believed that the 
Nawab of Rampur309 in central India kept his younger brother, the Sahibzada Nasir Ali 
Khan, in an English school for reasons of ‘jealousy or fear’. The Nawab appeared to be 
under the impression that if his brother returned to Rampur before a lawful heir was 
bom, he might become a ‘centre of intrigue and danger’.310 However the Government of 
India took the view that there was already sufficient intrigue and danger in Rampur* for it 
to be desirable for the Sahibzada to remain in England to complete his education, having 
passed his Moderations at Oxford and subsequently reading for the Bar.311
Towards the end of the nineteenth century there was greater princely enthusiasm for an 
English education, arousing further disapproval among government officials. The 
Secretary of State, Henry Fowler, wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, in 1894 that ‘it was 
possible to overdo the English education of young Chiefs’. The sons of two or three 
princes were at Eton and being brought up ‘in all respects like English boys ... how this 
may affect their influence in their own States is a question of some difficulty’.312 When
307 SoS to Gol, No. 59, 15 June 1876, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 2. Had the Nawab received an 
education in England, it is possible that he might have been more amenable when it came to sending 
his own son to Aitchison College. See the chapter on succession.
308 SoS to Gol, No. 13 1872, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 15.
309 The Nawabs of Palanpur, Tonk and Rampur, as well as one or two lesser Muslim rulers, shared a 
common ancestry as descendants of Pathan tribesmen from Afghanistan who entered India in search of 
the traditional cZan, Zar, Zarnin5 — women, gold and land. Allen, Lives o f  Indian Princes, p. 44.
310 Chief Sec. Govt. Punjab to Sec. Gol, FD, 22 April 1899, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXIX.
311 Chief Sec. Govt., NWP and Oudh, to Agent to Lt. Gov., 15 September 1899, R/2/801/6.
312 Fowler to Elgin, 15 June 1894, Elgin Collection, Vol. 1.
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the Gaekwar of Baroda intended his sons to go to Eton and Balliol Lord Curzon objected 
strongly, since he was convinced that at an English public school and university an 
Indian might develop a contempt for his own people. Hie Viceroy was proved correct 
when the eldest son of the Gaekwar, Fateh Singh Rao, had to be removed Rom Oxford 
due to ‘idleness and misconduct’ and upon his return to India ‘developed great 
extravagance’ and consorted with ‘low people’. Curzon observed that ‘A youth, either at 
Eton or Oxford, acquires ideas and tastes which are incompatible with subsequent 
residence in a Native State, or with sympathy for the people over whom he may be 
called to rule’.313
However, despite die appeal of a famous establishment like Eton, in the last decades of 
the nineteenth century British efforts to set up Indian colleges modelled 011 the veiy 
English public schools to which some Indian rulers aspired failed dismally to capture 
princely imagination and to prove a great enough incentive to break centuries of 
educational and cultural habits. For many royal families in the first years of transition 
from traditional kingship to modem ruler the concept of such a dramatic form of 
westernised education came too soon and was too alien hi nature. The following section 
of this part of the princely life cycle deals with the setting up of the princely colleges and 
gives an evaluation of the success and failure of the experiment during the period.
PRINCELY COLLEGES
In his study of the effect of the English public school system upon the British empire, J. 
A. Mangan sees die creation of colleges for Indian royalty and nobility as a ‘tangible
313 Curzon to Brodrick, 2 February 1905, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 164.
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symbol of both political expedience and moral conviction’.314 The British hoped to win 
over at least some of the influential traditional minority and ‘so succour a band of 
political evangelists sympathetic to the gubernatorial standards of the imperial race’.315 
The idea for establishing such schools sprang from Capt. F. K. M. Walter, Agent for 
Bharatpur, who in his 1869-70 annual report declared that:
If we desire to raise the chiefs of India to the standard winch they must attain in order 
to keep pace with the ever advancing spirit of the age, if we wish to make clear to 
them that our only object is to perpetuate their dynasties and to make them worthy 
feudatories of the crown of England, we must place within their reach, greater 
facilities for bestowing on their sons a better education than they can possibly now 
attain. Then and not till then can we hope to see the native princes of India occupying 
the position they ought to hold as the promoters of peace, prosperity and progress 
among their own people and hearty supporters of British authority.316
To achieve this aim, Walter urged ‘the establishment of an ‘Eton in India’, a college on 
an extensive scale ... with a complete staff of thoroughly educated English gentlemen, 
not mere book-worms but men fond of field sports and outdoor exercise, and the elite of 
the Native gentlemen belonging to the Education Department’.317 Walter’s ideas were 
formally adopted by the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, who at a durbar in Ajmer in 1870 asked 
for the co-operation of princes and nobles in Rajputana, ‘If we wished you to remain 
weak, we would say, “Be poor, and ignorant, and disorderly”. It is because we want 
you to be strong that we desire to see you rich, instructed and well governed’. Mayo 
believed that for the sake of civilisation the durbars should not be allowed to sink into 
disrepute and under his viceroyalty schools like Mayo College for Rajputana and 
Rajkumar College for Kathiawar in western India were founded. These were followed 
by Daly College for central India and Aitchison College for the Punjab. This section of
314 J. A. Mangan, The Games Ethic and Imperialism (London, 1986), p. 125.
315 Ibid.
316 Quoted in H. Sherring, The Mayo College 1875-1895 (Calcutta, 1897), Vol. I, p. 2.
317 Ibid.
318 Article from The Pioneer o f 17 October 1870, attached to letter from Mayo to Argyll, 2 November 
1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. II.
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the chapter on education will deal mainly with Mayo College, with briefer references to 
the other three schools.
THE FIRST PHASE
The four main princely colleges were subject to the general control of the British 
Government and each controlled by a council or committee responsible for general 
administration, made up of distinguished British and Indian members. For example the 
Mayo College council included the Viceroy, the Agent to the Governor-General in 
Rajputana, the Commissioner of Ajmer, seventeen rulers of Rajputana and political 
officers to the states involved.319 The colleges were by no means open to all; even a boy 
of high birth would not be admitted unless he or his father was a durbari and entitled to 
assist at durbars convoked to meet a viceroy. Some durbari nobles were poor and to aid 
their cause and ‘prevent the decadence of the native aristocracy’ a considerable number 
of scholarships were created, which were assigned according to the merits of the fathers 
of candidates.320
While the colleges were founded on the initiative of the British, they were financed 
initially by large contributions to endowment funds from the native rulers themselves 
and to a lesser degree by Government support. As numbers of pupils increased, Indian 
royalty and nobility gave generously to provide extra classrooms. The proposal for 
Mayo College, confined initially to the sons of rulers in Rajputana, was received with 
enthusiasm by the local princes, who promised contributions amounting to Rs. 594,500 
to an endowment fund. In addition to these grants, the rulers of Jaipur, Jodhpur,
319 Progi'ess o f  Education in India, Fourth Quinquennial Review, 1897-98 to 1901-02, p. 182.
320 J. Chailly, Administrative Problems o f  British India (London, 1910), p. 222.
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Udaipur, Bikaner, Alwar and Jhalawar gave large sums for the construction of boarding 
houses for pupils from their respective states. The Government of India undertook to 
provide seven lakhs of rupees: three for monthly payments towards the working 
expenses of die college and four to be expended on buildings, houses and sports
» • '3 '7 1facilities. Fees made up the bulk of annual revenue in all colleges except for Mayo, 
where the munificence of the rulers’ endowment fund was sufficient to run the 
establishment. Fees were paid by the individual state to which the young ruler belonged 
or by the estate of his family and were generally determined according to means by the 
political officer concerned. The cost of educating individual pupils was by no means 
standardised, as in the public schools of England, and could vary considerably.322
The question of an appropriate architectural style for Mayo College was not easily 
resolved. In the end seven separate designs, submitted by four different architects to 
three viceroys were required before construction began. A classical design was Lord 
Mayo’s original preference and in the summer of 1871 he asked the executive engineer, 
J. Gordon, to prepare a plan for a ‘plain but handsome Hall, with class rooms 
surrounding a pillared verandah’.323 The princes, when consulted belatedly in 1872, also 
gave their support to the ‘Grecian’ model, however it was finally decided to use an Indie 
design. The college was, after all, meant for the use of the princes of Rajputana. 
These princes, although now incorporated as feudatories within the British imperial 
system, still embodied some of India’s oldest ruling dynasties. Therefore in themselves 
they represented that link with India’s past to which the British wished to gain access. 
Indeed, as by the later nineteenth century the princes became increasingly creatures of
321 Report on Mayo College at Ajmer, attached SoS to Gol, No. 109, 28 September 1876, PSCI, 
1875-1911, Vol. 2.
322 Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 128.
323 Thomas R. Metcalf, An Imperial Vision: Indian Architecture and Britain’s Raj (London, 1989), p. 
69.
324 Ibid.
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the colonial order, it became all the more important that these men were able ‘to define 
their rulership in terms derived from India’s past and mark out visibly in their 
architecture their position as leaders of such a “traditional” order’ .325 It was unthinkable 
that the ‘Indian Eton’ set down in the Rajasthan desert, despite its playing fields and 
boarding houses, should take the shape of a Grecian temple.326
The architect of the college, Major Charles Mant of the Bombay Engineers, used a style 
termed Indo-Saracenic, which had been developed as a result of the debate over the 
relative suitability of various styles to British building in India. As Giles Tillotson 
makes clear in his study of the tradition of Indian architecture, the debate involved not 
only criteria such as climate and cost, but also political considerations. It was insisted on 
tire one hand that the style chosen, whether classical or Gothic, must be western; that the 
mission of empire was civilising and westernising in matters of law and education and 
British architecture should reflect the same values. On the other hand it was argued that 
the- role of empire was paternalistic and it was desirable to see the adoption of Indian 
styles, or the evolution of a style incorporating Indian features. The phrase frido- 
Saracenic was originally adopted by scholars such as James Fergusson to describe 
India’s Islamic architecture, generally characterised by a blend of Indian and Islamic 
design ideas.
325 Imperial Vision, p. 76.
32* Ibid.
327 G. H. R. Tillotson, The Tradition o f  Indian Architecture: Continuity, Controversy and Change 
since 1850, (New Haven and London, 1989), p. 46. See also Tillotson, ‘Orientalizing the Raj: Indo- 
Saracenic Fantasies’ in Christopher W. London ed. Architecture and Victorian and Edwardian India 
(Bombay, 1994), pp. 15-34. Tillotson considers that the term Indo-Saracenic was poorly chosen, as the 
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Mant, in a single sentence describing the design for Mayo College, spoke of its ‘Hindu 
feeling and treatment9, but concluded somewhat vaguely that ‘the whole building may 
be almost literally described, as being an adaptation of modem Hindu domestic
* o  O  Q »architecture’. The ‘Building News’, illustrating the design for Mayo College, 
announced that Mant had ‘boldly taken the indigenous ancient style’ and yet had 
produced a construction that was both ‘suitable and essentially modem’.329 The interior 
layout of the college, with its lecture halls and teaching rooms, represented the modem 
world the British were attempting to bring to the princes. However here, also, Indian 
symbolic forms were prominently displayed. The main lecture hall, for example, 
decorated throughout with richly carved panelling, had in its ceiling two large flat lights 
of coloured glass, one ‘a conventional representation of the sun, and the other one of the 
moon, the mystical sources from which the chief Rajpoot Dynasties claim to have 
sprung’ ,330 In the view of Lord Curzon, the young rulers were similarly ‘to combine the
• * ' I ' l  imerits of East and West in a single blend’. Trained and educated in Western ways, 
but ruling their states ‘upon Native lines, they were to be not ‘relics’ but rulers; not 
puppets, but ‘living factors in the administration’.332 Mayo College, where an elaborate 
Indo-Saracenic fa<?ade enclosed rooms in which young princes were to study English 
histoiy and geography, perhaps most vividly represented Britain’s inconsistent visions of 
princely India.
The college opened on October 1st, 1875. The Maharajah of Alwar, a minor, was the 
first and initially the only pupil. Since no accommodation was at that stage available in 
the college grounds, the Maharajah lived in a house outside the grounds and commuted 
to his daily studies on an elephant. Seven boys soon followed him from Jaipur, six from
328 Quoted Tillotson, Tradition of Indian Architecture ’, p. 52.
329 Quoted Metcalf, Imperial Vision, p. 77.
330 Note by Hardinge, January 13 1913, quoted Imperial Vision, p. 81.
331 Speeches by Lord Curzon, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 559, pp. 60-67.
332 Ibid.
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Jodhpur, including the Maharajah’s youngest brother, six government wards, two sons of 
fhakurs from the Ajmer College and Bakht Sing, Maharajah of Jhalawar. Other pupils 
were expected from Udaipur, Bikaner and Tonk. The age of the boys ranged from seven 
to seventeen, but most pupils were between nine and thirteen. In the first year of the 
College there was an English staff of three: the headmaster, the principal and a writing 
and arithmetic master. In addition an Indian staff of three was employed: an Urdu and 
Persian tutor, a Hindi and Sanskrit tutor, and a junior English and vernacular master. 
Major Oliver St. John, principal of the College, wrote in 1876 that ‘as yet the nobles of 
Rajputana generally had shown no spontaneous inclination to send their sons to be 
educated and for some at least, constant pressure will have to be exerted on parents 
through the Durbars of the States’.333
However by the time of the Annual Report for 1876/77 the number of pupils had 
increased to 40. Major St. John wrote that the
moral and physical improvement throughout the College has been more remarkable 
than the mental. Little taste, if not decided disinclination, was shown at first to all but 
comparatively sedentary games, and even to riding ... in study the boys are inclined 
to be idle, and are at first generally insubordinate; but I have, I am glad to say, as yet 
found it unnecessary to inflict any corporal or other severe punishment.334
If a boy did err, in, for example, telling a lie, he was put ‘in Coventry’ which was the 
severest penalty ever inflicted. In Sherring’s opinion ‘It is equivalent to being put out of 
caste and it is peculiarly adapted as a deterrent to a country like India’. The boy was 
forbidden to join in any game, no boy was allowed to speak to him, and even his own 
servants were unable to communicate with him, beyond giving him his meals.335
j33 ‘Report on Mayo College at Ajmer’, attached to SoS to Gol, No. 109, 28 September 1876, PSCI, 
1875-1911, Vol. 2. Sidney and Beatrice Webb were informed that parental pressure was still lacking 
when they visited Mayo College in March 1912. Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Indian Diary, p. 160.
334 SoS to Gol, No. 5, 17 January 1878, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 4.
335 Sherring, Mayo College. Vol. I, p. 151.
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Such attention to moral rectitude was also apparent at the opening of Rajkumar College, 
when Colonel Anderson, the Political Agent in Kathiawar, voiced the feelings of those 
present at the opening ceremony when he exhorted the teaching staff to mould ca manly 
set of noble youths ... burning with emulation to outstrip each other in the glorious task 
of elevating humanity’.336 Rajkumar (like Mayo) was to become an ‘eastern Eton’ 
which would stamp its mark on every pupil. However when the first term started in 
1871 there was little to suggest that the College would ever become an ‘eastern Eton’. 
Among the dozen or so kumars who comprised the initial enrolment there were several 
reluctant members who soon deserted the classroom for the more comfortable 
surroundings of the zenana, while those who remained, like the princes of Bhavnagar 
and Junagadh, were always accompanied, according to The Pioneer newspaper, to their 
lessons by ‘bands of armed retainers, strange, wild-looking creatures who might have 
come out of the middle ages’.337 The headmaster, Chester MacNaghten, a Cambridge 
graduate, felt that his task at Rajkot was not to turn out erudite scholars, but to mould the 
character of his pupils so that they would emerge as efficient and benevolent rulers. 
High on his list of priorities was the ability to accept advice:
Another question specially applicable for you who are here to be under my training is 
- do I do my duty towards my superiors, to those who are placed in authority over 
me? Am I obedient to them, and respectful? Do I do as well as I possibly can all that 
they tell me to do, all that they gave me to learn?338
It is conceivable that the authoritarian tone adopted by MacNaghten revealed the 
ultimate goal of the establishment, which was to create ‘a generation of rulers who
j3G Article The Pioneer, 24 December 1870, quoted Copland, British Raj, p. 134.
337 Ibid.
338 Chester MacNaghten, Common Thoughts on Serious Subjects: Addresses delivered between the 
years 1887-9 to the elder boys o f Rajkumar College in Kathiawar (London, 1912), pp. 20-21. 
MacNaghten eventually broke down under the relentless strain of being the only European in the 
school.
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would automatically look to their political agents for advice and invariably do the 
bidding of government’ ,339
In the internal organisation of the schools, the British clung faithfully to the 4 familiar 
educational blueprint’ which served the upper classes in England. The Mayo timetable 
was virtually indistinguishable from its British counterpart, however in the early years a 
shortage of European staff resulted in a different house system. Houses were supervised 
not by English housemasters but musahibs or motamids, native staff who were rarely 
teachers but responsible for matters such as tidiness and general behaviour.340 At Mayo 
there were ten houses, organised to accommodate boys from the states which had 
endowed the individual buildings.341 At Rajkumar the wings of the main building 
formed two houses and boys took rooms as they became available. Arrangements at 
Daly were similar with Rajputs, Kalthis and Muslims mixed together in four houses. At 
Aitchison, on the other hand, there were three houses for Muslims, Hindus and scholars 
respectively.342
The Annual Report for Mayo College for 1875-76 makes it clear that the system of 
separate boarding houses ‘although doubtless a necessary deference to Rajput prejudice’, 
had many disadvantages when it came to discipline and the promotion of friendly 
relations among the boys of different states.343 It was felt that it was difficult to instil 
‘habits of cleanliness and decorum combined with a proper feeling of self reliance’ into 
boys surrounded by a ‘set of dirty and obsequious servants’ during the entire time that 
they were absent from study.344 In accordance with the original proposals for the school,
339 Copland, British Raj, p. 135.
3'10 Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 131.
341 V. A. Stow, A Short History o f the Mayo College 1869-1942 (Ajmer, 1942), p. 3.
342 Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 131.
343 Extract from ‘Annual Report on Mayo College 1875-76’, quoted Stow, Short Histoiy, p. 5.
344 Ibid.
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boarding houses were maintained by the states which built them and boarding house 
staff were state, not college, employees, over whom the college had only partial control. 
Under the rules boys were allowed three private servants, however the rule seems to 
have been interpreted liberally horn the start and many boys retained more than the 
prescribed number.345 Individual arrangements had to be made for some pupils: the 
Maharajah of Kotah arrived at Mayo with 200 followers, for whom a special village was 
built, and the Maharajah of Alwar had a stable of over twenty polo ponies and four 
carriage horses.346
ACADEMIC PROWESS
As at Eton, private tutors were a feature of the schools, however their role, influence and 
numbers varied from college to college. These tutors served as an instrument for British 
rule, in all cases had to be approved by the Government and were frequently selected by 
political officers. Occasionally, when a pupil’s status merited it, they were Englishmen. 
Although Indian language and culture maintained a strong presence, English as a subject 
was ‘a vital element of the curriculum’ in all colleges. However differences of ability, 
motivation and facility with the language meant that pupils completed their studies at 
varying speeds.347 The emphasis placed upon the importance of the use of the English 
language in princely government was stressed by successive viceroys. Speaking to the 
students at Mayo College in 1883 Lord Dufferin insisted that:
English is the official language of the Supreme Government under which you live, 
and of the books which deal with the public affairs, the domestic administration and
346 Stow, Short History, p. 18.
347 'Mangan, Games Ethic, pp. 131-2.
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the general interests of your country, and it will be of continual use -  indeed I may 
say of absolute necessity -  to you in the positions which you may be called upon to 
fill. The keen-witted inhabitants of many other pails of India have fully appreciated 
this fact, and all their energies have consequently been devoted to the acquisition of 
English.348
Before 1890 the boys of Mayo College were prepared first for the entrance examination 
of Calcutta University and later for the matriculation examination of Allahabad 
University, The subjects studied were English, English and Indian History, Physical and 
General Geography, Arithmetic, Algebra, Euclid and Mensuration, Sanskrit and Persian, 
and Hindi and Urdu.349 E. Giles, Education Inspector of the Bombay Northern 
Division, in a report on Mayo, pointed out that this course was veiy long, difficult and 
uninteresting, and of little utility compared to other courses that might to advantage be 
chosen. As a foundation to a scholastic career it was satisfactory, but as an education in 
itself it left much to be desired. The instruction that a young ruler obtained at Mayo 
College was, in nine cases out of ten, all the education he would receive for the rest of 
his life.350 Therefore, at Giles’s suggestion, the course was changed, the university 
textbooks abandoned, and a special curriculum drawn up for the college. As far as 
Mathematics were concerned, only Arithmetic was taught until the top class, when 
students started Algebra, Euclid and Mensuration. The second language course remained 
much as before and pupils learned either Hindi or Urdu until the higher class when they 
could study either Sanskrit or Persian. In the lower classes Indian history was taught in 
Hindi by means of textbooks prepared especially for the college by a former master and 
in the upper classes this subject was taught in English, using the ‘Elementary History of 
India’. English history was studied only in the first and second classes.351
348 Sherring, Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 201.
349 Mayo College, Vol. I, pp. 103-6.
350 Ibid
351 Ibid.
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Geography was taught entirely through the drawing of maps. The world was divided 
into six divisions and a class was instructed to draw a map of each division, showing 
boundaries of land and water, countries and towns. When the map for a new year was 
learned, the map for the previous year was revised, thus when a boy reached the college 
class at the top of the school ‘the whole world is portrayed in his mind’s eye’.352 At 
Giles’s recommendation General Knowledge was introduced as a subject, using in the 
higher classes Paul Bert’s ‘First Book of Science’ as a textbook, containing elementary 
studies of Natural History, Geology, Botany, Chemistiy, Physics and Physiology. The 
headmaster, H. Sherring, remained convinced of the benefits of the addition of a 
scientific education, declaring that ‘Profound ignorance of the ordinary laws of nature, 
with its resulting superstition, disease and poverty, is the prevailing characteristic of the 
Orient, and if the Mayo College has succeeded hi illuminating this intellectual gloom 
with some shay rays of science, its work has not been in vain’.353
Two hours a day was given to the study of English. In Sherring’s opinion each boy 
prided himself on his acquaintance with the ‘ruling language’ and when he returned 
home the extent of his general education was measured by his power of speaking, 
reading and writing English. By the time a student reached the college class he had 
learnt by heart over 1,000 lines of the ‘masterpieces’ of English literature. Each boy 
took it in turn to go through a page of reader daily and did his best to enunciate the exact 
meaning. The next day this passage was read again, but with other paragraphs added, hi 
this way it was hoped that a boy would be able to form English sentences and in a few 
weeks learn to think in the language he was studying. In the two upper classes an 
attempt was made at original composition. Some subject likely to be of interest to the 
boys was chosen and, when the subject had been thoroughly discussed, each student
352 Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 107.
353 Ibid.
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attempted to write his own opinions and impressions. In the college class the finishing 
touch was put to students’ previous studies by reading Shakespeare and Tennyson, prose 
authors such as Dickens, Thackeray and Scott, and daily papers such as ‘The Pioneer’.354
In the second class boys read Whitworth’s law lectures, originally given to pupils of 
Rajkumar College and subsequently embodied in book form. The lectures heated penal 
law and criminal procedure and were deemed to be especially useful to young rulers who 
would be called upon to exercise judicial functions in their own states. In the first class 
Jevon’s ‘Primer of Political Economy’ was studied. Sherring declared that:
The ideas of an inhabitant of India, even though he be the highly educated product of 
our Colleges and Schools, on such subjects as the proper use of charity, taxes, the 
functions of government, wages, rent, capital, the investment of money, banking, the 
causes of poverty and many others connected with his every-day life, are extremely 
vague and distorted.355
The study of political economy would force students to find reasons for their ideas and 
beliefs and learn to think for themselves ‘which is the true aim of education’. The pupil’s 
memory would not be ‘stuffed with useless facts’, moreover ‘cramming of any kind was 
studiously avoided’.356
However academic standards at the princely colleges left much to be desired, as a result 
of professional complacency on the part of the staff and laziness on the part of both 
masters and pupils. Much of the curriculum was of ‘dubious relevance’ to the education 
of Indian princes. The teaching of English was not as thorough as it might have been 
and general studies suffered from a lack of goals.357 Giles laid out bluntly further
354 Mayo College, Vol. I, pp. 108, 110.
355 Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 109.
356 Ibid.
357 Mangan, 'Games E thic\ p. 132.
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reasons for poor intellectual standards in 1890 in a report on Mayo College. The 
Inspector found ca tendency towards idleness and indifference due to a lack of any 
necessity to learn, pupils’ prolonged absences from college, a disinclination to return at 
the end of holidays and antagonism towards the school within the boys’ homes’.358 
However he was aware of the fact that, in estimating the value of the institution as a 
whole, attention should be directed ‘not so much to what pupils learn as to what they 
are’. He was greatly impressed by the ‘admirable training in discipline, truth and 
manliness’, which sent the boys out as ‘honest and straightforward gentlemen, who may 
become worthy rulers of their own people, and the loyal and enlightened subjects of the
* 359  •Empire’. One area which was proving most successful was character training for 
leadership and, as at an English public school, the games field was the site for 
achievement.
MENS SANA IN CORPORE SANO
Often struck by the idleness of the native ruler, the British wished above all to develop a 
physical and moral robustness in the allegedly effete sons of princes or nobles. The 
1883 Report of the Commission on Indian Education stated that it was not intended to 
make the young chiefs great scholars, but to encourage in them ‘a healthy tone and 
manly habits’.360 Not surprisingly it was cricket which was deemed to combine the most
358 Sherring, Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 77.
359 Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 86. Emulating no doubt those English public school products who were 
‘worthy rulers’ o f the empire. As the Secretary of State, Lord Hamilton, wrote to Curzon, ‘I often 
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efficacious moral and physical training. Sherring noted that the game ‘formed half the 
existence of the Mayo College boy. It was apparently often played every day of the 
week including Sundays’.
The ideal of manliness was pursued in the colleges by generations of public 
schoolmasters imported from England for the purpose. The epitome of such a master 
was Chester MacNaghten, a ‘pioneer of the public school education of the feudatory 
chiefs’. MacNaghten came from a family with a long history of service in India. After 
an English education culminating in a Masters degree at Trinity College, Cambridge, he 
returned to the subcontinent in 1867 where he was tutor to the Maharajah of Darbhanga, 
the great Bengal zamindar, before joining Rajkumar College. As headmaster he 
attached the ‘utmost value to games as a training in character’.362 In his view they 
developed ‘energy, promptitude, judgement, watchfulness, courage, generous emulation, 
appreciation of the merits of other and the highest standards of truthfulness and duty’.363 
A typical prize giving address emphasised the need to combine the moral and physical 
with the mental,
we have aimed at the training of a liberal character, the sort of training, mutatis 
mutandis, which characterises English Public Schools. We have wished, of course, 
that our boys may be scholars, but we wish that they may be much more than mere 
scholars, that their bodily faculties may be developed as well as those of their minds, 
that they may be practical men of the world, knowing the right and daring to do it, 
retaining, amid the influence of the western ideas, the chivalry of their Rajput 
ancestry.364
The emphasis upon manliness in the ethos of the princely colleges is perhaps 
somewhat surprising in the light of the fact that two of the colleges were founded to
361 Sherring, Mayo College, p. 46.
362 The Times, 11 May 1895, p.5, quoted Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 133. Macnaghten taught cricket 
to the famous Indian batsman Ranjitsinji, Jam-Saheb of Bhavnagar.
363 Sir Bhavasinhji Takhtsinhji, Maharajah of Bhavnagar, Forty Years o f the Rajkumar College 1870- 
1910 (London, 1911), Vol. II, p.3.
364 Address by Chester MacNaghten, The Indian Magazine 1889, ‘Prize Giving at Rajkumar College 
by the Duke o f Connaught’.
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serve the boys of the Punjab and Rajputana, both classified by the British as breeding 
grounds for the ‘warrior races’ of India, as opposed to Bengal, deemed to be the home 
of the effeminate type of Indian. The people of the Punjab and Rajputana, whether 
defined by race, climate or personality, most resembled the British self-image. 
During an official visit to Multan the Viceroy, Lord Northbrook, reported with favour 
upon the physical attributes of the natives, who possessed
greater vigour and more use of their lungs both in talking and running than one 
sees in Bengal - evidently, a more manly and a finer race. This is very striking to 
any one who inspects the schools in the two provinces; a Calcutta school is the 
perfection of order and quiet, but these Punjabee boys are as difficult to keep quiet 
as English boys, cheer and play cricket.365
However praise of Punjabi manliness was obviously unable to eradicate the generally 
accepted image of the effeminate Indian prince in the eyes of those seeking to produce 
Anglicised rulers at the princely colleges; and indeed ancient Indian practices and the 
somewhat hedonistic lifestyle of the nobility ensured that the fairly Spartan, games 
orientated public school existence was viewed by many upper class Indians both in 
the Punjab and Rajputana as most unpalatable. As the next section makes clear, there 
was also little enthusiasm on the part of rulers for Indian public education for their 
sons.
DURBAR ANTAGONISM
Throughout the century there was evidence of much resistance emanating from 
durbars against any form of princely education which removed a young ruler from the
365 Northbrook to Argyll, 14 November 1872, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 9.
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palace environment, although matters gradually improved. The Local Education 
Committee return for Delhi College in 1845 reported an encouraging
diminution in the existing prejudices on the part of the Native Aristocracy, against 
our system of Public Education. Two youths of noble families, one a son of the 
Nawab of Jhujur, and the other a son of Raj all Sohim Loll, late Prime Minister to 
the King of Delhi, had been sent to the college and it was expected that more of the 
same grade would follow.366
Education reports throughout Delhi College’s history continued to show that, in spite 
of the presence of some leading Muslim scholars on the staff and occasional examples 
of lavish Muslim patronage, the founders’ original intention of attracting the sons of 
the displaced Muslim elites to the classrooms had never really been fulfilled.367 
Although some of the alumni from the pre-1857 classes won high reputations in 
scholarly circles in the second half of the century, most of the Muslim students were 
neither from ashraf backgrounds, nor did they make much impact in their subsequent 
careers. The enrolment of the relation of a nawab was certainly an occasion for 
comment, as for instance when the son of Nawab Faiz Muhammed Khan of Jhajjar 
chose to study at the college.368 This was rare, since the Muslim aristocracy preferred 
private tuition for their sons. The sons of ulama families were also usually taught 
privately, albeit in some cases by Delhi College lecturers in their own time, or ‘drawn 
in preference to the many renowned traditional madrasas of the city’.369
A clue to the unpopularity of Indian high schools was given in the General Review of 
Benares College for 1844-45 where:
A special class has been instituted to those people whose parents, being persons of 
wealth and rank, wish them to be kept separate from the general mass of the
366 ‘Local Education Report for Delhi College, 1845’, in General Report on Public Instruction in the 
N. W. Provinces o f the Bengal Presidency for 1853-4, V/24/905, p. 75.
367 Avril A. Powell, Muslims and Missionaries (Richmond, 1993), pp. 200-1
368 Ibid.
369 Ibid.
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students. For this privilege, a monthly payment of five rupees, or such other sum 
as the Committee may direct, is demanded. The feeling which induces Natives of 
respectability to dislike their children mixing familiarly with those of a much 
inferior grade, is not thought to be unreasonable. Some feeling of the kind 
probably exists in every country. But there is much inconvenience necessarily 
attendant upon a special class, which requires special accommodation and separate 
instruction. 70
There was criticism of the Agra College in 1846 from C. C. Fink, Superintendent of 
Indigenous Schools to the effect that schools such as the College, which offered free 
instruction, injured not only the indigenous schools by drawing away scholars who 
could pay for their education, but the College itself by making it accessible to the 
lower orders of the community, deterring ‘respectable’ people from sending their 
children there.371
However it is clear that the question of mixing with social undesirables was not a 
factor that taxed most princely families. For many durbars the mere departure of a 
young ruler from his state was perceived to have potentially disastrous consequences. 
In Sherring’s view antagonism toward the princely colleges arose because the public 
school education of a future ruler tended to mean state officials’ loss of influence and 
power. Within a state the
most influential men hope to increase their own influence in proportion as their 
chiefs capacity is lessened; and to such persons the idea of an educated ruler 
means prevention of illicit gains instead of aggrandisement. The wish and desire 
and the aim and object of the evilly disposed men of power and status in any state 
are to retard the education of their master, and in this they are ably seconded by 
court sycophants who lose no opportunity of placing temptations to entice their 
leader astray.372
A tutor was often employed on the advice of some favourite durbari.es who well 
understood that it was to their advantage to secure a man who would be under their
370 General Review o f Benares College 1844-5, V/24/905, p. 75.
J?1 ‘Local Education Report’, V/24/905. p. 3.
372 Sherring, Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 171.
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control and would not interfere with their plans for securing their own advancement. 
As he had little authority the service of a man of ‘intrinsic worth and independence of 
character’ was not likely to be obtained. By some noble families the whole idea of 
educating princely youths was seen as inconsistent with their rank and position. 
Rajkumars were bom ‘to wield the sword, to command others, to rule and to live in 
clover on the properties of their ancestors’.373
One British observer wrote of the typical young prince:
From his boyhood everything about him combines to put education into the 
background. The influence of the zenana is generally opposed to any 
enlightenment. Early marriage with its hindrances and distractions ... [and] in 
some case hereditary instinct leads him to regal'd education as scarcely better than 
a disgrace’.374
Chester MacNaghten agreed that ‘the zenana very often in the acts of Native Courts 
possesses a visible authority which its invisible presence does not prepare us to
375  *accept’. The influence of female protagonists at court was evident in a lengthy 
correspondence in the 1890s concerning the Dowager Maharani of Indore who, 
against the wishes of Maharajah Holkar, vociferously opposed the education of his 
two nephews at Daly College. Holkar, in a letter to W. J. Cuningham, Foreign 
Secretary, of 1895 revealed an impressively modem attitude in denouncing his 
stepmother’s interference in what he considered to be a matter of great importance:
You will agree with me that my nephews and illegitimate brother have been 
simply wasting their valuable time, which, in my opinion, should be devoted to 
education only. The consequent result is that they are surrounded by all sorts of 
evil influences and are becoming mischievous and troublesome ... What I would
373 Narullah Khan, The Ruling Chiefs o f  Western India and the Rajkumar College (Bombay, 1898), 
pp. 8-9.
374 The Rev. J. Johnston, Abstt'act and Analysis o f the Report o f the Indian Education Commission, p. 
83, quoted Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 138.
375 Article contributed to the Calcutta Review 1879, Vol. XLVIII, quoted in Bhavasinhji, Forty Years, 
Vol. VI, p. 11.
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suggest is that they should be sent under proper guardianship either to Poona, 
Jabalpur or Allahabad High School, or to the Mayo College at Ajmere, and that I 
would remit to them their allowances through the Residency authorities. Once I 
had placed my illegitimate brother, Yadorao, in the Indore Daly College ... 
instead of remaining there he removed himself into the town on the pretext of 
sickness. I am sure that they will do the same again when kept under proper 
supervision, but this should not be heeded. I therefore request that you, as Foreign 
Secretary ... be good enough to help me insisting on the education of my nephews 
and illegitimate brother being commenced as soon as possible; otherwise the 
blame of neglecting their education will be placed on me.
However, although R. J. Crosthwaite, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India 
was prepared to threaten the Dowager with an unfavorable report to the Government 
of India, the Viceroy himself was ‘reluctant to offer advice on such a delicate matter’. 
Intervention in court politics, even to further princely education, was not to be 
undertaken lightly.377
Despite the rosy picture painted by Maharajah Holkar of discipline and dedication to 
work at the princely colleges, in 1891 the Education Inspector Giles made the point that 
Mayo College resembled one of the more aristocratic English public schools rather than 
an Indian high school, in that the students were freed from the ‘stimulus of poverty and 
the necessity of employing education as a means of livelihood5.378 The Inspector 
maintained that, if at Eton a large number of boys did as little work as possible, it was 
hardly surprising that at Mayo there was a tendency towards idleness or indifference, 
most marked among those students who joined the college at an age when their ‘habits 
of life have become to some extent settled5.379 The boys had no necessity to learn, the
376 Letter from Holkar to W. J. Cuningham, 25 January 1895, R/l/1/154. See also R/l/1/129. Holkar
later revealed surprisingly firm views on the education he wished for his own son, ‘a Prince should 
learn to read and write, to understand accounts and to go deep in the administration instead of 
becoming proficient in playing polo, football etc. In saying so it is not meant that I do not approve of 
these manly sports, but that they should have a secondary consideration’. Holkar to Viceroy 30 July 
1900, R/l/1/253.
j77 Kharitas from Viceroy to Holkar, 28 March 1894 and 19 March 1895, R/l/1/154. The Indore 
Ranis were not to be trifled with, as the chapter on royal women makes clear. 
j78 Quoted Sherring, Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 80.
379 Ibid.
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class of society from which they were drawn was ‘hitherto unaccustomed to literary 
effort’ and home influences usually ‘entirely wanting, or decidedly antagonistic, to such
O O f J  4
effort’. Nevertheless in the opinion of Narullah Khan, an old boy of Rajkumar 
College and a Cambridge graduate, British efforts at princely education had gone far in 
overcoming difficulties which at first seemed ‘insurmountable’.381 Such difficulties 
included the reluctance of the chiefs to allow their sons to associate even with young 
men of their own rank and position, the ‘paternal affection’ which was such a deterrent 
to separation and engendered fears that the youths might become victims ‘to the 
machinations of designing persons’, and a false idea of their own dignity which led 
rulers to look down upon each other, even though they were of equal or nearly equal 
rank.382
Yet while some Indian rulers proved to be enthusiastic supporters of the colleges, many 
were indifferent or apathetic. The academic results of the first decades satisfied neither 
parents nor the Government of India. It was alleged that pupils received no solid 
instruction, acquired no taste for reading beyond ‘illustrated papers’, and speedily forgot 
almost everything they had been taught when they returned home.383 Moreover there 
was inadequate control by the motamids in the boarding houses. The Private Secretary 
to the Viceroy, Sir Walter Lawrence, wrote that two Rajput boys who left Mayo 
College in 1894 had informed him ‘that the boys drank and had intercourse with 
prostitutes’ and ‘ran a risk of becoming profligates’, and Capt. Pinhey, Resident at 
Udaipur, also complained about the facility to obtain liquor, an inadequate knowledge 
of English and bullying between older and younger boys.384
380
381
Ibid.
Khan, Ruling Chiefs, p. 3.
382 Ibid.
383 Chailly, Administrative Problems, p. 223.
384 Quoted Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule’, pp. 49-50.
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By the end of the nineteenth century, after some twenty years, the schools could only 
muster about 190 pupils in total. Both the low numbers and the status of entrants 
produced disappointment. In 1897 it was noted with regret that at Mayo ‘As regards 
rank and numbers, the chief drawback is that no heir or ruling chief from the three first 
class states of Udaipur-, Jodhpur or Jaipur has attended the College, nor has any prince or 
thakut been entered from the States of Bundi or Dungaput’.386 In 1901 Sir Walter- 
expressed the opinion that the low number of pupils suggested ‘the grand conception of 
Lord Mayo’ had not yet ‘commended itself to the Rajputs in spite of their loyalty to the 
English and their admiration of English customs5.387 Mayo College was created, in part, 
to bring Rajputs into the public affairs of their states. However the college was offering 
its education not only to princes, but also to the great barons’ sons who had neither the 
need nor the inclination for durbar employment, who scorned such employment as 
‘subservience to a chief who was only the fust among his equal clan coparceners’, and 
were in fact not employable by their durbars because the maharajahs feared to bring 
them too close to their gadisP8
Why were the ‘ruling chiefs’ prepared to contribute with such generosity to the building 
and running of the princely colleges when they were patently unprepared to send their 
offspring to such establishments? The significance of a display of largesse among
385 Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 137.
386 Sherring, Mayo College, Vol. I, p. 161.
387 Sir Walter Lawrence,‘Confidential Report on Chiefs’ Colleges’, 31 August 1901, Curzon 
Collection, FI 11/257, p. 100. However for some Rajput princes there were less altruistic uses for colleges 
such as Mayo Ilian mere education. As Edward Haynes points out in his study of traditional rulership in 
Alwar, the power of Maharajah Mungul Singh was more secure than that of any o f his predecessors on the 
Alwar gadi. Following a period of rebellion o f Alwar thakars against their prince, the recalcitrant thakurs 
were forced out of the state, and their jagirs were resumed and regranted to younger and, in the eyes of the 
British, ‘presumably more pliant heirs’. These young jagirdars were then sent to the newly established 
Mayo College to join Mungul Singh who had entered the school in 1875 as the first student. With the 
careful isolation of possibly dissenting Rajput lineages the Alwar ruler achieved a position that a British 
officer described as ‘something more than primus inter pares, as there are no very great nobles whose 
power might, if  combined, overshadow the throne, as is so often the case in the Rajput States’. Thomas 
Holbein Hendley, Ulwar and its Art Treasures (London, 1888), p. 5, quoted Edward S. Haynes, 
‘Alwar: Bureaucracy versus Traditional Rulership’ in Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes, pp. 37-8.
388 Robert W. Stem, The Cat and the Lion (New York, 1988), p. 159.
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Indian princes may well have played a major part in stimulating their generosity, despite 
the fact that for the great majority the tradition (and safety) of education within the 
palace walls was well-entrenched and unlikely to change before the twentieth century. 
In linking themselves to objects of public concern, such as schools (albeit schools for 
such an elite clientele), rulers could be seen to be meeting the needs of broad-based 
social and political welfare, as well as focusing attention on the giver. Sawai Ram 
Singh, Maharajah of Jaipur, had under his patronage Maharajah’s College, which after 
the Mutiny became the premier institution in Rajputana for the recruitment and training 
of a modem professional and administrative class, and in 1861 he founded the Nobles 
College in Jaipur, anticipating by more than a decade the major British effort to educate 
the Rajput nobility.389 Other educational beneficiaries of princely plenty were the 
Khalsa College of Amritsar, of which Hira Singh, Maharajah of Nabha and Rajindar 
Singh, Maharajah of Patiala were both patrons at the end of the nineteenth century.390 
Subscriptions to such educational establishments, as well as those to the princely 
colleges, were well published and inevitably enhanced the status of the individual ruler. 
As is emphasised in the chapter on hierarchy and ritual, the royal gift was basic to 
statecraft in pre-colonial kingdoms and princes frequently supported both traditional 
and modem projects in an effort to maintain an aura of largesse.
For those royal and noble families who were prepared to send their sons to the 
princely colleges there was undoubtedly a certain amount of prestige involved. The 
volume of ‘Chiefs and Ruling Families of Rajputana’ of 1894 identifies at least 
twenty-six young rulers as having attended Mayo College. Individual biographies 
compiled by C. S. Bayley, the Political Agent for Bikaner, suggested that for some
389 Stem, Cat and Lion, p. 124.
390 Barbara N. Ramusack, ‘Punjab States, Maharajahs and Gurdwaras: Patiala and the Sikh 
Community5 in R. Jeffrey, (ed.) Princes, People, pp. 177, 179.
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members of the ruling class such an education was a prized commodity worth
• • O Q 1displaying. However there is little to suggest that it made a significant difference to 
their later roles in life. Remarkably few thakurs applied themselves to duties over and 
above managing their estates, although Thakur Mangal Singh of Pokaran, having 
passed the University Entrance Examination, became a member of the Maharajah of 
Jodhpur’s Council392 and the son of Thakur Chatar Sal of Fathpur was employed in 
the state police.393 Three of the jagirdars elected to the Jagir Council of Alwar in 
1907, Daulat Singh of Khora, Phul Singh of Para and Sewai Singh of Chimraolim, 
were graduates of the College and, leading the bureaucratic opposition to the same 
Council, was the Judicial Minister, Duijan Singh of Jaoli, also an alumnus of 
Mayo.394 For some old boys, however, the benefits of an English education bore no 
fruit: Zalim Singh Bahadur, Maharajah of Jhalawar had his ruling powers withdrawn 
in 1887 ‘having failed to administer his government in accordance with the principles 
laid down for his guidance’ and his administration was entrusted to a British officer, 
as had been the case during his minority.395
CURZON’S CURE
By 1902 Lord Curzon was complaining that only twelve out of the thirty-two ‘ruling 
chiefs’ of Kathiawar had been educated at Rajkumar College.396 Moreover most of the 
rulers of the Punjab failed to send their sons to Aitchison College, and Daly College
391 Chiefs and Leading Families in Rajputana, Calcutta: Office of Superintendent of Government 
Printing, 1894, Introduction.
392 Chiefs and Leading Families, p. 9.
393 Chiefs and Leading Families, p. 87.
394 Haynes, ‘Alwar’ in Jeffrey, ed., People, Princes, pp. 52-3.
395 Chiefs and Leading Families, p. 86.
396 Sir Thomas Raleigh, Lord Curzon in India: Being a Selection from his Speeches as Viceroy and 
Governor General 1898-1905 (London, 1906), p. 244.
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never attracted the princes and nobility of the larger central states such as Gwalior, 
Bhopal and Dewas. V. A. S. Stow, headmaster of Mayo College in the 1940s, 
commented that there had always been a fluctuation in numbers. The presence of the hen- 
apparent of a state at the College tended to result in an influx of other boys from that 
state and when the heir left the others followed him. Alternatively, some apparently 
trivial incident could lead to a withdrawal of support from a certain state.397
However to a great extent the ruling classes had shown that they wished to cling to their 
own culture and were far from keen to give their children an English education. Ganga 
Singh, Maharajah of Bikaner, complained that the long periods of absence at school 
contributed to an estrangement from his people and his responsibilities as a ruler, while 
the Council of Regency in the state enjoyed too much freedom in its decisions. Ganga 
Singh did not send his son Sadul Singh to Mayo and also discouraged his nephew, Kami 
Singh from going there.398 As a regular financial contributor to the college he 
encouraged other princes to carry more weight in decisions concerning education, and 
his comment that ‘science must be compulsory’ suggested that his negative experience at 
Mayo could be due to what he perceived as scant attention to the new demands of 
princely rule.399 By 1900 complaints of the standards in the colleges were circulated 
widely. The Gaekwar of Baroda criticised die English public school model in the 
journal East and West in January 1902, and his criticisms were reproduced in The Voice 
o f India and The Kathicm>ar Times.400 As a result Curzon was under no illusion as to the 
rulers’ dissatisfaction with the ‘high cost and general irrelevance’ of the education 
provided.401
397 Stow, Short History, p. 20.
398 Durisotto, ‘Traditional Rule’, p. 50.
399 ‘Report o f the Proceedings of the Conference at Ajmer in comiection with Chiefs’ Colleges, 10-16 
March 1904’, enclosed A. H. T. Martindale to Sec. Gol, 5 April 1904, Curzon Collection, FI 12/442.
400 Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 140.
401 Ibid. Curzon considered that thakurs and jagirdars should be trained in Agricultural Science, Civil
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The Viceroy called a conference in Calcutta in 1902 to discuss the reform of the 
constitution and curriculum of the colleges.402 The conference lasted for four days and 
was attended by principal political officers, representatives of the native chiefs and heads 
of existing colleges. In his opening speech Curzon laid out what were in his opinion the 
three main cases for the paucity of pupils in the colleges. Firstly, the deeply embedded 
conservatism of the states, enforcing the tradition that young rulers or nobles should be 
trained among their own people and supported on the one hand by the strength of the 
zenana, which was alarmed at the idea of ‘emancipated individuality’, and on the other 
by the court, which was conscious of the loss of prerogative and authority which would 
result if the ‘young recruits from the west start to stir up the sluggish Eastern pools5.403 
Secondly, the fact that college education was too costly and many rulers had been 
affected by famines and other adversities. If families found that it was considerably 
cheaper to educate their sons by private tutors within the home it would not be unnatural 
for them to adopt that course of action. Thirdly, it was doubtful whether the rulers or 
nobles were entirely satisfied with the class and quality of the education. Too much 
appeared to be spent on bricks and mortar and too little on tuition. The Viceroy 
demanded of the college committees;
How can the best pupils be expected without the best teachers and how can the best 
teachers be forthcoming unless you offer them adequate prospects and pay? Where 
are the Public Schoolsmen, and where are the University graduates, European and 
Indian, upon your staffs and what is then number? 404
Engineering, Land Records and knowledge of stock and plants, while for young princes emphasis 
should be placed on History, Geography, Maths., Political Economy and Science. Speech by the 
Viceroy Opening Conference on Chiefs’ Colleges, Calcutta, 27 January 1902, FI 11/257.
402 L/PS/10/5 is a huge file, devoted entirely to the future policy for the Chiefs Colleges following the 
impetus of the Conference.
403 Quoted Bhavasinhji, Forty Years, Vol. II, p. 75.
404 Ibid. In 1889 when there was a vacancy for the principal o f Rajkumar College the Viceroy, Lord 
Lansdowne, wrote that it was of the ‘utmost importance that we should get a first-rate man to take 
charge’ and wondered if there was a ‘really strong candidate in England’. Unfortunately the salary was 
hardly compelling at a mere Rs. 750 per month. Lansdowne to Cross, August 1889, Lansdowne 
Collection, D558, Vol. 2.
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Later in 1902 a Government of India circular to provincial governments suggested 
among other recommendations that ‘both European and Native staffs should be 
strengthened and improved, an effort being made to procure English masters of the 
highest educational and social standing and to select for the Native staff Native 
gentlemen of good family and a liberal education’.405 A further conference was held 
at Ajmer in 1904. The aims of the changes suggested were to improve academic 
standards, to make the curriculum more relevant to the needs of future Indian rulers 
and at the same time to make the colleges even more like English public schools and 
thus raise their tone. One of Curzon’s actions was to reduce Daly to the status of a 
feeder college for Mayo in 1903, but reforms improved the school to such an extent 
that in 1905, at the request of the local chiefs, Daly was enlarged and raised again to 
the status of a major college.406 By 1912 the numbers at the colleges had risen to a 
total of 4 1 3 407
The relatively low academic standards set by the princely colleges in the late nineteenth 
century were indeed to some extent dictated by the educational backgrounds of those 
who taught in them. Although the Erst headmaster of Rajkumar College, Chester 
MacNaghten, had a Cambridge degree, his original staff consisted of five Indian teachers 
and no Europeans, which had obvious disadvantages when it came to instruction hi 
English subjects. Writing in 1942 V. A. S. Stow, headmaster of Mayo College (having 
been principal of Rajkumar College), commented that the revised 1892 curriculum was 
not very different from the curriculum of the 1940s, however fifty years earlier the 
standard appeared to him to have been appreciably lower.408 The first three principals of 
Mayo College, Major St. John, Major Powlett and Colonel Loch, were all military
405 Quoted in Bhavasinhji, Forty Years, Vol. II, p. 88.
406 Raleigh, Curzon in India, p. 234.
407 Progress o f  Education in India, Sixth Quinquennial Review, 1907-12, p. 227.
408 Stow, Short History, p. 11.
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officers seconded from the Political Department and, as has been discussed at the start of 
this chapter, were as such probably less fit to attend to the scholarship of their charges 
than an officer of the Indian Civil Service who had himself been subject to a more 
rigorous education. Colonel Loch himself admitted that the quality of teaching was 
poor; both he and the headmaster, H. Sherring, were neither public school men nor 
university graduates, ‘Twenty-three years ago I was appointed to the Mayo College as 
Principal... with, I fear, no other qualifications than a love of discipline and an affection 
for natives engendered from a seivice of thirteen years in my old regiment, the 19th 
Bengal Lancers5.409
Only with the reorganisation of Mayo College under Curzon in 1903 was the need for 
higher qualified teachers emphasised. Provision was made for a teaching staff of twelve, 
four English teachers and eight Indians. The English staff, while remaining members of 
the Indian Educational Service, were to form a separate branch of the service to be 
known as the Chiefs5 Colleges cadre, especially recruited for such colleges and serving 
under the Political Department. A university degree appears to have been an essential 
requirement for the branch. Two English assistant masters, were recruited from 
England: F. J. Portman, a graduate of Oxford410 and S. F. Madden, a graduate of 
Cambridge, The early death of Madden resulted in the appointment of another Oxford 
graduate, C. H. H. Twiss, who was at the time teaching at Aligarh College 411
409 Conference for Chiefs’ Colleges, Calcutta, 27 January 1902, Part II, Curzon Collection, FI 12/442.
410 Portman excelled at running, tennis, cricket and racquets. Unfortunately his enthusiasm reached 
such heights that he literally ran himself to death racing with his pupils before breakfast during their 
training for the school sports day. The Radleian, 3 March 1906, p. 314, quoted Mangan, Games Ethic,
Si/36-Stow, Short History, pp. 9,11. In addition to each o f the pennanent regular English staff 
sanctioned for the four Chiefs’ Colleges the Government of India instituted a leave reserve of first one, 
and later two, English assistant masters who, when not wanted elsewhere, were attached to Mayo. 
Under these conditions an Oxford graduate, W. Fanshawe, joined the staff o f Mayo College in 1908 
and remained there until 1926 when he left to take up the appointment of principal of Daly College. 
The incoming principal of Mayo in 1917 was F. A. Leslie Jones who had been principal of Aitchison 
College, a further example o f the circularity of academic appointments within the Chiefs’ Colleges.
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The education of young Indian rulers no doubt benefited from the fact that the policy of 
indirect rule was very much a public school balance between custom and efficiency. In 
his study of British leadership and the public school tradition, Rupert Wilkinson 
considers that the essence of indirect rule was that it respected traditional communities 
and traditional authorities. The policy was not without drawbacks, in that on the whole it 
deterred the British from making radical efforts to train native bureaucracies and from 
founding educational systems which would eventually have supported democratic 
government. Such innovations would have disrupted indigenous authority and many 
British officials felt some personal loyalty to native chiefs and princes with whom they 
closely worked.412 Certainly by dealing exclusively with royal and aristocratic families, 
there was little demand for the princely colleges to offer schooling for bureaucratic and 
professional employment. During a ruler’s minority a temporary administration was 
frequently set up, based on the larger bureaucratic machinery of British India, ensuring 
that there was no great need for a prince to be deeply involved in the administrative 
affairs of his state. When Jai Singh, Maharajah of Alwar returned from Mayo College in 
1897, he brought a view of an westernised Rajput ruler which conflicted with the 
independent role which the rationalised bureaucracy had made for themselves in the 
Alwar government. The Alwar* state servants were reluctant to accept a reassertion of 
the Maharajah’s power, in either modem or traditional terms, and retained enough
Stow, Short Histoiy, pp. 36-7. At the beginning o f the twentieth century there was a prevalence of 
masters who had been educated at public schools. J. C. Mayne, educated at Tonbridge and Oxford, 
taught at Brighton College and several Indian schools before becoming principal o f Rajkumar College 
in 1903. C. W. Waddington, educated at Charterhouse and Oxford, was appointed principal of Mayo 
College in 1903 and held the post until 1917. Three o f the Indian public school headmasters were 
assistant masters at Marlborough at one time or another: F. A. Leslie Jones and V. A. S. Stow at Mayo, 
and E. C. Marchant at Daly College. Mangan, Games Ethic, p. 217. The Annual Report for Rajkumar 
College for 1904-5 emphasised that the staff had been considerably strengthened during the year: there 
was a new Vice Principal, P. Hide, with a degree from Oxford, in conjunction with two assistant 
masters, both with degrees from Bombay University. Bhavasinhji, Forty Years, Vol. IV, p. 165.
412 Rupert Wilkinson, Gentlemanly Power: British Leadership and the Public School Tradition (New 
York, 1964), pp 102-3.
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influence to oppose him in his efforts.413
While Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, had hoped that through 
education the ‘better class’ of natives would not only be trained in ‘noblesse oblige’ 
but also fitted for employment ‘in our services’414 (and presumably states’ services), 
the British officers who made Mayo College’s policy were decidedly uninterested in 
preparing the sons of impecunious and obscure Rajput cadet families and the younger 
boys of ordinary jagirdars for gainful employment. One thing the imperial 
government wanted Mayo College not to be was a university preparatory school. The 
universities belonged to the middle class, the babus about whose loyalties the British 
had increasing doubts. The princely colleges were meant to belong to those whose 
loyalties the British were courting. In 1876 the viceroy created a few posts in various 
government offices to be filled by ‘young men of rank and education’, but the 
government would not allow the princely colleges to prepare their students for 
university matriculation. Until it would, they could only ‘limp along’ tiying vainly to 
transform the sons of a handful of princes and nobles who were not greatly interested 
in attending at all and ‘still less in being transformed into a nobility with serious 
obligations to anything but their families and their families’ estates’.415 Mayo College 
came finally to resemble an Indian Eton and function like one only during the first 
decades of the twentieth century, when the British government gave way to the 
princes’ request to allow the college to become a university preparatory school for 
Rajputs who wanted careers for their sons.416
413 Haynes, ‘Alwar’, in Jeffrey, (ed.) People, Princes, pp. 59-60,
414 Quoted Stem, Cat and Lion, p. 159.
415 Cat and Lion, p. 159.
416 Cat and Lion, pp. 159-60.
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The British probably performed as well as they could when it came to individual 
princely education at the end of the nineteenth century. In some cases it was remarkable, 
bearing in mind the highly conservative, tradition-bound nature of Indian durbars and 
the extraordinary power wielded by the zenanas, how easily the Government of India 
was able to convey to royal families the desirability of palace schools based on English 
models and of English tutors imparting ideas of a radically different nature to those of 
native tutors formerly employed in the same role, hi some ways for the first generation 
of young princes to be exposed to such an education the conservative nature of royal 
Indian life was a saving grace. In the few cases where western views were too 
vociferously imparted by English tutors and too readily accepted by their pupils the 
young rulers tended to be stranded in a ‘no man’s land’ in which they fitted neither into a 
western nor an oriental template: Sayajirao, the Gaekwar of Baroda, used his British 
education to adopt an independent, modernising stance within his state which proved 
unacceptable to the wary paramount power. Neither in an individual palace environment 
nor in the princely colleges was education aimed to achieve a particularly high academic 
standard, due often to a lack of intellectual rigour and corresponding lack of expectations 
on the part of those teaching. However it could be argued that during such a seminal 
period of transition between traditional and westernised rule teaching on more 
sophisticated lines would have proved too mentally demanding for pupils lacking 
exposure to English language and culture, and even less acceptable to royal families.
In the case of the princely colleges, the British approach was in many ways hugely 
arrogant in supposing that, however warmly they may have admired some aspects of 
English society, Indian princes and noblemen would wish to emulate an English
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education. The character building elements of the public school with boys in mixed 
houses, a Spartan style of living and an emphasis on sport must have engendered an 
inevitable reluctance to leave a somewhat sybaritic lifestyle, particularly if there was 
encouragement from the zenana and durbar officials to eschew any exposure to 
western ideas. Moreover to the first generation of young rulers, used to a rigid, 
religion-based tutelage at home, the indigestible mixture of English subjects must 
have seemed an unappetising prospect. However for the members of the Indian ruling 
classes who did attend the princely colleges, the true failure of the system lay in the 
fact that there were virtually no opportunities to put their newly found liberal teaching 
into practice. As will be pointed out in the chapter on administration there was little 
support from the Political Department for a ruler’s modem role in a state which was 
dominated by a powerful Minister and bureaucracy and too great a demand for refomi 
to allow sufficient time for a newly educated prince to develop into an effective ruler. 
By the start of the twentieth century only a handful of mlers had been given the 
opportunity to master the necessary skills to be able to control their administrations 
and to demonstrate that their education in British hands had been a worthwhile 
exercise.
Commenting on the benefits of an Indian public school education, as an old boy of 
Rajkumar College Namllah Khan declared that there was
evidence that the critical faculty has been developed amongst an Oriental people, 
owing to the material and moral advancement which society is undergoing under the 
enlightened British administration .... To recommend and support a policy which will 
effect reforms, diffuse education and enlightened ideas, encourage culture and abolish 
old customs which are unsuitable to the wants and needs of the present is therefore a 
duty especially incumbent upon educated and thinking men.417
417 Khan, Ruling Chiefs, p. v.
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In his view ‘anarchy was the rule rather than the exception and the people groaned under 
misgovernment’ in the states before British supremacy was established.418 However if 
by the end of the nineteenth century ‘anarchy’ in the states had to some extent been 
overcome, it was due less to the influence of the western education ‘diffused’ to 
traditional rulers than to the education in British India of a more humble breed of 
bureaucrats who were able speedily and effectively to take over the government of a 
state.
This chapter has provided many examples of the negative approach of palace women 
towards the introduction of western ideas. The following part of the princely life cycle, 
dealing with marriage and royal women, makes it clear that such negativity was by no 
means universal. By subscribing to western ideology a small number of royal females 
proved able to wield considerable power to contribute to the British goal of ‘good 
government’.
418 Ruling Chiefs, p. 1.
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MARRIAGE AND ROYAL WOMEN
To the Victorians the state of moral degeneration of India’s women was visibly 
represented by the zenana and the veil.419 Thomas Metcalf considers that, confined to a 
life of languid idleness in closed rooms, hidden from view, India’s women were seen by 
Victorians as suffused with can unhealthy sexuality and a disabling passivity’ 420 In the 
same vein, in his study of the ‘imperial imagination’ Lewis D. Wurgaft suggests that, 
more than any other Indian institution, the locked doors of the zenana symbolised the 
barrier between British society and the unsettling mysteries of native life 421 On a 
practical level the British in the nineteenth century were particularly concerned with 
bringing the Indian woman out of the darkness and into the light. Wurgaft maintains 
that one part of the impulse behind this need for reform was genuinely humanitarian. 
Another part of it helped to rationalise the British conviction that ‘social rather than 
political reform was necessary for genuine progress’ and only Britain could guide India 
to that end 422 However there was a third element in the commitment to reform, the need 
to bring Indian sexuality into a ‘more open and accessible sphere, where it could be 
controlled and tailored to imperial requirements’.
Palaces were considered to be riddled with mystery and intrigue, often permeated with 
sex and excess, and rulers were frequently pictured surrounded by servants egging them 
on to uncontrolled sensuality or even debauchery. Travelling as a journalist in the states
419 Purdah is a Persian word which literally means a ‘curtain’ or ‘screen’. In popular use it applies to 
the use of the veil among Muslim women as well as seclusion within the household.
420 Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 94.
421 Lewis D. Wurgaft, The Imperial Imagination: Magic and Myth in Kipling’s India (Middletown 
1983), pp. 51-53.
422 Imperial Imagination, p. 53.
423 Ibid.
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of Rajputana, Rudyard Kipling was constantly oppressed by the configurations of the 
native princes’ palaces. In the palace of Amber he found ‘crampt and darkened rooms, 
the narrow smoothwalled passages with recesses where a man might wait for his enemy 
unseen, the maze of ascending and descending stairs leading nowither, the ever present 
screen of marble tracery that may hide or reveal so much’, suggesting that ‘it must be 
impossible for one reared in an Eastern palace to think straightly or speak freely’ 424
In the nineteenth century British architects found rational motives for bringing about a 
change in the architecture of princely palaces. Sir Lepel Griffin, Agent to the Governor- 
General in Central India, wrote that in the past a palace had been required to offer 
‘protection against attack from without and privacy to a very large female population 
within’.425 The first of these requirements no longer existed and the second was rapidly 
losing its force, as chiefs become ‘content with one wife and do not need the 100 rooms 
and hazy labyrinths of an Oriental zenana\ For those princes, Sir Lepel continued,
whose minds have been enlightened by English training, the old, and it may be, 
picturesque designs of native palaces are odious. They cannot breathe in the confined 
rooms and narrow passages which were good enough for their fathers. They demand 
well-ventilated rooms, light and air, wide staircases and imposing halls. Such 
conveniences find no place in the conventional designs of native architecture 426
It was suggested that, once incorporated into the new order of the Raj, with his values 
and expectations appropriately transformed, an Indian ruler would inevitably find an old 
insalubrious palace unsuited to his new moral transparency and, like him, the female 
members of his household would be exposed to the ‘light and air’ of which they were 
deprived in the zenana.
424 Rudyard Kipling, ‘From Sea to Sea’, Rudyard Kipling’s Verse: Definitive Edition (New York, 1940). 
Vol. I, p. 24.
425 Lepel Griffin, letter of 29 January 1887 in The Pioneer; Allahabad, 5 February 1887, pp. 4-5.
426 Ibid.
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This chapter of the princely cycle has two sections. The first deals with the efforts of 
British officials to eradicate the more unwholesome sexual aspects of palace life through 
the regulation of royal marriages. It suggests that political officers removed princely 
authority by masterminding marriage alliances and by attempting to apply western 
constraints to existing royal marriage practice. The second section discusses the 
proposition that, in contrast to the Victorian view expressed by Metcalf, far from 
displaying a ‘disabling passivity’ the women of the royal zenanas, often ironically by 
acting as a conduit for British liberal ideology, were capable of wielding a degree of 
power in affairs of state which was remarkable not only by Indian but also by British 
norms of the time.
MARRIAGE
EARLY BRITISH IMPACT
The British system of indirect rule affected all aspects of royal practice, influencing both 
the motives behind and the contracting of royal marriages. One of the first casualties of 
British intervention was the practice of polygamy, which declined as a result of general 
British policy towards the Indian states rather than a deliberate British moral crusade.
Rajputana provides an interesting model of polygamy in that the practice assumed 
particular importance in the region, due to the military and political problems that the 
Rajput chiefs faced in the creation, expansion and consolidation of their territories and 
the social structure they evolved to meet the situation. The major Rajput clans came 
from outside Rajasthan and conquered lands from other ruling groups like the Bhils.
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Subsequently they fought continuously against each other for the further expansion of 
their territories.427 The Rajput chiefs adhered to a social system based on kinship and 
clan which served to keep them united for purposes of military strength. The 
recruitment base was narrowed down to the individual clan and within this restricted 
field the supply of manpower was only possible if there was an adequate number of male
* 428offspring. The Rajputs also used marriage to form alliances with other clans to 
expand their area of influence and militaiy strength. The marriages of Rajput chiefs 
were not arrangements between individuals, but two houses, and political relationships 
were forged through matrimonial agreements 429
Although the Moguls established their rule over the Rajput rulers through informal 
treaties and matrimonial relations, this did not bring about any fundamental alteration in 
the political system, other than loosening the clan bonds 430 With the coming of the 
British, Rajput rule underwent important changes. In concluding precisely written 
treaties during the first decades of the nineteenth century the British took upon 
themselves the responsibility of safeguarding the territory of the Rajput princes, under 
which the rulers agreed to act in subordination to the British government. In her study of 
Rajput courts Varsha Joshi makes it clear that polygamy lost its appeal as political 
marriages lost then use, The clan army no longer had a role. The concept of having 
more male progeny to increase fighting strength had lost its relevance’ 431 Moreover 
under British rule the Rajput jagirdars were particularly sensitive to the fact that a large 
number of children would result in the fragmentation of jagirs, as there was now no
A 'i 'ypossibility of territorial expansion.
427 Varsha Joshi, Polygamy and Purdah: Women and Society among Rajputs (Jaipur, 1995), p. 39.
428 Polygamy and Purdah, p. 40.
429 Polygamy and Purdah, p. 56.
430 Polygamy andPurdah} p. 55.
431 Ibid.
432 Ibid.
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Under Lord Bentinck zealous British reform resulted in further intervention in Indian 
royal marriage practice with the enactment of the abolition of sciti433 in 1829, which had 
a particular impact on royal widows. Sciti resulted from the political and economic 
circumstances of the polygamous marriage system and the hierarchical structure of the 
zenana. On the death of a chief, the mother of the son who succeeded to the gadi 
enjoyed higher status and privileges over the other ranis. In the case of a ruler being a 
minor she was designated queen regent and in that capacity all the powers of 
administration were vested in her. The life of a widowed rani whose son was not heir 
was dramatically degraded and, like other Hindu widows, many restrictions in relation to 
dress, food and physical movement were imposed upon her.434 The instances of self- 
immolation were relatively rare after the first decades of the nineteenth century, partly 
due to the decrease of polygamy and partly due to British use of sheer constraint where 
warranted.435 When Maim Singh, Maharajah of Jodhpur died in 1848 one rani, four 
concubines and one female slave committed sati. However his successor, Maharajah 
Tukht Singh, left on his death in 1873 about 28 legal and 15 illegal wives as well as an 
‘immense number5 of slave girls, yet, as a result of British orders to lock and guard the 
doors of the zenana, not a single woman attempted self-immolation. 436
CHOICE OF BRIDE
As the nineteenth century progressed less emphasis was placed by the British on reform 
than on the desirability of regulating royal marriages and broking sound political 
matches motivated by, in British eyes, good judgment rather than the Machiavellian
433 The self-immolation of a Hindu widow on her husband’s funeral pyre.
434 ‘Polygamy and Purdah’, pp. 141-2.
435 ‘Polygamy and Purdah’, p. 148.
436 Offg. Pol. Agent Marwar and Jaisalmer to Offg. AGG Rajputana, 3 February 1873, R/2/182/359.
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intrigues of individual durbars. There was hope that through the introduction of western 
ideas on, for example, monogamy, the lax moral standards which existed in many Indian 
palaces could be considerably tightened. The Government of India made it clear that it 
expected to be well informed of forthcoming royal alliances. When the Nawab of 
Rampur declared that it was a curtailment of his rights to divulge details of his various 
marriages, it was seen by British officials as a ‘curious perversion’ on his part, since it 
was understood that the Government of India needed such information in order to deal 
with problems of succession.437 Indeed the matter of succession emerged as a matter of 
considerable importance in the case of the Nawab of Rampur. Much official 
correspondence was generated by the question of whether or not the Nawab was a Shiite 
and his son by an informal marriage to a concubine therefore able to quality as a 
legitimate heir 438
Similarly, when it was discovered that the proposed wedding of Scindia, Maharajah of 
Gwalior, to a girl from a Tanjore family had been negotiated in secret by the President of 
the Regency Council and the Regent Maharani, the Agent to the Governor-General in 
Central India expressed great displeasure, since the Government of India had a 
responsibility in the matter of all important marriage negotiations and needed 
information on family, age and other details of the parties concerned.439 It appeared that 
the marriage plans had been deliberately hidden from the Government of India with the 
‘real object’ of getting the Maharajah out of his guardian’s hands as soon as possible.440 
Scindia was thirteen years old and the girl eleven, and although the ceremony was to
437 W. J. Cimingham, Sec. Gol, FD to T. Stoker, Chief Sec. to Govt, o f NWP and Oudh, 9 February 
1898, R/2/783/18.
438 See R/2/801/3. Referring to a muta or temporary marriage permitted by the law of the Ithna 
Asharis, making up the majority branch of Shiites, but not sanctioned elsewhere in Islam. The 
temporary marriage is contracted for a fee received by the woman, rather than a dowry. In the 1977 
Satyajit Ray film The Chess Players a British officer suggests that the real meaning of the word muta is 
‘enjoyment’,
439 A. Martindale, 1st Asst. AGG Cl, to Res. Gwalior, 26 December 1888, R/2/750/14.
440 Major David Barr, Resident Gwalior, to F. Henvey, AGG Cl, 17 January 1889, R/2/750/14.
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take place within the next month or so there was no intention of allowing the young ruler 
to live with his bride for some years.441 The President of the Council of Regency, Bapu 
Sahib Jadu, had suggested that she lived in one of the palaces in the meantime, however 
the Resident, Major David Barr, was of the opinion that she should return to her parents. 
Had she been of a good family, the marriage would have taken place at her father’s 
house, but ‘being of small account’ she was ‘to be consigned like a bale of goods, to the 
keeping of the Maharani’.442 There was a strong probability that she would reach 
puberty in two years when Hindu religion and custom would require the Maharajah to 
live with her, after which all further efforts to educate the boy would be futile.443
In fact the Tanjore bride was subsequently found to be twelve or more years old and 
therefore agreed by all to be unsuitable. It was suggested that the Government of India 
should take advantage of the situation by informing the Maharani Regent that in the 
interests of Scindia’s education, training and general welfare, the ruler’s future bride 
should be at least five years younger than him.444 A somewhat unsuitable consort for a 
chief of such an ‘exalted position’ was eventually found in Satara, having exhausted the 
princely families of Baroda, Kolhapur, Nagpur, Tanjore and others, however the Viceroy 
was disinclined to forbid the match, as ‘direct interference in such a matter should, if 
possible, be avoided’.445
The words ‘direct interference’ were open to interpretation. Political officers on the 
whole appeared to need little encouragement to enter into the cut and thrust of marriage 
arrangements between states. In 1896 British political officers were involved in intense
441 Barr to Henvey, 12 January 1889, R/2/750/14
442 Ibid.
443 Barr to Henvey, 17 January, 1889, R/2/750/14..
444 Barr to Henvey, 27 January 1889 R/2/750/14.
445 Henvey to Barr, 24 October 1890, R/2/750/14. Obviously the royal families of Satara and Nagpur 
were still relatively socially acceptable despite the fact that the states were annexed by the British in the 
1850s.
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diplomatic negotiations to marry one of the Mysore princesses to the Maharao of Kotah, 
aged twenty two, who was looking for a wife over thirteen with five lakhs of dowry to 
cover the wedding expenses. Colonel Loch, Principal of Mayo College, (who, as is 
cited in the chapter on princely education, was by his own admission better fitted for 
personnel work than academia) telegrammed to the Resident in Mysore that in his 
opinion the young man possessed an ‘honest and absolutely faithfull desposition [sic] 
gentle bright sympathetic and most thoughtful health excellent has no signs whatever of 
any hereditary disease his personal views are I know entirely in favour of monogamy’.446 
However the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana reported that there was no 
chance of such an alliance succeeding at this stage, due to die conservatism of ruling 
families in Rajputana and prejudice over matters of caste and otiier social questions.447 
This proved to be the case and the Maharajah’s tiiree sisters eventually married Ursus, 
members of a lesser branch of the Mysore royal family 448
The vexed question of finding an appropriate royal partner for their brother was 
illustrated by a report sent to the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, from the Resident at Mysore, 
Donald Robertson, on the negotiations in 1897 for die Maharajah of Mysore’s marriage:
At one time there seemed some chance of an alliance with Baroda. The Maharani 
favoured the idea, and I was given to understand that the Gaekwar would have 
acquiesced. An insuperable difficulty arose, however, in the tender age of the girl. 
She is only five years old and it would hardly have been prudent to bind the young 
Maharajah here to celibacy for seven or eight years more.4 A marriage with Baroda 
would have extinguished, for all time, the chances of a matrimonial alliance widi a 
good Ruling Family in Rajputana, but, as Your Excellency is aware, die prospects of 
such a match are exceedingly remote. The Diwan next tried Cutch. The Rao is, I
446 Col. Loch to W. Mackworth Young, Res. Mysore, 24 December 1896, R/2/29/273.
447 H. S. Barnes, Gol to W. Mackworth Young, 30 April 1896, R/2/30/274.
448 Sir Donald Robertson, Res. Mysore, ‘Secret Notes on Mysore’ 25 September 1903, R /l/1/1064.
449 Although the Government of India’s Age of Consent Act of 1891 is not mentioned in Crown 
Representative Records, at the end of the nineteenth century it appeai-s to have been rigidly adhered to 
by British officials in Indian durbars. Political officers insisted upon the prohibition o f consummation 
of marriage for girls below the age of twelve when making post-nuptial arrangements in royal 
households. The Gaekwar initiated the Infant Marriage Prevention Act in Baroda in 1904.
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believe, a good Rajput and everything promised favourably. A deputation was indeed 
to start thence for Mysore, when it was discovered that the Mysore and Cutch 
families both claim to belong to the same gotra, or sect, of Kshattryas. Marriages 
within the same gotra are prohibited ... the objection as regards Cutch applies, 
unfortunately, with equal force to the other Bombay States, which are branches of 
that House. There are, however, two or three more eligible Chiefships left in 
Bombay, an alliance with one of whom may serve as a stepping stone eventually to 
something better in Rajputana, and these the Diwan is now exploiting. We may take 
it that any marriage outside the circle of the Arsoos [Ursus], who are the poor 
relations of the Mysore Ruling House and who have hitherto held the field as 
candidates for matrimonial favours, will be strenuously objected to locally, but Her 
Highness professes to fully appreciate the wisdom of importing a new strain of blood 
into Mysore.450
A confidential memorandum from the Dewan of Mysore in July 1898 listed the 
requirements for those in ''loco parentis’ making a selection of possible brides for the 
Maharajah. Top of the list were the purity of Kshatriya blood, the personal health and 
appearance of the bride, the respectability and status of the family and, finally, the 
character, temper and disposition of the candidate.451 The Maharani Regent was well 
aware of the great benefit which would accrue to her children and the Mysore royal 
family of marriage alliances with Rajput families in the north of India, despite the 
inevitable unpopularity that such matches would produce in the local community.452 
Regardless of the failure of the Maharajah’s sisters to find Rajput husbands, a delegation 
was despatched from Mysore to Rajkot, consisting of a high ranking member of the 
Council, the Maharani’s brother, the Civil Surgeon in Bangalore and a palace official, to 
seek the ‘good advice ‘ of die Bombay Government and in particular diat of the Political 
Agent in Kathiawar, Colonel J. M. Hunter, since such a marriage would offer 
‘considerable temptations to unscrupulous adventurers’.453
In 1899, with British political officers acting assiduously as marriage brokers in ‘the
430 Robertson to Elgin 22 October 1897, R/l/1/195.
451 Confidential memo of Dewan o f Mysore, 26 July 1898, R/2/30/278.
452 K. Sheshadri Iyer, Dewan Mysore, to W. Lee Warner, 11 September 1895, R/2/29/272.
453 Robertson to the Hon. S. W. Edgerley, Sec. Govt. Bombay, 16 March 1898.
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process of exhausting all desirable and possible selections5, the Maharajah under 
pressure agreed to a match with the elder daughter of the Rana of Vana, a Rajput 
‘connected with other ruling Chiefs’ in Kathiawar.454 The girl was eleven, four years 
younger than her husband to be, and apparently desirable in appearance, physical 
condition and temperament. It was suspected that the family was not of a sufficiently 
high political status for a matrimonial union with Mysore, but British officials saw the 
objection as relatively minor in importance while the advantages were ‘weighty and 
obvious’ 455 It was a new departure for the Mysore royal family to seek a bride in the 
north and it was unusual for a Rajput Kshatriya ruler to forsake his ‘conservative 
traditions’ in contracting alliances. For some years Mysore had been ‘practically 
isolated’ as far as marriage was concerned and the claims of the royal family to be 
Kshatriya at all were ‘mythical rather than historical’, therefore it was a privilege to be 
able to marry into a Kshatriya family with as high a status as Vana.456 Eventually 
marriages between Mysore and important Rajput states might be negotiated ‘on level 
terms’, but at this stage the proposed match in which a comparatively obscure thakur 
allied himself with one of the wealthiest houses in India was considered a ‘satisfactory 
advance’.457 After the wedding the young bride would live with and be trained by her 
mother-in-law at Mysore. The Maharani’s ‘good sense and right feeling’ could be 
confidently relied upon for the judicious and timely decision on the matter of the 
consummation of the marriage and it was proposed ‘to defer the commencement of 
marital relations for about three years’ 458
454 Robertson to Sec. Gol, FD, 26 June 1899, R/2/44/413.
455 Ibid.
456 Ibid.
457 Ibid.
458 Ibid. See also R /l/1/1062. A match with a more ‘obscure’ wife could have its advantages. In 1878 
a letter from the Pol. Agent in Kolhapur, Colonel F. Schneider, revealed that the Kolhapur durbar was 
deliberately looking for a bride ‘o f reduced circumstances’ for the Maharajah. Whereas brides from 
‘more exalted’ backgrounds tended to ‘become dissatisfied’ and their dependents often gave much 
trouble to the durbars concerned, those chosen from a humble source were ‘proud of their elevation 
and more easily guided’. Col. F. Schneider, Political Agent Kolhapur, to C. Gonne, Sec. Govt. 
Bombay, 2 February 1878, R/2/1018/1006.
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The Maharani’s fears over local disapproval of the alliance with Vana were well 
founded. A letter to the Viceroy from the editor of the Bangalore Evening Mail 
dramatically illustrated the complications which could ensue from all but the most clear- 
cut of royal maniages and questioned the authority of the Maharajah in relinquishing the 
traditional practice of a local marriage. It declared that the decision to bring in a foreign 
bride was ‘attended with many evils’.459 It was asked whether ‘domestic felicity’ could 
be maintained if such a princess was introduced into the palace. The princes of Mysore 
were ‘pure vegetarians’ and the Rajputs ‘generally flesh-eaters’ and drinkers of alcohol 
‘who have no hesitation even to mix with the Mahomedans’ 460 In the palace there were 
many priests, sycophants and dependants, who were always trying ‘to work out some 
intrigue’ and die introduction of people of ‘dramatically opposite views and practices’ 
would ruin the harmonious atmosphere. Relations between mother-in-law and daughter- 
in-law would be ‘peculiar’ and there would be no common language in which to 
converse 461 Doubtless the wife would exert her power over her husband and through 
her influence his ‘present practices and habits’ might be changed, causing annoyance to 
his subjects since a prince should live ‘not for himself but for his people’. The editor 
demanded to know how suitable matches for the offspring of such a marriage were to be 
made, and whether the ‘degradation’ of a change of caste would be necessary. Neither 
Rajput princes nor Mysore Ursu families would consider alliances with the children. 
The social organisation of India was ‘very complicated and very rigid’ and the Mysore 
royal family would be forced to look for bridegrooms and brides from other 
communities, leading to ‘further complications and disturbances in the palace’ 462
459
460
461
462
Editor, Evening Mail to Viceroy, 14 October 1899, R/2/44/413.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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Inevitably palace ‘complications’ such as those feared in Mysore did ensue following 
princely adoption of western models of behaviour in matters of marriage. The following 
section deals with two such cases.
WESTERN INFLUENCE ON ROYAL MARRIAGES
There was evidence that at the turn of the century, Ganga Singh, Maharajah of Bikaner 
was strongly influenced by the ideas of his English tutor, Brian Egerton, whose 
adherence to austerity and discipline discussed in the chapter on education may have 
been at odds with the somewhat loose custom of betrothal. After Ganga Singh 
succeeded to the gadi the Regency Council attempted to betroth him to the daughter of 
Fateh Singh, Maharana of Udaipur, hi 1897 when marriage negotiations were taking 
place, the Bikaner ruler expressed his determination not to marry the Udaipur princess, 
alleging that the betrothal ceremony to her had not been formally completed, but in fact 
because he felt that the ultra-conservative Maharana would be a troublesome father-in- 
law and the girl was too young and not sufficiently good looking.463 The Maharana 
wrote to the Agent for the Governor-General in Rajputana, R. J. Crosthwaite, 
emphasising that the betrothal was valid. In a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Elgin, 
Crosthwaite made the Maharana’s feelings plain,
[he] tells me that, if the marriage is broken off, there will no longer be friendship 
between the States, and he and Bikanir will have a bad name throughout the whole of 
Hindustan. The result, he will probably say, of English education and an English 
tutor, is that young Chiefs learn to break their engagements ... if the Maharajah 
breaks the engagement, he will be considered to have acted contrary to the Rajput 
code of honour. He will undoubtedly inflict an injury on the Oodeypore lady. She 
has been reserved for him, and it will be difficult now to find a suitable match for her. 
It is to be regretted that the Maharajah having been brought up by an English tutor 
should commence life by acting in a manner which the Chiefs will probably consider
463 Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule’, p. 58.
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dishonourable. We must, however, expect that the Western wine will break the old 
Hindu bottles.464
The Viceroy, although sharing some anxiety over the breach of harmony between two 
states, could not hide his satisfaction in noticing that the policy of giving young rulers 
‘some insight into the ideas of morality and social habits’ which were considered 
‘essential points of modem civilisation’ had been somewhat successful.465 He admitted 
that ‘as we have educated the young Maharaja in an English fashion, we must not be 
surprised if he finds it difficult to conform to Hindu custom’. The Rajput custom of 
betrothal was inconsistent with the progress that the Government of India had tried to 
encourage and it could not be maintained except under a system of polygamy that was 
no longer welcome to young rulers. In substance Elgin agreed with Crosthwaite, ‘As 
you say, “the Western wine must break the old Hindu bottles” and while we must take 
care that it is not our hands that deal the blow, I see no reason in a case like this to regret 
the smash’.466
Nevertheless the decision not to marry the daughter of the Maharana was not a 
particularly wise move in Rajput society. Ganga Singh could be regarded as having 
committed a breach of faith and acting dishonourably towards the most prestigious 
Rajput ruler. At only seventeen it is possible that the Maharajah thought that in 
eschewing the custom of betrothal he was adopting a modem stance and the British 
would commend his action 467 The British certainly did not discourage him and, bearing 
in mind the amount of influence exercised by Egerton over the young ruler, it is possible 
that the tutor was to some extent responsible for Ganga Singh’s surprising refusal.
464 R. J. Crosthwaite, AGG Rajputana to Elgin 22 May 1897, Elgin Collection, F84/70. The 
‘Oodeypore lady’ eventually married the Maharajah of Kishengarh in February 1904. R/2/177/33 
gives details o f the extensive guest list, including at least forty Europeans.
455 Elgin to Crosthwaite, 4 June 1897, Elgin Collection, F84/70. See also Elgin to Crosthwaite, 12 
May 1897, R/l/1/1054.
466 Ibid.
467 Crosthwaite to Elgin 31 May 1897, Elgin Collection, F84/70.
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However later in life the Maharajah was to display a somewhat less disciplined attitude 
to marriage practice in general and, despite British hopes that he would eschew 
polygamy, Ganga Singh married three times to obtain male heirs.468
Despite the potency of ‘Western wine’ and its perceived benefits, exposure to western 
ideas did not always have a successful outcome. The complications of an Indian prince 
marrying a European woman were well demonstrated by the Raj all of Jind’s marriage in 
1900 to Olive, said to be the daughter of P. A. von Tassel, a balloonist and parachutist 
‘of Dutch or German origin’.469 After the wedding von Tassel received a sum of Rs. 
35,000 from the Rajah, the bulk of which was to be deposited in an English bank for the 
bride, but which appeared to be rapidly disappearing in the hands of her parents. The 
Government of India much deplored the misjudgement of the Rajah in contracting such 
a match, as he had recently changed from a ‘mere idler and pleasure-seeker’ to ‘a man 
addicted to business habits with something of a real regard for his duties towards his 
people’ 470 It was regretted that the Political Officer, Lieutenant A. Irvine, had been 
unable to stop the match, however after the Rajah’s investiture Irvine had been instructed 
by the Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, Sir Mackworth Young, to teach the young 
heir to stand alone and to seek advice only when absolutely necessary. Recognising that 
his action might not meet with British approval, the Rajah had resorted to the ‘utmost 
secrecy and rushed the ceremony at the dead of night’ 471
Problems were also generated by the marriage proposed in 1905 by the Nawab of
468 Durisotto ‘Traditional Rule’, p. 62. The predecessors of Ganga Singh of Bikaner, although already 
ruling under British protection, were convinced polygamists: Maharajah Sardar Singh, his grandfather, 
married more than ten times and Maharajah Dungar Singh, his father, seven times.
469 J. M. Douie, Chief Sec. Govt. Punjab to Sec. Gol, FD 25 November 1900, R/l/1/264.
470 Ibid.
471 Ibid.
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Rampur’s brother, the Sahibzada Nasir Ali Khan472, although in this case due to the fact 
that the groom was impecunious, unlike the magnanimous Rajah of Jind. The Nawab 
for dubious reasons wished his brother to settle down in England after he finished his 
education there, offering him an allowance of £1,000 a year on the condition that he 
remained out of India until the Nawab requested his return, and stayed loyal to his 
brother, avoiding any ‘intrigue’ with other subjects of Rampur 473 Nasir Ali Khan was 
free to marry and to take up an offer he had received to enter the Middle Temple and 
qualify as a barrister. Matters were complicated by the fact that he was enamoured of a 
Miss Ethel Hopkins, daughter of a London art dealer, who was well educated with 
‘considerable personal attractions’ and the prospect of an inheritance of £100,000. E. M. 
Hopkins, her father, objected to any formal engagement unless the Nawab settled on his 
brother an income sufficient to maintain a wife. Moreover he drew up a set of 
extraordinarily demanding marriage stipulations: Nasir Ali Khan was to become a 
naturalised English subject, he was to renounce for ever all rights and claims to the 
succession of Rampur, Inis children were to be brought up in his mother’s religion and, 
finally, he was to settle in approved English trust securities a sum sufficient to produce 
an annual income of £3,000.474
British officials noted that the position of the Sahibzada was a ‘peculiar one’. He had 
received an English education, all his ‘tastes and proclivities’ were English, and he 
wished to marry an English girl who was said to be clever and attractive 475 Every 
obstacle had been placed in the way of his return to India, and if he was to remain in 
England he could do much worse than to marry Miss Hopkins. It was noteworthy that 
he was the first native of high birth to take a high degree at Oxford or Cambridge and his
472 The Sahibzada also features in the chapter on education.
473 Confidential memo by Political ADC India Office, Sir Curzon Wyllie, 17 October 1905, R/l/1/337.
474 Ibid.
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record at school and college had been blameless.476 Extremely grudgingly the Nawab 
was eventually persuaded by the Government of India to offer his brother a guaranteed 
income of £1,020 a year, plus £820 a year to his widow and children for their lives, and 
the Sahibzada was strongly recommended to accept the offer, as it was felt that better 
terms would not be forthcoming.
Due to his enforced existence in England and his wish to take an English bride, the 
Muslim Sahibzada of Rampur’s alliance was indeed a special case. However royal 
Muslim marriage arrangements in India by no means followed a hard and fast formula. 
The two cases of Hyderabad and Bhopal illustrate the extent to which such arrangements 
could differ.
ROYAL MUSLIM MARRIAGES IN HYDERABAD AND BHOPAL
At a meeting in Hyderabad in 1882 between the Resident and the Minister, Salar Jung I, 
the living quarters for a possible wife for the Nizam, Mahbub Ali Khan, were discussed, 
in an effort to dissuade the ruler from participating in some of the more unsavoury 
sexual practices of the royal household. In the opinion of British officials in the state the 
wife should remain in the Purana Haveli and no females other than those permitted to
A H Q
attend upon her would have access to the palace. Salar Jung expressed the strongest 
disapproval, declaring that the control necessary to keep other females from entering the 
palace would be a ‘violent innovation contrary to the customs of the zenana1 and 
derogatory to His Highness’s wife; that it would be contrary to all custom and usage to
476 Ibid.
477 Gol to John Morley, SoS, 11 October 1906, R/l/1/337.
478 Report of meeting between W. B. Jones, Res. Hyderabad, Major Trevor and Salar Jung, 21 
December 1882, R/l/1/1226.
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keep His Highness’s wife apart from the general zenana; that if his wife were in the 
Purana Haveli the Nizam would ‘necessarily’ be in and out of the zenana in any case and 
this could not be prevented; and, finally, that the restraint proposed to be placed on the 
Nizam would be displeasing to the ruler.479 The Minister stated that marriage would 
make no difference to the Nizam’s opportunities for intercourse with women in 
attendance on his wife, and would fail to check his desire to avail himself of such 
opportunities 480
The Resident suspected that Salar Jung was afraid to consent to any arrangement which 
would be particularly distasteful to the Nizam’s mother and the zenana in general. 
Captain Clerk, the Nizam’s tutor, later reported that the young ruler had decided to 
perform a nikah ceremony 481 To Clerk it seemed that in British terms this ceremony 
was ‘worth but little, our marriage customs being so different to those of the zenana and 
our point of view so different to the Mahomedan’.482 Yet if His Highness were anxious 
to contract a marriage, he should be allowed to do so, provided his grandmother and 
mother approved of the young lady. It would be inconsistent for those immediately 
concerned with his training to make an objection to the ruler’s doing what was ‘lawful 
and right by Mahomedan law’, while allowing his licentious behaviour to continue 483 
The only restriction that might be made would be to limit his so-called visits to his 
mother to ‘what, strictly speaking, they ought to be’. As far as the issue of a nikah wife 
was concerned, the first-bom male, whether legitimate or illegitimate according to 
European ‘notions’ of the status of the mother, would be recognised as having the first
479 Ibid.
480 Ibid.
481 A Muslim marriage contract. A nikah ceremony does not need to take place in a mosque nor in the 
presence of a religious official, which may have contributed to the idea of its informal nature in the 
eyes of British officials.
4 2 Capt. John Clerk to Salar Jung, 4 January 1883, R/l/1/1226.
483 Ibid.
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claim to succeed to the gadi according to the custom of the state.484
Over twenty years later moral standards in the Hyderabad palace were said still to be 
‘exceedingly lax’ and the power of the zenana unbroken. Sir David Barr, Resident in 
Hyderabad, expressed much concern over the unmarried state of the Sahibzada, the 
eldest son and heir of the Nizam. It was suspected that the Nizam had in fact never been 
involved in a marriage ceremony and had no recognised wife, only an ‘enormous 
number’ of concubines who constituted the zenana 485 In Sir David’s view, having 
experienced ‘the evils -  not to say discomfort -  of an establishment of this nature’, the 
Nizam should save his son from such a miserable fate by allotting him one wife with 
whom he could lead a happy and respectable life, ‘such as has not been known in the 
Hyderabad palaces for many years’ 486 It was not the custom for English women to 
‘interview’ any of the women of the zenana when visiting the palace, but supposedly the 
Nizam’s mother was the virtual head of the household and, although not of high birth 
herself, she exercised considerable control over her son. Sir David was of the opinion 
that the zenana was the worst aspect of the Hyderabad palace, ‘The number of women 
maintained at the cost of His Highness is I believe nearer 10,000 than 5,000; they live 
under veiy unsanitary conditions -  and their manners and customs, according to 
common report, are altogether shocking and disreputable’ 487 Curzon also held a 
particularly low opinion of the lifestyle of the Nizam, declaring that ‘He cares only for 
the gratification of his personal whims and desires, and is ... wrapped up in sloth in the 
seraglio and scarcely capable of an intelligent conversation’.488
485 Sir David Barr, Res. Hyderabad, ‘Confidential Note on Hyderabad Affairs’ 8 February 1905,
R/l/1/1281
488 Curzon to Hamilton, 28 December 1899, Curzon Collection, FI 11, Vol. 158.
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In Bhopal, the second largest Muslim state, the approach to royal marriage was infinitely 
more circumspect than that existing in Hyderabad, hi selecting a husband for Sultan 
Jahan Begam, noble birth and a frugal disposition were the first considerations which her 
grandmother, Sikander Begam, required, ‘though a handsome appearance and the habits 
and manners of a gentleman were by no means unessential’.489 It was agreed that a few 
of the most eligible boys should be presented to Sikander, and if one of the candidates 
met with her approval, he was to go to Bhopal where arrangements for his training 
would be made and, after sufficient time to form a ‘just estimate of his habits and 
temperament’, a final decision would be given.490 The Begam alighted upon a 
representative of one of the noblest and most ancient families of Jalalabad, Ahmad Ali 
Khan, who at the age of seven was taken to Bhopal where he was constantly with his 
prospective bride both in study and play until the age of eighteen. By that stage it was 
agreed that his behaviour' ‘left nothing to be desired’ and his progress in his studies was 
‘more than satisfactory’ 491 However the final decision to marry in 1874 did not rest 
with the royal family. It was apparent that in the case of Bhopal the traditional power of 
a ruler to choose his or her spouse now required British sanction. A kharita had to be 
sent to the Viceroy for his approval, without which the marriage could not be 
concluded.492
A marriage contract was drawn up which curtailed the rights of the groom but also gave 
the most liberal powers to a Muslim wife. The marriage would be annulled if Ahmad 
Ali converted from Sunni to Shiah. He was to fulfil ‘all the duties of a husband’ and not 
interfere in any way with her jagir or other personal property 493 Failure to abide by 
these terms would give his wife the right to bring about a separation. The groom agreed
489 Sultan Jahan, Account, Vol. I, p. 50.
490 Ibid.
491 Ibid.
492 Account, Vol. I, pp. 51-2.
493 Account, Appendix B.
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not to take a second wife (permissible under Muslim law) without the ‘express 
permission and approval of Sultan Jahan’ and to have nothing to do with the marriages 
of any of his wife’s children, male or female, leaving such matters to her and her 
mother.494 He promised to treat the nobles, jagirdars and officials of state with respect 
and not to retain in his service any person to whom the ruler or her ministers might take 
exception, or who was reputed to be ill disposed towards the state or the British 
Government. None of his relatives or friends was to intervene in affairs of state. Finally 
he authorised his mother-in-law, Shahjehan, to decree a separation in the event of a 
‘serious disagreement’ between his wife and himself, a separation that would be binding 
and not questionable in a court of law. For the wife the marriage contract contained 
conditions which would also enable her to end the marriage in case of disagreement, 
interference or sheer incompatibility. This document received the signature of the 
Political Agent to give it British approval495
Although Sultan Jahan herself admitted later that many of the clauses could not be 
legally enforced,496 the marriage contract displayed the uniqueness of Bhopal as an 
Indian, and in particular a Muslim, state in allowing a ruling female such extraordinary 
powers over her husband and independence in her affairs. However other royal women 
in India during the period, although not rulers in their own right, also succeeded in 
wielding a considerable amount of power, often by subscribing to British ideas on 
matters such as education and government and thereby gaining British support for their 
position within the state administration. The increasing influence of the press and access 
to British legal advisers was also able to further the cause of female members of royal 
families. The next part of this chapter deals with some of these women.
494 Ibid.
495 Ibid.
496 Account, p. 56.
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A truly public profile was inconceivable for all but a handful of royal females, such as 
the Begams of Bhopal. However, as far as raising their status was concerned, royal 
Indian women were to find one of their greatest champions in Lord Lytton. Aware of 
the social advantages assured to the Viceroy as the first representative of the Crown 
within India, Lytton saw no reason to continue to defer to Indian custom as far as women 
were concerned, whether such custom applied to princely or plebeian circles. In a letter 
to the Queen's Private Secretary, Major General Ponsonby, the Viceroy declared that, 
while using the Imperial Assemblage of 1877497 to do away with the ‘worn out and 
inconvenient system’ of exchanging presents, it appeared that the occasion was 
‘singularly fit and favourable5 for introducing the European manner of displaying 
women in public.498 Lytton admitted that the idea was revolutionary in India, ‘the strict 
seclusion, not to say suppression of the female sex is so prevalent throughout the East, 
that the appearance in public of any Englishwoman, of the least rank or position, would 
shock native prejudices, and lower her in the eyes of the natives’ 499
However the Viceroy was persuaded by ‘previous personal intercourse with the better 
class of natives in India’ that this was an anachronistic official tradition. Wiry should the 
British
conform our own social life and customs to the low standard of those whose masters 
we are by reason of our superior social enlightenment. In any case, the particular 
prejudice which this un-English custom was intended to satisfy appeai-s to me to be 
one which it is not only beneath our dignity and self-respect to adopt and incorporate 
into our own manners and customs, but also contrary to the acknowledged principles 
of our policy, and the best interests of our Government, to encourage and perpetuate
497 The Assemblage appears in the chapter on hierarchy and ritual.
498 Lytton to Major General H. T. Ponsonby, 12 January 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19.
499 Ibid.
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on the part of the natives themselves. We have put down suttee with the strong hand 
and have done much to improve the position of Hindu widows and Mahomedan 
wives. We are establishing zenana schools throughout India and exhorting the better 
class of natives to educate their women and humanise female life in their homes. Is it 
consistent with such a policy to stultify our precepts by our practice? .... To me the 
adoption of such a course seemed singularly inappropriate to the solemn 
proclamation of the title of a female sovereign to the Empire of all India.500
Accordingly at the Assemblage, Lytton determined that his wife should accompany him 
on his state entry into Delhi, and was most satisfied to see that, in the light of the British 
position of social supremacy, such an assault on Indian accepted practice had no adverse 
effects:
So far from shocking the Native Piinces, it has, to all appearances, greatly flattered 
and pleased them. Each of those who were present at tire Viceroy's subsequent 
receptions spontaneously asked to be presented to Lady Lytton and all of them 
showed her the most deferential and courteous attention. When afterwards she 
appeared at the races, they rose, greeted and conversed with her as respectfully and 
cordially as the most polished Englishman could have done. Such conduct on their 
part was an entire novelty, surprising to many and gratifying to all who witnessed it: 
and I fully believe drat the course adopted in the ceremonials at Delhi, if judiciously 
followed up, will help to bridge over at least some portion of the inconvenient and 
deplorable gulf wlrich exists between English and native society.501
This lack of deference to traditional Indian ideas of female subjugation was reinforced 
by Lytton's request to the Queen in 1877 for the initiation of a special order for women 
within the Indian empire.502 Such an order would be ‘extremely useful and 
advantageous’, not only in raising ‘in the estimation of husband and male relatives the 
present depressed social condition of the female portion of Your Majesty's native 
subjects’, but also in helping ‘to introduce dre personal influence of the Empress of India
501 Ibid. Lytton’s efforts failed to bear fruit with any rapidity. In 1897 it was reported that the Maharani 
of Cochin was unwilling to leave the privacy of the palace to meet the Governor of Madras and Lady 
Havelock at the Residency. There had been no instance of a female member of the Cochin royal family 
calling at the Residency on such occasions and, due to her ‘sensitiveness’ the Maharani found the idea of 
breaking tradition ‘not quite agreeable’ and ‘too delicate for discussion’. Maharajah Rama Varma to I. D. 
Rees, Res. Cochin, 10 October 1897, R/2/9/47
502 The Order o f die Crown of India, which was given to Governors’ wives, to the Vicereine and to the 
spouses of the Commander-in-chief and the Secretary of State for India in London, as well as high-ranking 
Indian women. Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p. 90.
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into the Zenanas of Native Courts, which are at present shut to British influence, and 
where the other influences now predominating are often as mischievous as they are
crm
powerful’. The Viceroy recommended the Maharani Jumnabai, adoptive mother of 
the young Gaekwar of Baroda, as an ideal candidate, reporting that she was in need of 
British support,
the object of many influential native officials being to destroy tire influence of Her 
Highness over her son by surrounding him with all those temptations which generally 
make the royal Zenanas of this country the more deplorable schools for male or 
female character. All this she has nobly and successfully resisted.504
Maharani Jumnabai was just one of a number of powerful female regents during the 
period.
REGENTS
Prior to Lytton’s recommendation the Maharani Jumnabai had indeed shown a particular 
aptitude for administrative detail and a desire to instil methods of accountability within 
her state. She demanded a significant role in the administration during the minority of 
her son, Sayajirao III, and a scheme was devised by the Resident for the Minister, T. 
Madhava Rao, to spend a day a fortnight with her to discuss a short report on the state. 
The Minister was to arrange for members of the Gaekwar family in the palace to seek 
her advice with regard to their various needs. He was also to frame budgets for the 
palace and for twenty-five karkhanas, on the principle that within the budget 
arrangement the Maharani was to have complete authority in managing the karkhanas 
other than the submission of six monthly accounts. In framing the budgets the Maharani
503 Lytton to Queen, 28 August 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19.
504 Ibid.
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was to be freely consulted and if there was a difference of opinion between the Maharani 
and the Minister, the matter was to be referred to the Agent to the Governor-General.505
The royal women of Mysore also demonstrated an extraordinary enthusiasm for liberal 
ideas of government. In 1877 a kharita from the senior Maharanis to the Viceroy, Lord 
Lytton, raised with great clarity a number of subjects including the education of the 
young Maharajah, in an effort to achieve the ‘enlightened principles of justice’ which 
were ‘so characteristic a feature of British rule’ and particular significant in light of the 
fact that the state was to be restored to native rule in 1881, as has been discussed in the 
chapter on succession.506 The Maharanis requested an English gentleman from an 
English university to be appointed as tutor to the young ruler and a ‘high officer of 
ability and standing’ to act as guardian and to train him in the ‘principles of good 
government’. Moreover as he was fifteen they wished to see him married in accordance 
with the Mysore ‘religious code’.507 They expressed the need for the ‘machinery of 
Government’ to be simplified, since the current administration did not compare 
favourably with its predecessor and the Mysore people were ‘not a whit more 
prosperous’. Public Works and other departments were not working well and radical 
change was required. The famine had been badly mismanaged and tire remissions of 
assessments ‘too grudgingly and sparingly made’. Thousands of Mysoreans had died as 
a result of leaving the state to find food and employment.508 The royal women, in a 
surprisingly perceptive paragraph, recognised that there was a need for the imposition of 
a ‘house tax’ on the nobility. The middle classes of the community and Moslem
505 Memorandum by T. Madliava Rao, Minister of Baroda, 13 May 1875, R/2/53 9/321.
506 Kharita from the Senior Maharanis o f Mysore to Lord Lytton 1877, R/2/27/241. Somewhat at odds 
with the description of the zenana's efforts to sabotage the Maharajall’s education written by Colonel 
G. Malleson in September 1869 (see the second chapter on education). It is hard to imagine that the 
royal women o f Mysore developed a considerably more liberated stance towards education in eight 
years. Perhaps Malleson was making assumptions about the evil intentions o f the zenana.
507 Ibid.
508
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descendants of aristocratic families lived in virtual destitution as they drew very small 
salaries; more could be employed in the palace, with an allowance continuing to their 
heirs after their death. Finally, the Maharanis suggested that the office of Town 
Magistrate and President of the Municipality be filled only by a European officer of 
experience, since the present incumbent was hated by Moslems and disliked by Hindus, 
due to his overbearing conduct.509
The widow of Chamarajendra Wadiar Bahadur, the Maharajah of Mysore whose 
education the senior Maharanis were discussing in their kharita, displayed similarly 
assertive qualities. In December 1894 the Resident, Colonel Henderson, wrote that he 
was of the opinion that it would be unwise for the Maharani Vanivilas Sannidhana, to be 
appointed Regent, since she was
a lady of domestic tastes who has not concerned herself with events beyond the range 
of her family and the palace walls. The palace is, as it ever was, a hot bed of petty 
and mischievous intrigues, and a lady living in seclusion might with the best 
intentions be moved by evil influences to exeit her authority in a wrong direction.510
It would be advisable to Teave Her Highness the control and management of all affairs 
connected with the palace and of the expenditure of the Civil List, subject to certain 
restrictions, and I am inclined to think that she would not wish for more’,511 However 
by January Henderson was aware that he had underestimated the Maharani’s potential. 
He was informed by her brother that she had expressed strong feelings against the 
Dewan’s autocratic behaviour. Moreover
she had felt very much the practical seclusion of her own countrymen from palace 
and power, and considered that a Council should be more representative than the
509 Ibid.
510 Memorandum from Col. P.D. Henderson, Res. Mysore, to W. J. Cuningham, Sec. Gol, FD, 30 
December 1894,6 January 1895, R/l/1/143.
511 Ibid.
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present one, and should wield more influence. She was averse to the Brahmin 
element being too strong in the public service, and especially the Madras Brahmin 
element.512
The Maharani would oppose any British move to appoint the Dewan as Regent on the 
grounds that it would be more suitable for her to fill the position. The Resident admitted 
T have come to the conclusion that the Maharani is a woman of decided opinion and of 
considerable strength of character, and that any one who supposes she is going to prove 
a puppet is likely to find out his mistake’. It appeared that she was ‘a lady of education 
and intelligence not likely to be much influenced by bad advisers’ and it would be very 
difficult ‘not to give due weight to her representations’.513
An account of a meeting between the Resident and the Maharani, ‘without the 
intervention of the purdah\ reinforced the picture of a forceful female character. The 
Resident pointed out to her the ‘manifest difficulties’ of canying out the duties of Regent 
while living in ‘oriental seclusion’.514 He also stressed that in a constitutional state 
responsible officials carried out all administrative work under certain laws and 
regulations, and opportunities for the exercise of direct authority were rare. The 
Maharani replied in English that she was always perfectly willing to give audiences to 
her advisers, she had received a good education in both English and her own language, 
and was willing to devote time and trouble to the cases before her. She understood that 
in a state where the government organised the system of administration it was not 
necessary to interfere in the details. Wherever action was necessary on her part she 
would ask for and follow the advice of the Resident, whose supervision she hoped would
f i r
be closer than before. The Maharani suggested that the Council should not be purely
512 Ibid.
513 Ibid. See also R/2/29/264,
514 Henderson to Cuningham, 9 January 1895, R/l/1/143.
515 Ibid.
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consultative as at present, but with executive functions apportioned among the members 
and important matters referred to the entire assembly. She was particularly adamant that 
members should not be appointed by the Dewan, but by herself as Regent or by the 
Government of India. Mysoreans were not represented sufficiently in public service or 
in the Council and she wished her countrymen’s interests to be ‘cared for’ in these 
.areas.516
The Maharani’s success in persuading the British of her competence is demonstrated in 
the arrangements for the minority rule of her son, Maharajah Krishnaraja Wadier 
Bahadur, whose marriage prospects were discussed earlier in this chapter. The 
administration was to be conducted by the Maharani as Regent and by the Dewan in 
Council. The Council was to consist of the Dewan and three officers nominated by the 
Regent with the approval of the British Government. The work of the various state 
departments was to be distributed by the Dewan in Council between himself and the 
three Councillors. As suggested by the Maharani, the member in charge of each 
department would attend to the ordinary work of the department and would issue orders 
in the name of the Mysore Government, referring only matters of ‘doubt, delicacy or
r  1 n
importance’ to the Dewan. The decisions of the Dewan in Council would be carried 
into effect, unless they were opposed to the decisions of the majority of the Council, in 
which case the matter would be referred to the Regent for final orders. However in any 
case where reference was made to the Resident, whether by the Regent or the Dewan, no 
orders could be issued which might conflict with the advice of the Resident.518
Despite her obvious admiration for a more open British style of rule, the Maharani
516 Ibid.
517 Henderson to Cuningham, 22 January 1895, R/l/1/143.
518 Ibid.
160
expressed great reluctance to relinquish any form of control over her son to British 
officials and resented in particular the arrangements for separate rooms for him at 
Bangalore and Mysore. When the door leading to the zenana from these rooms was 
locked by the young prince’s British guardian there was much discontent from the 
‘Palace party’.519 The Maharani installed a telephone wire from her own bedroom to the 
Summer Palace to maintain contact with her son, despite the fact that there was already 
telephonic communication day and night, and also installed her own official to supervise 
the preparation of the Maharajah’s meals. The ruler’s guardian, Stuart Fraser, whose 
earnest attempts to turn the young prince into ‘a wise, sagacious, and highly cultured
C1} A
ruler’ are noted in the chapter on education, refused to tolerate the presence at the 
Summer Palace of an Old Palace official who was not subordinate to him but 
nevertheless giving orders to his servants and demanded that the Maharani recognise the 
limitations of her powers as Regent in matters connected with the prince, since it was the 
Government of India which exercised the guardianship.521
It was agreed that it would be difficult to remove the Maharajah, aged eleven, from the 
care of his mother, but there were ‘corrupting influences about the Palace’ over which 
the Maharani had little control, despite the fact that in many ways she was an ‘educated 
and sensible woman’.522 In 1896 there were signs that the Maharani was still attempting 
to interfere with the terms set out for the young ruler’s residence at the three palaces in 
Mysore, Bangalore and Ootacamund, announcing her intention while at Bangalore to 
proceed to Mysore for a religious ceremony, taking him with her. The Resident was 
forced to point out how unsettling this was for the Maharajah and how carefully his 
programme of studies should be followed. He admitted ‘There is no doubt that this little
519 Report by S. M. Fraser, 21 November 1896, R/2/33/314.
520 Quoted Vadivelu, Mysore Worthies, p. 63.
521 Report by S. M. Fraser, 21 November 1896, R/2/33/314.
522 Hamilton to Elgin, 26 November 1895, Elgin Collection, Vol. 13.
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lady, extremely nice though she be, when roused is exceedingly determined and 
overawes her relations and dependents’.523
These differences of opinion appear eventually to have been satisfactory overcome. At 
the end of the Regency the Dewan in Mysore reported that
in arrangements made for the education of the Maharajah, in management of Palace 
affairs as well as in concerns of State, Her Highness has shown a great capacity to 
grasp the bearings of the questions that have come before her .... Her Highness is 
almost a unique instance in the history of Mysore of a lady of her position responding 
successfully to an emergency and establishing by her breadth of mind, natural 
sagacity and high sense of duty a reputation which cannot but reflect on her sex.524
It was recommended that the Maharani should continue to receive a 19-gun salute with 
accompanying honours. By this stage the Maharajah to all intents and purposes had 
assumed power within the palace. Stuart Fraser noted that now the ruler was more 
mature, his mother possessed Tittle power to move him when he has made up his 
mind’. A case in point was a unilateral decision to postpone his nuptials until after his 
installation, a matter in which normally ‘custom would make the voice of a Hindu 
mother supreme’.527
Not all royal women were as commendable in British eyes as Vanivilas Sannidhana. 
With access to British advisors and the new opportunities offered by the availability of 
the press at the end of the nineteenth century, some royal females were able to defend 
themselves against male relatives or ministers of state to an impressive degree, if not 
always with maximum success.
523 Col. Donald Robertson, Res. Mysore, to Elgin, 2 October 1897.
524 P. N. Krishna Murti, Dewan Mysore, to Robertson, 9 May 1902, R/2/31/293.
525 H. Daly, Deputy Sec. Gol, FD to Robertson, 25 August 1902, R/2/31/293.
526 S. M. Fraser to Robertson, 13 July 1902, R/2/31/299.
527 Ibid.
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FEMALE PROTAGONISTS
With recourse to British advisors in the 1890s the Indore ranis were able to cany on a 
lengthy and highly acrimonious battle with the Maharajah, Holkar. The Maharajah 
bemoaned the fact that it ‘may appear at first that my step-mothers, women as they are, 
cannot do anything against me, who am the ruler of the State possessed of full powers’, 
whereas they ‘bribe my personal servants and attendants and the police peons on watch 
duty at my palace with a view to annoy and irritate’ ,528 He gave orders to the Treasurer 
to stop paying his step-mothers’ allowances until they, firstly, stopped fighting him over 
the Khasgi estate in Bombay, of which they retained possession, secondly, sent his 
nephews to a boarding school such as Daly College (an issue discussed at more length in 
the chapter on education) and, thirdly, dismissed their lawyer, Mr. Rochfort Davis, and 
other similarly employed persons.529
In Holkar’s view there was ‘serious misconduct’ on the part of the Dowager Maharani
Radabhai. On the death of the ruler’s mother, acting on the advice of the Agent to the
Governor-General in Central India, Francis Henvey, Holkar had given orders for the
Khasgi Department to be taken over by his durbar and for the current land agent,
Madhav Rao Gogte, to be dismissed as unsatisfactory.530 However the Dowager
Maharani Varanasi Bai who, in the Maharajah’s opinion, had ‘no right to interfere in any
way in the administration of the Khasgi or any other department of my State’, directed
the agent to bar access to Holkar’s nominee and only to take orders from her, as she
considered herself to be the heiress and ruler of the Khasgi Department.531 Holkar stated
that he could, on application to a civil Court of Law, have Gogte turned out and his
528 Holkar to R. J. Crosthwaite, AGG Cl, January 1891, R/l/1/129. Also Holkar to Crosthwaite, 16
March 1891, R/l/1/129.
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nominee installed in his place, ‘but I shrink from proceeding against a member of my 
own family in an open Court of Law, and virtually the suit would be against the 
Maharani Radabhai’.532
One of Maharani Radabhai’s advisers, Rochfort Davis, was a pensioner of the British 
Government who wrote defamatory articles against Holkar in the Eastern Herald. As 
Henvey pointed out in 1890, such articles ‘revived and exacerbated’ the fury of royal 
Indore family quarrels.533 If the Maharajah was a private individual he could prosecute 
the newspaper, but a ruler of his rank could not according to ‘native usages’ appear in 
the Cantonment Magistrate’s Court and subject himself to the ordeal of cross 
examination. However if he remained silent, the Maharajah feared that tire accusations 
against him would be repeated in every comer of India. Henvey recognised the 
unfairness of the position of the ruler:
Whatever may be thought of an unlicensed freedom of the press in British India, a 
cantonment of British troops, or a Residency situated in foreign territory and in the 
midst of powerful, suspicious and sensitive Chiefs, should not be used as a place of 
refuge, from which coarse and defamatory attacks may be securely levelled against 
Her Majesty’s feudatories.534
The anti-Holkar publicity initiated by female members of the royal family was both 
‘mischievous and politically dangerous’.535
Both the Dowager Maharani Radabhai and Junior Maharani Parwatibai had received 
large monthly allowances from the State Treasury which were partly used for the 
payment of men such as Rochfort Davis, whose ‘injurious articles’ induced the Dowager 
Maharani to give him money for his services. Hie cash payments which Holkar
532 Ibid.
533 F. Henvey, AGG Cl, to Sec. Gol, FD, 5 April 1890, R /l/1/117.
534 Ibid.
535 Ibid
164
proposed suspending were, the ruler emphasised, unrelated to expenses for living, i.e. 
houses, food, clothes, servants, carriages, attendants and guards, which were ‘provided 
free by the State in the most liberal style’ ,536 In 1891 the Agent to the Governor-General 
in Central India, R. J. Crosthwaite, responded to a memorial from the Dowager 
Maharani by declaring that he was unable to interfere on her behalf since she was 
continuing to retain the Khasgi estate in defiance of Holkar.537 Moreover she refused to 
meet the ruler’s wishes regarding the education of his nephews, whom she retained with 
their mother in her custody, apparently in the hope that the elder boy would succeed to 
the gadi. Under the Treaty of Mandisore the British Government had declared that it 
had no concern with any of the Maharajah’s children, relations, dependents, subjects or 
servants, over whom the Maharajah had absolute control. The British Government 
would therefore decline to intervene between the Maharajah and the ladies of the family 
unless circumstances existed to ‘imperatively require’ the interference of the ruling 
power. So long as the Dowager Maharani retained the property she had no right to 
complain if the Maharajah declined to pay her allowances.538 Crosthwaite was under no 
illusion as to the ability of the women of the zenana to impede the smooth running of 
state affairs, declaring that ‘Certainly we should get on better without these 
Dowagers’.539
A memorial of 1899 written to the Viceroy by Maharani Varanasi Bai, incensed at the 
lack of British justice in failing to reinforce the property rights of royal women such as 
herself, shows no signs of female reticence. It dwells at length on die fact that, as the 
Maharani of Indore, she was the trustee of vast estates held
536 Holkar to Crosthwaite, AGG Cl, January 1891, R/l/1/129.
537 Crosthwaite to Sec. Gol, FD, 21 August 1891, R/l/1/129
538 Ibid.
539 Crosthwaite to H. M. Durand, 8 August 1891.
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on behalf of future Maharanis .... The Khasgi estate is in the nature of a jagir in the 
Indore State and the possessor has inherent rights like any other jagirdar, chieftain or 
landlord which cannot be tampered with. The ruling Rani exercises supreme revenue 
and judicial powers, subject to an appeal to the Maharaja in respect of serious 
offences alone. The Rani holds Durbars for the transaction of business. There is a 
separate throne, a separate seal, a separate establishment; separate nazars are 
presented to her on solemn and festive occasions; and the Rani at the time of her 
accession is placed on the throne and receives a salute in the same way as the Prince 
does .... Further the Khasgi has a treasury of its own. It has independent jurisdiction 
both in matters civil and criminal.540
The Maharani pointed out that in the history of the Khasgi estate over 150 years no 
possessor had been removed. Twice attempts had been made by the reigning prince and 
on both occasions proved unsuccessful as a result of the interference of the British 
Government. It was hoped that, as her position as Maharani of Indore precluded her 
from appealing to a court of law,541 the Viceroy would now afford her the same 
protection as that given to her female predecessors so that she could attend to cthe 
maintenance of the dignity of the Senior Maharani, and the performance of charitable 
and religious acts’,542 However she failed to receive such a guarantee of protection from 
the Viceroy, since relations between Holkar and the Government of India were by the 
end of the century so strained that it was felt that it would hardly be advancing the cause 
of the Maharani to interfere in royal financial transactions.
Rani Janaki Subbamma Bai, second wife of Raja Ramachandra of Puddukkottai, also 
benefited from the newly found accessibility of British advisers. From 1878 to 1886 
while Ramachandra was still alive, the Dewan of the state, A. Sashiah Sastri, began his 
measures to end corruption among palace servants, to reorganise some overstaffed
540 Memorial from Varanasi Bai, Senior Maharani of Indore, to Viceroy, 5 May 1899, R/l/1/229.
541 In contrast in British Indian courts zamindari women felt no inhibitions in resorting to litigation to 
challenge male honour and authority, as is discussed in more detail in the chapter on succession. See 
Price, Kingship and Political Practice, pp. 47-76.
542 Memorial from Varanasi Bai to Viceroy, 5 May 1899, R/l/1/229. Also memorial of 15 March 
1899, R/l/1/229, and R/l/1/252 in which the Senior Maharani accuses Holkar of having ‘a very 
imperfect knowledge’ o f the ‘illustrious5 position of women o f reigning Mahratta houses to make her 
the insulting proposal o f Rs. 1,000 for monthly expenses. Varanasi Bai to Curzon, 14 February 1900.
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departments and to put the palace buildings in good repair. As mentioned in the chapter 
on education, after Sastri assumed the regency of Pudukkottai during the minority of the 
young heir, Martanda, the Dewan’s interference in every detail of palace life was ‘overt’, 
given clear encouragement from the British. However, as Joanne Punzo Wagthome 
points out in her study of the Pudukkottai royal family, the Rani after 1886 ‘left nothing 
undone’ in order to bring about Sastri’s departure from the state, hiring a British lawyer 
to put forward her case to save her remaining authority in the palace.543 Her argument 
was preserved by Sastri in his own printed response to her formal letter to the political 
agent, which he entitled ‘Memorandum Drawn up by the Dewan Regent Stating 
Categorically the Result of Correspondence between him and the Political Agent and 
Orders of the Government on Various Subjects alluded to and Allegations Made by the 
Junior Ranee Sahib’.544
The Rani’s ‘mystifying and confounding’ defence conducted through her lawyer raised 
issues which seemed as trivial as Sastri claimed.545 An argument over the use of a 
playground for the minor Rajah roused the Rani to assert her right to freedom of religion. 
The senior princess’s wrath was incurred because Sastri wanted to move her temporarily 
out of her old apartments in order ‘to make them sanitary’.546 The rest of the ill-will 
arose from the ladies’ unwillingness to give up the company of ‘a band of notorious 
villains’ which included a group of unsavoury playmates caught openly playing cards 
with the Rajah’s brothers, and tire supposedly dangerous ‘dancing girls who were found 
in constant company with the Princess’. It appeared that ‘the beleaguered Dewan had 
only persisted in his duty, much against the petty stubbornness of the palace ladies’.547
543 Wagthome, R aja’s Magic Clothes, p.59.
544 Ibid.
545 R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 62.
546 Ibid.
547 Ibid.
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However the expulsion of the ‘dancing girls’ was an act which fundamentally affected 
the existence of the princess, as these girls, the devadasis, served crucial functions for 
the palace women. At the end of the nineteenth century, the Tondaiman royal females 
were still expected to keep purdah. The devadasis, who were free from such 
restrictions, accompanied them on all their visits outside the palace and held up cloth 
screens to protect them from the public eye as they moved from their palanquins. The 
education of the palace women also depended on the devadasis who taught the essential 
arts of song and dance. Thus, deprived of their company, the senior princess would 
literally be captive in the palace and prohibited from fulfilling many of her ritual 
obligations.548
Sastri argued that many of the Rani’s objections to his rules of cleanliness in the palace, 
and to his mandates for the places where the minor Rajah should play and which 
apartments her daughter should occupy were based on ‘superstition’. But the Rani 
countered Sastri in a long letter to the political agent;
To meet me with the plea that my objections are untenable because they are 
superstitious is a dangerous answer in the mouths of the representatives of the British 
government. It is but so much of a slip from the domain of sentiment to the domain of 
religion. Yet could you expect obedience from me or approval from the government 
if you were to turn a deaf ear to my objections against the proselytizing of my son on 
the ground that the adherence to my own creed was a foolish form of superstition?549
Here the Rani argued convincingly that much of Sastri’s reforms fell into the category of 
the interference into Hindu religious affairs prohibited by the Queen’s Proclamation of 
1858.550 However her letter of complaint resulted in an interview with the Governor of 
Madras that, instead of being a hearing of her grievances, backfired into a stern lecture
548 R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 63. See also Frederique Apffel Marglin, Wives o f  the God-King: The 
Rituals o f  the Devadasis o f  Puri (Delhi, 1985), and Price, Kingship and Political Practice, p. 69.
549 Quoted R aja’s Magic Clothes, pp. 59-60.
550 R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 60.
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on her behaviour. As the Dewan reiterated in his official answer to her complaint, the 
Rani’s ‘character’ was already well known to the British. Reports of past political 
agents portrayed her as the twenty-year power behind the throne in Pudukkottai.551 She 
and ‘her relations’ and ‘two or three Brahmans, her special favourites’ supposedly 
inveigled the Rajah out of the state seal and ‘took control of the judicial process’. In 
addition ‘her Brahman Parasites’ weakened the power of the former dewan’s office. 
Sastri pointed to the ‘disgrace and ruin she has been to the character of her late husband, 
and to the State’.552
The obsessive ambition displayed by the Rani of Pudukkottai was by no means unique. 
In 1890 the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, scathingly observed of the Maharani of Rewa in 
Rajputana that she was representative of a breed of grasping royal widows:
In all cases where a very young ruler succeeds to a Native State, the widows of his 
predecessor give an infinite amount of trouble. Their object is of course to get hold 
of the boy and to bring him up under conditions which in a few years will convert 
him into an imbecile and leave the power in their hands. Our object is to prevent such 
a state of things arising.553
Cynically the Viceroy agreed with tire Maharani’s regret that, owning to the ‘abolition of 
suttee’ she and other widows of the late Maharajah ‘were prevented from removing 
themselves from this troublesome world immediately after their consort had left it’.554
However not all royal mothers were so eager to wrest power from their offspring and 
were able to use British advice, on occasions turning to the Government of India itself, 
to ensure that their children were not usurped by other, possibly less desirable,
551 R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 61.
552 Ibid.
553 Lansdowne to Cross, 19 May 1890, D558, Vol. 3.
554 Ibid.
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candidates to the throne. Following the death of her husband, the Maharani of Dumraon 
expressed her unwillingness to adopt a son in order not to disinherit her daughter, the 
Maharani of Rewa and her possible offspring. It was noted by Sir Charles Paul, 
advising the Council of India, that the late Maharajah had been well aware of the chance 
of the power of adoption not being exercised after his death and had deliberately left the 
matter entirely to the wish and option of his wife.556 Legally she was not bound to 
adopt, moreover it was impossible to hold the view that she was incompetent to manage 
the property in question until her daughter inherited it. The late Maharajah had spoken 
of his wife in his will as ‘possessed of great intelligence and capacity for business’, 
moreover when interviewed officially she had given satisfactory answers and could read 
and write ‘freely’.557 In the eyes of Sir Charles to be female was not a disqualification 
for owning an estate, ‘As Purdanashin ladies do not go out into the world but manage 
through Managers’ this particular role was well suited to those women capable of 
running a successful business.558
As the following section makes clear, in the state of Bhopal ‘Purdanashin ladies’ were 
capable of running not simply a business, but an entire state.
BHOPAL
When it came to demonstrating their capability, the profile of royal women was highest 
in the state of Bhopal. Yet, ironically, despite the traditionally martial stance of female 
rulers in Bhopal discussed in the chapter on succession, during the latter half of the
555 Interestingly the daughter-in-law o f the despised Maharani of Rewa, who apparently had failed in 
her attempts to emasculate her son.
556 Note by Sir Charles Paul, 19 March 1898, R/l/1/217.
557 Ibid.
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nineteenth century the ruling Begam, Shahjehan, was to provide a good example of 
‘disabling passivity’. Moreover under the sway of her second husband her 
unwillingness to cooperate with political officers undoubtedly decreased her political 
authority. Shahjehan Begam was, like her mother Sikander, honoured for her loyalty to 
the paramount power by British officials in the late nineteenth century. However 
government files revealed internal problems in Bhopal from 1881, when high officials in 
the Foreign Department were informed of the compilation of ‘seditious’ works on jihad, 
or religious war, by Sadiq Hassan, Shahjehan Begam’s second husband and a prominent 
supporter of the Wahabi movement. Named after the Arab evangelist, Abdul Wahab, 
the movement focused upon the puritan values of Islam, drawn from the Quran and 
Sunnah, and in the eyes of the British engendered religious fanaticism.
The 1857 Mutiny, although it originated in the army and found supporters among 
Hindus and Muslim alike throughout northern India, was widely viewed as a product of 
enduring Muslim animosity towards the British. Into the 1860s this aura of suspicion 
remained a powerful force shaping British conception of their Muslim subjects.559 
Constantly on the alert for outbreaks of violence, the British saw in the Wahabi 
movement the gathering together of the more extreme elements of ‘the tribes of Islam’ to 
‘wage holy war against the FaringhV However this view was gradually re-evaluated,
mainly as a result of the publication in 1871 of W. W. Hunter’s The Indian Mussalmans 
which questioned whether ‘these British subjects’ were ‘bound by their religion to rebel 
against the Queen’.561 The central objective of the work was to urge upon the 
Government a less hostile policy towards Muslims and to distinguish between the
559 See Peter Hardy, The Muslims o f British India (Cambridge, 1972), Ch. 3
560 Quoted Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 140.
561 Hardy, Muslims o f  British India, p. 85.
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‘fanatical masses’ and ‘the landed and clerical interests’.562 In fact despite the British 
fear of pan-Islamic activities (particularly in the wake of the Madhist revolt in 1881 in 
the Sudan) Islamic movements, even that of the Wahabis, veiy rarely presented a 
significant threat to the British.563
Although Colonel Henry Daly, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, initially 
dismissed fears of Bhopali disloyalty, the situation came to a peak under his successor, 
Sir Lepel Griffin, when the Nawab-consort persisted in disseminating his publications 
and works in Arabic, Persian and Urdu appeared in major centres of Arabic scholarship, 
such as Egypt, Constantinople and Mecca. Late in 1885, the Government of India 
publicly stripped Sadiq Hassan of his titles, salutes and rank.564 Francis Robinson points 
out that Sadiq Hassan was no charlatan but a leading Muslim fundamentalist reformer 
who wrote over 200 hundred books and has become the subject of ‘serious study’.565 
Moreover Claudia Preckel notes that the model of a reformed and modernised Islamic 
state which was created with his advice survived his deposition. Throughout Bhopal in 
the nineteenth century there was ‘a strong development of Islamic religious and cultural 
reform’.566 This Islamic revival could have been regarded with disapproval by the 
British authorities, however its inclusion of ‘huge architectural projects, educational and 
literary efforts and economic as well as administrative reforms’ resulted in a growing 
admiration for the female rulers of the state both within Indian and British circles.567
After her husband’s deposition, although Sir Lepel was often blunt and rude to the
562 Quoted Ideologies, p. 141.
563 Ideologies, p. 144.
564 See extensive correspondence in R/l/1/32 and R/l/1/33.
565 Francis Robinson, Introduction, Princess Abida Sultaan of Bhopal, ‘The Begums o f Bhopal’, 
History Today, 30 (October, 1980), p. 31.
566 Claudia Preckel, ‘The Roots of Anglo-Muslim Cooperation and Islamic Reformism in Bhopal5 in 
Jamal Malik (ed.), Perspectives o f Mutual Encounters in South Asian Histoiy, 1760-1860 (Leiden, 
2000), p. 65.
567 Ibid.
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Begam in private he continued to show respect for her in public meetings, placing all the 
blame for corruption and intrigue in the state on the Nawab-consort.568 However a 
lengthy article in The Times of 27th December, 1886, revealed sordid details regarding 
the Begam5s second marriage. The article declared that the Begams, in the mould of 
female rulers such as the Czarina Catherine, had never been famous for their ‘domestic 
virtues’ and Sadiq Hassan had been a ‘too successful lover’.569 The Foreign Department 
issued apologies, yet in all of the correspondence surrounding this incident the charges 
against Shahjehan were never actually contradicted. Instead, officers remarked on the 
‘want of prudence and generosity’ involved in publishing in an international newspaper 
the ‘fact’ of a reigning princess having been ‘seduced by a clerk’.570
To British officials in India Shahjehan, far from emulating the Czarina Catherine, fitted 
neatly into the role of the ‘degraded’ Oriental woman existing in submissive 
subordination to her husband. A government memorandum of 1886 pointed out that 
since her second marriage the Begam, who previously appeared in public and took a 
personal and active share in the administration, ‘has retired behind the purdah, and has 
become a mere cypher in the hands of her husband’.571 Sir Lepel dismissed the ruler as 
‘a weak misguided woman, completely under the influence of her husband, [who] had 
permitted her State and her subjects to become the prey of an adventurer’.572 Nothing 
short of banishing Sadiq Hassan from the state would provide an effective remedy for 
the existing maladministration of Bhopal. As long her husband was allowed to remain 
in the state, the Begam would be entirely unable to shake off his authority and govern on 
her own account through responsible Ministers. In Sir Lepel’s view:
568 See R/l/1/35.
569 ‘An Episode in Indian Government’ in The Times (London) 27th December 1886, R/l/1/55.
570 Note o f D. [Earl o f Dufferin], 5 February 1887, R/l/1/55, quoted Lambert Hurley ‘Contesting 
Seclusion’, p. 154.
571 Memorandum by FTH, 28 March 1886, R/l/1/33.
572 Lepel Griffin, AGG Cl, to H. M. Durand, Sec. Gol, FD, 10 March 1886, R/l/1/33.
173
It is impossible to exaggerate the ascendancy which he [Sadiq Hassan] has acquired 
over the Begam. All her attendants and relations attribute it to charms which he has 
given her, and which she wears in her hair and there is, indeed, something almost 
miraculous in her steadfast adherence to a man whose forgeries, perjuries and tyranny 
are thoroughly known to her. She cannot plead ignorance and she is as fertile as her 
husband in inventing lies to screen offences and crimes of his, which she is unable to 
deny.573
The inaccessibility of the Begam was much to be regretted, ‘she and her mother having 
been accustomed to come in public unveiled and dispose of State business face to face 
with their Ministers’.574 Moreover her female visitors had been discouraged from 
coming to the palace with the result that she was ‘virtually a prisoner’. All information 
on state affairs ‘she has heard with the ears of the Nawab and seen with his eyes 
alone’. Sir Lepel suggested that if the ruler were to come out of purdah many of the 
difficulties of administration would be removed.576 The Begam, hinting that the image 
of a ‘mere cypher’ may have been wrongly ascribed to her by British officials, replied 
somewhat acerbically that the Agent to the Governor-General appeared to imagine that 
her ideas and opinions were written on her face, standing firm in her refusal to come out 
ofpurdah as it was ‘contrary to her creed’.577
With the removal of Sadiq Hassan from the administration and his death in 1889, 
Shahjehan to some extent reasserted her political position. The Political Agent in 
Bhopal, Colonel W. Kincaid, congratulated her for her personal conduct of various areas 
of the administration. The ruler was prepared to sit in court daily during certain hours 
‘ready to hear all reports and listen to complaints’ to ensure that justice was carried out, 
and to issue speedy orders for enquiries into cases against the police. Moreover she had 
given an order to the Minister to visit the jails twice a month and was in the process of
573 Ibid.
574 ‘History o f Bhopal5, Lepel Griffin to Durand, September 1885, R /l/1/33.
575 Ibid.
576 Lepel Griffin to Durand, 29 October 1885, R/l/1/33.
577 Ibid.
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dividing the authorities in control of jails and police.578 Nevertheless the Acting 
Minister, Colonel C. Ward now had full power in all departments, subject to the 
Begam’s orders given by her personally, in a hope that ‘Constitutional Government will 
.,. take the place of a crushing and omnipotent tyranny’.579
Demanding more control in affairs of state, in a spirited kharita to the Viceroy in 1888 
Shahjehan complained forcibly that her authority had undergone ‘great dhninution’ and 
the state had become a ‘laughing stock to its enemies’.580 The appointment of an 
empowered Minister and the substitution of a new system of administration for the old 
customs of the State had reduced the Begam to an ‘imaginary picture’. She complained 
that no cases, except those connected with jagirs, were referred to her and demanded 
‘hill powers to conduct the State as formerly’.581 Such powers included the ability to 
engage a Minister to her liking on a salary suitable to the small revenues of the state; to 
introduce measures for improving and bettering the condition of subjects, officials and 
jagirdars; to punish officials by fine or dismissal; to appoint and promote officials; to 
call for reports from officials for negligence or irregularity; and to settle all cases 
according to the established usage of the state.582
Colonel Ward stressed that, despite her protestations, the Begam still possessed great 
authority, ‘there is not one single case of any importance in which she has not been 
consulted by me, either revenue or civil. As for money matters, she is supreme -  even 
my office bill goes to her monthly for sanction and payment’.583 Ward also credited 
Shahjehan with a certain amount of acuity in dealing with administrative reforms and, in
578 Col. W. Kincaid, Pol. Agent, Bhopal, to Begam, 28 M y  1885, R/2/453/71.
579 Lepel Griffin to Sec. Gol, FD, 21 February 1886, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box VI.
580 Kharita Begam of Bhopal to Viceroy, 28 M y 1888, R/l/1/96.
581 Ibid.
582 Ibid.
583 Col. C. Ward to F. Henvey, AGG Cl, 26 July 1888, R/l/1/88.
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particular, the problems facing the state in the collection of settlement revenue. The 
Begam regretted the excessive burden of taxation on her subjects and demanded that the 
Minister fix an assessment that was more realistic.584 However the Agent to the 
Governor-General in Central India, R. W. Crosthwaite, was not equally euphoric over 
her conduct of the administration when it was suggested that she should receive a further 
two guns to her personal salute. He was of the opinion that, ‘As a lady she has many 
difficulties to contend against, and the ability and discretion with which she governs are 
worthy of admiration. But in the actual condition of the State there is nothing in the 
administration which calls for special praise’.585
Sultan Jahan Begam, Shahjehan’s daughter, from whom the ruler was estranged for 
much of her reign586, observed of her mother that, ‘like the majority of her sex, she was 
wilful and obstinate’. She could rarely be induced to change her opinion, or to deviate 
from a course of action she had once determined to follow.587 Yet Shahjehan was by no 
means without her successes. It was not until her reign that Urdu literature and poetry 
flourished in Bhopal. The Begam was particularly fond of poetry and offered substantial 
state pensions to the men of learning who gathered at her court, also acting as patron to a 
circle of female poets.588 The most extraordinary of Shahjehan Begam’s writings was 
Tahzib un-Niswan, a 475-page manual for women, first published in 1889. It was 
written in a simple style, which made it accessible to most Urdu-speaking women, and 
as a result it was extremely popular and was reprinted several times. Considered the first 
women’s encyclopaedia in India, the volume covered a wide variety of topics relating to 
women’s work in the household and their status in Islam. It attempted to give women
584 Ward to Durand, 10 September 1886, R/l/1/47.
585 R. W. Crosthwaite, Note o f 24 October 1894, R/l/1/1225.
586 See the alleged attempted disinheritance of Sultan Jahan by her mother in the chapter on 
succession.
587 Sultan Jahan, Account, Vol. I, p. 200.
588 Lambert Hurley, ‘Contesting Seclusion’, p. 37.
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some control over their own lives by teaching them about pregnancy, child-rearing and 
hygiene, as well as marriage, divorce and other ceremonies within Islam.589 Shahjehan 
also recognised the need for a hospital specifically designed for the needs of purdah 
women, and The Lady Lansdowne Hospital for Women’ was opened in Bhopal in 
1892.590
During the last years of Shahjehan’s reign, under the Minister of State, Munshi hntiyaz 
Ali Khan, the administration of Bhopal deteriorated to an alarming degree. A corrupt 
system of revenue collection resulted in a fall in the state population from 900,000 to 
600,000 due to death or emigration, and courts of justice degenerated into arenas for 
‘bribery competitions’.591 Munshi hntiyaz Ali’s successor, Maulavi Abdul Jabbar Khan, 
was old, inexperienced in revenue administration and unable to tackle the corrupt 
practices which he had inherited in all departments. After Shahjehan’s death Sultan 
Jahan determined to train herself in administrative detail. In many ways she revealed 
herself to be as ‘wilful’ as her mother. In the light of ministerial behaviour during 
Shahjehan’s reign, she believed firmly that it was impossible for a Minister to be ‘in 
sympathy with the people and their interests to the same extent as the natural ruler of the 
State’.592 For a year and a half the Begam ruled the state unaided then, unable to cope, 
compromised by appointing two Ministers and dividing the work between them.593 At 
the start of her reign in 1901 she made a personal tour of the various districts of the state 
to deal with settlement arrangements, noting that,
Account, Vol. I, p. 156.
591 Account, Vol. I, pp.173-4.
592 Account, Vol. I, p. 225, Sultan Jahan also believed that the ‘appointment o f  an absolute Minister 
can seldom be productive of good results. It is only in accordance with the natural order of things that 
a person so appointed should be jealous o f  his authority, and should endeavour to make his will the law 
o f the land. He would need to be a man o f exceptional loyalty who could, in such a situation, patiently 
defer to the wishes o f the Chief when they happened to be in conflict with his own’. Account, Vol. I, p. 
224,
593 Account, Vol. I, p. 262.
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The affairs of every mahal that I visited stood in urgent need of reform and of the 
personal attention of the ruler. Four thousand six hundred and ninety-nine petitions 
were presented to me during this tour ... amongst these there were very few which 
were not deserving of attention, and on which orders were not passed.594
In her inspection to determine and grant leases it was impossible to get through the work 
of a single mahal in less than eight days, ‘My own work occupied me eighteen hours 
daily ... sometimes until past midnight, I was occupied with correspondence on various 
State matters, and in devising and directing measures for the suppression of plague’.595
Apart from a revision of the settlement procedures, one of Sultan Jahan’s first reforms 
consisted of the appointment of a Legislative Council, moreover she heard, personally, 
eveiy appeal that was made against the decisions of the Ministers’ courts. In 1903 she 
displayed considerable courage and determination in undertaking a hazardous 
pilgrimage to Mecca, in the course of which Bedouins fired upon the royal party.596 The 
newly installed ruler also opened the Madrissa Tabia Asifia, specialising in the teaching 
of Yunani medicine in 1903, and, against much opposition influenced by *purdah 
considerations’, opened in the same year the Madrissa Suleiman, the first school for the 
education of girls in Bhopal.597 After visiting Europe in 1911, Sultan Jahan’s 
educational and social campaign for women’s emancipation moved to an all-India stage 
and she became the founding President of the All-India Muslim Ladies Conference in 
1914. This conference supported girls’ education and raising the age of marriage, but 
discouraged the abandonment ofpurdah.59*
Ten years later the Begam attended the All-India Women’s Conference on Educational
594 Account, Vol. I, p. 281.
595 Account, Vol. I, pp. 277-8.
596 Account, Vol. I, pp. 338-352. See also Sultan Jahan Begam, The Stoiy o f  a Pilgrimage to Hijaz 
(Calcutta, 1909), pp. 19-127.
597 Account, Vol. I, pp. 317-325.
598 Shaharyar M. Khan, The Begums o f Bhopal, p. 180.
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Reform. By then, at the age of seventy, her stance on purdah had ‘mellowed’. At the 
Conference, well aware of the need to make life easier for her gender, rich or poor, she 
advocated ‘a lessening of purdah restrictions, greater focus of work on under-privileged 
women and a style of education less geared to domestic matters’ 599 Describing the life 
of her mother after her death, Sultan Jehan voiced the problems faced by all the Begams 
of Bhopal as the only female rulers in India in the nineteenth century and indeed faced 
by other royal Indian women in positions of power at that time, ‘When we realise the 
difficulties of the position she was called upon to fill, remembering at the same time the 
limitations by which in Eastern society ladies of noble birth are surrounded, we cannot 
but be amazed that her success was so great and her mistakes so few’.600
CONCLUSION
The British regulation of Indian princely marriages was not simply part of the imperial 
exercise to create a more ordered, tidy society in the states. It had several specific aims. 
By demanding that the details of proposed marriages were reported to the Government 
of India it was possible to eliminate the substantial wheeling and dealing of durbars in 
contracting alliances. As will be seen in the chapter on succession, royal children had a 
habit of appearing out of the woodwork as a ruler’s reign progressed and the monitoring 
of marriages was essential to ensure that the Government could arrive at the correct 
decision as to the heir to tire throne. Such monitoring tended to include a thorough 
inspection of the physical and mental attributes of the patties concerned, thereby 
preventing weaknesses occurring in the line of descent. There were obvious advantages, 
particularly in major states, to a suitable political match and, despite the unwillingness of
599 Ibid.
600 Account, Vol. I, p. 202.
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some senior British officials to condone intervention in private royal matters, there 
appears to have been no reticence on the part of political officers to enter into marriage 
negotiations with great enthusiasm. However the same enthusiasm was not reserved for 
those rulers who entered into marriages with European women, with the cultural 
differences which seemed destined to create complications.
British scrutiny of the princely nuptial process inevitably removed power and authority 
from royal families, resulting in much resentment. Marriage was seen by the more 
devious members of such families as a means by which the young heir could escape the 
clutches of British tutors or guardians. The British determination to ensure that a bride 
was sufficiently younger than her royal husband to allow him to live independently until 
an age when he had completed his education put paid to this ruse. Much resentment was 
also caused by the British attempt to supplant the allegedly more licentious practices of 
the zenana by the introduction of monogamous royal marriage, an attempt which was 
still proving somewhat unsuccessful by the start of the twentieth century. However, 
despite the fact that they were without a mandate from the Government of India to 
enforce western norms, limited interference by political officers was enough to remove 
total independence in maniage matters from many durbars and to alter traditional 
practice to some extent.
Whereas within a state a prince was frequently the principal loser in the face of British 
efforts to change traditional rule at the end of the nineteenth century, the women of his 
family stood much to gain by adopting and implementing British liberal ideas, 
particularly in the areas of princely education and administration. It must be stressed 
that those who took advantage of such an opportunity were few and far between. In the 
vast majority of princely durbars the highly resistant and conservative weight of the
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zenana constantly thwarted British efforts at ‘improvement’, particularly during a 
minority when they were able to wield significant control, as has been demonstrated in 
the chapter on education. However those royal women who proved themselves ‘useful’ 
in the process of British indirect rule were able, remarkably, to assume a female role in 
affairs of state which, with the exception of the monarch herself, was inconceivable at 
that time in England.
With access to the press and British legal advisors, if not the law courts of British India, 
royal women were capable of defending their position to an extent which had not been 
possible before the end of the century. Just as princely honour was being undermined by 
British intervention in palace life, it could also be undermined by a challenge in public 
from a female relative. However, far' from arousing admiration for the spirit and 
determination of the female protagonist, such behaviour tended to confirm ‘the 
Orientalist stereotype of zenana women as idle intriguers who, ignorant of substantial 
affairs of the world, preoccupied themselves with making trouble for others’ ,601 In doing 
so it played an unwitting role in strengthening the desirability of the ‘orthodox norms of 
feminine modesty and submission’.602 ‘Idle intriguers’ or not, power was undoubtedly 
removed from the zenana by the start of the twentieth century, in that the introduction of 
western ideas in some durbars opened up state administration and palace life, and the 
women’s quarters could no longer act as effectively as a source of invisible but at times 
almost despotic power. The following chapter examines the manner in which the British 
attempted to make state administration both accessible and accountable, and the effects 
of the implementation of western forms of government upon the rulers of certain states.
601 Price, Kingship and Political Practice, p. 75.
602 Ibid.
ADMINISTRATION
181
With the arrival of Lord William Bentinck as Governor-General in 1828, the British 
embarked upon an intensive programme of reform in India. Building upon what had 
previously been ‘little more than a vague expectation’ that somehow British rule ought 
to bring ‘ improvement’, free traders, Utilitarians and evangelicals created a distinctive 
ideology of imperial government shaped by the ideals of liberalism.603 The 
representatives of these groups, their scope of action limited within Britain, looked to 
India as a space where their theories might be implemented and tested. James Mill, 
Utilitarianism’s most influential proponent, identified the despotic oriental form of 
government as the root of Indian degradation and therefore saw reform of law and 
administration, particularly land revenue, and the introduction of an accountable and 
efficient centralised government as the means of reforming Indian society.604 These 
arguments instigated a reinterpretation of morally responsible British rule as a mission to 
bring India into the modem age.
Liberals differed over the urgency of reform and the relative importance of particular 
measures of reform, such as law or education. However they attempted invariably to 
free individuals from their ‘bondage to priests, despots and a feudal aristocracy’ in order 
that those individuals could become autonomous, rational beings, leading a life of 
‘conscious deliberation and choice’.605 Liberals had for the most part little sympathy 
with established institutions that were sustained by antiquity alone. Individual self- 
reliance, character and merit were required to shape a proper society, not a hierarchy that
603 Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 28.
604 E. Stokes, The English Utilitarians and India (Oxford, 1959), p. 35. Also D. A. Low, Lion 
Rampant (London, 1973), ch. 2.
605 Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 29.
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rewarded individuals on the basis of patronage and status. The administrative 
‘rationalism’ of utilitarianism embodied the distinction between die order associated 
with British rule and the anarchy and slothfulness of Oriental despotism.606
The spirit of colonial administration produced ‘subtle and pervasive’ changes in the 
Indian aristocracy in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries. The capacity 
to mobilise followers through the politics of corn! was diminished. Kingliness and 
the distribution of honours became less important and less practicable, while 
‘economy’ and ‘good management’ were the measures of success for the dependent 
princes and the landlords of the British territories.607 Ideas of largesse and gifts for 
service ‘succumbed to European concerns for financial rectitude and educational 
qualification’ and, as the nineteenth century progressed under British rule, the 
reinforcement of legal and administrative systems both in British India and the Indian 
states became a priority.608
The channels of British influence upon Indian rulers were both direct and indirect. Tire 
political agent not only advised in the matter of a prince’s education but also was 
frequently involved in the setting up of a temporary administration until the ruler 
attained his powers, usually at eighteen. As the paramount power, the government 
reserved the right, if the new ruler happened to be a minor, to take steps to safeguard his 
patrimony during his minority. Minority rule provided the occasion for strong, often 
creative, intervention and laid the basis for subsequent influence. The assumptions 
which governed British relations with the Indian princes in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century held that ‘intimate British involvement in all but the largest states
606 Ibid.
607 Bayly, Indian Society, pp. 152.
608 Indian Society, p. 153.
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would not be allowed to continue beyond a ruler’s majority, when the established 
patterns of administration would continue under the supervision of the adult raja’.609 
Therefore if changes were to be made in the administrative basis of a state under 
minority rule, they could not simply be introduced by the authority of the agent, but 
would have to be ‘deeply ingrained in the bureaucracy’. Any advances in the 
administration would otherwise be artificial and easily removed or adapted when British 
participation was reduced.610 The minority administration was an exact replica of the 
larger administrative machinery run in British India. The Government of India with a 
regency council under its control usually reorganised the state administration already in 
force, which was frequently outmoded and medieval in many respects, and cautiously 
introduced its own administrative ideas.
By operating through the medium of Indian ministers and bureaucracies the doctrine of 
liberal reform was administered in the states both during and after minorities, justifying 
British imposition of land reform, law and, of prime importance in the states, efficient 
and accountable government. The agents of administrative reform were frequently, 
although not exclusively, the products of education, training and experience in British 
India. Of all the British resources that in one way or another permeated state boundaries 
‘bureaucratic centralisation seems to have had the greatest effect on altering the 
parameters of politics in the states’.611 Under British sponsorship durbar bureaucracies 
grew and impinged increasingly upon the customary rights and privileges of royalty by 
introducing rigorous systems of economy and sound management. The imperial 
government did not superimpose its political system on states, but rather counted 011 
being able to serve its interests by ‘manipulating, through minimal interference, political
609 Haynes, ‘Alwar’ in Jeffrey (ed.), People, Princes, p. 38.
610 Ibid.
611 Robert W. Stem, ‘An Approach to Politics in the Princely States’ in Jeffrey (ed.), People Princes, 
pp. 359.
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systems that were not subject to its direct bureaucratic control5.612 More than minimal 
interference was almost always considered by British authorities to be undesirable in that 
it was ‘costly, offensive to loyal princes and often productive of British involvement in 
local intrigues from which they found difficulty in extricating themselves5.613
However once begun in the states, administrative reforms tended to develop an impetus 
of their own, quite apart from British policy statements. Although it may have been at 
odds with the original intention of British officials of all ranks to work towards the ideal 
of the westernised ruler in charge of his administration, the momentum of such reforms 
and the increase in power of those administrators who instigated new systems of 
government frequently resulted in a considerable loss of a ruler’s control within his own 
state and subsequent loss of status in his relationship with his subjects. As Ashis Nandy 
suggests, modem colonialism won its great victories not so much through military and 
technological prowess as through its ability to create secular* hierarchies incompatible 
with the traditional order. These hierarchies opened up new vistas, particularly for those 
exploited or cornered within a traditional system. To them ‘the new order looked like -  
and here lay its psychological pull -  the first step towards a just and equal world’ .614
For various reasons the Political Service lacked the determination to stop the loss of 
princely control. Weakened by Government of India financial parsimony, prejudice 
against intellectual ability, and lack of provision of training in administrative skills, 
political officers were frequently accused of needless and unproductive intervention in 
states’ affairs by their superiors and given little encouragement in reconciling 
different factions within a state to arrive at an effective administration. During the
612 Stem, Cat and Lion, p. 23.
ell Ibid'Ashis Nandy, The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery o f Self under Colonialism (New Delhi, 
1983), p. ix.
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last decades of the century the ability of such officers to uphold the position of a ruler 
was increasingly diminished by the rise of powerful bureaucracies headed by 
intellectually acute Indian Ministers, who succeeded to a greater or lesser extent to put 
in place accountable administrations on the British Indian model without much help 
from either resident or ruler. It is hardly surprising that in many cases political 
officers were content to leave their princely charges as figureheads rather than prime 
movers in the government of a state, if such a government was in any case 
progressing in line with liberal ideals. Indeed it could be argued that such officers 
were more successful in moving towards their goal of ‘good government5 by so 
doing.
This chapter is divided into two main sections. The first deals with Government 
policy in general as far as the administration of the states was concerned and the 
second consists of four case studies to examine the workings of individual 
administrations.
The first section covers three areas: the official line taken towards the states in the 
decades following the Mutiny; the negative opinion of the role of political officers 
expressed both by senior British officials and by the princes whom political officers 
served; and, finally, various cases of excessive princely misrule in which the power of 
the Government of India machinery was brought to bear upon the offender over and 
above political officers on the ground, ironically often displaying much of the 
ineptitude of which such officers were accused by their superiors.
GENERAL POLICY
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THE OFFICIAL POST-MUTINY APPROACH TO INTERVENTION
The post-Mutiny policy appeared to have achieved little in moulding the princes into 
responsible servants of the Crown. In fact it was argued that it had made the durbars 
more belligerent and unyielding in their conservatism. The Political Secretary at the 
India Office, Sir Owen Tudor Bume, questioned the wisdom of his predecessors’ 
decision to perpetuate the states regardless of their administrative worth or potential:
The fortunate moment which will never recur again was apparently lost, of recasting 
the whole of our Treaties with Native States in terms favourable to them whilst 
equally advantageous to ourselves, by equalisation of tribute or contribution, control 
of their armies ... and the initiation of some form of constitutional gov[emmen]t 
applicable to all in a general sense.615
Renowned in British Indian circles as a force for improvement the Viceroy, Lord Mayo, 
was highly conscientious in his approach to the states. Until his assassination in 1872 he 
threw himself into the work of the political portfolio with an enthusiasm reminiscent of 
Dalhousie, Mayo was the first Governor-General to undertake a comprehensive tour of 
the princely states and found the experience disturbing. He informed the Secretary of 
State, Lord Argyll
that in Joudhpore, Ulwar and Odeypore and several of the small states a state of 
chronic anarchy prevails - that corruption and intrigue is as rife in several courts as it 
was in the days of the Emperors, that female infanticide and many of the other old 
evils prevail to an enormous extent - that to begin what must be the work of many, 
many years, an Entire Change of Policy must be adopted, the present mixture of 
Laissez-Faire and niggling interference must be abandoned and the Chiefs must be 
told what they will not be allowed to do.616
615 Minute by Sir O. T. Bume, 22 January 1875, quoted in Copland, British Raj\ p. 127.
616 Mayo to Argyll, 7 February 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. I.
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Mayo was convinced that if the princes were to act as ‘loyal feudatories’, a policy must 
be found ‘to exalt the dignity, strengthen the authority and increase the personal 
respectability of these ancient families’.617 Britain should ‘obtain real and lasting 
influence by showing them that that which they value above everything, i.e. the support 
of the British Government... is only to be gained by the exercise of justice, by the certain 
punishment of crime and the encouragement of those who support our 
recommendations ’ ,618
The task was not an easy one, since the majority of rulers hardly constituted promising 
material. Mayo referred scathingly to ‘these men who are children in some respects but 
treacherous and savage in others’.619 Moreover relations with the states were extremely 
ill-defined:
We act on the principle of non-interference but we must constantly interfere. We 
allow them to keep armies for tire defence of their States but we cannot permit them 
to go to war - we encourage them to establish courts of justice but we cannot hear of 
their trying Europeans -  we recognise them as separate Sovereigns but we daily issue 
orders to them which are implicitly obeyed - we depose them ... when the Ruler 
commits or sanctions a grievous crime - or create an administration for them as in the 
Ulwur case when the Chief misgoverns and harries his subjects - with some we place 
political agents, with others we do not - with some as with Jeypore, Bhopal and 
Puttialla we are on terms of intimacy and friendship, with others as with Dholepore 
we scarcely ever address them except to find fault with some gross neglect of Duty ... 
[we] are governed by the Circumstances of the Time and the Character of the 
Ruler.620
Mayo did not believe that the princes had a natural entitlement to imperial protection. 
As a part of the new hierarchy which was to emerge as a result of the Queen’s 
Proclamation he was adamant that the Indian rulers should earn British support. 
Speaking to the assembled Rajput princes at Jaipur in October 1870 he outlined his
617 Mayo to Argyll, 10 May 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. I.
618 Ibid.
619 Mayo to Argyll, 7 February 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. I.
620 Mayo to Argyll, 25 November 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. II.
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view:
If we respect your rights and privileges, you must also respect the rights and regard 
the privileges of those who are placed beneath your care. If we support you in your 
power, we expect in return good government. We demand that everywhere 
throughout the length and breadth of Rajpootana justice and order should prevail; that 
every man’s property should be secure; that the traveller should come and go in 
safety; that the cultivator should enjoy the fruits of his labour and the trader the fruits 
of his commerce; that you should make roads, encourage education, and provide for 
the relief of die sick.621
However examples of die British desire to avoid a too harsh imposition of British rule 
appear frequently during the viceroyalties of both Mayo and his successor, Lord 
Northbrook. In 1869, a despatch from Argyll dealing with the proposed territorial 
distribution for the Rajputana agencies made the position clear,
the entire redistribution of the political Agencies in Rajpootana without the views of 
the Chiefs being in any way taken into consideration indicates a tendency to treat 
Rajasthan too much as if it were a British Administrative Division. It is essential to 
bear in mind its distinctive character, as a territoiy of which the internal 
administration belongs, alike of right and by Treaty, to the many important states 
among whom it is divided.622
This view was reinforced by the official reaction to disputes between the Maharajah of 
Bikaner and his nobles, ‘Her Majesty’s Government are averse from a direct and 
authoritative interference in the affairs of the State, regarding such interference as being, 
except in extreme cases, inexpedient, especially when, in the case of Bikaneer, it is not 
provided for in our Treaty with the Chief.623
The Maharajah of Marwar’s decision the following year to appoint a Council to deal 
with grievances of his nobles was commended by the Secretaiy of State, who ended a
621 Speech by Mayo 21 October 1870 in The Times, 5 December 1870, quoted Sir W. W. Hunter, A 
Life o f the Earl o f Mayo (London, 1876), I, pp. 11-12.
622 SoS to Gol, No. 204, 30 September 1869, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 12.
623 SoS to Gol, No. 153, 20 December 1871, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 14.
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relevant despatch to the Government of India, T entirely approve your intimation to the 
Maharaja that we have no desire to interfere in the Government and that our interest in 
the state is confined to its being prosperous and well governed’.624 A similar line was 
adopted when dealing with Holkar, Maharajah of Indore, who was allegedly confiscating 
the holdings of those nobles beneath him whose guarantees did not exist in the recently 
republished treaty of Indore, ‘it must be borne in mind that in the absence of an express 
guarantee, we have no right to interfere between Holkar and his feudatories’.625 The 
case of Indore illustrated the paradoxical situation in which a ruler was able to exploit his 
subjects in the safe knowledge that the threat of British intervention prevented internal 
uprisings within a state. Referring to Holkar, Sir Lepel Griffm, Agent to the Governor- 
General in Central India, wrote to the Viceroy, Lord Ripon, in 1881, ‘These chiefs are 
proud of their extortions, and boast that the British Government would never dare to take 
what they can from the people; forgetting that it is no love for them which keeps their 
subjects quiet, but the great shadow of the British Government which is ever seen 
sheltering the Raja’s throne’.626
Even in cases which would have aroused the fury of social reformers earlier in the 
century, if a ruler was not directly implicated in misdeeds within his state no particularly 
stringent action was taken by the Government of India. When dealing with the failure of 
the Rewah durbar in 1870 to investigate two cases of sati and punish those involved, it 
was merely suggested that surprise and displeasure be conveyed to the prince, which 
‘may lead to increased vigilance in the repression of the crime... in other Chiefs’ .627 Ian 
Copland refers to the all-out effort to reform the states in the image of the West in the
624 SoS to Gol, No. 57, 6 June 1872, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 15.
625 SoS to Gol, No. 211, 12 October 1869, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 12.
626 Lepel Griffin to Ripon, 15 June 1881, Ripon Collection, ADD 43614.
627 SoS to Gol, N o.13, 21 January 1870, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 13.
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period from 1870 to 1890, but in many cases this zeal was tempered by a desire to 
persuade miscreant rulers to change their ways rather than to force them into action. In 
attempting to eradicate the kidnapping of children in the Madras and Bombay 
presidencies, advice was given by the India Office to the effect that native rulers should 
not be coerced into supporting British efforts at reform,
the obvious duty of each political officer [is] to urge on the Chief to whose Durbar he 
is accredited that the summary repression of this infamous practice is due, not so 
much to the demands of the British Government, as to those of common humanity 
and that, on this ground, Her Majesty’s Government fully rely on his cordial 
cooperation in a matter so closely affecting the welfare of his subjects.629
In the 1870s it was unlikely in any case that particularly effective intervention in states’ 
affairs would have been possible. When Mayo took over the viceroyalty Indian finances 
had shown a deficit for the past three years, and resources were hardly available to fund 
the employment of a sufficiently large force of political officers to deal with all
miscreant rulers. There was also an idealistic side to the Viceroy’s reasoning. Mayo and
his chief political adviser, the Calvinistic Sir Charles Aitchison, were staunch believers 
in the ultimate triumph of good over evil. They were confident that, ‘with proper 
guidance, the princes could be induced to mend their ways’.630 This was an optimistic 
view shared by a vast majority of the Indian Political Service. However intervention by 
Political Agents was often seen as far from constructive by both Calcutta and London. 
Throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century official condemnation of the Political 
Service flowed both in government despatches and viceregal correspondence. The India 
Office made it clear that British political officers would ‘most surely earn the 
approbation of the Government which they serve by abstaining from all obtrusive and 
vexatious interference with details, while showing themselves ready to aid with their
628 Copland, British Raj, p. 123.
629 SoS to Gol, No. 263, 11 October 1869, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 12.
630 Copland, British Raj, p. 129-30.
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• 1advice the chiefs and rulers to whom they are accredited’.
THE BLIGHT OF THE POLITICAL OFFICER
The loudest and most vigorous criticism of the new wave of political officers came from 
the Council of India. During the Duke of Argyll’s term as Secretary of State 
(1868-1874) hardly a despatch went out which did not contain either general or specific 
criticism of political style. Two of the most able and experienced members of the 
Council, Sir Erskine Perry and Sir George Clerk, voiced their views clearly in notes 
attached to a despatch of 1873 on the succession of the grandson of the Maharaj Rana of 
Dholpur. According to Perry, if the small states who gained independence at the break 
up of Maharatta power were not supported by the officers of the paramount power, they 
would be absorbed by the larger princes, such as Patiala and Scindia, ‘Our presence 
however prevents this sort of natural crystallization going on, which is the tendency of 
native (perhaps of all) society. We keep things in “status quo” but at the same time we 
destroy all energy and capacity for self-government’.632 Clerk agreed that ‘Faction is 
fomented, responsibility paralyzed and the self respect of Rulers destroyed in this puerile 
meddling and muddling in the affairs of certain ever loyal States, willing in all 
emergencies to serve us with their entire resources’.633
Sympathy was given to a plea by the Maharajah of Bharatpur to be relieved of the 
continual presence of a Political Agent at his court, on the grounds that the Agent tended 
‘to diminish his self-reliance and to cramp his personal exertions’. The India Office
631 SoS to Gol, No. 2, 11 March 1875, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 1.
632 Undated note by Sir Erskine Perry attached to SoS to Gol, No, 78, 4 June 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, 
Vol. 16.
633 Undated note by Sir George Clerk attached to SoS to Gol, No. 78, 4 June 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, 
Vol. 16.
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advised the Government of India that:
Her Majesty’s Government would be loth to encourage among Native Chiefs any 
possible feeling that, whilst the evil results of the system in force are attributed to the 
Native ruler, the good is assigned to the interposition, more or less directly exercised, 
of the British officer, that they have responsibility without independence and that they 
are placed in a false position with respect to both the British Government and their 
own subjects.634
On the grounds of the ‘highly satisfactoiy account’ of the prince, agreement for the 
removal of the Agent was accordingly given.635
Similar British sympathy was shown by Argyll over the appointment of a Resident to the 
court of Kashmir, a measure fiercely opposed by the Maharajah on the grounds that his 
treaty exempted him from such supervision. The Secretary of State admitted that ‘it is 
the very fact of dependence which makes the arrangement distasteful to Native Princes 
in India. In the case of really independent nations, there is no danger of the 
representatives of other States interfering or being troublesome; whereas our Residents, 
in virtue of our Suzerain powers, are very apt to be perpetually interfering and practically 
make the Princes feel that their “Raj” is over’.636 Correspondence between the 
Maharajah of Kashmir and the Afghan leader, Shere Ali, which was intercepted in 1879, 
revealed the extent to which the Indian ruler detested British interference. It was 
reported that the Maharajah had written letters to the effect that
the practical difference between the British and the Russian Raj, assuming one or 
other to be our master, is that, under the Russian Raj, we shall at least be spared the 
intrusion of the Resident Political Officer. The Russians put garrisons where such 
garrisons will give them the military and political control of then subject Asiatic 
provinces, and to the native rulers of those provinces this involves only a matter of 
tribute, the amount of which, if left to then own devices, they can always wring out of 
their subjects. The British, on the other hand, come upon us with certain 
preconceived and semi-religious ideas (which, like all religious ideas, are not
034 SoS to Gol, No. 58, 30 April 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16.
635 Ibid.
636 Argyll to Northbrook, 23 December 1873, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 9.
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susceptible of open discussion) about administrative proprieties, and the duties of 
rulers towards their subjects, etc; which ideas are not only uncongenial, but absolutely 
incomprehensible to us ... The presence of a political officer lifts our *pur d a and the 
moment our ipur da' is lifted, goodbye to our local independence. If we do not act in 
precise conformity with the foreign notions prevalent amongst what is, so far as we 
can judge, the lowest class of a distant western community, necessarily ignorant of 
the practical conditions of our Eastern life, the political officer immediately reports 
the fact to his Raj; and his Raj then comes down upon us with a heavy hand, in the 
name of ‘humanity’ or ‘civilisation’, or some other such absurdity undreamed of in 
our philosophy. Under the Russian Raj, we should no doubt still be feudatories, but 
feudatories free at least to wallop our own packages with our own sticks in our own 
way, and rid of that intolerable nuisance -  ‘the British Political Officer’.637
Northbrook’s successor, Lord Lytton, was in entire agreement with the Maharajah as far 
as the intervention heavy-handed political officers was concerned,
I have long thought that the British Resident at Native Courts is on the whole a 
political mistake. I am certain that he is regarded by those Courts as an intolerable 
nuisance, and that, instead of facilitating our relations with them, or increasing our 
influence over them, he is either a chronic source of irritation to them, or else, for all 
practical purposes, their agent and advocate in eveiy matter of dispute with the British 
Government.638
However although the Viceroy prided himself on the ‘great dominant purpose of the 
British Raj to improve and civilise wherever it extends its power’, whereas the Russian 
Raj ‘craves power in every direction, without any reference to the power of doing good’, 
he was unable to produce a formula which would move the states forward to an ideal 
standard of ‘political perfection and social prosperity’ without some form of British 
presence. With limited resources to furnish eveiy ruler with a political officer of 
substance, there seemed to be no practical alternative between ‘crushing’ a ruler or 
leaving him alone.639
Throughout his viceroyalty, Lytton remained convinced that the general system of
637 Lytton to Cranbrook, 5 November 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
638 Ibid.
639 Ibid.
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Residents had not been successful, ‘certainly our best relations are with the Punjab 
states, at whose Courts we have no Residents’, and criticism had been made that no case 
could be cited of any ‘really important’ reform in a native administration directly due to 
the influence or agency of a Resident, since all such reforms had been carried out by the 
direct intervention of the Government of India during minorities, or under similar 
conditions.640 However the Viceroy did admit that the reason why it was now possible 
to withdraw political officers from some native courts was that ‘the relations between 
those Courts and the Suzerain Power have long ago been reduced to then right 
permanent position by the local action and influence of the Resident’. The work of Sir 
Richard Meade in Hyderabad was one example of a highly competent political officer in 
the demanding position of dealing with a ‘feudatory authority whose personal aims we 
know to be incompatible with our political interests’.641
As a matter of long-term policy, Lytton favoured the system originally suggested by 
Lord Mayo of reducing the number of political officers and grouping native states under 
‘collective relations to one superior political authority’ with few officers resident at their 
respective courts. This measure would ‘strengthen our political control over the 
feudatoiy Courts, and greatly improve our relations with them’.642 A proposed 
amalgamation of the central Indian and Rajputana agencies could create savings of Rs. 
218,920 per year. It would not be necessary to delegate greater powers to one Agent to 
the Governor-General than were already possessed by two. Moreover, when railway 
communications were complete, one Agent could see more of every chief than two had 
been able to do previously and could ‘easily manage to visit eveiy State in the two 
Agencies, at least once a year, if required, even taking his camp with him’, since ‘there is
640 Lytton to Sir R. E. Egerton, 2 December 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
641 Ibid.
642 Lytton to Cranbrook, 5 November 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
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not a State which could not be reached within two days from the nearest railway 
station’.643
However there was evidence that the constant surveillance of Indian rulers was not 
confined to British officials operating within the states. In 1885 the Secretary of State, 
Lord Randolph Churchill, expressed further concern over the amount of British 
intervention in states’ affairs:
A much more generous and pleasing policy might be pursued by the Foreign Office 
at Calcutta towards many of the Native Princes. My impression, when I left India, 
was that relations between many of the Native Princes and the Foreign Office showed 
a constant nagging petty interference by the latter with the former in all affairs, small 
and great, and that this was working great mischief.644
Churchill’s successor, Lord Hamilton, agreed with this view. Writing to the Viceroy, 
Lord Curzon, in 1899 he expressed the opinion that it would be worthwhile to ‘cultivate 
kinder relations’ with the Gaekwar of Baroda, ‘a man of ability ... [who] governs his 
territories well’.645 The Secretary of State added ‘Few, if any, of our great Feudatories 
love the Paramount Power, and I am not at all sure that in several cases this antipathy is 
not largely due to tactlessness, mistakes and undue interference on the part of the various 
Foreign Offices and Political Residents’.646 In the case of Sir Lepel Griffin, Agent to 
the Governor-General in Central India, such criticism was quite possibly justified. 
When Sir Lepel was accused by the Begam of Bhopal of using ‘imperative terms’ while 
addressing her,647 a senior British official failed to rush to his defence, noting that ‘Local 
officers in these matters are not always safe guides. They allow themselves to be 
influenced by local prejudices and they are apt to fancy that any opposition to their
643
Lytton to Sir Alfred Lyall, AGG Rajputana, 26 August 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
644 Churchill to Dufferin, 7 August 1885, Dufferin Collection, IORNeg. 4352.
645 Hamilton to Curzon, 2 February 1899, Curzon Collection F l l  1, Vol. 158.
646 Ibid.
647 See the section on Bhopal in the chapter on marriage and royal women.
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wishes is a crime against the State’,
Similarly when it was reported that the Nizam of Hyderabad ‘bitterly resented’ a 
proposed examination of his personal finances, and, rather than undergo such an 
indignity, was prepared to give the Government of India a guarantee that he would limit 
his expenditure to 55 lakhs from the public treasury, Curzon saw the proposal as not 
unreasonable, ‘I am certain that these Princes are to be got at by a little personal 
courtesy, and that what is represented as disloyalty to Government is often no more that 
the irritation produced by a long course of friction with a not veiy tactful British 
representative’.649 On the other hand, in Curzon’s view, turning a blind eye to princely 
activity was hardly the answer to good management of the states. On a visit to Chumba, 
a minor Himalayan state which ‘wisely or unwisely, we leave almost entirely to itself, 
Curzon noted that no political officer or Resident was in situ, and the young Raj air was 
visited only once or twice a year by the Lahore Commissioner. As a result he had 
degenerated into a ‘timid and useless inebriate... . For want of a little schooling he has 
gone hopelessly to pieces’.650
Unlike Lytton, Curzon had little faith in the Punjab system of managing states, which 
‘leaves them utterly alone until they have turned into fuddle-headed jockeys, like Patiala, 
or into hopeless debauchees, like the late Bhawalpur ... .Eveiy day that I am here, I am 
more impressed with the futility of managing Native States through Local Governments,
648 Letter from W. Bell, 17 April 1886, R/l/1/35. Sir Lepel was hardly a model of tact, writing in 1883 
that it would be unwise for the British ‘to descend from the high place which the genius of Englishmen has 
rightly won, and endeavour to persuade the people of India what, indeed, only the most credulous of them 
would believe -  that they are intellectually or morally our equals, and that to them have been confided by 
fortune those secrets of government which in the modem world, are the inheritance of the Anglo Saxon 
race alone’. ‘Indian Princes at Home’, Fortnightly Review, Vol. 34, October 1883, p. 495.
649 Curzon to Hamilton, 23 March 1899, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 158.
650 Curzon to Hamilton, 25 September 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159
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who have neither the tradition, the training, nor the men for the job’.651 Of the twelve 
‘gun’ rulers of the Punjab, the Viceroy identified no fewer than seven who ‘afford a 
spectacle that cannot be studied with complacency’.652 Local administrations possessing 
no Political Service had failed to provide support to young rulers who had ‘enjoyed the 
advantages of tuition at the best European hands’ at the very time when they most 
needed it. The Rajah of Jind was allotted a military member of the Punjab 
Commission to act as his tutor and guardian.654 As discussed in the chapter on royal 
marriage, the Rajah subsequently secretly married the daughter of ‘a professional 
aeronaut of low character’, which to Curzon illustrated ‘how imperfect the authority and 
control of the Local Government must be’, supporting his view that ‘wherever possible, 
these young Chiefs, at the most ductile period of their lives, should be put in charge of 
Political Officers, not picked haphazard from the ranks of the Army, or from the Civil 
Commission, but selected from the trained Political Department’.655
Writing to the Secretary of State in 1900 during a tour of Cochin and Travancore, 
Curzon repeated his criticism of the monopoly of local governments over princely 
states in then control. He declared the system ‘utterly vicious and rotten’.656 
Practically it would be difficult for the Foreign Department to manage either the states 
of Madras, because of their distance from headquarters, or the states of Bombay, 
because their administration would ‘add so immensely to our own labours’. Yet there 
was great danger in leaving the local governments to supervise states and rulers 
‘whom they now consistently mismanage, and who, under this plan, drift away
652 Minute by Viceroy on ‘The Appointment of a Political Agent to the Phulkian States5, 11 October 
1900, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXXV.
653 Ibid.
654 The outcome o f much deliberation, detailed in the chapter on education.
655 Curzon to Hamilton, 3 October 1900, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 159.
656 Curzon to Hamilton, 18 November 1900, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 159.
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altogether from the Imperial system’. According to the Viceroy, the inevitable 
weakness of the local organisation lay in the fact that Residents had no political 
training before they were sent to a state, ‘Everything depends on the idiosyncracies of 
the individual; but there is no system, no tradition, no body of rules; and a tactless 
Political Officer, with a weak or obstinate. Native Durbar, can very soon bring the 
whole edifice to the ground’.658 Such officers were in stark contrast to those men who 
reported directly to Curzon:
From my Agents to the Governor-General I receive incessant and minute reports. I 
know everything that goes on in the Courts of the Chief under their charge ... take 
the case of the Local Governments. During the 2lA years in which I have been in 
India, I have had only one reference from the Madras Government with regard to 
Cochin and Travancore. With the exception of the boundary dispute, I have never 
had any reference from Bombay about Cutch. Till famine arose, and they required 
loans from us, I never heard a word about die Kathiawar States ....The Local 
Governments, in their treatment of their Native States, pursue a policy of absolute 
independence, and never refer anything to the Government of India except in the 
last resort.659
However the Political Committee in England was adamant that the control of states 
under local Governments should remain under their Governors rather than be 
transferred to Calcutta. The Committee contended that were such control transferred 
to the Political Department of the Government of India, the Foreign Office would find 
it impossible to supervise the increase in work. Moreover there would be the greatest 
difficulty in finding men outside the areas where the states were situated who had an 
adequate regional knowledge of race, customs, traditions and systems of 
administration and taxation.660 The Secretary of State did recognise that local 
governments lacked departments or high officials adequately trained to scrutinise the 
work of political agents to ensure continuity or energy within the service. It was
658 Curzon to Hamilton, 28 November 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159.
659 Curzon to Hamilton, 15 May 1901, Curzon Collection F111, Vol. 160.
660 Hamilton to Curzon, 28 March 1901, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159.
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suggested that a compromise might be found whereby the Government of India 
should have a voice in the selection of agents. They should be taken from the local 
service and there should be a division of matters to be referred for orders: those 
relating to revenue matters and local habits to be referred to local governments, and 
those political in a broad sense to be referred to the central government.661
PRINCELY MISRULE
Although, other than during Curzon’s regime, it was officially seen as desirable to 
reduce interference to a minimum, serious abuses of power within princely 
administration could not be tolerated. As links in the chain of British rule, the Indian 
princes must not be allowed to appear as symbols of depravity, although during the 
latter part of the nineteenth century there was little evidence of a defined Government 
of India policy to deal with major or minor princely shortcomings.
Following an attack upon an individual by aimed men in the employment of the 
Maharajah of Rewa, which constituted not only a serious outrage but a breach of his 
treaty with the British Government, the ruler was fined Rs. 10,000 which ‘will no 
doubt serve to note the liability of a Chief, in his position, to punishment when 
avenging, in outrageous form, an insult’.662 In 1875 the Maharajah made the state 
over to the care of a Political Agent ‘until debts were discharged, and a fair system of 
administration established’. The state revenue had dwindled from 35 lakhs to 8Vz 
lakhs and the ruler had squandered vast sums in gifts to jagirdars and priests.663 The
651 Ibid
662 SoS to Gol, No. 109, September 10 1874, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 17.
663 Ibid.
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Nawab of Janjira, who killed two gaolers by flogging, having previously displayed his 
unfitness to rule by other misdeeds, was deprived of criminal jurisdiction and allotted 
a Political Agent at his own expense.664 Given the opportunity, the Bombay 
Government would have inflicted a similar punishment on the Rana of Porbandar for 
the torture and murder of an Arab who entered the zenana of his late son. The 
Government of India opposed such strong measures, but under pressure from Bombay 
agreed to demote the prince to the third class of Kathiawar chiefs.665
In cases of excessive misrule Britain was forced to take more serious action. If the 
princes were now to be representatives of the Crown, a certain standard of civilised 
behaviour was required on their part and, if such a standard were not met, it would be 
necessary to remove them from power. The Home Government duly approved the 
deposition of the Maharajah of Patna in Bihar in January 1871, as a result of cases of 
‘scalping and human sacrifice’.666 Forceful, if less drastic, punishment was meted 
out to Dungar Singh, Maharajah of Bikaner, in 1884. In marked contrast to the rule of 
his somewhat enlightened son,667 the Maharajah had shown a ‘persistent disregard’ 
for the advice of the Government of India, hi January a despatch declared that if
owing to chronic misrule a Native State has fallen into a condition of disorder so 
complete that the authority of the Chief can be maintained only by the employment 
of British hoops, it appears to us that the Government of India is ... bound to take 
adequate steps for the reform of the administration and the redress of the 
grievances from which the people of the State are suffering.668
664 SoS to Gol, No. 273, December 9 1869, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 12.
665 SoS to Gol, No. 8,27 January 1870, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 13.
666 SoS to Gol, No. 1, 5 January 1871, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 14.
667 See references to Ganga Singh, Dungar Singh’s son, in the chapters on education and marriage.
668 Gol to SoS, No. 5, 8 January 1884, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box IV.
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A Political Officer was to be appointed and the upkeep of the Agency was to be borne 
by the Maharajah, as well as the cost of a British military expedition sent to end a 
dispute between the ruler and some of his thakurs.669
On the whole, the more powerful the state, the more severe was British treatment of 
misrule. British leniency in a major, much exposed test case would be seen to create 
a dangerous precedent. Moreover, whereas in minor states there were limited British 
resources to control the administration and it was necessary to gain the co-operation 
of local rulers, in the largest of the princely dominions British manpower and 
financial support were much more readily available. Malharrao of Baroda was 
without doubt the most important prince to be deposed in the second half of the 
nineteenth century. Baroda was opened up for the first time to British influence, and 
the princes at large reminded forcefully of the strength of the paramount power.670
The report of the Second Baroda Commission, published at the beginning of April 
1875, proved totally inconclusive. Sir Richard Meade and his two English colleagues 
serving on the commission found the Gaekwar guilty of attempting to poison the 
Baroda Resident, Colonel Robert Phayre. The three Indian members held him to be 
innocent. The supreme government was faced with a grave problem: if they accepted 
the verdict of the commission, which was technically ‘not guilty’, they were obliged 
to restore Malharrao to his throne. If on the other hand they ignored the findings, they 
would be forced to find some other justification for his deposition. Eventually, after 
much pressure from the Cabinet, it was decided to remove Malharrao on the grounds
670 Edward C. Moulton, Lord Northbrook's Indian Administi'ation (London, 1968) devotes a whole 
chapter to the Baroda crisis and S. Gopal, British Policy in India, 1857-1905 (Oxford, 1953) also 
singles it out for attention.
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A 71of ‘gross misrule5. Northbrook deeply regretted the Cabinet’s decision. He 
realised that the removal of the Gaekwar on the grounds of maladministration would 
be a breach of his Government’s earlier pledge, giving the prince until December 
1875 to introduce reforms, and would in addition deny the credibility of the
rn ? \
enquiry. The Viceroy was well aware that there was already ‘some sympathy with 
the Gaekwar among the Native Princes, not personally, but because of the class of 
evidence against him - i.e. his own Private Secretary and the Residency servants’.673
In refusing to give the Gaekwar the benefit of the doubt when the three Indian 
commissioners concluded that the charge was not proven, Northbrook acted 
inconsistently with his policy of placing them on the commission in the first place. 
The damage to relations between Britain and the princes stemmed less from the 
eventual deposition of Malharrao, who was blatantly unfit to rule, than from the 
obvious British contempt for native ability and integrity. As Salisbury stated,
the Baroda experiment... has sufficiently indicated to us that an open enquiry and 
Native members of the tribunal are instruments in advance of present Indian 
requirements. The moral which the whole of this affair has left written upon 
Indian history is that the Government is still supreme to punish Princes who do 
wrong, unfettered by any obligations or customary pledges as to procedure, and 
with that broad result we have no reason to be dissatisfied.674
Minuting in May 1876, Northbrook’s successor, Lord Lytton, found nothing in the 
performance of governments in either Bombay or Calcutta to indicate ‘any well 
considered and well-defined policy5 towards the states.675 In his opinion, Northbrook 
had ‘neglected feudatory policy to his cost’.676 However during his own viceroyalty,
671 Copland, British Raj, p. 150.
672 Northbrook to Salisbury, 21 April and 21 June 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
673 Northbrook to Salisbury, 19 March 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
674 Salisbury to Northbrook, July 30 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
675 Minute dated 18 May 1876 quoted Copland, British Raj, p. 153.
676 Copland, British Raj, p. 153.
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in dealing with the ruler of Kashmir, Lytton proved no more proficient in finding a 
satisfactory means of disciplining the Maharajah without moving inexorably towards 
annexation.
Lytton reported to the Secretary of State, Lord Cranbrook in July 1879 that, despite 
being under severe pressure from the Punjab Government and public opinion in India to 
undertake the management of the major famine in Kashmir, he was loath to intervene to 
stop the ‘wholesale corruption and terrible depopulation’.677 As the Viceroy explained,
This I have declined to do, partly because the famine is too far gone to be 
successfully treated by any system, or at any cost, but mainly because such an 
attempt would involve the suppression of the whole local machinery, as well as of 
the Maharajah’s authority and ultimately the annexation of Kashmir, after a great 
and useless expenditure of money by us ... all Native States are badly governed, 
according to our standard, and if we once begin to interfere in the internal affairs of 
independent Native Governments, we shall infallibly end by being forced to annex 
them.678
Fear was expressed by the Viceroy that too strong an approach against the Maharajah 
of Kashmir on the grounds of gross, or even criminal, mismanagement of the famine 
should not be taken, as such an approach ‘would have shocked and shaken to the base, 
the confidence of every one of the Queen’s great feudatories throughout India’.679 
Writing to Sir Robert Egerton, Lieutenant-Governor of the Punjab, he expressed his 
opinion that if the Kashmir administration were put under unprecedented supervision, 
British action would be regarded by other states as
that of political Pecksniffs, endeavouring, under a pretence of philanthropy, to 
secure an extension of political powers, for which no other pretext could be 
devised. In that case, all our other Native States would, I think, consider
677 Lytton to Cranbrook, 8 February 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
678 Ibid.
679 Lytton to Sir R. E. Egerton, 2 December 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
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themselves to be in the cave of Polyphemus, and each would be wondering whose 
turn would come next,680
However it was recognised that in the case of Kashmir some disciplinary action must 
be taken. ‘Philanthropic sentiment’ had been ‘outraged’ by the painful accounts of 
the famine. In the light of the fact that the Maharajah had used the independent 
political action allowed to him ‘to augment his own importance, rather than to 
promote British interests’, the Viceroy felt that the prince should be deprived of all 
powers in relation to the territories of Chitral and Yassin, and told firmly that 
‘henceforth, he will neither be required, nor permitted, to meddle with the affairs of 
any state, great or small, beyond the Cashmere frontier’.681 In 1883 Lytton’s 
successor, Lord Ripon, was advised that on the death of the current Maharajah strong 
measures should be adopted to deal with the state,
a regular Resident, under some other name if necessary, with an assistant to remain 
all the year round in Kashmir; the British flag should be hoisted over the 
Residency (as it has never been so yet); and things symbolic of the paramount 
power be put as ostentatiously forward as they are now studiously suppressed 682
Drastic grounds for intervention also occurred in the northeastern state of Manipur in 
1891. An anti-British revolt resulted in the murder of the Political Agent, the Chief 
Commissioner for Assam and four British officers. A purge of all British influence in 
the state followed: telegraph offices and lines were destroyed, telegraph operators 
murdered, a sanatorium burned down and British graves desecrated.683 Within a 
fortnight British forces converged upon Manipur. The royal palace was looted and 
razed to the ground to make way for a permanent military camp and Tikendrajit, the 
subversive brother of the ruler, was publicly hanged. The execution of a prince, albeit
682 O. St. John to Ripon, 22 July 1883, Ripon Collection, ADD 43613.
683 The Times, 4 May 1891.
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a villain, upset Queen Victoria, who protested to the Viceroy, Lord Lansdowne, 
suggesting that the behaviour of residents and political agents tended to exacerbate 
events in a princely state. The Viceroy agreed that ‘the bearing of our Residents to 
the Native Princes is not what it should be, and they are often rude and overbearing, 
their notion being that of governing India by fear, and by crushing, instead of by 
firmness, joined with conciliation5.684 However he was determined to maintain the 
principle that all subjects of native states found guilty of rebellion against the 
paramount power were, prima facie, worthy of death.685
There was an assumption by the press in England that Manipur would be annexed with 
‘a good deal of acceptance in official circles5.686 Lansdowne was not prepared to admit 
that annexation must follow as a matter of course. There were points to be resolved: 
whether by annexation responsibilities would be incurred which would be better 
avoided; what would be the financial cost of the step; what political effect it would have 
on other states; and ‘whether it was beyond the power of the Government to devise an 
arrangement which would secure all the advantages of annexation, without its
t  £ 0 7
disadvantages5. Lansdowne considered that, if the state were not annexed, the 
government should declare that Manipur* had forfeited its independence, but that, ‘as an 
act of clemency, we are prepared to restore it, subject to any conditions upon which we 
may find it desirable to insist5.688 It would be a great deal more difficult to avoid 
annexation if those people concerned in the rebellion escaped punishment. Moreover 
there was a need to ensure that feelings of clemency in England did not override the 
Government of India's decision.689 The new ruler of Manipur* was to be Chura Chand,
684 Lansdowne to Cross, 19 August 1891, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 4.
685 Lansdowne to Cross, 23 June 1891, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 4.
686 Lansdowne to Cross, 15 April 1891, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 4.
687 Ibid.
688 Lansdowne to Cross 30 June 1891, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 4.
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aged five, descended from the same ancestor as the ex-Maharajah. Lansdowne was 
adamant that it was ‘most important to show that we are making an entirely new 
departure and that the new ruler will owe his position altogether to our favour ... a long 
minority under the guidance of a careful British officer will be much the best for this 
purpose5.690
By the end of the nineteenth century direct opposition to the orders of the 
Government of India was in some cases seen as a worse princely crime than actual 
misrule. The ‘final battle’ to depose Holkar, Maharajah of Indore, rested on relatively 
minor issues such as decisions by the Maharajah to order the permanent expulsion of 
four innocent people released from prison by the Government of India, and to recant 
previous statements made in the press of his good intention to rule well. Curzon 
declared that
Of course the serious element in the points at issue lies in the fact of direct 
insubordination to the orders of the Government of India ... Such acts of 
disobedience, though perhaps small in themselves are, if committed with impunity, 
more fatal to the Government of India than any evidence of local misgovemment, 
however gross 691
Repeated defiance of tire Government of India also brought about the- deposition of 
the Maharajah of Jhalawar, who consistently breached the agreement under which 
ruling powers were restored to him. The Council of India set out its justification that 
it was to Britain alone that the subjects of the state could look for protection against 
misgovemment,
690 Lansdowne to Cross, 15 September 1891, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 4.
691 Curzon to Hamilton, 5 July 1899, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 158. The man dealing with the 
nut and bolts of Holkar’s deposition and the installation of the ruler’s son was the current Resident in 
Indore, Francis Younghusband, who was soon to depart on his infamous expedition to Tibet.
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Misrule on the part of a Government which is upheld by British power is misrule 
in the responsibility for which the British Government becomes in a measure 
involved. It becomes, therefore, not only the right but the positive duty of the 
British Government to see that the administration of a state in such a condition is 
reformed, and that gross abuses are removed.692
In the light of the Baroda trial it was nevertheless seen as essential to adopt the correct 
judicial procedure for any proposed deposition to avoid the possibility of antagonising 
other rulers. In the case of the Maharajah of the central Indian state of Panna, Madhava 
Singh, who was directly implicated in a case of poisoning in which his uncle died, the 
Secretary of State advised Curzon that
If you have not appointed your Judicial Commissioner for the trial of die Maharajah 
of Panna, I would suggest sending two, and not one, Commissioners. The trial and 
deposition of ruling Princes for offences of this kind are somewhat ticklish; we got 
into trouble [in] ... Baroda some years ago, and I think it would be satisfactory to the 
Princes generally if the decision did not rest in one man’s hands alone.693
The Maharajah was duly deposed and imprisoned, the eldest son of his uncle nominated 
in his place and despatched without delay to a princely college.694
Curzon’s withering view of the princes as a whole was set out in a letter to Lord 
Hamilton in 1900,
... to a large extent we act as their schoolmasters. For what are they, for the most 
part, but a set of unruly and ignorant and rather undisciplined schoolboys? What 
they want more than anything else is to be schooled by a firm, but not unkindly, 
hand; to be passed through just the sort of discipline that a boy goes through at a 
public school in England, but which they have never had out here; to be weaned, 
even by a grandmotherly influence, from the frivolity and dissipations of their 
normal life.695
Gol to SoS, No. 50, 18 March 1896, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXL
693 Hamilton to Curzon, 17 October 1901, Curzon Collection FI 11/ Vol. 160.
694 Not surprisingly, the British were particularly sensitive to the reactions o f other princes to the 
deposition of one of their fellow rulers. Following an official visit to Orchha, during which the 
Maharajah made ‘offensive and uncalled for allusion’ to the deposition of the Maharajah of Panna, the 
Viceroy declared that no further viceregal visits should be made to the state during the lifetime of the 
present ruler. Note from Viceroy’s Camp, Udaipur, 17 November 1902, R/l/1/287.
695 Curzon to Hamilton, 29 August 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159.
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Already princely subjects were
beginning to protest against the extravagance and tyranny of many of these rulers, 
and it is to us they turn and ask for security and protection .... So long as Lord 
Canning’s policy is adhered to ... we are bound to train, and discipline, and control 
them, and so to fit them for the unique position which we have placed within their 
grasp.696
To many British political officers the requirement ‘to train, and discipline and control5 
their princely charges post-Canning had given them an ideal opportunity to focus not 
only upon moral correctness but also upon the virtues of financial rectitude and 
accountability in state administration. It is possible that had such officers had 
concentrated more upon upholding the traditional role of the Indian ruler as the prime 
mover in his state, and less upon the implementation of bureaucratic procedure, by the 
end of the nineteenth century the princes might have emerged less in the mould of 
‘rather undisciplined schoolboys’.
CASE STUDIES
The second main section of this chapter examines four case studies of states during 
the period to discover to what extent the Government of India view on non­
intervention was in fact adhered to by political officers and how far their efforts 
succeeded in producing the desired species of Indian ruler. In all of the studies the 
imposition of British methods of ‘good government’ at the end of the nineteenth 
century tipped the existing balance of power within a state administration. There is 
less of a defined policy within states than a series of shifting relationships between the
696 Ibid.
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ruler, his minister and bureaucracy, the British resident and, in the case of Rajputana, 
the nobility.
The tasks of protecting imperial interests within the states, and increasingly 
integrating the states into an imperial whole, were assigned to political officers who 
were theoretically accountable to their superiors in British India. However Robert 
Stem considers that in a modem bureaucratic empire the source of effective policy­
making frequently tends to lie at the lower end of the scale, pointing out that ‘in no 
bureaucratic structure can one assume congruence between general policy statements 
emanating from the top and the implementation of policy with regard to particular
S" Q+T
cases at the bottom’. Moreover, as has been suggested in the preface, the power 
structure of a state administration was by no means well defined, in that the British 
position of dominance was diluted by the requirement for negotiation and cooperation 
between British political officers and English educated Indian bureaucrats and 
ministers. Despite the official British line against intervention in princely states, were 
political officers sufficiently ‘empowered’ to take a controlling role in the 
administration or did they merely act as buffers between a dewan at times of an 
impressively high intellect, a powerful bureaucracy and a ruler whose interests it was 
increasingly difficult to protect if ‘sound’ government were to be achieved? Was 
traditional Indian royal rule sacrificed in the cause of well-regulated and efficient 
systems of rule?
The states selected are: Mewar (Udaipur), the most prominent Rajput state, which 
provides an example of typical British attitudes towards the states of Rajputana at the 
end of the nineteenth century; Mysore, taken under British rule in 1831 and restored
697 Stem ‘Approach to Politics’ in Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes, pp. 362-363.
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to an Indian ruler fifty years later, the administration of which was under the 
particular scrutiny of both British and Indians; Baroda, following the deposition of its 
ruler in 1875 an arena for important and far-reaching administrative reforms; and 
Hyderabad, the major Muslim state in India, maintaining an intricate balance between 
the modernisation of the Mogul system of administration and the preservation of 
traditional institutions and personnel. It is not intended to discuss in any detail the 
financial intricacies of individual administrations, as these varied hugely from state to 
state over the period. It would require a significant study to cast light on not simply 
state budgets, but what were at times decidedly murky dealings involved in state and 
imperial transactions.
MEWAR
The British treated the states of Rajputana as a special case. The interactions of princes 
and barons in early nineteenth century Rajput polity were ‘so reminiscent of similar 
interactions in medieval Europe’ that the British tended to identify the Rajput system as 
feudal.698 The major influences in shaping British officers’ conceptions of Rajput 
feudalism and suggesting, in the broadest terms, imperial policies appropriate to these 
conceptions were the works of Lieutenant Colonel James Tod and Sir Alfred Lyall. Tod 
was one of the earliest explorers of Rajputana when it was still terra incognita to the 
Company and, as a surveyor and negotiator he played an important role in helping the 
Company to establish its protectorate over the Rajput states. Lyall was a man of greater 
official and literary distinction who in the mid 1870s served as Agent to the Governor- 
General in Rajputana.699 Both men believed that the less their government and its 
officers interfered in the internal affairs of the Rajput states the better. In Tod’s view a
698 Stem, Cat and Lion, p. 24.
699 Cat and Lion, pp. 24-5.
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policy of intervention would only ‘destroy the links which connect the prince and his 
vassals’ and leave the Rajputs with no system at all ‘or at least not a system of feuds, the 
only one they can comprehend’.700 A policy of non-interference, on die other hand, 
would allow feudalism’s ‘renovation’ and a return to its pristine state.701
Lyall, reflecting on more than half a century of British indirect rule, judged it to have 
been ‘considerably less than successful’ in reaching Tod’s goal of renovating Rajput 
feudalism. He regretted the persistent ‘inclination of an English government . ..toward 
the support of the central administration’ in the Rajput states, ‘To make haste to help the 
chief to break the power of his turbulent and reactionary nobles, in order that he may 
establish policy and uniform administration over Ids whole territory, is to an Englishman 
at first sight an obvious duty, at the second look a dubious and short sighted policy’.702 
Lyall wanted the British in Rajputana ‘to abstain as much as possible from interference, 
and to maintain, so far as we do interfere, the equilibrium of weight between chief and 
nobles’, to avoid the danger of changing die Rajput ‘tribal chieftain’ into an ordinary 
Indian ‘petty autocrat’.703 He contrasted the Maratha ruler, Scindia, ‘a despot of the 
ordinary Asiatic species, ruling absolutely the lands which his ancestor seized by the 
power of a mercenary army’ with die rulers of the Rajput states, where the ‘feudal lords’ 
counterbalanced the sovereign power of the prince to effectively prevent him from 
becoming ‘an arbitrary despot’.704 As a result, he said, although the peasantry were 
often reduced to near serfdom, the ‘feudal system’ of Rajputana was ‘the only free 
institution of India’. A system of government diat could be described by analogy with 
that of Europe, even the Europe of the Middle Ages, was by definition superior to a
700 James Tod, Annals and Antiquities o f Rajasthan I (originally published 1829), pp. 223-4 quoted 
Stem, Cat and Lion, p. 32.
701 Cat and Lion, p. 32.
702 Alfred C. Lyall, Asiatic Studies: Religious and Social, ‘The Rajput States of India’, Chapter 8, 
quoted Cat and Lion, p. 33.
703 Ibid.
704 Lyall, Asiatic Studies, pp. 224, 244, quoted Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 74.
212
*• 7 0 ^system which was purely ‘Oriental’ in character.
As Robert Stem points out in his study on Jaipur, the ‘bureaucratic chains’ which linked 
the various parts of British administration in Rajputana to one another and to parts of the 
wider bureaucratic empire were by the end of the nineteenth century becoming more 
intricate and extensive. In these chains the Rajput jagirdars were the ‘missing links’.706 
The Foreign Department of the Government of India was linked to its Agency in 
Rajputana, which was linked to its residencies in the Rajput states, which in turn were 
forging links with the bureaucratised parts of the various durbars ' administration. In 
addition ‘the Department, through its Agency, was managing for ... all of Rajputana 
para-military (the local corps), quasi-judicial (the courts of vakils) and educational 
(Mayo College) bureaucracies’.707 With their economic, military and judicial effects on 
Rajputana, the railways brought corresponding bureaucratic connections, as did the 
incorporation of Rajputana into the vast area of imperial free trade, the extension of the 
British salt monopoly to Rajputana and the integration of the Rajput maharajahs into one 
imperial system of graded princes. However the jagirdars, who were the lords of most 
of Rajputana and about seventy per cent of Rajputana’s cultivators, were frequently 
‘beyond the reach of durbar authority’.708
The loss of the link of the Rajput nobility in the bureaucratic chains had been caused in 
the first place by the arrival of British indirect rule. By concluding treaties in the early 
nineteenth century with individual Rajput rulers, thereby committing to protect them, the 
Company had established a direct relationship between the princes and the paramount 
power which ousted the nobility from its role as a major player and counterweight in
705 Ibid.
706 Cat and Lion, p. 154.
707 Ibid.
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state politics. In 1884 Lyall spoke of British rule as having ‘rescued’ the Rajput states 
from the anarchy that had followed the decline of Mogul rule. However he also 
recognised that the ‘listless security produced by our protection’ had brought about a 
‘rapid deterioration ‘ in the effective functioning of such states.709 Moreover, despite 
their belief in the efficacy of some sort of feudal system in Rajputana, the reluctance on 
the part of British officials to interfere on a consistent basis to maintain the political 
strength of the jagirdars resulted in a failure to provide the checks and balances within 
government which might have prevented a general trend towards Rajput monarchical 
absolutism. The case of the state of Mewar clearly illustrates this failure.
The Sesodia Maharanas of Mewar had a universally recognised claim to the highest rank 
and dignity among the Rajput princes of India. More than any other Rajput dominion, 
Sesodia rule exhibited the ancient and uncorrupted Hindu polity, practically unchanged 
by Mogul interference,710 However the political system of Mewar cracked during the 
disintegration of the Mogul empire, when the country was overrun from without by 
marauding bands of Marathas and Pathans and tom from within by feuds between rival 
jagirdars who rose frequently in rebellion against the prince. In 1818 Mewar entered 
into a treaty of subordinate alliance with the British and an agreement between the 
Maharana and his chiefs was ultimately reached through tense negotiations under Tod’s
• 711 •supervision. Constitutional and administrative reforms carried out in the two decades 
following the Mutiny were due to the initiative of British officials. Consequently 
reforms came to be associated with the pro-British party at the durbar, headed by the 
highly influential official, Mehta Panna Lai.712
709 Lyall, Asiatic Studies, pp. 204, 261-63 quoted Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 79.
710 Raj at K. Ray, ‘Mewar: The Breakdown of the Princely Order’, in Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes, p. 
206.
711 Ray, ‘Mewar’, pp. 211-12.
712 Ray, ‘Mewar’, p. 222.
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The accession of Maharana Fateh Singh in 1884 brought this era of limited reform to an 
end. A report on Mewar written in 1901 by the Resident, Major A. F. Pinhey, noted that 
the Maharana worked harder than any other ruler he had known and was ‘always 
influenced by laudable motives’, however at the same time he was ‘uneducated, very 
undecided, suspicious of every one and uncompromising in his attitude towards the 
Jagirdars ... too conservative to appreciate the necessity of keeping abreast of the 
times’.713 The ruler was reduced to a ‘position of isolation’ which prevented him horn 
benefiting horn the assistance of his natural advisers in conducting the administration 
and every question, however trivial, went before him before final orders were passed. 
Upon the dismissal of Mehta Panna Lai, Fateh Singh had assumed personal charge of 
state affairs and in spite of repeated British requests the ruler refused to appoint a new 
Dewan, since he regarded such an influential officer as a potential ally of the British.714 
It was impossible for the Maharana to control his officials adequately, he was scarcely 
able to leave the capital and his knowledge of what was occurring in the districts was 
based on whatever unreliable information his officials cared to give him.715
Relations between the jagirdars and the durbar were becoming increasingly more 
unsatisfactory. Many of the older, more influential jagirdars had died recently and their 
successors were minors, while, as Pinhey noted, ‘the Durbar has become, with our 
assistance, far more powerful than it used to be’.716 Durbar officials quite unfitted for
713 Major A. F. Pinhey, Res. Mewar, ‘Note on Mewar’, 7 March 1901, R/2/147/97.
714 Ibid.
715 Ibid. In the same way the Rajputana Agency proved only partially successful in bureaucratising 
the Jaipur durbar. To the Agency’s dissatisfaction Maharajah Sawai Madho Singh evidently failed to 
acknowledge the ‘self-evident superiority of European rule and system’ and became the autocrat o f his 
administration. In theory a council o f ten men assisted him, but most of them were ‘sleeping members 
in the firm’ and the council was unable to pass orders on the smallest matter without reference to the 
Maharajah. Lt. Col. C. Herbert, Res. Jaipur, Note on Jaipur, 8 August 1905, R/l/1/328. For three and 
a half decades he used his council as it pleased him, without attaching much weight to Residents’ 
advice or regard for bureaucratic consistency or restraints. During this period the complementary 
interests between the British government and Sawai Madho Singh of, principally, railways and salt 
blocked the access o f the nobility. Stem, Cat and Lion. pp. 182-4.
716 Pinhey, ‘Note on Mewar’, 7 March 1901, R/2/147/97.
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the responsibilities of their position managed the estates of jagirdars under minorities, 
missing opportunities to improve the administration and to tree the estates from debt. 
The jagirdars had been ‘from ancient times hereditary counsellors and pillars of the 
state’, however they were seldom associated with the Maharana in the administration.717 
When they came to Udaipur with their grievances they were heated with ‘scant respect’ 
by state officials and they found it impossible to obtain an impartial hearing. The 
jagirdars were no doubt largely to blame for the state of affairs as they failed to attend at 
the capital when requested and annoyed Fateh Singh by setting themselves up as 
virtually independent rulers. Nevertheless the Resident was convinced that they were 
thoroughly loyal to the Maharana as the head of the clan and if he met them with more 
sympathy yet firmness, their grievances could be amicably settled.718
Highly conscious of the heroic and glorious past of the Sesodias, the great ambition of
Fateh Singh was to restore to the position of Maharana the dignity enjoyed by his
predecessors and to resist all innovations. In spite of British objections he stopped work
on a projected railway line from Udaipur to Chittor 011 the grounds that funds were not
available. Moreover Mewar remained the only important princely state free from the
obligation to supply troops to the British.719 The State Education Committee, appointed
by the previous Maharana, was abolished and control for that department given to the
durbar, which showed no inclination to spend the accumulating sums allocated to 
• 720 * *education. In addition the virtual breakdown of earlier agreements between Fateh 
Singh and his jagirdars seriously affected the administrative capacity of the state to cope 
with the devastating famine of 1899. Distrustful of his own officials, he attempted to
717 Ibid.
718 Ibid.
719 Ray, ‘Mewar’, p. 223. The Imperial Service Troops scheme is discussed in the chapter on 
hierarchy and ritual.
720 Ray, ‘Mewar’, p. 224. In 1912 Sidney and Beatrice Webb commented on the absence of a College 
or other educational establishment for the young men of Mewar. Indian Diaiy , p. 156.
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centralise government into his own hands with the result that he was overwhelmed by ca
• • no 1mass of confusing details’. The power of jagirdars in civil and criminal cases was 
not defined and the state police exercised little or no authority over the greater nobles. 
The latter, although outwardly submissive to the Maharana, constantly disobeyed his 
orders.722
In 1906 a confidential note from the Resident discussed the possible death of the 
Maharana and the action of the Resident if he were to take over the administration of the 
state. In many ways Pinhey was still adhering to the principles laid down by Tod and 
Lyall. He advised that:
Local conditions and customs should be scrupulously respected and no change should 
be introduced merely because it coincides with some preconceived idea of how a 
thing should be done or because a different system prevails in British India ... .A s 
few outsiders should be introduced as possible, at any rate until it has been definitely 
demonstrated that local men are really incompetent or untrustworthy if properly 
supervised .... It would be a great mistake to entirely lose sight of old traditions or to 
attempt to transform an essentially Rajput state into a model British province. The 
Rajput element should be fostered and encouraged and the more important and better- 
educated Rajput nobles should be taken unreservedly into our confidence.723
In Pinhey’s view it would be impossible to improve the administration as a whole unless 
the jagirdars were involved and felt that they had a real stake in the country. This was 
particularly the case as far as judicial and police matters were concerned, but also in 
areas relating to education, medical and sanitary arrangements, and the extension of 
irrigation and famine programmes.724 The first move should be to reappoint the 
committee of officials and nobles nominated by the Maharana’s predecessor. Secondly, 
a Court of Wards should be established under a European officer for the proper
721 Lt. Col. W. H.C. Wylie, AGG, Rajputana, to Sec. Gol, FD, 1 April 1901, R/2/147/97.
722 Ibid.
723 Pinhey, ‘Confidential Note on Mewar Affairs’, 8 March 1906, R/2/147/97.
724 Ibid.
management of the jagirs under minority administration in order to restore their 
prosperity. Where the recognition of traditional rights did not interfere with the 
administration of the state under modem requirements, these rights should be 
conceded.725
However, despite the obvious imbalance of power in the state, the Government of India 
was reluctant to interfere in Mewar affairs. While generally concurring in the line of 
action proposed to reform the admiinistration, senior government officials felt that it was 
most important to show the Maharana plainly that it had ‘no intention of pressing 
reforms upon him against his will’ and it would be ‘wise to leave largely to his initiation 
the actual undertaking of improvements’.726 As a result Fateh Singh was able to 
maintain, as far as possible within the limitations of treaty relations with the British, a 
deeply conservative and safely autocratic position until forced to step down in favour of 
his son after the First World War.727
Within Mewar and certain other Rajput states during the period, such as Jaipur, the 
British were unable to control an unhealthy gain of power 011 the part of rulers by failing 
to support the nobility or to introduce an effective bureaucracy. In the other three case 
studies discussed below it can be argued that, conversely, princely power was 
diminished due to a British inability or will to control an unhealthy gain of power on the 
part of bureaucracies and the ministers at their head. Neither approach succeeded in 
producing a model princely administrator.
726 Asst. Sec. Gol, FD to E. G. Colvin, AGG Rajputana, 6 May 1907, R2/147/97.
727 The Maharajah o f Bikaner also managed to achieve an ‘autocratic position’. In 1905 the Political 
Agent noted that as a result of a ‘novel experiment’, instead of using a Dewan or Excutive Council the 
Maharajah conducted the work o f state personally through secretaries in charge of various departments. 
The ‘essence o f the scheme’ was apparently to ensure to His Highness a more close and personal 
control over the affairs o f his state. Major A. F. Bruce, Pol. Agent Bikaner, Note on Bikaner, 6 July 
1905, R/l/1/328.
MYSORE
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The Mysore of Haidar Sultan and his son, Tipu Sultan, was a Muslim conquest state 
created in 1761 by a coup against the Hindu ruling house. The new Mysore was 
maintained by rigorous revenue management and a growing emphasis on die power of 
the sultan, posing a threat to British dominance through an increased military capacity 
which challenged the Company’s army. Following Tipu’s death fighting Wellesley’s 
armies in 1799 the state was made over by die British to Krishnaraja Wadiar HI, the 
relation of a Hindu family which had once ruled a small portion of it.728
The establishment of colonial government in Mysore was greatly facilitated by the use 
made of the old Dewan as a de facto ruler, however when the young Maharajah failed to 
maintain law and order, the state was taken under direct British rule in 1831. After 1857 
the emerging imperial strategy to heat the Indian princes as allies resulted in a decision 
by the British government to restore Mysore to native rule in 1881, by which time the 
British would have prepared the adopted son of the Maharajah for rule. The task of the 
princely regime to win British favour after reinstatement was helped by the policies of 
the British Commission prior to 1881. When Maharajah Chamarajendra Wadiar was 
reinvested with his powers, he was presented with a fully developed administrative 
structure based upon Madras and Bombay models. The British also inserted an Indian 
official of the highest calibre as Dewan and a tradition was soon established of a strong 
centralization of power in his hands. This tradition was carried on by a number of 
accomplished successors who were able to maintain the high quality of administration 
given to them by the British, Consequently before the end of the century knowledgeable 
and highly critical British observers cited Mysore as ‘the best administered native state
728 Bayly, Indian Society, pp. 95-7.
in India’.729
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There was a strong continuity in direct British day-to-day contact, as many British 
officers were retained in higher administration, in control of several important areas such 
as the Public Works, Judicial and Police Departments. At least forty Europeans 
remained in the Mysore government.730 The Viceroy, Lord Mayo, had earlier seen the 
need to introduce natives into the minority administration to retain British credibility in 
Mysore. He regretted the fact that ‘This Country is almost wholly wanting in the class 
of “Good Native Families” from whom we ought to be able to select well educated 
young men’ and felt that it might be advisable to establish a special class in the High 
School for a number of Indian youths to be educated towards service in the higher ranks 
of the state administration.731 However, as a later despatch made clear, the task would 
not be an easy one, due to the complexity of the administration introduced by the British 
during the young prince’s minority. The Mysore system was ‘too much encumbered by 
forms’ with ‘too intricate departmental systems’ to be worked satisfactorily by a native 
government and it was feared that the transfer of such an administration to native hands 
would ‘ensure the failure of the restored government’.732 This result would have the 
worst possible effect upon the people and princes of India who had been watching the 
experiment with interest and ‘who would not hesitate to impute to us the worst motives 
in failing to accomplish its success’.733
In 1878 the Viceroy, Lord Lytton, stressed that it was extremely desirable to introduce
729 W. Lee-Wamer to The Times, 18 August 1897, Lee Warner Collection, File 31. See also James 
Manor ‘Princely Mysore before the Storm: the State-level Political System o f India’s Model State, 
1920-36’, Modern Asian Studies, IX (January, 1975), pp. 31-58.
730 Sharma Rao, Modern Mysore, Vol. II, p. 46 quoted Bjom Hettne, The Political Economy o f  Indirect 
Rule: Mysore 1881-1947 (London, 1978), p.50.
731 Mayo to Argyll, 20 April 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. I.
732 SoS to Gol, Draft No. 133, 3 October 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16.
733 Ibid.
220
‘constitutional principles’, not to give the new native government ‘any recognised 
representative character’, but to organise it ‘upon tire basis of a certain balance in the 
administrative powers of the State’.734 Safeguards were to be built into the financial 
administration: a specific sum was to be fixed for the civil list of the Maharajah, to be 
kept firmly apart from the revenues of state, and the administrators of the Mysore 
revenue would be responsible, not to the Maharajah personally, but to the state ‘of 
whose financial interests the Suzerain Power would still remain guardian’ .735 There was 
to be a legislative body, ‘by no means necessarily elective’, whose decisions would be 
made ‘subject to the ratifications sanctioned by the Viceroy in Council, as 
Representative of the Suzerain Power of all India’.736 These stringent measures, which 
in effect would drastically curtail the young Maharajah's ability to exercise power over 
his own state, were deemed necessary
to provide against the possibility of all the powers of the new Native State falling 
eventually into the hands of any one man - be he the Prince himself, or a popular and 
powerful Minister - over whose use of them the Government of India could exercise 
no adequate control without hostile, and possibly violent intervention.737
However by 1894 there was little evidence that such a balance of power was being 
maintained. A memorandum from Colonel P. D. Henderson, Resident in Mysore, to the 
Foreign Secretary of the Government of India stated that, although in many ways the 
current Dewan’s administration had been ‘a brilliant success’, there had been ‘more or 
less autocratic rule’ by K. Sheshadri Iyer under cover of the Maharajah’s name.738 
Native Mysoreans were driven to seek a living outside the province. The non- 
Brahminical classes had little chance of obtaining even the most humble government
734 Lytton to J. D. Gordon, 21 June 1878, Lytton Collection, Vol. 20.
735 Ibid.
736 Ibid.
737 Ibid.
738 Col. P.D. Henderson, Res. Mysore, to W. J. Cuningham, Foreign Sec. Gol, 30 December 1894, 22 
January 1895, R/l/1/143
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posts and there was a tendency to fill almost all positions from the ‘lowest Amin 
upwards’ with Brahmins who formed ‘a powerful and impenetrable clique’.739 The 
Muslim population was particularly discontented with Brahminical rule and complained 
that it did not receive justice in revenue matters from Brahmin officials. In the courts 
much the same situation existed and officials treated Muslims with an absence of 
consideration for then social position. The Mysorean Brahmins were discontented at the 
preponderance of imported Madras Brahmins, ignorant of the language of the country 
and out of sympathy with the people. The Dewan’s ‘pet hobby, that of filling the higher 
grades of the Civil Service by successful candidates at a competitive examination open 
to all India is unfavourably regarded as filling tire service with foreigners’.740 A wider 
representation of all classes in the government was needed and the regulation of 
admissions to the Civil Service in all grades to prevent a monopoly by any one class.741
Nevertheless to the British the accountability and efficiency that Sir Sheshadri Iyer’s 
regime had brought to state affairs made any internal differences within the 
administration pale into insignificance. A report by Sir Donald Robertson, the Resident 
in 1902, referred glowingly to the way in which Mysore was ‘governed on enlightened 
principles’ and the fact that the administration was ‘practically the same as that in force 
in the fifty years of British occupancy which terminated in 1881 \ 742 The ‘liberal policy 
and enlightened statesmanship of the late Dewan, Sir Sheshadri Iyer, have produced 
results probably finer than anything in British India’.743 That the Maharajah had had 
little to do with this major achievement appears to have been immaterial to British 
officials, in fact the British insistence upon bureaucratic procedures which resulted in the
739 Ibid.
740 Ibid. Strong views on this state of affairs were aired by the Maharani Regent, Vanivilas 
Sannidhana, quoted in the chapter on royal women.
741 Ibid.
742 Sir Donald Robertson, Res. Mysore, ‘Mysore Narrative’ 1902, R/2/14/92.
743 Ibid.
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removal of power from the palace had been stated clearly by the Secretary of State and 
quoted in a memorandum from the Resident in 1895,
it is obviously necessary that a large part of the details of current business should be 
disposed of by His Highness’s Ministers ... we consider it essential under this system 
of personal government that all important acts and orders shall necessarily have 
passed through certain departmental formalities, and shall have undergone certain 
processes of examination and joint consultation before they issue in the Maharajah’s 
name and by his will.744
In 1903 it was reported that the new Dewan, Sir Krishna Murti, was displaying many of 
the same ‘autocratic’ characteristics as his predecessor. The Resident complained that 
he was hardly involved in administrative measures since his role was confined to 
securing ‘adequate recognition’ for the Maharajah and ‘fair play’ for the ‘sanctioned 
scheme of administration in all its branches’.745 He was entirely dependent for 
information upon stray conversations with visitors, newspaper reports and belated 
monthly proceedings. It was suggested that Krishna Murti was not giving the young 
ruler the ‘real support and assistance’ he had a right to demand of his Dewan.746 The 
Dewan was still clinging to the idea that he was head of the administration and orders 
promulgated by the Maharajah, which were not exactly in accord with his wishes, were 
‘unjustifiable curtailments of his power and dignity’.747 He had resorted to ‘sundry 
stratagems’ such as holding back papers indefinitely and keeping Councillors in the dark 
over the issuing of orders, and had started a ‘Camp Office, a ‘most mischievous and 
undesirable’ institution, which was unfair to the secretariat as papers were lost and an 
‘entirely unnecessary adjunct to the administrative machinery’,748 In attempting to assert 
his position the Maharajah had been diverted from profitable work and the completion of
744 Henderson, ‘Memorandum on Mysore Minority Arrangements’, 17 January 1895, R/2/29/264.
745 Robertson, ‘Secret Notes on Mysore5, 25 September 1903, R/l/1/1064.
746 Robertson, ‘Note on the Work o f the General Secretariat’, 30 April 1903, R/2/32/302.
747 Ibid.
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his education.749 The Resident admitted that ‘the science of good government’ was 
‘almost as well known to the clever officials of Mysore as to us’. Nevertheless there was 
‘a feeling that most Brahmins entertain, namely that should the Palace party assert itself 
the authority of the hitherto all-powerful Brahmin element must decline’.750
Yet the ‘Palace party’, like the much-lauded Representative Assembly, was to prove no 
threat to the Dewan and his bureaucracy. Notes written at the beginning of the twentieth 
century by the Resident, Sir Donald Robertson, dismissed the Assembly as a ‘harmless 
institution’, consisting of ‘raiyats, pleaders and merchants’ elected to represent certain 
qualified areas, which met annually at the capital for a few days.751 It had been of ‘little 
practical use either to the people or the State’ and its aims had been ‘mistakenly 
described as securing popular* representation’.752 hr future it should be encouraged 
merely as a means of affording the people an opportunity of paying homage to their ruler 
at the festival of Dassara or making direct representations to him. On any other basis it 
would probably in time prove both ‘anomalous and mischievous’ in an Indian state.753 
At first the Assembly was not even allowed to be called ‘representative’ as it was feared 
that such an expression might give rise to misunderstandings. According to Hindu 
political theoiy councils and assemblies were ‘organs in the body politic’, with the 
Maharajah as tire supreme head and the Dewan as executive aim, therefore no power 
existed that was not derived from the ruler’s person.754 However in the long run it was 
not possible to maintain the assembly as a body of ‘royal sycophants’ and by the 
beginning of the twentieth century debates were dominated by the struggle between
749 Robertson to Krishna Murti, 13 April 1903, R/2/32/302.
750 Robertson, ‘Secret Notes on Mysore’, 25 September 1903, R/l/1/1064.
751 ‘Mysore Narrative’ 1902, R/2/14/92.
752 Robertson, Note on Mysore, 5 November 1900, R/l/1/260.
753 Ibid.
754 Hettne, Political Economy, p. 365.
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Madrassi and Mysorean bureaucrats, with little recognition of the Maharajah’s 
traditional role as leader of government.
BARODA
In 1817, after the final defeat of the Peshwa, the Gujerati lands of western India claimed 
by the Marathas were divided between the British and the local warlords, the Gaekwars. 
The Gaekwars’ share became known as Baroda state.756 The power of the Gaekwars 
was based originally on an informal alliance between the Gaekwar, various local 
Gujurati notables and some rich Vania financiers, however this system of rule provided 
little stability. The final downfall of the system was brought about by the personal 
misrule of two Gaekwars, Khanderao and his successor, Malharrao, who, as has been 
discussed in the first section of this chapter, was deposed by the British in 1875 on the 
grounds that the Baroda government was riddled with corruption and that Malharrao was 
not capable of carrying out the necessary reforms.757
The British created an artificial minority by replacing Malharrao with a twelve-year-old 
boy from an obscure branch of the Gaekwar family, Sayajirao III and, following the 
Minister’s departure from Travancore, the state was placed hi the capable hands of Sir 
Madhava Rao. Before 1875, when the young Maharajah began his reign, Baroda was 
under a ‘patrimonial’ system of government whereby office holders owned their 
positions personally and ran their offices with the help of their followers, relatives and
755 Ibid.
756 David Hardiman, ‘Baroda: The Structure of a ‘Progressive’ State’ in Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes,
p. 108.
757 Hardiman, ‘Baroda’, pp. 107-13. In his recent study o f Baroda and Mysore, Manu Bhagavan makes 
the point that Malharrao inherited a significant number of problems from his predecessor and received 
the blame for them from the British. Sovereign Spheres, p. 43.
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Mends. Under Madhava Rao’s imposition of a modem bureaucratic system of 
government local notables and hereditary office holders lost their power to officials 
appointed by merit, who were paid regular salaries by the state. In his study of Baroda 
as a ‘progressive’ state David Hardiman suggests that what had once been considered as 
‘an office holder’s worthy solidarity with kith and kin came to be seen as nepotism and 
corruption’,758 State employed officials became the local political powers and also the 
representatives of the people. This change in administrative practice inevitably brought 
considerable dislocation. However, despite the discontent which resulted, Baroda was 
one of the few Indian states to instigate a full modem bureaucratic system similar to that 
found in British India.759
Under the new system, power was concentrated into the hands of the Dewan and his 
subordinates. Although an Executive Council existed, consisting of the Dewan, Deputy 
Dewan and two leading officials, there was no provision for the nomination of non­
officials before 1940. The same applied to the Legislative Council, which was founded 
in 1907. Although Baroda was far in advance of most princely states in having such a
n£.(\
body at all, it was likewise under the control of the bureaucracy. The Dewan was 
President, the Council could only give ‘advice’ and there was a majority of officials and 
government nominees among the eighteen members. At the local level, the new 
bureaucratic system followed the British pattern closely, with each of the four districts of 
the state placed under a revenue officer.761 The Baroda bureaucracy maintained its 
political power through the control of state expenditure. In the past most of the state 
revenue had gone towards the upkeep of the Gaekwar and the maintenance of his army, 
the police and princely administration. Between 1876 and 1934 state expenditure in
758 Hardiman, ‘Baroda’, p. 116.
759 Ibid.
760 R. L. Handa, History o f  the Freedom Struggle in Princely States (New Delhi, 1968), p.61.
761 Hardiman, ‘Baroda’, p. 117.
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these areas declined from 70 per cent to 33 per cent and by 1934 most of the revenue 
was spent by the bureaucracy on public works, education and various improvement 
projects to aid the development of Baroda. For instance, between 1876-7 and 1933-4 
education expenditure rose from 1 per cent to 17 per cent of total state expenditure. 
During the same period expenditure on public works rose from 5 per cent to 13 per 
cent762
Following a rivalry which grew up between Madhava Rao and Sayajirao’s tutor, F. A. H. 
Elliott, the Minister retired prematurely in 1882. The period of Elliott’s influence lasted 
from 1881 to 189 5763 and was a time of continuing reform in the state. However, 
according to the Agent to the Governor-General in Baroda, the administration ‘under the 
cloak of codes, laws, regulations and highly paid officials’ was anything but sound.764 
Elliot, despite at times preventing friction between residency and durbar, was not 
qualified to act as an adviser in matters relating to civil and political administration and, 
unable to distinguish between his clear duty to his own government and his ‘fancied 
duty’ to the young man he had educated, upset one Minister after another.765 During this 
period British officials in service of the state, instead of ‘forwarding’ the policy of the 
Government of India, did their utmost to foster the Gaekwar’s ill will towards Britain 
and vied with each other in supplying him with arguments with which to combat the 
Agent to the Governor-General. The administration of which they were supposedly in 
charge was a ‘pale copy’ of that existing in British India ‘with all its defects magnified 
and its vivifying spirit wholly wanting’.766 It was considered that any benefit that the 
empire at large might derive from proposed reforms in Baroda was counterbalanced by
762 Baroda Administration Report, 1876-77, p. 101 and Baroda Administi-ation Report, 1934-5, p. 85 
quoted Hardiman ‘Baroda’, p. 117.
763 Elliott’s influence is discussed in greater detail in the chapter on princely education.
764 Lt. Col. N. C. Martelli, AGG Baroda to W. J. Cuningham, Sec. Gol, FD, 29 May 1895, R/l/1/162.
765 Ibid, See also Martelli to Cuningham, 30 May and 21 August 1895, R/l/1/162.
766 Oliver St. John, ‘Memorandum on Baroda Affairs’, 28 September 1888, R/l/1/1040.
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the antagonism to British rule,767 Due to his championship of Baroda interests Elliott 
was by no means popular in British circles and in 1895 he was forced to revert to British 
service.768
A report of 1895 on Baroda affairs written by Colonel J. Biddulph, Agent to the 
Governor-General in Baroda, emphasises the unsatisfactory attitude of the Gaekwar 
towards the Government of India during Elliott’s term. It refers to the ruler’s efforts at 
‘pulling the whole administration to pieces and building up an unworkable system that 
[he] has been taught to believe is superior to anything in British India’.769 Having 
adopted Machiavelli’s The Prince as his political guide, the Gaekwar subscribed to the 
belief that the Baroda state was politically equal with the British Government, ‘which 
has no more right to interfere with Baroda affairs than it has to interfere in tire affairs of 
Denmark or Portugal’.770 Colonel Biddulph’s report suggests that, despite attempts at 
reform during this period, major problems still existed in the state. The official class was 
very corrupt in spite of high salaries. A large proportion of officials consisted of 
Mahrattas imported into the state for the purpose of building up a Mahratta 
administration and ‘only concerned to make money and convey it into British territory’, 
with the result that there was constant intrigue between Mahrattas and Gujeratis and ‘a 
substitution of regulations for personal responsibility’.771 Bankers had been mined by 
previous regimes and their grievances never remedied. Petty landlords were subjected to 
great oppression, as the policy of the state was to get as much land as possible into its 
hands. Although Baroda College was satisfactory, the Education Department was 
mismanaged and compulsory education, which ‘started with a great flourish of trumpets
767 Ibid.
768 See R/l/1/162.
769 Col. J. Biddulph, AGG Baroda, ‘Report on Baroda Affairs’, attached to No. 185, 18 September 
1895, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XX.
770 Ibid.
771 Ibid.
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in 1893’ was ‘a sham’. The judicial service was highly paid and although there were 
attempts at ‘honourable independence’, some of the younger judicial officers were very 
conupt and the Durbar did not hesitate to interfere with and disregard judicial verdicts 
when it pleased.772
However Biddulph’s view was not necessarily the definitive picture of the Baroda 
administration. The Baroda Resident, Captain Evans Gordon, in 1894 expressed the 
opinion that the Gaekwar was ‘an extremely able man with apparently a perfect 
knowledge of every detail concerning the condition of his people and the administration 
of his state’ .773 The Gaekwar had pointed out to British officials that a ruler could never 
guarantee how accurately his opinions on administrative matters were represented to the 
Government of India. The Residency was the channel for all communications ‘and they 
are coloured in the passage by the personal feelings, character, and opinions of the 
individual in charge .... Supposing a Resident to be adverse, die Government of India 
hear the worst side only’.774 In the Gaekwar’s opinion the system was faulty in principle 
and had been accentuated by the frequent change of Resident which had occurred in 
recent years. The only remedy would be ‘a closer and more intimate knowledge by the 
Viceroy and the Foreign Secretary of the Chiefs diemselves; and a fuller representation 
of their views by Political Officers, as apart from the personal opinion of the latter’. In 
meetings with the Viceroy the Gaekwar ‘sometimes could not fail to detect the tutoring 
hand of the Resident or the Foreign Secretaiy’ which made him uneasy.775 Colonel 
Biddulph in particular was determined ‘to interfere in everything’, undermining the 
ruler’s influence. The Viceroy had once told the Gaekwar that he wished the ‘Rulers of 
Native States should govern them in fact as well as theory’, but this would prove an
772 Ibid. See also R/l/1/1040.
773 Capt.W. Evans Gordon to Cuningham, 16 May 1894, R/l/1/140.
774 Ibid.
775 Ibid.
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impossible task if the Political Officer took pains to show the people that their ruler’s 
authority was Tittle more than nominal’. Such an attitude might be necessary in a badly 
governed, backward state, but in states like Baroda where there had recently been a 
genuine attempt at improvement ‘it paralyses the usefulness of the best Native Chief.776
No doubt partly due to the frustration of having to spar constantly with British political 
officers, during the latter period of his reign Sayajirao spent increasingly more time 
away from Baroda and he was not involved in the day-to-day administration of the state, 
relying increasingly on Ministers who lacked adequate arrangements for the continuation 
of work in his absence.777 The outgoing Resident at Baroda, Major C. Pritchard, 
reported in 1906 that the Gaekwar- ‘leaves very much to his Dewan and Council’ and the 
latter was responsible for the ‘sometimes unsuitable style of correspondency’ with the 
Residency with the object of contesting the orders of the Government of India, belittling 
the Resident and his assistants and reducing the Residency to ‘a mere pillar- box’.778
During Curzon’s viceroyalty there was yet again an official difference of opinion as to 
the calibre of the Baroda ruler. The Viceroy was of the opinion that, although Sayajirao 
professed to have enlightened standards of government, his famine administration in 
1900 had been ‘slack and abominable’.779 Moreover his frequent and lengthy 
absenteeism on European visits, which he was accused of financing through the 
imposition of an income tax in Baroda, had convinced a succession of viceroys of his
776 Ibid. See also report of interview between Res. Baroda Col. M. J. Meade, and Gaekwar, 14 
February 1908, R/l/1/288, in which the Gaekwar complains that ‘The tendency is more and more to 
treat us like officers or servants in charge of districts, rather than the hereditary rulers of States’.
777 Cuningham to Evans Gordon, 21 February 1894, R/l/1/140. See also R/l/1/288.
778 Major C. Pritchard, Res. Baroda, to Sir L. W. Dane, Sec. Gol, FD, 16 December 1906, R/l/1/339.
779 Curzon to Hamilton, October 29 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159. Curzon’s vitriol knew 
no bounds when it came to the Gaekwar, ‘the most disagreeable, contumacious and cantankerous o f the 
whole of our Chiefs ... .The man, as you know, was the son o f a cow-herd and his humble origin and 
antecedents are constantly, in spite o f his considerable ability, coming out in his words and deeds.’ 
Curzon to Hamilton, 4 June 1902, Curzon Collection. F i l l ,  Vol.161.
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readiness to abandon his subjects and their needs.780 However the Secretary of State, 
Lord Hamilton, having met the ruler in England, rejected Curzon’s dismissal:
He has thought and read a good deal, and being selfish and self-seeking, he analyses 
with great acumen the motives and guiding influences of his fellow-countrymen ... 
contrasting him with other Native Princes, he undoubtedly shows far more aptitude 
than the majority for governing and managing his own affairs.781
In Hardiman’s view Sayajirao was an extremely effective and popular' ruler, imbued
j
with the faith that western institutions could greatly enhance the power and prestige of 
his state. He was not an original thinker, but he was extremely receptive to the original 
thought of others and depended a great deal on good advisers.782 Had he been 
encouraged more by British officers and had his genuine efforts at reform received a 
more receptive audience from them it is possible that he, rather than the bureaucracy 
which supposedly served beneath him, might have gained more credit by the end of the 
nineteenth centuiy as the power behind one of the most progressive of Indian states.783
780 Curzon to Hamilton, 25 June 1902, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 161. Also 12 March 1903, Vol.
162 and Curzon to Brodrick, 30 March 1905, F ll  1, Vol. 164. Despite viceregal protestations over the
Gaekwar’s frequent visits to England, such visits afforded great opportunities for some hard 
bargaining. The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, pointed out that If the ruler attended Queen Victoria’s 
Diamond Jubilee celebrations in 1887, he might be persuaded to abolish transit duties and to find a 
solution to problems existing over a new telegraph line ‘over which he wishes to have supreme 
jurisdiction’. Dufferin to Cross, 16 May and 3 June 1887, Dufferin Collection, Vol. 8A.
781 Hamilton to Curzon, 25 April and 1 August 1901, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 160.
782 Hardiman, ‘Baroda’, p. 114.
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Since 1766 the Company had occupied the rich coastal districts of Hyderabad, the 
domain of the former governors of the Mogul empire, the Nizams. During die next 
decades the Nizam’s control over the Telegu warriors of his outlying districts became so 
weak that the annual tribute which the Company continued to pay for these districts was 
crucial to the survival of the state. A new subsidiary alliance in 1798 enforced the 
Nizam’s dependence upon die British and expelled the French battalion which had given 
him some room for manoeuvre. The British already had a powerful group of supporters 
at Hyderabad consisting of Shia Muslims and north Indian Hindus who looked to the 
British for protection against the Marathas. After Hyderabad lost more of its outlying 
districts in 1800-1, it was drawn firmly into the British orbit, as a succession of powerful 
residents built up an alliance with the diwans of the day.784
The policies and practices of the Diwan, Salar Jung I, effective ruler of Hyderabad from 
1853 to 1883, initiated a modernising administration. In 1853 Hyderabad was in severe 
financial straits, and the Government of India threatened to take over the state through 
loans, cession of land, or direct administration. To preserve Hyderabad’s independence, 
the young Diwan had to reorganise the revenue system and the bureaucracy, both to 
achieve financial stability and to meet British criticism of its corruption and 
inefficiency.785 Hie Diwan understood that the importation of British Indian 
administrative practices and personnel could have a significant cultural and political 
impact upon Hyderabad society. Personally opposed to the cultural changes 
accompanying western education and the use of English elsewhere in India, his main
784 Bayly, Indian Society, pp. 94-5.
785 Karen Leonard, ‘Hyderabad: The Mulki-Non-Mulki Conflict’ in Jeffrey (ed.) People, Princes, p. 
67.
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goal was to preserve Hyderabad’s Mogul political traditions and culture.786 Therefore he 
developed policies to prevent and control change, whereby the Hyderabad nobles, the 
new administrators, and British officials were kept isolated from each other, from the 
Nizam and from political power as centralised in the Diwan. In addition to the 
regulation of social contacts, there was a prohibition on British entry into the old walled 
city to insulate the nobility and court from English political and cultural influence. The 
insularity of the old city and its inhabitants provided politically useful for Salar Jung and 
on several controversial matters during his thirty year Diwanship he forestalled reforms 
urged by successive Residents by ‘citing cultural backwardness’ on the part of the 
Nizam or nobles.787 Recurring issues were the implementation of judicial refomis, the 
reduction of Arab troops, use of the Hyderabad Contingent and the construction of the 
railroad through Hyderabad.788
Since both the British and die new Diwani officials were denied access to leading 
Hyderabadi representatives, they became allies. In their efforts to construct a modem 
bureaucracy the officials were constrained by a strong Diwan, a powerful traditional 
aristocracy, and a Nizam secluded with his palace retainers. Many of the new 
administrators had come from the Indian Civil Service and die Hyderabad Diwani 
administration was modelled upon British Indian administration.789 In 1888 William 
Digby, founder and director of the Indian Political Agency, bemoaned the fact that 
Hyderabad and other states removed from the British provinces
the best of their Mahomedan and Hindoo sons ... statesmen for whom there is no
786 H. Fraser, Memoir and Correspondence o f General J. S. Fraser o f the Madras Army (London, 
1885), Appendix p. xxvi.
787 Leonard, ‘Hyderabad’, p. 70.
788 Thomas Henry Thornton, General Sir Richard Meade and the Feudatoiy States o f Central and 
Southern India (London, 1898) and Richard Temple, Journals Kept in Hyderabad, Kashmir, Sikkim 
and Nepal (London, 1887), Vol. I.
789 Leonard, ‘Hyderabad’, p. 71.
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room in our scheme of rule. Without begrudging him to the Nizam we want Mehdi 
Hasan in the Chief Justiceship of the North-West Provinces, not in that of Hyderabad. 
We want British India to receive some of the many benefits which follow horn the 
judicial and administrative efforts of such men’.790
In some respects the departmental secretaries in Hyderabad had more power than their 
counterparts in British India. These administrators were familiar with the modernising 
policies of British India and their implementation and they were aware of developments 
occurring in other Indian states. There was impatience with the obstacles to 
modernisation set up by elder members of the Hyderabad nobility and a distaste for the 
use of ‘antiquated Urdu’. Moreover in Hyderabad they were confronted with a civic 
culture which they judged to be a regional and inferior version of the Mogul heritage 
then disintegrating in British India.791
By 1890 it was clear that non-Hyderabadis dominated the Diwani administration. The 
Civil List of 1894 included 680 gazetted officers; the number of non-Hyderabadis had 
nearly doubled, from 230 to 447 men, in the eight year period from 1886, and the 
number of Hyderabadis had actually decreased.792 Salar Jung II, who took over the 
Diwanship after his father’s sudden death in 1883 had begun his Diwanship as an old 
friend of the young Nizam, Mahbub Ali Khan,793 and was in fact appointed by the 
Nizam against the wishes of the Government of India, who viewed tire new Minister as 
‘without ability, strength of character, or official training’.794 However the Diwan’s 
apparent manipulation by Diwani and Residency officials soon provoked conservative 
opposition to him. The Nizam declared that Salar Jung wished to ‘exclude him 
altogether from interference in public affairs’ and the Minister’s misrepresentation of
790 Letter from William Digby to the Editor of the St. James’s Gazette, 16 May 1888, Dufferin 
Collection Vol. 11 A.
791 Nawab Jivan Yar Jung’s English translation of his father’s Urdu autobiography, Server-el-Mulk, 
My Life, (London 1932), p. 92, quoted Leonard ‘Hyderabad’, p. 71.
792 Leonard, ‘Hyderabad’, p. 76.
793 Mahbub Ali Khan features strongly in the chapters on education and royal marriage.
794 Gol to SoS, No. 60, 9 May 1887, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box VII.
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matters to the Resident was creating ‘constant mischief.795 Palace officials, such as the 
ruler’s secretary, Sarwar Jung, and others of the old order who had the ear of the Nizam 
turned Mahbub Ali Khan against his Diwan, obstructed proposals which did not suit 
their interests and encouraged the Nizam in extravagant spending, with the result that the 
finances of the state degenerated to a drastic degree,796
It was apparent that over the years political officers had been unable to convince 
Hyderabadi rulers of the benefits of subscribing to British advice, thus failing to 
strengthen the Nizam’s position vis-a-vis his Minister. However the officiating 
Resident, Colonel K. J. Mackenzie, observed in 1894 that British officials were to some 
extent responsible for this princely mistrust:
While I am here my constant endeavour will be to induce the Nizam to see and feel 
that I am his friend, that I wish to see him strong and a real power for good, that if I 
differ from him, it is not because we want ... to back any one who, as our agent, 
would be subservient to our policy against the interests of his State; but because the 
difference of opinion is an honest one, dictated purely in the interests of himself and 
his State and with no ulterior motives whatever ... it has been a great misfortune that 
we have so often backed Ministers personally distrusted by or distasteful to the 
Nizam of the day, and frequently have kept them in power for years against his 
wishes. The natural result was that the Nizam either sulkily effaced himself, or 
secretly intrigued against us.797
A later Resident, Sir David Barr, also regretted the lack of British support for the Nizam:
I am more than ever convinced that there is no state in India more dependent upon the 
Government of India and indirectly upon the Resident than is Hyderabad. If the 
Resident is on good terms with the Nizam his power is almost unlimited. Every one 
in the State recognises this - and the consequence is that intrigues are discouraged, 
and the authority of the Nizam is upheld.798
795 Dufferin to Kimberley, 6 March 1886, Dufferin Collection, Vol. 5.
796 Trevor Chichele Plowden, Res. Hyderabad, 14 November 1895, R/l/1/165. See also R/l/1/1/51 
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797 Col. K. J. Mackenzie, Offg. Res. Hyderabad, to W. J. Cuningham, 6 October 1894, R/2/67/17. 
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To achieve changes in the Hyderabad administration efforts were made by British 
officials to diminish what was perceived as ‘despotic5 power on the part of the Minister 
in favour of increased control by the bureaucracy beneath him. The leading characteristic 
of the scheme was a distribution of responsibility in place of a concentration of authority 
in a single individual. Sub-ministers were to be invested with ‘definite5 powers to be 
exercised ‘without reference to others5.799 The Cabinet Council, to which all business of 
importance was to be referred, was to meet three times a month and was designed to 
check the exercise of despotic authority by making the whole body of ministers 
answerable for the treatment of major issues. Finally, attempts were made to prevent the 
Nizam from ‘divesting himself of the responsibility of a ruler of a great state5. The 
proceedings of the Cabinet Council were to be reported regularly to him and he could 
modify decisions at will.800 However the Nizam continued to be ‘peculiarly 
inaccessible5. The Minister and other Hyderabad officials could only obtain rare 
interviews with the ruler and consequently great delay resulted in dealing with state 
affairs. The confidence winch the Nizam placed in his secretary, Sarwar Jung, ‘made it 
easier to play upon the traditional jealousy with which the Chief of a Native State is apt 
to regard his Minister, and so bring the administration almost to a stand-still5.801
Official files suggest that by the end of the century the British were over-preoccupied 
with die relationship between Nizam and Minister, leaving the Diwani administrators 
much to their own devices. Over-ambitious secretaries, who acquired the real power in 
the state, disregarded the views of sub-ministers. Grave financial mismanagement 
occurred and public scandals were frequent.802 The Resident admitted that he saw more 
value in acting behind the scenes as a ‘hghtning-conductor ... carrying off, harmlessly,
R/l/1/1281.
799 Chichele Plowden to Sec.GoI, FD, 2 April 1894, R72/66/10.
800 Ibid. See also R/2/66/13.
801 Chichele Plowden to Sec.GoI, FD, 9 February 1897, R/l/1/183.
802 Bawa, Hyderabad under Salar Jang, p. 220.
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storms which might otherwise wreck the administration’, rather than entering officially 
into the formal fray of government.803 In 1898 the Foreign Secretary to the Government 
of India, W. J. Cuningham, warned the Viceroy that ‘the personal question naturally 
looms largely’ in Hyderabad.804 The only solution to save both Nizam and state 
appeared to rest in the prevention of the Minister’s downfall, upon which the Nizam was 
intent, as demonstrated by his establishment of a Nobles’ Council as a rival body to the 
Minister’s Cabinet Council.805 Cuningham declared that
authoritative interference in superseding the Nizam’s power is as big an act of State 
as the Government of India have ever touched in connection with the Native States of 
India. It would be of course denounced most vehemently in Hyderabad itself where 
the ideas of the State’s political independence are very exalted .... Everything which 
lends support to the contention that the Minister and the Resident in collusion have 
brought the affairs of the Nizam to a crisis, will weaken the position of the 
Government.806
However it was required that the Nizam govern his state in a reasonable manner in order 
to avert ‘dangerous danger and confusion’. In the last resort it was the duty of the 
British Government to save the state from such consequences.807 Initial attempts by the 
British Comptroller-General to examine the Hyderabad financial situation succeeded 
only in generating much official secrecy over existing accounting procedures.808 In
1901 the weakness of the position of Diwan was recognised by the Secretary of State,
Lord Hamilton, who saw the need to find a ‘competent European’ to overhaul the 
present state of finances in Hyderabad, ‘It is very improbable that you would be able to 
find any Native outside Hyderabad, capable of coping both with the Nizam and 
Hyderabad nobles, as Dewan. If you can once get through a reliable European control 
over the finances, the Dewan’s weakness or mal-administration is of secondary
803 Sir David Ban*, Offg. Res. Hyderabad, Report 6 August 1900, R /l/1/1281.
804 Cuningham to Viceroy, 28 January 1898, R/l/1/202.
805 See R/l/1/209.
806 Cuningham to Viceroy, 28 January 1898, R/l/1/202.
807 Ibid.
808 See R/l/1/171 and R/l/1/202.
importance’.809
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In the meantime the Diwani administration became a largely autonomous bureaucracy, 
constituting itself as an elite. No longer checked by the Nizam, the Diwan or powerful 
nobles, it was left to make decisions that affected the structure of Hyderabadi society. 
The accelerated modernisation and expansion of the administration enhanced its political 
power and the Mogul bureaucracy was ‘effectively dismantled and its personnel 
disinherited at all levels’.810
CONCLUSION
The need to abstain from intervention urged upon political officers by then superiors in 
the latter part of the nineteenth century undoubtedly deterred such officers from 
maintaining a sufficiently high profile in state affairs to be able to uphold Indian rulers as 
prime movers in states’ administrations. Strongly advised to refrain from ‘meddling’ in 
state politics, the reforming zeal of such officers appeal's to have been concentrated upon 
achieving high standards of administrative procedure through bureaucracies operating 
according to British Indian models, rather than attempting to secure the traditional role 
of a prince as the authoritative voice in government, a task that would have required 
blatant intervention in state affairs. When the Government of India was forced to 
intervene itself in cases of undeniable misrule, the fear of the effects upon other princes 
of severely chastising or even deposing one of their kind resulted in a lack of consistent 
policy to provide a yardstick for princely behaviour for both rulers and political officers.
809 Hamilton to Curzon, 22 August 1901, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 160.
810 See Leonard, ‘Hyderabad’, p. 66.
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In Rajpntana the British appear to have been mesmerised by the mystique of traditional 
‘feudal’ government. However despite appreciating that an essential part of such 
government was provided by the checks and balances of baronial power, British officials 
failed to maintain jagirdars as a power base, choosing rather to introduce where possible 
a somewhat limited bureaucracy to further their own interests. As a result several rulers 
in Rajputana, such as Fateh Singh, Maharana of Mewar, moved gradually towards 
autocracy, curbed neither by their nobles nor by the Government of India, which was 
reluctant to meddle in what it perceived as the tried and tested art of Rajput politics.
The importance of Mysore as an example of a ‘model state’ after its return to native rule 
after 1881 and the inheritance of a sophisticated British administration necessitated the 
employment of a powerful, highly competent dewan and an educated bureaucracy 
imported largely from British India and versed in British methods. There was little role 
for the Maharajah beyond that of a signatory on a checklist and, in the interests of sound, 
accountable government, the British appealed reluctant to remove power from dewan 
and bureaucracy in order to change the ruler’s role from symbolic head of state to 
instigator of administrative achievements in the state.
On the contrary, die power base of Sayajirao, Gaekwar of Baroda, was not threatened by 
an intellectually superior dewan. By some British officials the ruler was seen to be a 
wise and innovative administrator, determined to replace traditional elements within 
Baroda society by a powerful class of bureaucrats owing more to merit than patronage. 
However a loss of British support resulted from die fact that other officials were rankled 
by his leaning towards independence and supposed antagonism towards the paramount 
power. Princely disillusionment led to disinterest in state administration, and Britain 
failed to maximise the skills of a potentially able ruler.
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In Hyderabad a bureaucracy imported from British India and isolated from both Resident 
and Nizam by a powerful diwan succeeded in establishing an unassailable position over 
the state administration. Nizam Mahbub Ali Khan, conservative by nature and an easy 
prey to subversive influences, failed to control state expenditure or to participate in any 
positive way in government. The British in their turn and by their own admission failed 
to pay heed to his dislike of the autocratic methods employed by successive diwans or to 
push the Nizam to any great extent to mend his ways. As in Mysore and Baroda, while 
the individual figures of rulers and ministers waxed and waned an elite class of 
administrators achieved greater power, steadily achieving its independence from the 
indirect control of the Political Department and die greater authority of the Government 
of India.
As princely authority decreased within state administration it was also diminished by the 
imposition of an imperial hierarchy in which the princes were effectively subordinated in 
rank in their relationship to the paramount power. The next chapter examines the 
manner in which such subordination occurred and the efforts of the British to restrain 
traditional princely adherence to lavish ceremonial display dirough the introduction of 
ideas of economy and accountability.
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HIERARCHY AND RITUAL
Unlike the other stages of the princely life cycle in which states were heated by the 
British on an individual basis in identifying channels through which western ideas and 
moral improvements could be introduced, efforts to change princely hierarchy and ritual 
occurred in a more centralised and formal manner. The determination behind such 
efforts revealed the degree to which the Government of India was prepared at a high 
level to intervene in royal practice to reinforce the position of Britain as the paramount 
power, despite constant criticism by senior British officials of the intervention of 
political officers on the ground. Protocol for ceremonial events, increasingly remote 
from the ceremony of pre-colonial India, was rigidly standardised in memoranda issued 
from the Foreign Department of the Government of India. Any deviation from the 
unyielding instructions of such memoranda was a source of immediate concern at the 
heights of the imperial administration.
Traditionally the Indian royal ritual process was highly fluid and capable of being 
adapted to meet the requirements of the current political situation. Ritual performances 
were visual statements of variable honour and status and under Mogul rule a prince, as 
the supreme authority within his state, was able to a great extent to orchestrate ritual 
display to meet his own ends. However under British control in the latter part of the 
nineteenth century bureaucratic rules and regulations increasingly forced ceremonies 
into a straitjacket of rigid format in which a ruler was deprived of the opportunity to 
dazzle or influence his subjects on a political level. By the end of the nineteenth century 
the ceremonial durbar became separate from the administrative durbar, with the former 
becoming only a ritual (and increasingly Europeanised) celebration of Diwali, Dassara
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and other major festivals. The administrative durbar, which had previously represented 
an open discussion of the affairs of state between the ruler and his kinsmen as well as the 
prominent non-kindred interest groups of die state, was being transformed into the more 
restricted meetings of the new ‘state council’ which began to rule individual states under 
increasing British influence.811
Following the Queen’s Proclamation of 1858 a highly detailed hierarchical structure of 
Indian society was designed by British officials, within which princely subordination to 
British rule and the person of the British monarch was repeatedly reinforced to an extent 
unknown under the Mogul empire. Moreover measures of economy were increasingly 
applied to princely lifestyles. With the disappearance of direct tools of control, 
particularly legitimate armies which were disbanded following the signing of individual 
treaties between states and the British, the largesse of Indian rulers had increased in 
importance in die early nineteenth century. Yet such largesse, unless directed towards 
an imperial cause or a project of liberal ‘reform’, was by the end of the century severely 
curtailed by British political officers in an effort to control princely expediture in the 
interests of states’ subjects.
This part of the princely life cycle continues with two main sections. The first deals with 
princely hierarchy and studies the change in durbar practice. It also looks at the 
Imperial Assemblages which took place under Viceroys Lytton and Curzon, and the 
investiture of the Star of India. The second section deals with the impact of British ideas 
of frugality and accountability upon religious ceremonies at court and princely largesse, 
and the resulting change in royal ritual practice under British rule.
811 Edward S. Haynes, ‘Rajput Ceremonial Interactions as a Mirror of a Dying Indian State System 1820- 
1947’, Modern Asian Studies XXIV (1990), p. 474.
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PRINCELY HIERARCHY
To the great advantage of die East India Company there were several features of the 
theory and practice of the successor regimes to the Mogul empire which smoothed the 
path to overall control. First an ideology of empire existed, largely unaffected by current 
political events. Even Hindu and Sikh warriors who were in open revolt against the 
Mogul empire retained much of its revenue machinery and continued to operate within a 
loose imperial system of honours and legitimacy which still centred on Delhi. The 
person of the Mogul became, if anything, more significant. As Bernard Cohn has 
argued, one reason for British success was the close attention to Indian court ritual and 
diplomatic usage. They used the name of the emperor, his charters, seals and durbar 
halls, in a maimer which placated the urban populace. They stabilised the relationship 
between the emperor and his vassals, and respected the diplomatic system, placing 
themselves in a position of importance.812
In the decades preceding the Indian Mutiny the attitude of both Company and residents 
towards court rituals altered to conform to the change in Company policy towards the 
states in general. By and large the Company gradually distanced itself from the values 
expressed by court formalities, tending to regard them as ‘essentially ineffectual and far 
removed from the real business of administration’.813 Most residents attempted to show 
other Europeans that they regarded much of the ritual as ‘empty pageant’. However they 
continued to show appreciation of the depth of meaning of such ceremony for Indian 
audiences, both at court and among the general populace. Company policy was ‘to 
respect, or at least not overtly insult, court rituals while at the same time indicating to
812 Cohn ‘Representing Authority’, pp. 165-209
813 Fisher, Indirect Rule, p. 251.
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* 521AEuropean audiences its low estimation of them’. Particularly representative of this 
attitude was the Company’s policy towards rituals associated with the Mogul emperor. 
The emperor continued as the nominal sovereign of the Company until 1857 and 
received ceremonial visits from Company officials up to that date, despite the fact that 
he was regarded by many Company employees as a somewhat ‘quaint vestige of the
• 521 Cdistant past’. British tourists would visit the emperor’s palace, the Red Fort, as a stop 
on their tour through India’s ruins. They would ‘wander freely through neglected 
imperial audience halls, gardens and even the throne room’. Some tourists included in 
their itinerary an audience with the emperor himself.816
The rising of 1857 led to the desecration of the person of the Mogul, resulting in actions 
such as holding Christian services in the audience hall of the emperor and quartering 
Sikh cavalry in the imperial mosque.817 The Government of India Act of 1858 and the 
Queen’s Proclamation of the same year ended the ambiguity of the position of the 
British in India, as the British monarchy now encompassed both Britain and India. For 
the British ruling elite, at home and in India, the meanings attached to the events of 
1857-58 and the resulting constitutional changes were increasingly ‘the pivot around 
which their theory of colonial rule rotated’,818 leading to redefinitions of Indian society 
and the relationship of the rulers to the ruled. As part of the larger colonial project of 
ordering the whole of India’s society its princes and landlords, were perceived as 
‘natural leaders’, situated at die top of society.819
814 Indirect Rule, p. 252.
815 Ibid.
816 Ibid. Also Mrs Colin Mackenzie, Six Years in India: Delhi: The City o f the Great Mogul (London, 
1857).
817 Indirect Rule, p. 253.
818 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 179.
819 Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 192.
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David Cannadine suggests that the hierarchical principle underlying the British 
perception of empire was not exclusively based on the collective colour-coded ranking 
of social groups, but depended as much on the ‘more venerable colour-blind ranking of 
individual social prestige’.820 In Cannadine’s opinion the British empire has been 
extensively studied as a complex racial hierarchy, but has received far less attention as 
an equally complex social hierarchy. When the British thought of the inhabitants of their 
empire in individual terms rather than collective categories they tended to be more 
concerned with rank than with race, and with ‘the appreciation of status similarities
• • O') 1based on perceptions of affinity’. Since most Britons came from what they believed 
to be a hierarchical society, it was natural for diem ‘to search for overseas collaborators 
from the top of the indigenous social spectrum, whom they supported, whose 
cooperation they needed and through whom they ruled’.822 The British chose their allies 
abroad because of the social perceptions they brought with them from home. Moreover, 
and ‘in conformity with the historic practices and traditions of British local government’, 
this also made financial sense. If the empire was to be run ‘on the cheap’, there must be 
‘voluntary collaborators’ and the best people with whom to collaborate were likely to be 
the rich, wellborn and powerful. Imperial peoples were no ‘aggregated, collective mass, 
all regarded without exception as inferior and potentially hostile: they were seen 
differentially and often individually’.823
No doubt as ‘collaborators’ the Indian princes were placed in an elevated position in the 
social hierarchy fabricated in India by their British rulers, yet Cannadine’s work fails to 
emphasise the fact that this system was used by the British as much to reinforce Indian 
princely subordination to the paramount power and its monarch as to bolster the native
820 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, p. 9
821 Ornamentalism, p. 123.
822 Ornamentalism, p. 124.
823 Ibid. See also C. Bolt, Victorian Attitudes to Race, (London 1971) p. 186.
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rulers as upholders of traditional society and values. In Indian political tradition 
whoever was powerful enough to make a good claim to control sizeable human and 
material resources could act like a king and be accorded the appropriate deference. 
However after 1858 individual Indian princely status was that of a loyal supporter of the 
monarch of Great Britain. Durbars were no longer ritual displays of power over 
prominent members of a ruler’s community but meetings involving the British and the 
Indian rulers, in which the latter were frequently relegated to a position of equality with 
British officials. The following section examines the change in tone and content of such 
meetings over the latter pail of the nineteenth century.
THE DURBAR
As part of the reestablishment of political order in 1858 Canning undertook a series of 
extensive tours through north India to clarify the new relationship proclaimed by the 
Queen. As one of their main features the Viceroy’s tours included durbars with large 
numbers of Indian princes, notables, and Indian and British officials, at which honours 
and rewards were presented to Indians who had demonstrated loyalty to the British in the 
1857 mutiny. At such durbars Indians were granted titles such as Rajah, Nawab and 
Rai Sahib and presented with special clothes and emblems, granted special privileges 
and some exemptions from normal administrative procedures, and rewarded in the form 
of pensions or grants. The durbar model derived from court rituals of the Mogul 
emperors, utilised by Hindu and Muslim eighteenth century rulers, then adapted in the 
early nineteeth century with English officials acting as Indian rulers.825
824 ‘Representing Authority, pp. 167-8.
825 Ibid.
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The central ritual in the Mogul durbar was the act of incorporation. The person to be 
honoured offered nazar (gold coins) and/or peshkash (valuables such as elephants, 
horses, gold or other precious objects). The emperor, or his deputy, would present 
khilats, which consisted of specific and ordered sets of clothes, but could also include 
horses and elephants with various accoutrements as signs of authority. The number of 
such items and their value was always carefully graded.826 Under the Moguls and other 
Indian rulers ritual presentations were not understood as simply an exchange of goods 
and valuables. The khilat was a symbol of continuity or succession, implying that the 
recipient was ‘incorporated through the medium of clothing into the body of the
Qtj  n  m
donor’. This ‘incorporation’, according to F. W. Buckler, was based on the idea that 
the king stood for a ‘system of rule of which he is the incarnation ... incorporating into 
his body ... the persons of those who share his rule’.828 The offering of nazar in the 
coins of the ruler was the officer’s acknowledgment that the ruler was the source of 
wealth and well-being and its presentation was reciprocal to the receipt of the khilats*29 
Both were ‘acts of obedience, pledges of loyalty, and the acceptance of the superiority of 
the giver of the khilats’.830
The British in the seventeenth and eighteenth century tended to misconstrue the acts 
of the durbar by seeing them as economic in nature and function. Offerings of nazar 
and peshkash were seen as ‘paying for favours, which the British then translated into 
“rights” relating to their trading activities’.831 Objects which formed the basis of a 
relationship through incorporation, such as cloth, clothes, gold or silver coins, 
animals, weapons or jewellery, were seen by the British as utilitarian goods which
826 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 168.
827 Ibid.
828 F. W. Buckler, ‘The Oriental Despot’, Anglican Theological Review (1927-8), p. 239 quoted Cohn, 
‘Representing Authority’, p. 168.
829 ‘Representing Authority’, p.168.
830 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 169.
831 Ibid.
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were part of their system of trade. At the end of the eighteenth century Parliament and 
the Directors of the Company began to limit the acquisition of private fortunes by 
Company employees by eliminating private trading activities and defining as 
‘corruption’ the ‘incorporation of officials of the Company into the ruling native groups 
through the acceptance of nazar, khilats, and peshkash, which were declared to be forms
no*}
of bribery’. In addition Company officers were prohibited by their employers and 
Parliament from participating in rituals and constituting improper relationships with 
Indians who were their subordinates. However, in relationships with territorial rulers 
who were allied with the British, it was recognised that loyalty to the Company had to be 
symbolised in some fomi. Reversing roles the British therefore began the practice of 
presenting khilats and accepting peshkash in formal meetings that could be recognised 
by Indians as durbar s.833
Although the British as ‘Indian rulers’ in the first half of the nineteenth century 
continued the practice of accepting nazar and peshkash and giving khilats, they tried 
to restrict the occasion for such rituals to highly significant ceremonies such as the 
installation of a ruler.834 The giving of nazar as a ceremonial payment by a ruler to 
the British when an adoption sanad was bestowed by the paramount power was also 
encouraged as an act of obedience and pledge of loyalty, although seen to be in need 
of regularisation ‘with due regard to the circumstances of each case’.835 A despatch 
of April 1873 declared that Her Majesty's Government had been under the impression 
that payment of nazar ana was ‘not only in accordance with Native custom under 
Mogul and Mahratta Rule, but was also entirely consonant to the feelings of the 
Chiefs, as indicating, by its receipt, a direct recognition, by the Paramount Power, of
832 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 171.
8j3 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 171-2.
834 See R/2/750/12 for details o f the installation of Maharajah Madho Scindia, Maharajah o f Gwalior.
835 SoS to Gol, No. 74, 30 April 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16.
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the succession on account of which it was accepted’.836 Although the levy of 
nazarana had been discontinued during the earlier period of British rule, it was 
suggested that its reintroduction would be ‘readily if not gladly witnessed’.837
When a prince or notable visited Government House in Calcutta or when the Governor- 
General, governors, commissioners and lower British officials went on tour, a durbar 
would be held. Khilats were always granted in the name, and by the permission of, 
governors of presidencies or the Governor-General. Items offered by Indians as nazar 
and peshkash were never kept by the official to whom they were given. Valuations and 
minute listings were made of the objects presented, which were ultimately deposited in 
the Toshkana, the special government treasury for the receipt and disbursement of
838  * • *presents. Unlike Indians, the British recycled the presents which they received, either 
directly, by giving one Indian what had been received horn another, or indirectly, by 
selling at auction in Calcutta what they received and using the proceeds to buy objects to 
be given as presents. The British always ‘tried to equalise in economic terms what they 
gave and received by instructing Indians of the exact worth of objects or cash they would 
be allowed to give’.839
An official description of the installation of Sultan Jahan, Begam of Bhopal, in 1901 
illustrates the manner in which palace ritual was defined by the British in monetary 
rather than symbolic terms. It was reported that articles composing the khilat for the 
Begam from the Viceroy ‘to tire value of Rs. 10,000’ were brought into the Sadr Manzil 
palace where the Agent to the Governor-General tied an emerald and pearl necklace
836 Ibid.
837 Ibid.
838
839
‘Representing Authority’, p. 172. 
Ibid.
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from the khilat around the ruler’s neck and seated her on the Chair of State.840 Her 
Highness presented the ‘usual nazar of gold mohurs\ expressing her determination to 
abide by the traditions of her house. The Nawab Consort was invested with the ‘usual 
khilat, valued at Rs. 10,000’, by placing a pearl and ruby necklace on his neck, affixing a 
sarpech or head jewel on his turban, wrapping a shawl around his shoulders and ‘girding 
him with the sword of honour’.841 The Nawab then presented nazar of 101 gold mohurs 
and ‘expressed in suitable terms his gratitude to the Paramount Power’. Proceedings 
terminated with ‘the usual distribution of atar and pan\ The report emphasises 
unequivocally that ‘articles for the khilats for both Her Highness the Begam and the 
Nawab Consort were provided by the state, and the nazars presented in return were 
credited to the state treasury’.842
The Mogul ritual might seem to have been retained, but the meaning had changed. What 
had been under Indian rulers a ritual of incorporation had now become ‘a ritual marking 
subordination, with no mystical bonding between a royal figure and chosen friend or
843 *servant’. A contractual relationship was formed by converting what was a fomi of 
present giving into an economic exchange between a British official and Indian subject 
or ruler.
An equally precise code of conduct was established for princes and chiefs for their 
attendance at a durbar. The clothes they wore, the weapons they could carry, the 
number of retainers and soldiers that could accompany them to the viceroy's camp, 
where they were met by British officials in relation to the camp, the number of gun
840 Lt.-Col. M. J. Meade, Offg. AGG Cl, to H. S. Barnes, Sec. Gol, FD 9 July 1901, PSCI, 1875-1911, 
Box 36.
841 Ibid.
842 Ibid. R/2/28/261 itemises the articles making up the Viceroy’s khilat at the installation of the 
Maharajah of Mysore in January 1895.
843 ‘Representing Authority’, p. 172.
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salutes fired in their honour, the time of the entry into the durbar hall or tent, whether 
the viceroy would rise and come forward to greet them, where on the viceregal rug 
they would be saluted by die viceroy, where they would be seated, how much nazar 
they could give and whether they would be entitled to a visit from the viceroy, were 
all ‘markers of rank5 and could be changed by the viceroy to raise or lower their 
standing.844 In 1898 the Maharajah of Travancore was formally promoted to a salute of 
twenty one guns, as during his twelve year's of rule he had in every way proved himself a 
‘wise and sympathetic ruler5 and expressed an ‘unselfish subordination of personal to 
public interests.845
The status of a prince represented at a durbar was not always to the ruler's satisfaction. 
With the exception of Maharana Sajjan Singh, who was a minor at the Imperial 
Assembly of 1877, no Maharana of Udaipur had made obeisance after other Indian 
rulers, and the suggestion that at the 1911 Coronation Durbar he would be not occupy a 
position of superiority was seen as a ‘bitter pill5, resulting in great loss of dzzaf.m  The 
problem was solved by the Maharana5s appointment as ‘Ruling Chief in Waiting5 to 
King George V and his participation in the ceremonies as such.847 Some British
844 ‘Representing Authority’, p 180. R/2/783/20 deals in detail with the number of attendants
permitted to accompany the Maharajah of Benares, the Nawab of Rampur and the Rajah of Tehri at 
durbars, in an effort to introduce ‘a uniform scale classified according to salutes ... to systematise the 
ceremonial observed at meetings between the H. E. the Viceroy and rulers’. R/2/69/52 discusses the 
‘ceremonials’ to be observed on the occasion of official visits between the Governor of Madras and the 
Maharajah of Mysore and R/2/880/48 looks at the vexed question of the ‘garlanding’ of British 
officials by Indian royalty. A supplement to Allen's Indian M ail’ giving a gradation list of ‘Chiefs of the 
Indian Empire’ is attached to Salisbury to Lytton, 13 July 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 3 A.
845 Chief Sec. to Govt, o f Madras to Sec. to Gol, FD, 11 January 1898, R/2/892/275. Travancore and 
Cochin did not have a tradition of kingly wealth and pomp. In contrast kingship was associated with 
austerity and dharmic morality. In his thesis on the two states Vikram Menon points out that, instead of a 
history of ‘princely misgovemment, royal posturing and theatrical extravaganzas, there is a record of 
investment for growth, an educated and enlightened monarchy and a simplicity o f lifestyle’. Vikram 
Menon, ‘Popular Princes: Kingship and Social Change in Travancore and Cochin 1870-1930’, pp. 20,261.
846 A word of Persian origin which was assimilated into Hindustani during the period of Islamic rule. 
Sometimes translated as ‘prestige’, more usually as ‘honour’, izzat was both a source of power and a 
focus of obligation. While it turned the ruler almost into a demi-god, it also predisposed him to act in a 
way which would maximise the glory of the state.
847 J. G. Kaye, Res. Udaipur, to E. G. Colvin, AGG Rajputana, 20 July 1911, R/2/161/206. The Rajput 
rulers were particular sticklers for protocol: R/2/168/267 is devoted to die procedure of Rajput princes at
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officials, such as Charles Tupper and William Lee-Warner, spent years sorting out the 
correct relationship between the Queen-Empress’s regal status and that of the Indian 
princes. Tupper confidently declared the princes to be ‘chiefs’ but not kings, citing 
Pudukkottai as a prime example of a state whose dewan had to be reprimanded after 
daring to call his rajah a ‘royal person’. Quoting Sir Henry Maine horn a memorandum 
dated 1864, Tupper reminded his reader ‘There may be found in India every shade and 
variety of sovereignty but there is only one independent Sovereign, the British 
Government’.848
Proof of the determination to enforce a new definition of the relative standing of the 
Indian rulers to the paramount power appears in an official despatch of May 1873 
concerning the Nizam of Hyderabad, the Gaekwar of Baroda and the Maharajah of 
Mysore, all of whom received in British territory a gun salute equal to that given to 
the Viceroy and higher than that to which the Governors of Madras and Bombay were 
entitled. It was decided that advantage was to be taken of the fact that the rulers of 
Hyderabad and Mysore were both minors, and the Gaekwar had just succeeded to the 
gadi, to reduce their gun salutes from 21 to 19 guns in British territory and, in so 
doing, to raise British officials in rank vis-a-vis the three major princes.849 However 
such a blatant sign of demotion was in hindsight seen to be capable of 
counter-productive ramifications. A year later when discussing the question of 
modifications to the Gaekwar's durbar practice the Secretary of State admitted that
the Native Princes must submit, in the inevitable course of things, to constant 
retrenchments of power at our hands, and, therefore, I should be inclined to be the
the wedding of the Maharana o f Udaipur and a princess from Idar in 1875.
848 Charles Lewis Tupper, Indian Political Practice: A Collection o f the Decisions o f  the Government of  
India in Political Cases (London, 1893), pp 19-20.
849 SoS to Gol, No. 70, 8 May 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16. In fact the Government of India 
expressed no desire to interfere with the practice of a ruler receiving from his own artillery and within his 
own territory a salute greater than that to which he was entitled to receive from British artillery or under the 
orders o f a British officer. R/2/880/52.
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more cautious not to diminish the ceremonial observances to which they have 
become accustomed. They care most about the show; we care most about the 
power. For some time at least we may hope to travel along peaceably with them 
upon those lines.850
Nevertheless in the light of the 1858 Queen's Proclamation efforts were made to 
curtail the pretensions of the rulers in relation to the paramount power. The 
aspirations of Holkar, Maharajah of Indore, towards equality with the British royal 
family were apparent in 1877 when an official despatch reported that letters had been 
received from the prince to the Queen and Prince of Wales, together with two boxes 
of til seeds. It was declared unwise for the Queen to reply to Holkar, even under the 
Royal Sign Manual, as there was no precedent for ‘conceding such an honour to a
• * 851Native Prince’. It was suspected that the real occasion for the Indian ruler's letter 
was ‘the entrance of the sun into the northern solstice - an annual occurrence which 
the Maharajah is in the habit of celebrating by sending letters and til seeds to various 
personages in England and elsewhere’, therefore Holkar's letter would be repeated 
year after year, each expecting a reply. The Secretary of State noted that a royal letter 
might well give the Maharajah ‘an idea of equality of station with the Queen, which 
would be prejudicial’.852 The Queen was also discouraged from signing formal letters 
to princes, as it was important to impress upon the rulers that they must look upon the 
Viceroy as the Queen’s representative in India and all communications to or from 
them should pass through him. Any new practice ‘might disturb the minds of the 
Native Princes’ and it was ‘most desirable to avoid any possible risk of an apparent 
diminution of the authority of the Viceroy’ .853
850 Salisbury to Northbrook, 24 April 1874, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 11.
851 SoS to Gol, No. 65, 4 October 1877, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 3.
852 Ibid.
853 Fowler to Elgin, 27 July 1894, Elgin Collection, Vol. 2.
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Great attention was paid to the phrasing of official speeches made by the Viceroy to 
princes to avoid any doubt in the new order of precedence that followed the Queen's 
Proclamation. Writing to Argyll in 1872, Northbrook reported that in meeting Holkar 
and ten other Central Indian rulers in durbar, T took care to use the words “allegiance to 
the British Crown” and to assert the duty of the British Government to interpose as the 
paramount power in case of a disturbance of peace and order in India, because Holkar is 
reported to me as somewhat disposed to assume a position of equality’.854 Any such 
suggestions of princely equality with the British Crown were to be firmly quashed, as 
was apparent during the Prince of Wales's tour of India in 1875. Rumours existed of 
private communications between Sir Salar Jung, Diwan of Hyderabad and the Prince's 
staff on the subject of a royal visit to the state and the Viceroy was quick to point out that 
‘His Royal Highness could not, without seriously diminishing the position of the British 
Government, visit Hyderabad territories unless the Nizam first visits and pays Ms 
respects to the Prince’.855
The British now suggested that at no time in the history of the Indian rulers had they 
been kings in the accepted sense. Any attempt to use monarcMcal terms such as ‘king’, 
‘kingdom’ or ‘royal’, or even to refer to the gadis or cusMons on wMch the rulers sat on 
formal occasions as ‘thrones’, was to be vigorously opposed over the next decades. 
When dealing with the proposed visit to England of a small number of princes for the 
Queen’s Jubilee in 1887 it was agreed that the rulers ‘would be flattered if the Queen
854 Northbrook to Argyll, 6 December 1872, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 9. As is seen in this chapter, 
and the chapters on royal women and princely administration, Holkar was a constant thorn in the side of 
the Gol until his deposition.
855 Northbrook to Salisbury, 23 August 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12. Salar Jung insisted that the 
Nizam was too unwell to travel to Bombay to visit the Prince of Wales. The Resident, C. B. Saunders, ‘in 
his blunt, blundering British fashion’ questioned the authenticity of the illness and the resulting acrimony 
between Minister and Resident resulted in the publication by the former of relevant correspondence in the 
Bombay Gazette and Times o f  India. Finally a deputation of Hyderabad nobles including Salar Jung 
represented the Nizam in Bombay and the Government of India formally absolved the co-Regents and the 
Nizam of disrespect. Bawa, Hyderabad under Salar Jang, pp. 176-82.
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would grant them a private audience or, better still, Her Majesty might hold a durbar in 
true Indian fashion’,856 but it was stressed that neither Holkar nor other rulers should be 
allowed to assume the title of Royal Highness.857
Fifteen years later the Viceroy, Lord Curzon, was still experiencing difficulty in curbing 
the ‘external symbols of sovereignty’ claimed by the princes,
I wage quiet, but unceasing warfare here against their inclination to call their 
offspring the Royal Family, to speak of this or that son as the Prince, or the Heir- 
Apparent, or His Highness, to use the words ‘sovereign’, ‘reign’ and ‘throne’, to 
assume the Royal Crown on writing paper ... and to put their servants into the royal 
scarlet lively’.858
Curzon was also perturbed about the status which Indian rulers automatically assumed in 
England, irrespective of their behaviour in India, ‘It is hopeless for me to endeavour to 
take a strong line in India about the unworthy and dissolute members of the Princely 
class, if, at the same time, they receive encouragement and compliments from the Queen 
at home. I am afraid that every Indian Prince, whatever his character or personality, is 
invested with a sort of halo in Her Majesty’s eyes’.859 The Viceroy was well aware of 
the fact that in the case of the Indian rulers abroad, pride would come before a fall:
856 Dufferin to Cross, 17 April 1887, Dufferin Collection, Vol. 8A. Dufferin had a jaundiced view of 
those princes who were prepared to attend the Jubilee. The Rajput Pratap Singh ‘does not speak 
English, his teeth are disfigured by betel chewing and his only notion of smart get up is to make 
himself look as much like an English jockey as possible’. Cooch Behar, ‘if  only he will dress in native 
costume, will quite realize the British idea of what an Indian Rajah should look like’. Finally, Holkar, 
‘a burly, ill-mannered, vulgar Mahratta’ whose ‘principal idea in the whole business is simple 
debauchery’. Dufferin to Cross, 20 March 1887, Dufferin Collection, V 0I.8A .
857 Ibid.
858 Curzon to Hamilton, 9 April 1902, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 161. See also R/l/1/265, 
R/l/1/266 and R/l/1/275 for Gol directives to political officers in Hyderabad, Travancore and Cochin, 
Rajputana and Central India, pointing out the ‘misuse’ o f words ‘prince’, ‘throne’ and ‘reign’ in 
relation to Indian rulers in official documents.
859 Curzon to Hamilton, November 28 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 159. Curzon’s view of the 
Queen’s attitude towards the Indian rulers does seem to have been correct. In 1897 she recommended 
the Maharajah of Kapurthala (described by the Secretary of State, Lord Hamilton, as ‘dissipated and a 
spendthrift’) for an honour on the grounds that ‘knighted European sovereigns and princes are not 
always o f spotless reputation’. Hamilton to Elgin, 18 June 1897, Elgin Collection, Vol. 15.
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In India the real proportions and merits of these individuals are carefully sifted and 
thoroughly understood, at home every man with a turban, a sufficient number of 
jewels, and a black skin, is mistaken for a miniature Akbar, and becomes the darling 
of drawing-rooms, the honoured guest of municipalities, and the hero of the 
newspapers. During the next few months ... a good many balloons that have been 
sailing high in the English firmament will experience a dismal collapse.860
As Curzon suggested, the ‘unworthy and dissolute members of the Princely class’ 
received a less generous reception in India. Inasmuch as it invariably involved the 
paramount power, the slightest hint of scandal at a major durbar was to be rigorously 
avoided. The ‘disagreeable and embarrassing’ behaviour of Holkar, who refused to 
dispense with his male lover, Gopalia, threatened to sabotage die young ruler’s 
succession ceremony. Holkar, having promised solemnly that he had expelled Gopalia, 
on the day of his private inauguration ‘not only recalled this creature to Indore, but in 
full Durbar conferred a jagir upon him and a pearl necklace which was tied around his 
neck by the chief official of the State’.861 To avoid a scandal the Agent to die 
Governor-General in Central India, Sir Lepel Griffin, was left with little alternative but 
‘to pretend ignorance of the Durbar incident’, at which, ‘fortunately’, British officers 
were not present.862 However the Viceroy was informed that it ‘would be an open insult 
if this man were occupying a seat of honour in Durbar when Her Majesty’s 
representative installed the new Chief and it was recommended that the installation 
would only take place if Gopalia was not present at this durbar or any other public 
ceremony in which the Viceroy was involved. If the Maharajah was not in agreement, 
the confirmation of fidl powers would be postponed.863
860 Curzon to Hamilton, 27 August 1902, Curzon Collection, FI 11, Vol. 161.
861 Lepel Griffin to H. M. Durand, 6 July 1886, R/l/1/36.
862 Ibid.
863 Durand to Viceroy, 10 July 1886, R/l/1/36. Holkar was duly installed and there was no record o f  
Gopalia being in evidence, however the ‘notorious favourite’ turned up again in 1889 when he 
appeared aboard a ship bound for Poona, ostensibly on the way to Europe with Holkar who had given 
the British ‘the slip5. Lansdown.e to Cross, 24 May 1889, Lansdowne Collection, D558, Vol. 2.
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The emphasis placed on the enhanced rank of British officials vis-a-vis Indian princes 
grew during the latter half of the nineteenth century. As early as 1873 a seating 
arrangement proposed by the Gaekwar of Baroda for a visit from the Governor of 
Bombay, in which the Governor was placed on the left rather than the right of the ruler, 
met with a stem reprimand from the Government of India. The Baroda Resident was 
requested to inform the Gaekwar that this was not ‘a question of courtesy to be shown to 
His Highness by the British Government, but of respect to be shown by him [the 
Gaekwar] to Her Majesty’s representative in the Bombay Presidency’.864 To add insult 
to injury the Gaekwar was also informed that the traditional presence of British soldiers 
when he left or returned to Baroda was no longer appropriate, ‘Ceremonies asked for by 
His Highness Malharrao, besides being most inexpedient as the troops are exposed to the 
sun, were opposed to rules laid down in 1841 that such escorts are for State occasions 
only’.865
An example of court protocol in Hyderabad at the end of the century further illustrates 
the ranking procedure between Indian rulers and British officials. At a durbar to 
announce Colonel K. J. L. Mackenzie’s appointment as officiating Resident in 1894, the 
practice was introduced of standing up when a kharita from the Viceroy was being read. 
The Nizam asked if the innovation could be abandoned, since there was no evidence in 
Residency files to suggest that it had previously been the custom to stand.866 However 
the First Assistant to the Resident, A. Tucker, pointed out to Nawab Vikar-ul-Umra, the 
Minister, that there was no reason why, once a practice had been adopted, it should not 
continue. As Tucker stated firmly:
864 Sec. Gol, FD to Sec.Govt. Bombay, 14 January 1873, R/4/489/75.
865 Sec. Govt. Bombay to Sec. Gol, FD, 28 May 1874, R/4/489/75. See also R/l/4/307, Circular No. 9551, 
Gol to local governments and senior Political officers, concerning the ending of the practice of military 
officers taking part in ‘Peshwai’ ceremonies accorded to Indian rulers on their arrival at military stations.
866 Col. K. J. L. Mackenzie to W. J. Cuningham, Foreign Sec. Gol, 17 October 1894, R/l/1/135.
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Matters connected with ceremonial in one view are trivial, yet in another view they 
have an importance of their own, and, if the standing up is a form of respect that 
ought to be paid to communications from His Excellency the Viceroy when read in 
Durbar, Colonel Mackenzie is sure His Highness is the last person to wish that that 
form of address should not be paid.867
In the same vein the Political Agent in Eastern Rajputana, Major Prideaux, complained 
vociferously that the Maharajah of Alwar did not pay him the ‘compliments’ due upon 
every formal visit. The Maharajah had not met die officer at the railway station, nor 
fired a salute when the officer was on an official visit to the ruler, nor fired salutes every 
time the Political Agent arrived in or departed from the state. The ruler treated the Agent 
to the Governor-General with the correct protocol and it was unreasonable that he should 
not do so in the case of the Political Agent ‘whose status, conferred upon him by the 
Imperial Government, entitles him to compliments of the same character’.868
The increase of European influence upon princely ceremonies is demonstrated by a 
description by the Political Agent in Baroda, Mr P. S. Melvill, of the investiture of the 
Gaekwar. Two hundred and thirty four European guests attended, among whom were
the Consuls at Bombay of France and the U.S.A.; the heads of the mercantile 
community of Bombay; travellers of distinction from England, Italy and Belgium; 
and civil and military officers of Government .... A band attends every evening 
(except Sunday) after dinner, and the guests find pleasure in a nightly dance.869
At the state banquet given by the Gaekwar there were only eight ‘Native gentlemen, 
those few who were occasionally invited to dine at Government House in Bombay’ and 
at a fancy dress ball the following night the maharanis and ladies of the palace were 
situated in an adjoining room ‘which was veiled from outside gaze by open-work
868 Major W. B. Prideaux, Pol. Agent, Eastern Rajputana, to W. H. J. Wilkinson, 1st Asst. AGG 
Rajputana, 16 December 1912, R/2/169/276. There is no record of whether or not Prideaux succeeded in 
obtaining what he saw as his rightful recognition.
869 Enclosure No. 21, P. S. Melvill, AGG Baroda, ‘Investiture of Gaekwar’, 2 January 1882 attached
to Gol to SoS, No. 10, PSCI, 1875-1911 Box II.
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screens, but through which the inmates could see the ball-room’.870
By the beginning of the twentieth century there was evidence of less fraternisation 
between Indians and Europeans at residency gatherings as well as more formal 
ceremonies such as the Gaekwar’s investiture. Sir David Barr, Resident in Hyderabad in 
1905, wrote that when he first arrived in the state,
it was the practice to invite a large number of the Nobles and officials of the state to 
the Residency on occasions of dinners and dances when English ladies were present. 
I have done all I can to discourage this practice. I never invite Native gentlemen or 
Nobles to dances -  and restrict official entertainments, such as Breakfasts and 
Dinners, at the Residency to gentlemen (English and Indian) only. The only 
exception is when the Nizam dines at the Residency, then we invite ladies as well as 
gentlemen to meet His Highness and we ask for a list of those nobles and officials 
whom His Highness wishes to be invited to meet him. The practice of the nobles .., 
to invite ladies and gentlemen of the garrison of Secunderabad to Dinners, Picnics 
etc, has been discouraged by me.871
This widening of the gap between Indian and European over the nineteenth century is 
illustrated by the description of Edward Raleigh, who accompanied the Governor- 
General, Lord Amherst, on a diplomatic tour through Bengal in 1828, of the way in 
which an Indian ruler would be embraced on entering the durbar tent. During the 
ceremony the Governor-General might inspect the presents arm-in-arm with the visitor. 
Such acts of physical intimacy denoted respect, acknowledged a certain level of equality, 
even affection, all of which were integral to the creation of an intimate bond between the
R 7 7  ■ n n ^two men. Although the British did not always relish the participation in such acts, 
the retention of these ceremonies in their original format suggests that the British were 
willing to acknowledge their significance. The British acceptance of Indian structures of 
power meant that they were also forced to submit to such indignities as standing in the
871 Sir David Barr, Res. Hyderabad, ‘Confidential Note on Hyderabad Affairs’, 8 February 1905, 
R/l/1/1281.
872 E. Collingham, Imperial Bodies (Cambridge, 2001), p. 129.
873 Lord Auckland, according to his sister, ‘ detest[ed] a great part of the ceremonies, particularly 
embracing the rajahs!’. Emily Eden, Up the Country, Letters from India (first published 1886), p. 27.
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presence of the Mogul Emperor, from whom, theoretically, they derived their authority, 
and the practice of a Resident taking off his shoes when visiting the Nizam of 
Hyderabad.874
However such acts of subordination on the part of the British disappeared following the 
removal of the Emperor of Delhi into exile and the proclamation of Queen Victoria as 
the new monarch of India, resolving the position of the British as de facto rulers deriving 
their authority from a virtually powerless figurehead. The durbar, reinvented on a 
national level as the Imperial Assemblages of 1877, 1903 and 1911, became a place 
where the Indian princes, redefined as feudal allies, expressed their allegiance to the 
British. Any suggestion that British officials might be symbolically subordinate to 
Indian rulers was removed. The British rid themselves of unwanted intimacy with their 
subjects, such as the physical contact of embracing and handholding. The new format 
‘transformed the physical performance of the princes from one which symbolised 
incorporation, equality and respect, into one of homage’.875
IMPERIAL ASSEMBLAGES
The Imperial Assemblages of 1877, 1903 and 1911 were the most successful 
appropriations of the indigenous form of the durbar, articulating the traditional social 
order and legitimating the position of the British monarch at the head of it, with the 
Indian princes firmly relegated to the role of native aristocracy. A strong element of 
psychological manipulation lay behind the mountain of bureaucratic detail involved in 
the organisation of these mass gatherings, and viceregal and other official
874 Barr, Report 6 August 1900, R /l/1/1281.
875 Collingham, Imperial Bodies, p. 129.
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correspondence dealing with arrangements for tire Assemblage of 1877 reveals a certain 
amount of racism in British attitudes towards the Indian rulers. The susceptibility of the 
Indians to symbols and show was assumed. The British, Lord Lytton declared, could 
gain the allegiance of the rulers, ‘without giving up any of our power ... the further East
you go, the greater becomes the importance of a bit of bunting’.876 Although the
Viceroy suspected that he might appear ‘fussy, or frivolous’ in his attention to detail, he 
stressed the importance of display to Disraeli, ‘The decorative details of an Indian 
pageant are like those parts of the animal which are not used at all for butcher's meat, 
and are even unfit for scientific dissection, but from which augurs draw the omens that 
move armies and influence princes’.877
Following the assumption by Queen Victoria of the title of Empress of India, it was 
agreed that the Viceroy would distribute gold medals with a suitable inscription to ‘chief 
dignitaries’. The Viceroy's Council eventually decided upon ‘Kaiser-i-Hind’, an 
imperial title not monopolised by any crown since the Roman Caesars, which gave it ‘a 
lofty and mysterious place in the imagination of the eastern populations’.878 However 
Lytton stressed that the new title of Empress was only potentially popular in India. If the 
major princes were put to trouble and expense simply to be informed that the Queen had 
assumed a title which Her Majesty and her government regarded as a mere technicality 
and ‘unconnected with any practical advantage, or benefit to themselves’ they would 
leave the Assemblage disappointed and angry.879 The Viceroy recognised that ‘Here is 
a great feudal aristocracy which we cannot get rid of, which we are avowedly anxious to
876 Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
877 Lytton to Disraeli, 3 October 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
878 Lytton to Salisbury, 30 July 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18. The title was suggested by G. W. 
Leitner, a Hungarian Professor of Oriental Languages and Principal of the Government College in Lahore. 
Leitner argued that the term ‘Kaiser’ was well known to the natives of India, having been used by Muslim 
writers in relation to the Roman Caesar. Moreover it neatly combined die Roman ‘Caesar’, German 
‘Kaiser’ and Russian ‘Czar’ imperial titles. Cohn ‘Representing Authority’, p. 201,
879 Lytton to Disraeli, 30 April 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
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conciliate and command, but which we have as yet done next to nothing to rally round 
the British Crown as its “feudal head”’.880
Political motives for such a glittering ceremony were evident. As Lytton explained to 
the Queen during the planning of the Assemblage, the celebrations would also help 
Britain from a strategic point of view. In a letter of November 1876 he declared that, if 
there was a threat of European war which might bring Europe ‘into collision’ with 
Russia in Central Asia, ‘it is essential to the success of our military operation that we 
should, as soon as possible, rouse the enthusiasm, secure the confidence, and confirm the 
loyalty of the Native States of India, in order that we may be able to withdraw troops 
from the interior without any risk to the stability of our rule’.881 The Secretary of State 
for India, Lord Salisbury, agreed that Britain should ‘try and lay the foundations of some 
feeling on the part of the coloured races towards the Crown other than the recollection of 
defeat and the sensation of subjection’.882
As was to be their role throughout the Assemblage, the princes attended as recipients of 
largesse and honour given to them by their empress.883 Somewhat surprisingly princely 
reactions indicate that the majority of the most powerful rulers were by no means 
unwilling to accept their new role of loyal servants of Queen Victoria. Much attention 
was given to the question of suitable recognition for Scindia, Maharajah of Gwalior, one 
of the most influential princes, whose position was already so elevated by previous 
‘marks of favour from the Suzerain Power, that it was hard not to lower it by the honours
881 Lytton to Queen, 15 November 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
882 Salisbury to Lytton, 7 July 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 3 A.
883 See Cannadine, Ornamentalism, pp. 45-6; Copland, British Raj, pp. 154-5; L. A. Knight, ‘The 
Royal Titles Act and India5, Historical Journal XI, no. 3 (1968) p. 488; M. Lutyens, The Lyttons o f  
India: LordLytton’s Viceroyalty (London, 1979), pp. 74-89.
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and privileges to be given to princes of lower rank and smaller salutes’.884 Upon being 
informed that he would receive the Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, Scindia spoke 
of the Queen using a word which in its original meant ‘the power of issuing absolute 
orders which must be obeyed’. Delighted, Lytton assured his sovereign that this 
reference ‘permanently and publicly fixes your Majesty's suzerain, and more than 
suzerain, power in India, beyond all possibility of future question’.885 However, to make 
sure that the Maharajah was left in no doubt as to his position in the new hierarchy, 
Lytton stressed the point that for a Viceroy to travel to Gwalior for the investiture would 
be ‘improper’. Scindia was therefore instructed to visit Calcutta to receive the Order.886
In a similar vein a sycophantic letter from Holkar to the Prince of Wales, rejoiced in the 
fact that the Queen was ‘pleased to confer upon the Native Princes new dignities 
commensurate with their ranks, and admit them also to participate in her new greatness, 
so that the whole political fabric of India may appear together as one harmonious group, 
tending, by its united effort, to exalt the British name’.887 However Holkar's true 
suspicions are reflected in the last paragraph, in which he expressed the hope that the 
‘independence’ of native princes would continue to be respected ‘according to treaties 
which have been ratified by Her Majesty's Proclamation of 1858’.888 Unfortunately 
Lytton could not give the princes any guarantee of their independence. He admitted to 
Salisbury that the rulers presented a dilemma which was not to be solved by a devolution 
of power, ‘For whilst on the one hand, we require their cordial and willing allegiance, on
884 Lytton to Queen, 23 December 1876 to 10 January 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19
885 Ibid.
886 Lytton to Salisbury, 11 October 1877, Lytton to Scindia, 23 November 1877, Lytton Collection, 
Vol. 19.
887 Holkar to Prince of Wales, 21 September 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
888 Ibid.
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the other hand we certainly cannot afford to give them any increased political power 
independent of our own’.889
The sheer mass of detail of the Assemblage succeeded in impressing upon the 
‘feudatories’ the fact that, for all their personal wealth and influence, they were 
unable to place themselves on an equal footing with their imperial overlords. 
Scindia's Minister, Sir Dinkur Rao, was heard to say that:
If any man would understand why it is that the English are, and must necessarily 
remain, the masters of India, he need only go up to the Flagstaff Tower, and look 
down upon this marvellous camp. Let him notice the method, the order, the 
cleanliness, the discipline, the perfection of its whole organisation, and he will 
recognise in it at once the epitome of every title to command and govern which 
one race can possess over others.890
Holkar confided to Lytton that ‘India had been till now a vast heap of stones, some of 
them big, some of them small. Now the house is built and from roof to basement each 
stone of it is in the right place’.891 The ruler of Indore, ‘the most avaricious and 
stingy Prince in India’, was so pleased with the promise to rectify one of his 
boundaries, that he subscribed £800 to famine expenses.892 Moreover the attitude of 
the Maharajah of Kashmir at the Assemblage showed a respect for the paramount 
power which had not hitherto been apparent, dismissing his councillors and declaring 
to Lytton, ‘I am now convinced that you mean nothing that is not for the good of me 
and mine. Our interests are identical with those of the Empire. Give me your orders 
and they shall be obeyed’.893
The only state whose officials failed to admit that the Imperial Assemblage provided
889 Lytton to Salisbury, 11 May 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
890 Lytton to Queen, 23 December 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19.
891 Lytton to Queen, 10 January 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19.
892 Lytton to Queen, 4 May 1876, Lytton Collection, Vol. 18.
893 Ibid.
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incontrovertible proof of British supremacy was Hyderabad. Sir Salar Jung's delusions 
of grandeur were at their most blatant during the celebrations, when he referred to 
relations between the Nizam's administration and the British government as ‘equal in 
sovereignty’, although ‘unequal in strength’.894 Lytton reported to the Queen that, at the 
presentation of the banner and medals to the Nizam, when
I alluded to your Majesty's reliance on the loyal allegiance of His Highness, Salar 
Jung translated the words ‘loyalty’ and ‘allegiance’ by the words ‘friendship’ and 
‘alliance’. My interpreter having noticed this, I corrected the intentional 
mistranslation and caused the young Nizam to be informed that I meant not only 
friendship and alliance, but obedience and fidelity.895
The Viceroy was swift to demand a ‘written acknowledgment of the supremacy of your 
Majesty's Government over that of His Highness’ and, after several unacceptable drafts, 
such an acknowledgment was received, leaving relations with Hyderabad ‘on a more 
safe and dignified footing’ and firmly placing the Nizam publicly in ‘the true position of 
... one of your Majesty's feudatories’.896
At the Imperial Assemblage of 1903, the Coronation Durbar to proclaim Edward VII 
Emperor of India, Curzon was determined to give princely morale a further boost by 
securing the active participation of the leading princes in the ceremony. Each prince in 
turn mounted the dais and offered a message of congratulation to tire King-Emperor, and 
in place of the presentation of nazar Curzon simply shook hands with each ruler as he 
passed. Some such interchange of ‘homage and courtesy’, Curzon insisted, had been ‘an 
immemorial feature of Indian Accession Durbars\ 897 However, although like its
894 Lytton to Queen, 23 December 1876, 10 January 1877, Lytton Collection, Vol. 19.
895 Ibid.
896 Ibid. See also Bawa, Hyderabad under Salar Jang, pp. 187-193.
897 Minute o f 11 May 1902, quoted Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 197. See also Note from H. S. Barnes, Sec. 
Gol, FD for a sample of the gargantuan amount of bureaucratic material involved in planning the 
Coronation Durbar, 16 July 1902, R/2/449/3. R/2/505/122 and R/2/505/123 deal extensively with 
arrangements for the Gaekwar and the Baroda party at the Coronation Durbar. R/2/13/86/1 deals with 
the Mysore party.
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predecessor of 1877 the Durbar provided an elaborate display of traditional Indian 
rulership, it was intended above all to demonstrate the power and majesty of the British 
Empire. Never before, Curzon exalted, had there been a gathering of the Asiatic 
feudatories of the British Crown’ from such a ‘sweep of territory’, extending over ‘fifty- 
five degrees of longitude’ from Aden to Burma. By bringing together this great number, 
Curzon hoped to give India’s ruling elite a sense of ‘common participation in a great 
political system and of fellow citizenship of the British Empire’.898
The Secretary of State, Lord Hamilton, suggested to the Viceroy that the rulers might be 
given ideas above their station, ‘you and the Ruling Princes necessarily were ‘en 
evidence’, and the performers in the series of functions, and the rest of the officials, 
nowhere: will this not give the Native Princes a more exaggerated sense hereafter of 
their own importance and make them more difficult of management by their agents?’899 
However Curzon was convinced of the rulers’ awareness of their supporting role as 
figureheads rather than prime movers in the Durbar, as in die Indian empire, ‘I believe 
that they went away, not only conscious that they had played a prominent and glorious 
part in a magnificent pageant, but proud of their honourable position as partners and 
pillars of the Empire’.900
INVESTITURES OF THE STAR OF INDIA
Lytton’s medievalist vision also found expression in the creation of orders of 
knighthood. In India, as throughout the empire, such orders grew throughout the later
898 Speeches by Lord Curzon, Vol. 3, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 559, pp. 60-67.
899 Hamilton to Curzon, 23 January 1903, Curzon Collection, F i l l ,  Vol. 162.
900 Curzon to Hamilton, 13 January 1903, Curzon Collection, F i l l ,  Vol. 162.
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nineteenth century. For example, in addition to the award of Indian titles, the 
government in 1861 created a special English order of knighthood entitled the Star of 
India. Restricted to the most influential princes and senior officials, it at once became 
the most coveted of all the distinctions at the disposal of the viceroy. At first the order of 
the Star of India, which included both Indian and British knights, was restricted to 
twenty-five members consisting of the most important Indian princes and distinguished 
senior British civil and military officers. In 1866 it was expanded by the addition of two 
lower ranks, and by 1877 there were several hundred holders of knighthoods in the 
order, which were granted by the Queen.901 However the granting of the order to the 
most senior princes such as the Maharajahs of Mysore, who could reasonably expect to 
receive the Star of India in every generation, was something of a two-edged sword. As 
David Cannadine points out,
many a ruling prince posed for his portrait in the mantle, star, collar and sash of the 
Order of the Star of India, as did the governors of Bombay, Madras and Bengal, and 
also the viceroy himself: another sign of ordered hierarchy and honorific equality, as 
the British proconsuls and Indian princes were merged together,902
Bernard Cohn suggests that die investiture and holding of chapters of the order added an 
important European component to the ritual that the British were establishing in India. 
The accoutrements of the order were ‘English and “feudal”: a robe or mantle, a collar, a 
medallion with the effigy of the Queen (the wearing of such a human effigy was an 
anathema to Muslims) and a jewelled pendant’.903 A report of the investiture ceremony 
stated that ‘on the ground, in front of the dais, is a crimson carpet, with a large oval 
frame of scrolls worked in relief, in gold, and the Lion and Unicom with “Dieu et mon
901 Cohn, ‘Representing Authority’, p. 181.
902 Cannadine, Ornamentalism, pp. 90, 100.
903 Cohn, ‘Representing Authority’, p. 181. R2/50/894 ‘Installation and Investiture Durbars’ shows the 
great care for precedent and precision in investiture programmes.
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droit” in the centre’.904 The ceremony was conducted in a European style with the 
reading of the warrant and a presentation of the insignia, the newly entitled knight 
kneeling before the monarch’s representative. The ‘contractual aspect of the entitlement 
was painfully clear to the Indian recipients, as the accoutrements given had to be 
returned on the death of the holder’.905 Unlike symbolic accessories received from 
Indian rulers in the past which were kept in treasure rooms as objects to be viewed and 
used only on sacred occasions, these had to be returned. Statutes of the order required 
the recipients to sign a bond that the valuables would be returned by their heirs.906
The knighthoods not only became rewards for ‘good service’, as in the case of Nawab 
Faiz Ali Khan, prime minister of Jaipur, recommended for the Companion of the Star of 
India in 1870 for the ‘progress, public works, good order and general good native 
government’ of his state907 and the Phulkian rulers of Jind and Nabha, distinguished by 
their service to the Government of India and ‘the excellence of the contingents which 
they have furnished for service in the field’ in 1879.908 They could also act as one of the 
final sanctions that might be served against the rulers in cases of grave misconduct. The 
absence of the Maharajah of Jodhpur from Mayo's viceregal durbar at Ajmere in 1870, 
on the grounds that he was unable to ‘sit on an equality’ with the Maharana of Udaipur, 
was one such instance; a reduction in his gun salute was deemed to be insufficient 
punishment and the ‘only other possible penalty’ suggested by the Viceroy was to 
deprive him of the Star of India on the grounds that he had committed a ‘misdemeanour 
derogatory to his honour’ .909 Mayo took an unequivocal stand,
904 Undated article from The Pioneer on Star of India investiture Calcutta, 3 January 1870, Argyll 
Collection, Vol. I.
905 Cohn, ‘Representing Authority’, p. 182.
906 Ibid.
907 Mayo to Argyll, 7 February 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. I.
908 Lytton to Cranbrook, 3 April 1879, Lytton Collection, Vol. 21.
909 Mayo to Argyll, 9 November 1870, Argyll Collection, Vol. II.
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I can look upon the conduct of the Joudhpore Raja in no other light than a deliberate 
and premeditated insult to her Majesty's Representative. I hold that if the Viceroy 
desires the attendance of the feudatory chiefs in Durbar, it is for him and not for any 
particular Chief to settle any question of precedence - the greatest care is taken in this 
matter that ancient custom and well ascertained right should be strictly adhered to - 
and it is most desirable that all these questions of Precedence should be determined 
on and finally settled.910
Until 1875 British holders of the Star of India far outnumbered their native counterparts. 
Thirty-eight British Knights of the order existed, as against thirteen native Knights, and 
sixty-nine British Companions of the order as against thirty-one native Companions. 
Northbrook put forward the suggestion in 1875 that there should be a fixed proportion 
between British and native holders of both the KCSI and CSI, resulting in a ratio of forty 
British to twenty native Knights and eighty to forty native Companions. Nevertheless 
the numbers were still heavily weighted in favour of the British holders of the order.911
Attempts on the part of the Indian princes to create their own order were firmly curtailed. 
In 1885 the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, wrote to the Secretary of State, Lord Kimberley, 
that a ‘sudden fancy had seized the Nizam for instituting an Order and distributing 
decorations’.912 Indian princes were entitled to grant ‘titles’ of honour at their discretion 
to their own subjects, so ‘we cannot plead that the Empress is the sole fountain of 
honour’.913 However it was ‘not desirable that every petty Rajah or Maharajah should 
be sowing stars and ribands broadcast over India’. A distinction should be made 
between a ‘purely Indian ornament and one which should imitate the insignia of our 
Western Orders’.914 A further rebuke was delivered later in the century to the Rajah of 
the Punjab state of Kapurthala, informing him that personal orders with insignia in any
910 Ibid.
911 Northbrook to Salisbury, 15 April 1875, Northbrook Collection, Vol. 12.
912 Dufferin to Kimberley, 5 June 1885, Dufferin Collection, Vol. 2.
913 Ibid.
914 Ibid. See also R/2/66/6 regarding the conferral o f a native title by the Nizam on Capt. John Clerk, 
superintendent of his education. A Gol despatch declared that there was no formal objection to Capt. 
Clerk receiving die title and form of address when within Hyderabad territories, however such a title 
should not be used by the Resident or other British officers.
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way resembling British decorations to reward officials and subjects would not obtain 
recognition.915 In Curzon’s view the Rajah of Kapurthala had ‘never been the same 
man since he confabulated with the Czar of Russia and die Emperor of Germany’, 
persisting in calling himself a Maharajah, whereas he was ‘only a Raja, and a veiy small 
one at that’.916 Dufferin’s successor, Lord Lansdowne, warned the Queen that although 
the expectation of a honour was always ‘a useful stimulus’ to a ruler, there was a danger 
that decorations could do more harm than good, ‘The Chiefs watch very closely die 
manner in which such awards are distributed and are quick to notice the selection of an 
undeserving member of their class’.917
Durbars and Star of India ceremonies were not the only areas in which British ideas of 
order were imposed upon India’s royalty. Religious ritual at court and general displays 
of largesse were, in the hands of political officers, subject to great scrutiny and 
modification in the interests of accountability and sound bookkeeping.
ROYAL RELIGION AND LARGESSE
BRITISH ATTITUDES TOWARDS RELIGIOUS RITUAL
As early as 1755 officers of the East India Company had begun to move into the Indian 
ceremonial world in both royal palaces and temples. The Company frequently sent 
troops and bands to march in processions that accompanied festivals at the temples in
915 Capt. H. Daly, Dep. Sec. Gol, FD to Chief Sec. Govt Punjab, 12 April 1901, PSCI, 1875-1911, 
Box XXXVI.
916 Curzon to Hamilton, 20 August 1902, Curzon Collection, F i l l ,  Vol. 161. The Raj all was nno 
doubt also inflated by the attention o f Queen Victoria, as seen in the footnote earlier in this chapter.
917 Lansdowne to Queen, 6 November 1893, Lansdowne Collection, Vol. 1.
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their newly acquired territories. By the 1840s the issue of British participation in such 
‘idolatry5 reached the floor of Parliament and direct connection to temple ritual was soon 
severed following Parliamentary pressure.918 Hinduism in particular tended to be 
regarded by the British as an elaborate mixture of cultic practices and superstitious 
beliefs, incoherent at best and frequently debased and licentious.
Although efforts at religious reform were generally abandoned after the Mutiny, there 
was evidence in the latter half of the nineteenth century that die British wished to 
distance themselves in general from Indian religious practices. The change in attitude is 
illustrated by two examples of British attendance at religious festivals held within states. 
In 1862 the Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, Richard Meade, wrote to 
the Political Agent in Gwalior, Major R. H. Keatinge, making it clear that in British eyes 
the festival of Dassara was ‘not a religious but a military pageant5.919 Meade conceded 
that ‘as with all such proceedings among natives there is a religious act to complete to 
consecrate this Festival, but with that we have nothing to do5. He adopted the view that 
‘If we confine ourselves to the military no objection can be raised in the case of 
religion5.920
A similar example of imperial aloofness was displayed in 1875 when it was reported 
that, at variance with orders of the Court of Directors of 1841, during the festival of 
Ganpati British troops were paying military honours to the Gaekwar of Baroda at a close 
proximity to a tank where the religious ceremony was performed. Moreover, when the 
procession carrying the idols reached a certain spot, the Resident and the Commanding 
Officer ‘mount elephants and join it, and march with it past the open place where the
918 Wagthome, Raja’s Magic Clothes, p. 33.
919 R. J. Meade, AGG Cl, to Major R. H. Keatinge, Pol. Agent, Gwalior, 26 September 1862, R/2/750/2.
920 Ibid.
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troops are standing, to within a stone's throw of the tank where the idols are worshipped 
and immersed’.921 This Hindu ritual amounted to a ‘non-Christian act of worship’, even 
‘more glaring and more painful’ when the festival took place on a Sunday and the 
European officers and hoops were kept waiting for several hours to the exclusion of their 
own religious services. Orders were therefore to be given that the attendance of the 
British at the procession should cease, although marks of respect could be paid to the 
Gaekwar on his return to the palace. No troops or military bands should be called out 
and no salutes fired in honour of the festival.922 However British curiosity into Hindu 
practices did not entirely disappear. The Reverend Samuel Mateer of the London 
Missionary Society wrote in 1883 of the Hindu festival of Dassara in Travancore, which 
included ritual worship of the sword. According to Mateer, ‘A British officer, who 
seemed not to have carefully considered the moral aspect of his action, informed me that 
he and many others are accustomed to hand over their swords to the sepoys for this 
festival, with a contribution towards the expenses. Enlightened natives, on the other 
hand, plead that they only join in this absurd worship through fear of giving offence to 
their elders’.923
Despite the fact that in tire latter part of the nineteenth century there was a deliberate 
attempt to curb princely pretensions, the British nevertheless continued to recognise die 
potency of significant elements within Indian court tradition. British observers noted the 
childlike devotion of the Indian people to a paternalistic ruler and their insatiable 
appetite for the trappings of Oriental monarchy. Theodore Morison, principal of the 
Moslem college in Aligarh, in inviting his readers ‘to enter into the political ideas of the 
people of India’ in 1899 described how
921 SoS to Gol, No. 106, 12 August 1875, PSCI, 1865-1911, Vol. 1.
922 Ibid.
923 Rev. Samuel Mateer, Native Life in Travancore (London, 1883), p. 131.
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when the glare of day has softened to a golden haze ... the Rajah’s elephant, in long 
housings of velvet and cloth of gold, comes shuffling down the steep declivity ... the 
women and children rush to the doors of their houses, and all the people gaze upon 
their prince with an expression of almost ecstatic delight; as the elephant passes, each 
man puts one hand to the ground and shouts ‘Maharaj Ram Ram! .... The most 
indolent tourist cannot fail to notice the joy upon the people’s faces; and when the 
cavalcade winds home and he realises the intensity of delight which the mere sight of 
their prince has caused the subjects, he will begin to understand the suitability of 
monarchy to certain phases of social evolution.924
Harcourt Butler, Lieutenant-Governor of the United Provinces, in 1907 was also of the 
opinion that the ‘visible and outward embodiment of Hindu secular power’, the ksatriya 
rajah, even when shipped of his kingly powers, retained, along with the Brahmin priest, 
his ‘old world claim and grasp upon the reverence of Hindus’. Although the rajah might 
be ‘over-bearing, often cruel ... [his people] live at his gate, where his horses and cattle 
and elephants are stalled, and there is a strong bond of common humanity between them. 
It is the old idea, “You shall be my people and I will be your God’” .925
The tutor to the Maharajah of Mysore, W. A. Porter, also noted that during the 
Maharaj all’s tours of the state:
On the part of villagers, the feeling manifested had something in it of almost 
religious veneration. Away on the outskirts of the crowd, too far away to receive 
any notice or recognition, or serve any object except to gratify his feeling of 
reverence, a poor ryot would drop on the ground and this simple act of devotion 
over would rise and stare with all his eyes .... Any one could see by unmistakable 
signs that loyalty to the ancient dynasty of Mysore is still a living and powerful 
feeling.926
However, despite the existence of an ‘almost religious veneration’ among state 
subjects, British political servants tended to disregard the religious aspect of royal
924 Theodore Morison, Imperial Rule in India (London, 1899), pp 48-9.
925 Quoted Metcalf, Ideologies, p. 192.
926 W. A. Porter to J. D. Gordon, Chief Commissioner of Mysore, 15 September 1879, R/2/27/239.
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life, although they did not fail to notice its existence.927 In official records durbars 
were strictly classified as ‘political’ and religious festivals were called simply 
‘ceremonials’, as in the case of the observance of the Dassara festival in Mysore in 
which the Resident and other European guests visited the palace to exchange the 
‘usual salutations’ with the Maharajah.928
In her study of the south Indian state of Pudukkottai, Joanne Punzo Wagthome 
suggests that British participation in princely ritual was to be as disinterested 
spectators, subscribing to the belief that it was unnecessary to invest such ritual with 
ontological significance beyond ‘representation’ or ‘symbolisation’. In Wagthome’s 
view Raj all Ramachandra was even in his court part of a religious system in which the 
ornamentation and the public display of gods and the king was central to theology. 
However under British rule during the second half of the nineteenth century the 
Pudukkottai palace ‘could no longer be allowed to function as a ritual centre in any 
profoundly religious sense’,929 since the assumption of the power of God by mere 
mortals was blasphemous to the British 930
Wagthorne’s work suggests an interesting reaction of British officialdom to the 
‘idolatry’ of Indian courts, however it seems likely that the change in the nature of 
royal religious observance in Pudukkottai and other states was due more to British 
attempts to turn the ritual framework of the state to the rule of law and order than to 
British efforts to eradicate the religious aspects of palace ritual. Civil ceremonies, 
particularly if political officers had a hand in orchestrating them, were quantifiable in 
fiscal terms to British officials, whereas the somewhat unknown quantity of Indian
927 Sir William Barton, The Princes o f  India (London, 1934), p.61.
928 Programme for Dassara, R/2/28/261,
929 Wagthome, Raja's Magic Clothes, p. 72.
930 Raja’s Magic Clothes, p. 115.
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religious practice was not. In Pudukkottai Rajah Ramachandra’s earlier requests in the 
1850s and 1860s for sums of money centred on rites within the family or a series of 
rituals that had been part of the history of his own house. However such requests for 
expensive ceremonial displays with a religious connotation were decreasingly granted, in 
favour of ceremony with an imperial connection.931
The Rajah was allowed Rs. 2,000 in 1870 for new carriage horses to be used for the 
British Governor’s intended visit, whereas in 1867 the ruler’s request for Rs. 10,000 for 
his daughter’s puberty rites (a major ceremony in royal Tamil households) had been 
denied. In 1870 Rs. 20,000 was sanctioned to allow the Rajah to attend a reception 
for the visiting Duke of Edinburgh, and in 1877 a grand durbar was held to honour the 
assumption of the title of Empress of India by Queen Victoria and the ruler was 
permitted to purchase a silver throne for the visit of the Prince of Wales. However every 
year from 1852 to 1884 his budget requests for the Hindu festival of Dassara were 
disputed by the Political Agent.933 By 1884, although still in debt, the Rajah had his 
title restored. The Dewan of Pudukkottai had Rs. 2,500 approved by the Political Agent, 
and more funds were provided for coconuts, fireworks, shawls and drinking water for the 
public celebration of this event. Certainly Rs. 2,500 was economical, compared with the 
Rs. 10,000 the Rajah normally requested for his Hindu family rituals. Nevertheless the 
request seemed to work primarily because the need was presented in a mode more 
accountable and ‘palatable to the secular requirements of the British’.934
On occasions sacred sites within royal palaces were casualties of British measures of
931 R aja’s Magic Clothes, p. 48.
932 Ibid.
933 Ibid.
934 Rajah’s Magic Clothes, p. 49. Also Note on Grand Durbar held on 19 May 1884 to celebrate the 
granting of the title o f ‘Highness5 to the Rajah of Pudukkottai, R/2/879/21.
275
economy. During A. Sashiah Sastri’s years as reforming dewan of Pudukkottai935 the 
importance of the Timgokamam temple outside the palace walls soon overshadowed the 
significance of the Dakshinamurti temple, built directly in front of the Rajah’s old seat of 
state. Early records emphasised the importance of the Raj all’s durbar in the palace, the 
elaborate Dassara festival and his daily rides to the Dakshinamurti temple to display 
himself to his people 936 By the twentieth century the palace worship was much 
diminished and all the major royal rituals were conjoined to the cycle of the 
Tirugokamam temple, not least because in Sastri’s view the general squandering of 
temple funds in the state required closer scrutiny.937 Similar measures of economy were 
enforced in Idar under the control of the Bombay Government. The insolvency of the 
state had been aggravated by huge alienations, chiefly of a religious nature, made by the 
Maharajah at the end of the nineteenth century. After the ruler’s death in 1901 the 
Political Agent declared that all religious endowments to individuals were to cease, and 
those conferred on religious institutions were to be ‘considered hereafter’. Moreover the 
temple attached to the palace was to be run as cheaply as possible until ‘we can 
overcome the sentimental objection of the Ranis to close it and provide for the Idol 
elsewhere’.938
In these cases the British condemnation of ‘excessive’ religious ceremony appeared to 
be a campaign against general extravagance and a lack of accountability rather than a 
deliberate attempt to secularise court life. Such a campaign was waged by the British 
not only over the intricacies of palace ritual, but also over secular displays of princely 
largesse.
935 Sastri’s efforts at ordering other areas of the royal household are discussed in detail in the chapters 
on education and royal women.
936 Wagthome, Raja's Magic Clothes, p. 73.
937 Ibid.
938 Pol, Agent Mahi Kantha to Sec. to Govt, o f Bombay, Political Dept. 24 February 1901, 
R/2/157/178.
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In Pudukkottai the Dewan’s penchant for rules, regulations, bookkeeping and records 
backed a full frontal attack on the Jmzur establishment of the palace.939 Sastri 
initiated his revisions of the huzur establishment as part of the Inam Settlement of 
1888. The inam, or tax-free right to land, was a particular privilege and entitlement 
to a special status, a royal relationship. The privileges of inamdars included rights to 
titles, offices and honours, rights to command groups of people, as well as the light to 
offer particular services to an overlord in a hierarchical political and social system.940 
In other words, the inam, as both gift and entitlement, was a basic ingredient of the 
social and political relations of the Tittle kingdom’, in which it became one of the 
principal means for the creation and maintenance of the local structure of privilege. 
All political action was predicated on understandings and assumptions about the 
meaning of gifts, honours and emblems, ties of affinity, offers of service and various 
codes for conduct. These meanings were simultaneously practical, instrumental and 
cultural. The gifts kings gave to their subjects were often the means by which the 
latter became not just subjects but subject to their king. While the gifts did not 
specify service in a contractual form, they were often given after services were 
performed or with the expectation that future services would be performed.941
In the state of Pudukkottai in the mid nineteenth century less than 30 per cent of the 
cultivated land was either taxed or given out from year to year on a share (amani) 
system. Seventy per cent of the cultivated land was inam, or tax-free.942 Instead of 
payment for services through unenfranchised gifts of land with rights to its cultivation
939 The general name given to the complex set o f servants who ministered to the rajah within the 
palace.
940 Dirks, Hollow Crown, pp. 325-33. Also 122-25.
941 Ibid.
942 Hollow Crown, pp. 117.
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tax-free, Sastri substituted wages for all palace personnel and deeded their land to 
them permanently, but subject to taxation.943 The Dewan was well aware of the exact 
names and services performed by each member of the huzur establishment, yet ‘he chose 
to officially reduce their importance from palace incumbents to palace servants whose 
position depended on their personal conduct’.944 After the Dewan’s reforms, the actual 
purpose and importance of individual employment was glossed over by a vague 
categoiy, such as ‘menial service’, which retained the office but demeaned the 
officeholder. Paid servants were given money to do a job; they were given land that had 
to be used to make money to pay taxes, a distinction between the traditional Indian 
concept of land as a sign of power over people and the British concept of land as capital. 
When the interconnectedness of person to office was broken, the palace itself began to 
look on paper ‘just like a well-regulated part of the general bureaucratic machinery of 
the state’.945
Under British rule measures of economy such as those enforced in the Pudukkottai
palace were applied to Indian princes across the board. The rulers were exhorted to
behave as responsible agents of the Crown and self-indulgent displays of wealth such as
huge marriage expenses were viewed as highly irresponsible. Such indulgence provided
a target for India Office criticism. In the case in 1871 of die vast retinue taken by the
Maharajah of Kotah to Idar for his marriage to the ruler’s sister it was suggested diat
when the Chief is accompanied by a European officer as a representative of the 
Government, advantage should be taken of the circumstance to discourage so far as 
possible all such inordinate outlay .... It is only by inducing the larger Chiefs to set 
the example of a wise economy on marriage ceremonies that we can hope to 
influence the smaller Rulers, and, through them, the people.946
943 Wagthome, Raja’s Magic Clothes, p. 67.
944 Raja \s Magic Clothes, p. 6 8.
945 Ibid. See also Dirks, Hollow Crown, p. 125.
946 SoS to Got, No. 132 of 9 November 1871, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 14.
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In 1875 the Maharana of Udaipur was ‘induced’ by his Political Agent to reduce his 
wedding retinue to travel to Kishengarh to 1,800 men, 500 horses, 30 elephants, 1,000 
baggage camels, 50 riding camels and 500 bullocks.947 Similarly, as the result of 
correspondence in 1877 between the Ranis of Mysore (whose enlightened ideas on 
government are considered in the chapter on royal women) and the Government of India, 
assurance was given that the Maharajah’s forthcoming marriage would be celebrated 
with ‘suitable splendour', but with due regard to economy’, a measure felt to be of 
particular* importance during a time of famine.948
There was official discouragement of the giving of lavish gifts by native princes during 
the visit of the Duke of Edinburgh in 1869:
It is to be anticipated that the occasion of the first visit ever paid by a Prince of the 
Blood Royal of England to Her Majesty's Indian possessions will elicit a disposition 
on the part of the Princes and Chiefs of India to manifest their loyalty to the Queen by 
costly offerings to Her Majesty's son. It will be the duty of Your Excellency to 
discourage this tendency through the agency of your* several representatives at the 
Native Courts, and to assure all whom it may concern that it is not the desire of Her 
Majesty that her esteemed friends should testify their devotion to her by lavish
Due to famine, ideas of a ‘vast assemblage’ in honour of the Duke's visit were 
abandoned and the Home Government later expressed pleasure at die fact that many of 
the princes had chosen to celebrate the stay of die Prince in India by acts of goodwill to
947 Pol. Agent, Mewar to OfFg. Police Superintendent, Hilly Tracts, Mewar, 27 January 1875, 
R/2/160/202.
948 SoS to Gol, No. 72, 15 November 1877, PSCI, 1875-1911, Vol. 3. See also R/2/32/303 and 
R/2/11/73/1 which deal in minute detail with the expenditure for the Maharajah of Mysore’s wedding in 
June 1900 and the matxiages of two of his three sisters. The Government of India originally sanctioned an 
amount of 3 lakhs o f rupees from the state for the marriage of the Maharajah, but was adamant when 
practically double that sum had been spent on the celebrations that no further financial help would be 
forthcoming. H. R. C. Dobbs, 1st Asst. Res. Mysore, to T. R. A. Thumboo Chetty, Dewan Mysore, 13 
October 1900, R/2/32/303.
949 SoS to Gol, No. 230 o f October 28 1869, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 12.
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their subjects rather than extravagant ceremonies.950 A visit to Calcutta and Bombay by 
the Prince of Wales in 1875 was also seen as a good opportunity to instil ideas of 
economy into princely behaviour. Expenses should be kept ‘within the most reasonable 
limits’.951 The Viceroy did not intend to hold a ceremonial durbar and an exchange of 
presents at less significant durbars would not be made. The Indian rulers might wish to 
present the Prince of Wales with examples of special manufactures of their states, but he 
had specified that presents should not exceed ‘a reasonable amount’ in value 952
It was hoped that the princes would in the future express their loyalty to the Crown 
through good government rather than mutual exchanges of wealth. This line of thought 
was reinforced when dealing with congratulatoiy letters received in England from the 
princes to the Queen and the Prince of Wales on the latter's recovery from serious illness, 
‘The growing practice of sending such Letters in costly boxes and bags, elaborately 
ornamented with valuable jewels, is one which, like the sending of expensive presents, it 
is expedient, as far as possible, henceforth to discourage’.953 There were undoubtedly 
motives of self aggrandisement involved in the exchange of gifts in some cases, such as 
the presentation of a ‘handsome gift’ by Sir Salar Jung, Dewan of Hyderabad, to the 
Prince of Wales, for which, a newspaper report stated, the Minister received by telegraph 
‘the cordial thanks of His Royal Highness’ 954 Lytton declared that such a report was 
extremely harmful, as ‘by a long-standing rule of this Government, Native Princes, and 
their Ministers, are forbidden to present gifts to members of the Royal Family, or to 
correspond with them’.955 This rule was ‘salutary and necessary’ and the effect of the 
report on the public of India was
950 SoS to Gol, No. 81 of 29 June 1871, PCI, 1792-1864, Vol. 14.
951 C. U Aitchison, Sec. Gol, to AGG Rajputana, 5 August 1875, R/2/167/258.
952 Ibid.
953 SoS to Gol, Draft No. 21 of 6 March 1873, PCI, 1792-1874, Vol. 16.
954 Lytton to Francis Knollys, 15 February 1878, Lytton Collection, Vol. 20.
955 Ibid.
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especially prejudicial, inasmuch as all the gifts hitherto made by Sir Salar Jung to 
influential personages in England, for the purpose of increasing his own popularity 
and importance there, appear to have been surreptitiously paid (for) out of the 
Hyderabad treasury or subtracted from the State regalia, of both of which the British 
Government is guardian through the Nizam's minority.956
However measures of economy did not always produce ideal results. The Resident in 
Mysore, Sir Donald Robertson, wrote in 1903 that it was essential to avoid any 
‘sweeping retrenchment’ in tire Maharajah’s Civil List, as this would be undesirable for 
‘a Chief on the threshold of his career’.957 The Maharajah currently had living with him 
his mother, brother and three married sisters, all of whom were accustomed to keeping 
up a ‘certain amount of state’, such as participation in ceremonials, and it was difficult 
for him ‘summarily’ to curtail their expenditure. However he was attempting to exercise 
‘a gentle and beneficial restraint’ on their ‘somewhat extravagant notions’.958 Over ten 
lakhs of the total expenditure from the ruler’s Civil List was of a permanent nature, such 
as Rs. 276,000 for stipends to illegitimate branches of his family and ‘family adherents’, 
Rs. 422,000 for departmental charges for his establishment, Rs. 162,000 for gifts and 
donations, including principally religious contributions, and Rs. 150,000 for the upkeep 
of his residences. In the Resident’s opinion this left insufficient provision for 
‘Purchases, Tours, Extraordinary Charges and Personal Expenditure’ 959 Frequently the 
Maharajah was asked for contributions which he was forced to turn down, or compelled
956 Ibid. The Government of India was particularly sensitive when it came to expenditure during a 
minority. Ten years later Sir Lepel Griffin, Agent to the Governor-General in Central India, commissioned 
a portrait of himself by Frank Holl for a sum of £1,000 to be paid by the Gwalior state. In the eyes of the 
Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, this commission was bound to ‘create a most unfavourable impression all over 
India’, particularly since the ruler was a minor and ‘a mere Council, who are bound to exercise the strictest 
economy in the application of their master’s money, would certainly commit a very grave blunder if they 
disbursed a thousand pounds for the portrait of a British officer, no matter how great the services he might 
have rendered’. Dufferin to Cross, 29 June 1888, Dufferin Collection F130, Vol. 11A
957 Sir Donald Robertson, ‘Note on Mysore Civil List’, 4 September 1903, R/2/28/258.
958 Ibid.
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to contribute sums ‘quite inadequate to his position in this part of India'. He now had to 
‘forego luxuries and conveniences’ to which a prince of his position was entitled.960
Sir Donald presumed that ‘All we are, I imagine, concerned to secure is the prevention 
of undue extravagance, and the restriction of the privy expenditure within the bounds 
which the State can afford’.961 In the light of the fact that the current Civil List had been 
fixed twelve years ago, since when the income of the state had increased by fifty lakhs, 
he felt that it was reasonable to request an increase, particularly as the Maharajah had 
already instituted a careful examination of palace debts. It was no doubt desirable to 
maintain a clear dividing line between state and palace budgets, but not expedient to 
place the ruler in a position where ‘necessities may often operate as a temptation to 
overstep the limitations thus imposed; and either to incur debts or to seek assistance ... 
by obtaining relief in an irregular- and unworthy manner’.962 The Resident concluded 
that:
Probably no Chief of a status approaching that of His Highness is relatively as poor as 
the Maharajah of Mysore. He has no personal or private estate or income other than 
the amount allowed for his Civil List, it is incumbent upon him to live in the style of 
one of the leading Princes of India, and so long as he is not guilty of reckless waste or 
extravagance we should ... assist him to cany on after the manner public opinion 
expects from one of his position.963
960 Ibid. The British also discouraged the display o f extravagant decorations when the Maharajah of 
Mysore went on tour in his state, asking for more flowers and ‘less cloth and tinsef. Ryots who found 
it hard to refuse demands for money or supplies in the name of tire Maharajah were involved in 
expenditure they could ill afford and reimbursement by officials in charge of the organisation was 
invariably late. Sir Donald Robertson, Res. Mysore to Dewan of Mysore, 4 May 1901, R/2/13/85.
961 Sir Donald Robertson, ‘Note on Mysore Civil List’, 4 September 1903, R/2/28/258.
962 Ibid.
963 Ibid. Under Curzon measures of frugality were also imposed upon political officers, much to their 
indignation. R. C. Carr, Acting Resident in Travancore and Cochin, in 1906 wrote to the Government of 
Madras, forcibly arguing that ‘The Resident has for more than a century represented die British power to 
the people in these two States. In die course of years the Establishment has grown around him, and if die 
shears are put in too ruthlessly, the Resident’s position in the eyes of the Chiefs and of the people must be 
lowered’. ‘Entertainments’, such as weekly garden parties, were valuable ‘from a political point of view’. 
The Resident was duty bound to make his parties attractive and could not hope to do so without a large 
staff o f servants. R. C. Carr, Acting Res. Travancore and Cochin to M. Hammick, Chief Sec. Govt. 
Madras, Pol. Dept. 2 May 1906, R/2/893/293. .
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The Resident’s pleas succeeded in procuring an increase of two lakhs in die Maharajah’s 
Civil List from the Government of India, on the understanding that no further requests 
would be considered for several years. However palace expenditure rose from Rs.
451,000 in 1903 to Rs. 642, 000 in 1909 on items such as the Palace Family Goddess, 
the Zenana, the Insignia Department, the Cattle Department, the Elephant Department, 
the Zoological Gardens and the Engine Department. Miraculously the Maharajah 
achieved a further four lakhs from the Government of India in 1910.964
To preserve their royal reputation for distribution rulers tended to make magnanimous 
gestures during state festivities, at times incorporating events with an imperial 
connection to gain the approval of the paramount power. An account of the 
celebrations in Mysore for the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria in June 1897 
described events such as the ‘feeding and clothing of the poor of all classes and 
inmates of charitable institutions’, sports and entertainments for children of public 
and private schools, a display of fireworks in Cubbon Park, the illumination of public 
offices and the Museum, and a display of massed bands. In addition the release of 79 
prisoners and the remission of sentences for 315 other detainees were hailed as acts of 
‘grace and clemency’.965 However the Jubilee was also seen as an ideal occasion for 
the laying of the foundation stone of the Victoria Hospital in Bangalore. An initial 
sum of Rs. 5,000 was sanctioned from the state arid subsequent grants of Rs. 3,000
964 Extract from note by Maharajah’s Private Secretary, 7 July 1910, R/2/32/303. Another item of 
expense in the palace expenditure was no doubt the exotic garden. The Mysore durbar twenty years 
earlier had expressed much interest in obtaining a European head gardener from England and the 
Director o f the Royal Gardens at Kew was asked to select and send out a suitable person. It was 
considered that ‘To induce a taste for gardening with artistic grouping and colouring of plants and their 
sweet perfume should be as much an object o f State care as technical schools and the like’. Extinct 
from note by Mr. Ricketts, 19 September 1890, attached to No. 48, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box X.
965 Account of Diamond Jubilee celebrations Mysore 1897, R/2/8/63.
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from Provincial Funds and Rs. 2,000 from City Municipal Funds were 
forthcoming.966
Even when not associated with imperial celebrations such as the Diamond Jubilee, 
westernised projects achieved a higher profile in princely benefaction in the last 
decades of the nineteenth century. In 1881 a letter from the Resident in Mysore 
reported that as well as giving Rs. 5,000 to the Datavya Bharata Kavyalaya in 
Calcutta, the Maharajah had donated Rs. 1,000 to the Town Hall in Madras as an ‘act 
of private liberality’.967 Similarly during a visit in 1886 to Calcutta to see the 
Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, the Begam of Bhopal subscribed to several institutions: Rs.
10.000 was given to the Lady Dufferin Fund for women’s hospitals, Rs. 1,500 to the 
Bible Fund, and Rs. 2,000 to the Islamia Madrissa, as well as a scholarship of Rs.
6.000 to enable a student to study either Law or Medicine in England for three
968years. A memorial to ‘confer a permanent benefit on the people of Bhopal’ marked 
the 1887 Golden Jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria in the form of a walkway 
around the Shahjahanabad Lake, to be called the Kaiser Embankment.969
Following Queen Victoria’s death, the establishment of the Victoria Memorial Fund 
to erect a building on the Calcutta Maidan was greeted with much enthusiasm by 
Indian royalty. By 1903 contributions had reached a total of nearly fifty lakhs of 
rupees. The Maharajah of Mysore offered one lakh as a ‘preliminary donation’,970 
and, following the example of other princes such as Scindia of Gwalior,, agreed later
966 Account o f Diamond Jubilee celebrations in Mysore, Appendix B, 22 June 1897, R/2/8/63.
967 Sir James Gordon, Res. Mysore to Maharajah of Mysore, 20 July 1881, R/2/32/303.
968 Sultan Jehan, Account, Vol. I. pp. 131, 133.
969 Ibid.
970 Walter Lawrence, Private Sec. to Viceroy, to Sir Donald Robertson, Res. Mysore, 19 March 1903, 
R/2/30/286.
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to subscribe a further one and a half lakhs when there was a shortfall in funds.971 
Designed by William Emerson, with its vast size, tessellated marble paving, soaring 
domes and Renaissance styling, a building such as the Victoria Memorial went far 
towards reassuring Britain’s princely allies that they were contributing to an empire 
which was not a ‘moribund organism’ but still in its youth with ‘the vitality of an 
unexhausted purpose’.972
However princely contributions to the imperial cause were not confined to charitable 
funds and architectural projects. Having guaranteed the defence of Indian rulers by 
treaty in the early nineteenth century, thereby removing the principal raison d ’eti'e of 
state armies, die British in the last decades of the century made a concerted effort to find 
a profitable means of satisfying the traditional princely requirement for military display. 
Writing to the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, in 1885, the Secretaiy of State, Lord Randolph 
Churchill, envisaged a total transformation of the armies of the states in which they 
would be
incorporated effectually in the military resources of India, each state maintaining a 
certain military quota calculated upon its population and revenue, which should be 
efficient as our own native troops in equipment, skill, and discipline, and frequently 
inspected by British officers and brigaded with British troops. This would lead to a 
tremendous reduction in point of numbers of the Native armies, but the Princes would 
be so gratified by the superior efficiency and responsibility that I do not think they 
would object. Here you might find your outlet for native military aspirations which 
our policy since the Mutiny has unduly, I think, repressed. 973
In 1887 the Government of India first introduced its Imperial Service Troops scheme. 
Under the scheme, Indian princes were invited to designate already existing or recently 
organised units of their armies to be trained and equipped by the British to the levels of 
military efficiency of comparable units in the Indian Army. British officers were
971 Telegram from Res. to Lawrence, 24 April 1903, R/2/30/286.
972 Curzon, speech upon receiving the Freedom of the City o f London, 20 July 1904, quoted Metcalf, 
Ideologies, p. 168.
973 Churchill to Dufferin, 22 September 1885, Dufferin and Ava Collection, IOR Neg. 4352.
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assigned to these imperial service troop units for the purposes of ‘advising, 
superintending and instructing’ them in the ways of modem armies, but not to command 
them.974 Imperial Service units were not contingents of the peacetime Indian army. 
Rather, they were elite corps of their separate state armies; available for imperial sendee 
in times of need, but ordinarily commanded by their own Indian officers and under the 
political control of then princes. Lord Roberts, Commander in Chief of the Indian 
Army, and a leading proponent of the scheme was of the opinion that, because they were 
isolated in their states and scattered over the map of India, imperial service units were 
themselves unlikely to be the cause of serious disturbance. He remained
convinced that our wisest policy ... is to let the chiefs see that we are prepared to trust 
them’ and congratulated the government ‘at having obtained a material addition to its 
available militaiy forces at a comparatively insignificant cost, and on having at the 
same time secured ... important political advantages.975
This new opportunity for a display of princely largesse immediately met with success. 
In 1888 offers of help were received from rulers of states such as Hyderabad, Jaipur and 
Kashmir. Although in the eyes if the Government of India it was deemed not ‘altogether 
desirable or proper to accept grants of money from states, some of which can ill afford to 
make them’, it appeared to be possible to train and equip portions of states’ armies for 
use in time of war, starting with Kashmir and the Punjab, then ‘useful material’ in 
Rajputana, to protect and defend the passes leading from Afghanistan to India.976 A 
scheme was put forward in 1889 to train individual, state-based troops to add 25,000 
men to the effective force of the empire and by 1892 more than 15,000 had been 
recruited. It was agreed that the states ought to be associated with the population of 
British India for the defence of the country, as
974 Quoted Stem, Cat and Lion, pp. 199
975 Quoted Cat and Lion, p. 200.
976 Gol to SoS, No. 206, 24 November 1888, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box IX.
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No part of India has gained more from the establishment of English supremacy than 
the territories of the Native Chiefs. Protected from external attack and aided 
whenever necessity arises in the suppression of internal disorder, the Native States 
have become wealthy and prosperous in a very remarkable degree.977
Regiments raised in the states were to be ‘State troops proper’, not recruited outside the 
state. The rulers themselves would greatly prefer this arrangement, which would enable 
them to feel a legitimate interest and pride in their armies. Moreover in the case of a 
serious disturbance within India, ‘forces of this nature would be more under the control 
of their rulers and less likely to be influenced by any external disaffection, than forces of 
a less distinct and isolated character’.978 The scheme would provide an opening for the 
sons of many great Indian families ‘who have at present no career before them, and 
whose lives are passed in idleness and often in discontent’. 979
Unfortunately to a significant number of princes the appeal of a life ‘passed in 
idleness’ proved infinitely more attractive than the commitment involved in 
sustaining a military force of sufficient weight to support the paramount power. 
Other less worthy substitutes for traditional largesse were luxuries emulating the 
lifestyle of affluent westerners. By the start of the twentieth century the Rajah of 
Pudukkottai no longer spent money on palanquins, jewels, or extravagant religious 
ceremonies, but on items of western luxury. His absenteeism had left too much 
uncontrolled authority in the hands of the Dewan, he was unduly extravagant and 
inclined to ignore the Political Agent. Moreover it was feared that in establishing the 
proposed revenue settlement of the state the ruler might ‘be tempted to aim at a high 
assessment in the hopes of a larger personal allowance’.980
9/7 Gol to SoS, No. 41, 13 March 1889, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box X.
978 Ibid.
979 Ibid.
980 Chief Sec. Govt. Madras to Sec. Gol, FD, 6 August 1897, R/2/892/271.
287
In discussing the Privy Purse expenditure of the Rajah in 1901 it was agreed by the 
Government of India that the amount at his disposal, one lakh of rupees, was intended 
to cover all tour charges in India other than State tours, his ‘table’ charges, charges for 
his personal establishment including the pay of a European Private Secretary, and 
private stable charges. He was expected to live within his income, however he was 
suspected of debiting against the state, ‘small items of personal expense which he 
ought to provide for from the Privy Purse’.981 Five years later matters had not 
improved. It was agreed that the Rajah was not ‘fully alive to the impropriety of 
spending State funds on private objects i.e. motor cars, carriages and horses, 
European and tours other than State visits i.e. the expense of meeting H. H. the Prince 
of Wales at Madras [at] no less than Rs. 25,000’.982 Although the ruler kept himself 
‘remarkably free from intrigue’ it was a regrettable fact that he did not spend enough 
time in Pudukkottai to become involved in state affairs.983 By 1917 neither His 
Highness’s subjects nor the British were prepared to welcome him and he married an 
Australian beauty, Molly Fink, making it clear that he wished to abdicate the throne.
Curzon was particularly anxious to make his princely charges accountable when major 
expenditure occurred which might affect states’ subjects. Referring to a request from the 
Maharajah of Cooch Behar for £40,000 to cover a foreign trip, the Viceroy aired his
981 G. Stokes, Chief Sec. Pol. Dept. Govt. Madras, to Sec. Gol, FD, 4 June 1901, R/2/893/284.
982 The Hon. H. Bradley, Acting Chief Sec., Govt. Madras to Sir Louis Dane, Sec.GoI, Foreign Dept.,
7 December 1906, R/l/1/344. Other princes were guilty of subscribing lavishly to a western lifestyle. 
An account sheet for die Maharajah o f Mysore itemising palace expenditure for 1883-4 includes Rs. 
31,294 for chandeliers and furniture from Osier and Co. in Calcutta, Rs. 7,908 on a marble bust of His 
Highness and Rs. 5,943 for a ‘Fancy Ball’ at Bangalore. Memorandum from K. Sheshadri Iyer, 
Dewan, to Sir Oliver St. John, Res. Mysore, Appendix A, 25 June 1890, R72/28/250. The Maharajah 
of Patiala was also a great source o f disappointment to die British in his ‘liberality’. Memorandum 
from C. L. Tupper, Chief Sec. Govt. Punjab, to Sec. Gol, FD, 16 July 1892, R/l/1/122.
983 Dirks, Hollow Crown, p. 391. L/PS/10/90 is an extensive file devoted entirely to tracking down 
the Rajah as he traversed Europe. In 1900 Curzon turned down an application for him to leave India so 
soon after his last travels, declaring that, ‘If this is the way we treat these young sprigs, how can we 
possibly expect them to bear good fruit? There are some shocking loose fish among die Indian princes 
as it is. I do not want to breed any more during my time’. Curzon to Sir Arthur Godley, 4 July 1900, 
Curzon Collection, FI 11, Vol. 158.
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suspicion that the money for ‘this unnecessary and ill-advised visit to London ‘ was 
either ‘taken from the pockets of the peasants in Kuch Behar or filched from the 
allowance which the Maharajah undertook to set apart for the future maintenance of his 
children’.984 The Government of India should stop rulers ‘gallivanting’ over Europe 
with the disastrous financial consequences that ‘commonly ensue’.985 Curzon’s 
predecessor, Lord Elgin, had in 1896 been informed by the Secretary of State for India 
of the need to keep the Maharajah out of London jewellery shops due to ‘the ease with 
which women can get anything out of him’. With a son at Eton he had a ‘plausible 
excuse’ for travel, however the Secretaiy of State observed that such ‘intermingling ... 
was not dissociated from financial transactions’.986
To combat the absenteeism of rulers of the Maharajah’s ilk the Viceroy issued a circular 
in 1900, demanding that applications for princely foreign travel be transmitted to the 
Government of India some time before departure. Local Governments should not 
sanction visits in advance, either conditionally or absolutely. The Viceroy’s Council was 
to be left with an ‘unfettered discretion to comply or refuse’.987 The circular stated that, 
in return for British protection, rulers should devote their energies not ‘to the pursuit of 
pleasure, nor the cultivation of absentee interests or amusements’, but to the welfare of 
their own subjects and die administration of dieir states.988 Trips abroad could lead to ‘a 
widening of the range of knowledge of an intelligent ruler’, but such cases were in the 
minority. ‘Habits of restless and extravagance’ were more likely to be ‘inculcated in the 
Oriental mind’ by die sudden change of environment, and by the temptations of 
European society, than ‘incentives to duty or aspirations for reform’.989 As a result the
984 Curzon to Hamilton, 28 May 1903, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 162.
985 Ibid.
986 SoS to Viceroy, 17 July 1896, Elgin Collection, Vol. 14.
987 Curzon circular 20 July 1900 re foreign travel o f princes, PSCI, 1875-1911, Box XXXIII.
988 Ibid.
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outcome of foreign tours was more often a collection of expensive furniture in the palace 
and of ‘questionable proclivities’ in the mind of the returned traveller, than an increase in 
his capacity for public or political service’.990 However the Secretaiy of State, Lord 
Hamilton, while agreeing that many of the princes were ‘children in character and 
determination’, felt that it was unwise to reveal to the entire world the extent of British 
control over them. The circular had apparently given ‘deep offence’ in certain quarters 
and the Queen and Royal Family were ‘somewhat excited’.991
As, among other western influences, foreign travel changed the princely lifestyle, 
Edward Haynes notes the changes in architectural development that might be equated to 
stages in the changing pattern of ritual display as princes moved under the umbrella of 
imperial rule 992 The first stage consisted of the hilltop fortress which could seive as a 
military base, a place of refuge and the earliest ceremonial focus. Forts were usually 
simple and Spartan and frequently lay in fairly isolated areas. The ceremonial quarters 
would often sport mural paintings of the rajah seated in a formal durbar, surrounded by 
subordinate kinsmen, providing a vital form of advertising for the current administration. 
The second location was a ceremonial and symbolic ‘feudal fort’; the earlier defensive 
fort was either transformed into a more luxurious palace or replaced by a new structure, 
‘closer to the realms of taxable wealth than plunderable wealth’ 993 While the fort might 
have a reserve military function it was becoming predominantly an arena for ceremonial 
interaction with the ruler’s troublesome kinsmen, a place where they could be awed by
990 Ibid. Curzon’s vitriol reached greater heights when the Gaekwar complained that he had not been 
received in England with as much distinction as the Khedive of Egypt, T he theory at home is that an 
enlightened Prince is taking a tom- for the improvement of his own mind and the ultimate edification of 
his devoted and delighted subjects’. In fact ‘what he goes for is to have his interviews with European 
royalty, to buy a number o f expensive gew-gaws for his palace, to accumulate a great stock of rifles 
and ammunition, and to have a costly flutter with the demi-monde o f the Boulevards or of Leicester 
Square’. Curzon to Hamilton, 18 July 1900, Curzon Collection FI 11, Vol. 158.
991 Hamilton to Curzon, 20 September 1900, Curzon Collection F i l l ,  Vol. 159.
992 Haynes ‘Rajput Ceremonial Interactions’, p. 476.
993 Ibid.
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private artistic displays of music, miniature painting, dance and quasi-religious court 
ceremony.994 The third stage was the building of a new city palace. As conditions in 
the state stabilised and as the ruler came to receive recognition from a powerful external 
power, whether Mogul or British, having survived challenges to his authority and 
succession, the general pacification of the country allowed the construction of an urban 
palace in the city which had now grown up at the foot of the hill on which the 
ceremonial fort had been built. The palace became administrative rather than military in 
nature, following the British guarantee to protect the ruler from attack by kinsmen, and 
was used to receive representatives of the paramount power.995
The final stage consisted of the luxury palace. Ceremonial demands on the ruler had 
moved from formal durbar to luxuriant garden party, and unhealthy and cramped 
conditions were seen as less than desirable by college-educated young chiefs. A new 
palace was needed on the outskirts of the state’s capital city. In Haynes’s somewhat 
cynical view, this structure, ‘representing the late phase of princely Indo-Saracenic 
decadence, also represents the final collapse of the state system’.996 In his opinion the 
structures were better prepared for their ultimate fate, to serve as hotels for foreign 
tourists and a residence for the ‘deposed and culturally encapsulated ruler’ than a 
venue for ceremonial behaviour such as the durbar which had supported and 
sustained an individual state administration.997
Into this last category of inordinate excess can be found the Jai Vilas Palace, built at 
great speed by Jayaji Rao, Maharajah of Gwalior, between 1872 and 1874 to
994 Ibid.
995 Ibid.
996 Ibid.
997 Ibid.
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accommodate the Prince of Wales,998 the Amba Vilas Palace in Mysore, constructed 
in the first decade of the twentieth century,999 and the Laxmi Vilas Palace built by 
Sayajirao, Maharajah of Baroda, designed by Charles Mant and completed in 1890 at 
a cost of about £180,OOO,100° Possibly because the building of such edifices may have 
fallen under the category of Public Works or because, as has been suggested in the 
chapter on marriage, the British welcomed a move towards a more open palace 
construction, signifying a more accessible princely lifestyle, there is no record in 
official files that these highly prominent examples of conspicuous consumption 
provoked the anticipated ire of the budget conscious officers of the Government of 
India.
CONCLUSION
Subject to British control during the latter half of the nineteenth century Indian rulers 
were subject to major changes in ceremonial practice. In the precolonial period a 
person was ranked, ‘not according to an absolute scale, but in relation to the changing 
assets and achievements of others in a specific ritual context’.1001 Under British rule 
an Indian ruler, safe on his gadi unless found guilty of gross misrule, no longer had a 
requirement to influence his kinsmen or rivals and was unable to consort with his 
fellow rulers except under extraordinary circumstances such as Imperial Assemblages. 
Ceremonies which had been sufficiently fluid to display pomp and wealth to influence 
individual audiences and sufficiently adaptable to change the parameters of local 
politics were now detailed in rigid format in Government of India files. Durbars,
998 Maharajah of Baroda and Virginia Fass, The Palaces ofIndia (London, 1980), p. 112.
999 Palaces o f  India, p. 146.
1000 Palaces o f  India, p. 156. Appropriately enough the Laxmi Vilas was named the White Elephant 
Palace. E. St. C. Weeden, A Year with the Gaekwar o f Baroda (London, 1912), p. 81.
1001 Price, Kingship and Political Practice, p. 17.
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traditionally arenas for a princely exhibition of authority, evolved into meetings 
between British officials and individual princes, in which die Indian rulers deferred to 
the paramount power.
Increasingly, as the century progressed, the Indian ruler was not only bound by the 
strictures of a rigid hierarchical system within which he owed allegiance to the British 
monarch and was frequently consigned to a position of equality with British officials, 
but also constrained by the need to subscribe to the tyranny of imperial bookkeeping 
and measures of economy. Religious ceremony and princely largesse of a lavish 
nature was firmly discouraged in an attempt to instil methods of accountability into 
palace procedure. A number of Indian princes contributed substantial amounts to 
both traditional and westernised charitable projects and found an outlet for the need 
for military display in the Imperial Service Troops scheme. However others, deprived 
of the opportunity to reveal their abundance in ceremonial ritual, channelled a need 
for ostentatious exhibition into foreign travel, the accumulation of western luxuries 
and the construction of inordinately extravagant modem buildings.
The change in ceremonial practice was not without its critics, hi 1909 an impassioned 
letter from the Maharajah of Bikaner to the Viceroy, Lord Minto, raised the question of 
‘restoring the Izzat and position of the Chiefs to their former glory’ through the ‘honours 
and courtesies’ extended to mling princes on official occasions. The Maharajah stressed 
that ‘our dignity and importance has gradually diminished to some extent and ... we do 
not occupy the same position as we did some fifty years ago’.1002 Some procedures had 
been allowed ‘to drift away from the desirable and original line’ and, since ‘splendour 
and ceremonials’ were special features of the East, ‘the importance of a person is gauged
1002 Maharajah of Bikaner to Viceroy, 29 December 1909, R/2/752/36.
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by the populace according to the compliments paid to him’.1003 In Minto the Maharajah 
was to find a sympathetic ear. Following a policy of laissez-faire toward the Indian 
states, the Viceroy conveyed to the Agent to the Governor-General in Rajputana that he 
wished to impress ‘most forcibly on all Political Officers the great importance of 
maintaining ceremonials in accordance with local custom and of doing nothing to lower 
the position of loyal Ruling Chiefs in the eyes of their subjects’.1004 However for most 
Indian rulers the ‘desirable and original line’ of royal ritual had already been 
irretrievably lost by the start of the twentieth century.
1003 Ibid. Prestige could also be lost through the arrival o f imperial innovations in a ruler’s state. In 1895 
considerable delay occurred in the construction o f a railway line in Jodhpur, as die Maharajah regarded the 
withdrawal o f jurisdiction over railway property as a ‘diminution o f ‘izzat’ and therefore refused to find the 
necessary funds. Col. G. H. Trevor, AGG Rajputana, to W. J. Cuningham, Sec. Gol, FD, 6 February 1895, 
R/l/1/139.
1004 S. H. Butler, Sec. Gol, FD to E. G. Colvin, AGG Rajputana, and Lt, Col. H. Daly, AGG Cl, 21 April 
1910, R/2/752/36.
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In October 1906 the Governor of Bombay, Lord Lamington, urged the new Viceroy, 
Lord Minto, to ‘initiate a policy of relieving them [the princes] from so much 
Government supervision and interference’.1005 Minto needed little encouragement, 
resenting the aggressive and dictatorial behaviour of his predecessor, Lord Curzon, 
towards the states. A year later he informed John Morley, the Secretary of State, that 
Scindia of Gwalior had declared, ‘the tyranny of Curzon’s rule towards the Native 
Chiefs had been so unbearable that nothing would have induced them to put up with it 
and that they would have united together without regard to religion or caste to throw it 
o ff.1006 With the appointment of Harcourt Butler at the head of the Foreign Department 
in 1908,1007 Curzon’s ideas were officially discarded and replaced by a policy of non­
interference in states affairs.
Various factors had led to the adoption of such a policy. It had been deemed necessary to 
reduce the demands made of the overworked and understaffed Foreign Department and, 
after much open resentment on the part of the rulers, to relieve them of the constant 
overseeing of their private affairs, examples of which are evident in the chapters on 
education, marriage and hierarchy and ritual. In addition the Viceroy believed strongly 
that, given the home government’s determination to introduce constitutional reforms in
1005 Lamington to Minto 9 October 1906, Minto Collection no 12765, quoted Ashton, British Policy, 
p. 36.
1006 Minto to Morley, 12 September 1907, Morley Collection, No. 12.
1007 Butler’s appointment was surrounded by controversy. The new Foreign Secretary had entered the 
Indian Civil Service in 1888 and had reached the position of Deputy Commissioner at Lucknow in the 
United Provinces before taking charge of the Department. He qualified for the position neither on the 
basis of his seniority nor his previous experience in the states or on the frontier. His appointment took 
many senior political officers on active service completely by surprise and they greeted it with open 
hostility.
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the provinces, in order to appease critics of the Raj he was morally bound to grant a 
corresponding concession to its most faithful allies. Minto and Butler were persuaded 
by an argument put forward by the Gaekwar in 19091008 that 4 a looser leash on the 
princes would improve, rather than retard, the standard of their administrations’.1009 
Above all, however, the policy was designed to ensure that the princes would act to 
support the British position in India.
Confronted with the rise of extreme nationalism following Curzon’s partition of Bengal 
in 1905, Minto and Butler reached the conclusion that the Indian rulers could be both 
‘capable and willing alliance partners’. At the beginning of the discussions which led to 
the Indian Councils Act of 1909, Minto suggested that a Council of Princes might serve 
as a possible counterpoise to the Indian National Congress, the vehicle for the nationalist 
movement. John Morley, the Secretary of State, doubted the wisdom of the suggestion 
on the grounds that ‘if the princes were allowed to combine and confer they might 
conceivably use the opportunity to unite against the Government’.1010 However, 
although Minto failed to secure constitutional recognition for the princes, he was 
determined that his viceroyalty would not leave them empty handed.1011 In a speech at 
Udaipur in November 1909 he unveiled the principles of the new non-interference 
policy, declaring:
I have always been opposed to anything like pressure on Darbars with a view to 
introducing British methods of administration, - I have preferred that reforms 
should emanate from the Darbars themselves, and grow up in harmony with the 
traditions of the State. It is easy to overestimate the value of administrative 
efficiency -  it is not the only object to aim at, though the encouragement of it must 
be attractive to keen and able Political Officers, and it is not unnatural that the 
temptation to further it should for example appeal strongly to those who are
1008 Speech by Gaekwar of Baroda at viceregal reception, Baroda, 15 November 1909. Mary, 
Countess of Minto, India, Minto and Morley 1905-10 (London, 1934), p. 351.
1009 Copland, Princes o f  India, p. 30.
1010 Ashton, British Policy, p. 195,
1011 Ibid.
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temporarily in charge of the administration of State during a minority, whether 
they are in sole charge or associated with a State Council. Their position is a 
difficult one -  it is one of peculiar trust -  and though abuses and corruption must 
of course as far as possible be corrected, I cannot but think that Political Officers 
will do wisely to accept the general system of administration to which the Chief 
and his people have been accustomed. The methods sanctioned by tradition in 
States are usually well adapted to the needs and relations of the ruler and his 
people. The loyalty of the latter to the former is generally a personal loyalty, 
which administrative efficiency, if carried out on lines unsuited to local conditions, 
would lessen or impair.1012
The Udaipur speech makes it clear that Minto was well aware of the fact that, as has 
been set out in this thesis, ‘the value of administrative efficiency’ by which ‘keen and 
able Political Officers’ set such store, had frequently undermined the traditional basis 
of rule in the Indian states, at times totally disregarding the ‘needs and relations’ of 
the ruler and thereby undermining his status vis-a-vis his subjects. The precise details 
of the new policy were formulated by Butler in the Political Department Manual. In 
sharp contrast to the policy of Curzon, the political officer was now given strict 
instructions that he was not to interfere in the domestic affairs of the princes unless 
misrule was rampant. Paragraph six of the Introduction to the Manual insisted that:
He should leave well alone; the best work of a Political Officer is often what he 
has left undone .... Having guaranteed internal independence to the states, and 
having undertaken their protection against external aggression, the Imperial 
Government have assumed some responsibility for the maintenance of order and 
fairly efficient government of them and cannot consent to being an indirect 
instrument of oppression. The degree of misrule which will call for interference is 
a question for decision on the merits in each case. It may be stated generally that, 
unless misrule reaches a pitch which violates the elementary laws of civilisation, 
the Imperial Government will usually prefer to take no overt measures for 
enforcing reform; and in any case, the attempt to reform should, so long as is 
possible, be confined to personal suasion.1013
The reappraisal of government policy towards the states during Minto’s viceroyalty
was accompanied by an equally significant development among the princely ranks. A
1012 Minto, Speeches, 1905-10, (1911) pp. 323-6, quoted C. H. Philips (ed.), The Evolution o f India 
and Pakistan 1858-1947: Select Documents (London 1962), p. 426.
1013 Gol Introduction to the Manual of Instructions to Officers of the Political Dept. 1909, R/2/18/117.
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new type of prince, ‘anglicised in outlook and social habits’ began to emerge. 
Curzon’s administration had done much to stimulate this development. In attempting 
to foster a new sense of responsibility among the princes, Curzon was largely 
responsible for ‘dismantling the traditional barriers of isolation’1014 which had 
prevented a prince from looking beyond the narrow confines of his own state. As has 
been discussed in different chapters of this thesis British influence, particularly in the 
area of education, had produced westernised princes such as Jey Singh, Maharajah of 
Alwar and Ganga Singh, Maharajah of Bikaner, both products of Mayo College. 
However these men were not representative of the princely order as a whole and the 
transition was not always wholly successful.1015 A prince could become both 
physically and culturally estranged from his subjects, endangering the traditional 
respect for authority which was still seen to validate the existence of the princely 
regimes.
Such estrangement was not inevitable. In a few isolated cases, as Manu Bhagavan 
has suggested, ‘by bridging the gap between the colonial and the colonized’, princes 
and their bureaucracies could use ‘modem’ ideas successfully to provide model 
examples of states. Wearing one hat, they could claim to be loyal representatives of 
the empire and, wearing the other, the last line of defence protecting the Indian people 
from the ‘full onslaught of English evil’.1016 The packages of reforms pursued by the 
administrations of Krishnaraja Wadiar of Mysore and Sayajirao, Gaekwar of Baroda 
during the first three decades of the twentieth century were warmly received by their 
people, who expressed their general contentment by rejecting frequent calls for
1014 Ashton, British Policy, p. 46. Ironically, having removed ‘the traditional barriers of isolation5, 
Curzon5 s conception of a prince was a ruler who would remain in his state and submit to a superior 
British will.
1015 See Ashton, British Policy, pp. 45-47.
1016 Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres, p. 176.
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agitation against their governments.1017 However for many princes less ambitious in 
their outlook the ‘methods sanctioned by tradition’ to which Minto referred at 
Udaipur were no longer an option either in internal state government or palace life. In 
December 1915 Scindia, Maharajah of Gwalior, described the irreversible situation 
created by the loss of his traditional role, informing the Viceroy, Lord Hardinge, that 
although political officers had used minority periods to remove long-standing abuses 
and improve the finances of the states, their methods had ‘shaken the adherence of the 
people to their traditional customs and ways’. He considered that minorities had 
worked to alter the ties of personal loyalty and obedience between the subjects and 
their prince when the latter entered upon his inheritance.1018
As the possibility for a political partnership increased, relations between the British and 
the princes came to be characterised more by consultation than control of subordinate by 
superior, particularly after the establishment of the Chamber of Princes in 1921, which 
allowed rulers direct access to the Delhi authorities. Pre-eminent among those rulers 
who played a prominent role in institutions such as the Chamber of Princes and the 
Committee of Ministers were Ganga Singh of Bikaner, Udaibhan Singh of Dholpur, 
Dijvijaysinliji of Nawanagar, Bhupinder Singh of Patiala, Sultan Jahan Begam and 
Nawab Hamidullah of Bhopal. However it must be stressed that the dazzling status 
achieved by these rulers on the all-India stage was unable to hide the fact that in most 
cases in their own states the traditional power base of the princely rank had been 
severely diminished by the lack of British support during the last decades of the previous 
century. Ian Copland suggests that the princes failed to maximise their domestic 
political advantages in advance of the British departure from India in 1947 by ‘formally 
incorporating elite sections of their own people, particularly the growing commercial and
1017 Bhagavan, Sovereign Spheres, p. 179.
1018 Quoted Ashton, British Policy, p. 48.
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professional middle class, into the local darbari system’.1019 The insistence placed by 
British officials on the employment of ‘highly credentialled’ outsiders in tire form of 
dewans and senior bureaucrats, increasingly playing a more significant role in the state 
administration than a prince himself, might not have been in the long term a good policy. 
As foreigners they were often unpopular with the people and ‘as mercenaries their 
primary loyalty was to their paymasters’.1020 The rulers might have fared better in the 
denouement of 1947-8 if they had opted for less distinguished but more patriotic 
‘servants with roots in the regions’.1021
James Manor views the implementation of a laissez-faire policy towards the states as the 
major factor determining the downfall of the princes.1022 Other historians agree that the 
commitment by Minto to the ‘minimum of interference’ from the imperial government 
went far towards preventing the introduction of internal reforms within the states and, 
unreformed, they stood little chance of positive participation in a new democratic India. 
Barbara Ramusack states that the adoption of an official laissez-faire policy towards the 
states in 1909 marked a point beyond which virtually nothing was done to secure the 
political future of the rulers.1023 Stephen Ashton considers that the introduction of the 
policy was a ‘landmark’, and the principles underlying it stood in marked contrast to the 
principles underlying the policies pursued during the nineteenth century;1024 and Ian 
Copland expresses the view that during the thirty years from 1909 to 1939 the British 
‘did not do nearly enough to ready their clients for the time when they would have to
1019 Copland, Princes o f India, p. 277.
1020 Princes o f  India, p. 7.
1021 Ibid.
1022 James Manor, ‘The Demise of the Princely Order: A Reassessment’ in Jeffrey, ed., People, 
Princes, p. 307-8.
1023 Barbara N. Ramusack, The Princes o f India in the Twilight o f Empire: Dissolution o f a Patron- 
Client System, 1914-1939 (Columbus, 1978), pp. 233-235.
1024 Ashton , British Policy, p. 193.
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stand on their own feet, without the support of imperial patronage’.1025 Yet this thesis 
makes it clear that during the latter part of the nineteenth century, although considerable 
effort was expended by the British to regulate palace life and, by exposing young heirs to 
the gadi to western liberal thought, to lay the groundwork for a ‘modem monarchy’, a 
British laissez-faire approach to the princes already existed when it came to matters of 
government. Adult rulers were to a great extent left to their own devices by the 
paramount power. Reforms could ‘emanate from the Darbars themselves’, but such 
reforms tended to ‘emanate’ from an administration supervised by a competent dewan 
and his bureaucracy, not an Indian prince.
During the period the British had high hopes that the stereotype of the ‘Oriental despot’ 
could be erased, replacing it by the model of a ruler embodying the virtues of rectitude 
and clean living, and overseeing a fiscally circumspect government intent upon the 
improvement of the moral and social welfare of its people. There was little delicacy on 
the part of British officials when it came to undermining traditional princely practice. 
For political officers in particular the ends were seen to justify the means in a rigorous 
determination to produce order where there was chaos. As demonstrated below, such 
determination is evident in every stage of the princely life cycle. However in the most 
important stage for the ruler, the one in which he was intended to rule, the British pursuit 
of order undoubtedly reduced the traditional authority of an Indian prince to the greatest 
extent without providing him with the support to recreate his role in a modem mould.
Despite the granting of adoption sanads by Canning in an effort to maintain princely 
loyalty, the British still retained the ultimate sanction of royal successions in the 
Indian states. If a prospective heir was deemed ‘unfit to rule’ for any reason, or if  a
1025 Copland, Princes o f  India, p. 276.
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succession was unclear, the Government of India showed little hesitation in alighting 
upon a candidate who showed a readiness to adopt modem methods of rule. To instil 
such a progressive attitude the British were rigorous in their dedication to princely 
education, if not wholly successful in achieving the desired results. The British 
attempt to regulate royal marriages and to improve the moral tone of palace life was 
to a great extent to ensure that a dissolute environment did not dissipate their efforts 
on the princely educational front. In some cases their campaign against what they 
perceived as ignorance, prejudice and superstition was furthered by the presence of 
powerful royal women who subscribed to British ideas. As far as royal ritual was 
concerned, ceremony was now bound by mles and regulations, and traditional royal 
largesse was curtailed by severe economic restrictions. The subordination of the 
Indian princes to British imperial rule was constantly emphasised in subtle and less 
subtle ways as their position was established in the imperial hierarchy. Finally, the 
British obsession with efficiency and accountability in the realm of administration 
resulted in adult princes being deprived of the opportunity to act as an essential cog in 
the wheel of a sound, modernised government.
The word ‘puppet-like’ has frequently been used to describe the Indian rulers during 
the period,1026 yet there is little proof that the British set out deliberately to 
manufacture puppet rulers. Why should the paramount power have devoted so much 
time and energy towards ‘civilising’ young princes if they were intended merely to act 
as figureheads? The problem lay in the fact that the regulations and economic 
measures required to produce well ordered and open government were on the whole 
alien concepts to the first generation of Indian westernised rulers. Attempting to 
integrate a relatively untrained, and often unwilling, ruler into the administrative
1026 Most recently by Niall Ferguson in Empire (London, 2003), pp. 206 and 230.
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procedure was frequently more trouble than it was worth, particularly with the endless 
round of negotiation required between the various parties involved in state politics. 
As far as individual rule was concerned, a British laissez-faire policy towards the 
princes had begun decades before the Minto declaration. These decades were by no 
means the ‘golden age’ that Metcalf described. Traditionally the protectors and 
sustainers of the social fabric, the status of the Indian princes had been dramatically 
diminished by the process of enforcing in their administration the virtues of 
‘Clearness, certainty, promptitude, cheapness’ advocated so enthusiastically by James 
Mill.1027
As Butler recognised in the ‘private and secret’ handing-over note he wrote to his 
successor in 1910:
The indigenous system of government is a loose despotic system tempered by 
corruption, which does not press hard on the daily lives of the people and relies for 
its sanctions on occasional severe punishments of erring and offending individuals. 
Our system is a scientific system which presses steadily on the people in their daily 
lives, controls them, regulates their actions, attempts to be preventive and through 
its hordes of subordinates makes itself everywhere felt. The advancing Native 
States generally adopt our methods, because it is easy to get good men of their own 
school with modern training .... But it would be a bold man who said that our 
system was always the better.1028
As ‘The Power behind the Throne’ makes clear, for the purposes of modelling aware 
and progressive rulers of India, the enforcement of the rigorously ordered British 
‘system’ during the crucial phase of princely development at the end of the nineteenth 
century was by no means the ‘better’ solution. Rejecting the view that Britain ‘built 
up’ her princely allies to retain their loyalty in the latter part of the nineteenth century,
1027 James Mill, British India, Vol. V, p. 521, quoted D. A. Low, Lion Rampant (London, 1973), p. 51.
1028 ‘Handing Over Note’, 1910, quoted Creagh-Coen, Indian Political Service, p. 17.
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this thesis comes to the conclusion that British indirect rule, by commission or 
omission, severely undermined the traditional role of the Indian prince. In adding 
significantly to the understanding of the involvement of the British in princely India 
during the period the work makes a strong contribution to research on imperialism 
under the Raj.
GLOSSARY
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respectable class
fragrant essential oil of jasmine, roses and other flowers 
Muslim female ruler, married Muslim woman
a woman ‘married’ to a god in a temple, participating in ritual 
dancing
senior minister, head of administration (diwan in Hyderabad)
royal court, formal assembly
courtier
foreigner
throne
literally, ‘the presence’, the seat of authority
a gift of rent-free land to reward service or recognize kinship
one who receives an inam
honour, respect, prestige
hereditary estate
grantee of hereditary estate
office or place where business conducted
state-owned or controlled
formal letter to or from a ruler
robe of honour worn on ceremonial occasion
Hindu military caste
heir of rajah, eveiy son of rulers of Gujerat and Kathiawar 
a hundred thousand (unless otherwise specified, rupees)
Muslim school of learning originally attached to a mosque 
division of district yielding revenue
maharajah princely ruler
maharani wife of princely ruler
mohur gold coin worth fifteen rupees
munshi clerk
nautch intricate traditional dance performed by professional dancing girls
nawab Muslim princely ruler
nazar, nazarana offerings of presents or coins to signify loyalty to a ruler
nizam Muslim princely ruler, originally Mogul governor
pan betel vine prepared as a savoury
pandit Hindu theology teacher
peshkash tribute
purdah veil or curtain, practice of keeping women in seclusion
purdahnashin veiled or secluded woman
raj ruling regime
ryot peasant cultivator
sahibzada son of ruler
sanad grant or deed conferring rights or title
sardar, sirdar nobleman
sepoy soldier
shastras sacred Sanskrit texts
shariat Islamic law
Shia and Sunni the two principal Muslim sects
taluqdar revenue official presiding over district, landed aristocrat in Awadh
thakur minor Rajput ruler
ashraf
atar
begam
devadasis
dewan
durbar
durbari
faringhi
gadi
huzur
inam
inamdar
izzat
jagir
jagirdar
karkhana
khalsa
kharita
khilat
Ksatriya
kumar
lakh
madrasa
mahal
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til sesame
ulama scholar of Islamic jurisprudence, learned man
vizier Muslim high official
wakil agent, attorney
zamindar landholder, landed aristocrat in Bengal and elsewhere
zenana women’s quarters
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